STUDY OF JAINISM

By

T. G. KALGHATGI  M.A., Ph.D

PRĀKRTI BHĀRATI ACADEMY
JAIPUR
STUDY OF JAINISM

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STUDY OF JAINISM/PHILOSOPHY
Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi, Madras.
FOREWORD

I am glad to know that one more book entitled “Study of Jainism” by Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi, Professor and Head, Department of Jainology, University of Madras, is being published by Prākrit Bhārati Academy, Jaipur.

Dr. Kalghatgi is an eminent scholar of Jainism, Jaina Philosophy and Psychology and he is well-versed in Indian Philosophy. He has written many books on Jainism and on Philosophy and Psychology, of very high international standards. The books have been well received in this world of scholarship both in India and abroad.

This book is in two parts. The first part is mainly historical and Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi begins the study with an extensive outline of the History of Jainism giving the life and teachings of Śrāvaka Tīrthankara and also brief study of other tīrthankaras. He has also introduced a chapter on Mahāvīra’s life and teaching. In this he has seen to it that mythological aspect of the life stories of tīrthankaras is not mentioned. He has been, as far as possible, faithful to the historical aspects of the Jaina studies.

In the second part, he has discussed philosophical aspect of Jainism like Jaina Logic, Jaina Epistemology and Jaina Metaphysics. His interpretation of Jaina logic of Anekānta and Syādvāda is quite modern. He has given a comparative study of many modern philosophers including the recent eminent philosophers like Bertrand Russell, Alexander and others.

In discussion of Jaina Ethics, he has given modern interpretation of the Concept of Ahimsā and its applications to the modern world.

The book is a great contribution to the Jaina Literature and I hope it will be very well received and studied by the scholars of Jainism.

Madras,

S. SRIPAL, I. P. S.,
Inspector General of Prisons,
Tamilnadu.
PUBLISHER'S NOTE

We are happy to put before the reader Professor T. G. Kalghatgi's 'STUDY OF JAINISM'.

Professor Kalghatgi's name is well-known in the field of Jain scholarship. He has devoted his life-time to the study of Jainism in its various aspects, philosophical, historical and textual. We hope that readers will find in this book a mature expression of his learning.

Professor Kalghatgi begins his study with a fairly detailed and extensive outline of the history of Jainism, speaking of Tirthankaras who preceded Mahāvīra, before coming to the last Tirthankara, Mahāvīra himself, to whose life and thought he devotes a considerable section of his book. The next part of the book is concerned with Jaina Philosophy and doctrine, a complex subject which Professor Kalghatgi is able to present with readable simplicity. He places Jaina history and thought in the context of the larger canvas of Indian life and thought in general, speaking of their interactions and debates and thus enriching our understanding of both the Jains and the larger life of which they were a significant part.

M. VINAY SAGAR
Director and Joint Secretary.

D. R. MEHTA,
Secretary.
PREFACE

Jainism is a Pre-Āryan religion. It belongs to the Sramaṇa current of thought. As a religion Jainism leads us, like kindly light, from darkness towards the light of enlightenment and perfection of the self through self-effort and not through the surrender to or the grace of any higher deity. The Jainist interpretation of the dictum Tat Tvam Asi would say: you are the God—the divinity and no higher being is needed. As a philosophy it is realistic. It is empiricist in approach. Synoptic in outlook and analytic and dialectical in methodology.

So far Jainism was studied from the slanted angle of the Vedic scholars and the Brahminical way of thought. I do believe that it is now necessary to look afresh at the Jaina religion and philosophy from the perspective of history and proto-history and from the synoptic point of view. And I have made this humble attempt of presenting Jaina religion and Philosophy in the synoptic presentation in this work; ‘STUDY OF JAINISM’. There are two parts in this work. In Part I, I have given a brief survey of the beginnings and the development of Jaina religion with reference to the lives and teachings of the Tirthankaras (prophets). In presenting the lives of the Tirthankaras, I have, as far as possible, avoided to present the mythological content in their lives. In Part II, I have presented, to the extent possible, a synoptic picture of the Philosophical problems of Jainism. I have looked at the problems from the detached philosophical point of view. But philosophy is not mere academic pursuit but a view of life “to see life steadily and to see it whole”. And mine is a Jaina view of life.
I am grateful to the Prākrit Bhārati Academy, Jaipur, for getting this book to see the light of the day. The Prākrit Bhārati Academy has published this book. I am specially grateful to Sri. D.R. Mehta and Sri. Vinayasagarji for giving me all encouragement in this work. I am also grateful to Sri. N. Vasupal, M.A., Ph.D., Lecturer, Department of Jainology, University of Madras, for going through the proofs. I thank Selvi G. Shyama, Stenotypist in the Department of Jainology, University of Madras, for assisting me in getting some pages typed. I thank the Research Foundation for Jainology in Madras and its organisers Sri. S. Sripal, I.P.S., Inspector General of prisons, Tamil Nadu, Sri. Surendrabhai Mehta and Sri. S. Krishnachand Chordia for their constant encouragement in getting this work completed in time. I am grateful to Sri. S. Sripal, I.P.S., for writing the foreword to the book.

I am grateful to my wife Smt. Laxmidevi Kalghatgi for giving me encouragement and inspiration for writing this book. She has been giving suggestion off and on and the work in this form is due to her.

I am extremely grateful to Sri P. H. Viswanathan, Manager, Balussery Printing Press and the workers of Balussery Printing Press, Madras for completing the work in a very short span of time.

Madras,                              T. G. KALGHATGI
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PART—I

JAINA RELIGION—its beginnings and development
And an old Priest said, Speak to us of Religion,
And he said:

Have I spoken this day of aught else?
Is it not all deeds and all reflection?

And that which is neither deed nor reflection,
but a wonder and a surprise ever springing in
the soul, even while the hands hew the stone or
tend the loom?

Who can separate his faith from his actions,
or his beliefs from his occupations?

The Prophet
KAHLIL GIBRAN
CHAPTER—1

JAINISM AS A PRE-ĀRYAN RELIGION

Jainism is a Pre-Āryan religion 'which prevailed even before Parśva and Mahāvira, the last two tīrthaṅkaras'

Radhakrishnan S.
CHAPTER—I

1. The essence of Indian Culture is to be found in the synthesis of the Śramaṇa and the vedic currents of thought. Śramaṇa current of thought is Non-Vedic, It is, in fact, Pre-Vedic. It was prevalent in India much before the Vedic Āryans came to this land. The Vedic culture does not express the concepts of Mokṣa, Karma and Sanyasa. These were introduced in the Āryan way of life through the assimilation of the śramaṇic thought. There is only casual reference to the concept of renunciation in the Rgveda. The Vedic seers were more concerned with the richness of this life; and the Samhitās in the Rgveda are invocations to the Gods, who are mainly personifications of Nature, for the plenty and prosperity in this life. The śramaṇa way of life influenced the conquering Āryans and by the time of the Āranyakas and Upaniṣads, the concepts of self-abnegation and the mokṣa were incorporated in the Vedic thought.

Jainism belongs to the śramaṇa current of thought. Jainism is a religion preached by the Jina, and Jina is a perfected soul who preaches the Law to the suffering humanity. He is one who has conquered the passions. The perfected souls are free from the karmic bondage. They are omniscient. They have kevala Jñāna and Darśana. The perfected souls free from the karmic bondage live in eternal bliss. Among them, some, out of compassion for the suffering humanity and with a view to freeing the beings from the mire of misery, preached the Dharma (Law). They are the tirthanakaras. Tirtha refers to the crossing of the ocean of life and tirthankara is one who leads us, like kindly light, towards the eternal life of perfection. Tirtha also refers to the social and spiritual order which consists of the śramaṇa, i.e., (monks) Śramani (Nuns) Śrāvaka (the lay follower of religion) and Śrāvika (Women laity). Tirthankara leads the four orders of society towards the path of spiritual perfection. When we say that Jainism is a religion preached by the Jina, we mean Jainism expresses the eternal truths of life and spirituality preached by the prophets who are tirthankaras and who have crossed the ocean of life.

The concept of Tirthankara is, however, different from the concept of Avatāra which we find in the Vedic religion. Tirthankara does not express the connotation of incarnation of divinity.
descending on the earth in the human form. Tirthankara is a human being who rises, through his own efforts, to the state of spiritual perfection. It is, in a sense, expression of the spirituality inherent in man through the practice of spiritual exercise. He becomes the ideal for the other human beings and "when we see greatness passing by, our-selves are great" We are lifted from the mire of misery and that also with our own efforts keeping the Tirthankara as an ideal.

Jainism is a religion preached by the tirthankaras. The first tirthankara in this eon of the cycle of time is Rsabha and the 24th tirthankara is Vardhamana Mahavira.

Therefore, it would be apter to say that Vardhamana Mahavira was not the founder of Jainism. He was only the promoter (Pravarsaka) of Jaina religion and thought. He carried the tradition of the previous tirthankaras. The tradition of 24 tirthankaras is an important contribution of Jainas to the Indian thought. It has been suggested that the Jaina concept of 24 tirthankaras has influenced the Vedic concept of Avatara and the Buddhist concept of 24 Buddhas. The Avatara in the Vedic tradition has been expressed in various ways. With reference to the number of Avataras in the Bhagavata Purana, there are variations in the number of Avataras. The Bhagavata mentioned 16, 22 and 24 Avataras. Tradition of 24 Avatara gets crystallised in the Vaishnava tradition by the middle ages. Some scholars have suggested the tradition of 24 Avataras. This has been influenced by the Jaina view of 24 tirthankaras. The Buddhist tradition also mentions 24 Buddhas. In the Lankavatara sutra there is mention of 24 Buddhas, although in some other places the number varies. But, by and large the Buddhist tradition has accepted the concept of 24 Buddhas. But we find the Jaina have stead-fastly held to the tradition of 24 tirthankaras.

2. Jainism is a Pre-Āryan Religion which prevailed in India long before Mahavira and Parsva, the last two tirthankaras. Jacobi has made it clear that Jaina tradition is much earlier than the Buddhist tradition and Mahavira is the last tirthankara to carry the tradition of Jaina teaching. As McDonnel points out, there
is no mention of the concept of re-birth in the Vedas, although there is a passing reference to it in the Brahmapuras.  

The antiquity of Jainism can be studied from the points of view of a) Jaina tradition and b) from other traditions and evidences.

a) The Jaina tradition maintains that Jainism is the eternal religion preached by tirthankaras from time to time according to the exigencies of the social and spiritual needs of the People. The wheel of time moves eternally expressing the progressive and the decadent phases of society. The progressive phase is the eon which presents the brighter side of life with plenty and prosperity in spirit and life. This is the Utsarpini. Then comes the decadent phase where there is gradual decadence of plenty and prosperity in material and spiritual spheres. This is the Avasarpini eon. Each has been divided into six phases with reference to the prevellance of happiness and bliss. The decadent eon begins with the plenty and prosperity in material and spiritual spheres. It is the Sukhasukha stage. Next comes the suka stage in which there is still plenty and there is no trace of want or misery. Then gradually the decadence starts with the prevellance of dukkha. In the third and fourth stages dukkha increases by steps and we are made to forget our true nature. We do not hunger and thirst after righteousness. We struggle to get material prosperity irrespective of the altruistic sentiments. During the last part of the third stage and during the fourth stage there is a decline of spirituality, and disvalues predominate. We need prophets to lead us towards the proper path. And tirthankaras have preached during these periods to help the living beings to move towards perfection. The 24 tirthankaras preached the religion during these periods. This process continues in every eon. The Jaina tradition says that there were 24 tirthankaras in the past eon, and 24 will come in the next eon. In the present eon Rśbha was the first tirthankara and Mahāvira was the last and the 24th tirthankara.

b) Considered from the point of view of other traditions and evidences, it is clear that Jainism, as a religion, was not founded by Vardhamāna Mahāvira. Mahāvira was the last tirthankara. He
was a senior contemporary of the Buddha. He carried as we said earlier, the traditions of the previous tirthankaras. Rsabha was the first tirthankara. There are references to Rsabha in the Rigveda, Yajurveda and Bhagavata Purana. Yajurveda mentions Rsabha, Ajita and Aristanemi as tirthankaras. Bhagavata Purana endorses the view that Rsabha was the founder of Jainism.

Jainism has been variously referred to in the early vedic and Buddhist literature. It was called ‘Arhat Dharma’ and the followers of teachings of the Arhats were the Arhats. The Arhats do not recognise Vedas and the Brahmanas. In the Rigveda we find that the followers of the Vedas and the Brahmanas were called ‘Barhat’. The utterances of the Vedas were referred to as Brhati. The Arhats believed that the self gets bound by karma and the goal of freedom for every self is possible through self-effort, Sāṃvāra and Nirjara. The Padma Purāṇa eulogises the Arhat religion as good. Satapata Brahmana also describes the Arhan as a superior being. Srutakevali Bhadrabahu has referred to Aristanemi and other tirthankaras as Arhats. In the Padma Purāṇa and Viṣṇu Purāṇa the word Arhat Dharma is used for describing Jaina religion.

If we survey the religious literature of the time of Mahāvira we find that the word ‘Niggaṇṭha’ was used for Arhat. In the Dīgha-nikāya, Mahāvira was referred to as Niggaṇṭha Nātaputta. In the Asokan Inscriptions the word Niggaṇṭha has been used. In the Vedic literature also we find the word Niggaṇṭha used. We find the use of jina Sāsana, Jina Vacana and Jina Marga in the Daśavaikālika, Uttaradhyayana and Sūtrakṛtaṇga. In the Vīṣṇuvaśyaka Bhasya there is mention of Jina dharma. Later references are many. For instances in the Matsya Purāṇa and Devibhāgavata “Jina dharma” and “Jaina dharma” are used. From this it is clear that the Jaina religion, as the expression of śramaṇa thought propounding the theory of the karmic bondage and need for the freedom from bondage as a continuous tradition, was recognised by the Vedic and the Buddhist currents of thought. In certain exigencies of time it was described as Arhat Darśana and also as Jaina dharma. Jaina Dharma, therefore, is a stream of thought expressing the śramaṇa current and specifying the teachings of 24 tirthankaras.
In the Rgveda we get references to Vātaraśanā Muni. Taittiriya Āraṇyaka gives a description of Ketu, Aruna and Vātaraśanā Muni. They are apramādi (self controlled). In the Srimad Bhagavata there is a description that Rṣabha is the promoter of the religion of the Vātaraśanā Śrāmapāṇa.

In the Taittiriya Āraṇyaka we get description that disciples of Rṣabhadeva were Vātaraśanā Munis. Similarly Vraṭya is a complementary word to Vātaraśanā. These Munis were practising sanyāsa dharma and were against the Vedic ritualism. It is clear from the description of the Vātaraśanā Munis in the Vedic literature that they were Jaina Munis called Śrāmapāṇa. Megasthenes has described the conditions of India in his travelogue. He found that there were two sects of Munis: Śrāmapāṇa and the Brahmaṇa.

Studied from the Archaeological and the epigraphical points of view, we find there is abundant evidence to show that Jainism prevailed even in the remote civilizations of Harappa and Mohenjodaro. Prof. Ramprasadji Chand writes in the Modern Review August, 1932 that the engraved seated deities on some Indus seals or in Yoga posture bear witness to the prevalence of Yoga in the Indus Valley civilizations. The standing deities are in Kayotsarga posture (standing posture). Prof. Chand writes “The Kayotsarga posture is peculiarly Jaina. It is a posture not of sitting but of standing. In the Ādi Purāṇa, Book XVIII, Kayotsarga posture is described in connection with the penances of Rīṣabha or Vrasabha. A standing image of Jaina in Kayotsarga posture on a slab showing four such images assignable to the 2nd Century A.D. in the Curzon Museum of Archaeology, Mathura. Among the Egyptian sculptures of the time of the early dynasties there are standing statues with arms hanging on two sides. But though these early Egyptian statues use and the archaic Greek kouroi show nearly the same pose, they lack the feeling of abandon that Characterises the standing figures on the Indus Seals and images of Jinas in the Kayotsarga posture. The name Rīṣabha means “bull” and the bull is the emblem of Jina Rīṣabha.

Sri T.N. Ramachandran, Director General, Indian Archaeological Department writes regarding the statue in the Kayotsarga
posture "These two rocks place before us the truth that we are perhaps recognising in the Harappa statue a full fledged Jain tirthankara in the characteristic pose of physical abandon (Kayotsarga).

The statue under description is, therefore, a splendid representative specimen of this thought of Jainism at perhaps its very inception. 27

If we survey the Upanisadic literature, we find that in the earlier Upanisads the concepts of sanyasa and the protests against sacrifices were generally not to be found. Later Upanisads have made a mild protest against the performance of sacrifices. Dr. Radhakrishnan has suggested that the earlier Upanisads must have been formed about the 8th Century B.C. 28 Mundakopanisad has mentioned that yajña is not the good means for the attainment of self-realisations. 29 In the Mandukyopanisad there is a distinction between parā-Vidyā (transcendental knowledge) and Apara-Vidyā which includes the knowledge of the Vedas and of other subjects, like the Grammar and Astronomy. 30 It is probable that Sramanic thoughts has influenced the later Upanisads and it must have been later than the Parsva period. Winternitz says that the later Upanisads have incorporated the Non-Vedic thought. 31

Considered from the point of view of the references to Jaina thought in the Buddhist literature, there is evidence to show that Buddhist canonical literature contains references to the Pārśva cult and there are clear references to Mahāvīra's thinking. In the Majjhima Nikaya, the Buddha describes that before he got enlightenment 32, he was a Sramana and practised rigorous ascetic practices like pulling one's hair (lochana) and fasting. This refers to the Practices of the disciples of Pārśva in their ascetic way of life. Dharmananda Kosambi holds the view that the Buddha did adopt the practices of the Pārśva cult. 33 According to the historian, Radhakumuda Mukharjee, the Buddha developed his scheme of life after trying the Jaina and the Vedic practices. 34 This view has been endorsed by Mrs. Rhys Devids. 35 Pandit Sukhlalji says that the Buddha adopted the teachings of the disciples of Pārśva before he developed his system of thought. 36
Modern scholars have accepted the view of Jainism as a Pre-Āryan Religion. It was not founded by Mahāvira. The first tīrthankara is Rṣabha. It is the śramaṇa religion. In the introduction to Uttarādhyāyana sūtra Dr. Charles Carpenter says that Jaina religion is certainly older than Mahāvira, “His reputed predecessor Parśva having almost certainly existed as a real person, and that, consequently, the main points of the original Doctrine may have been codified long before Mahāvira.”

Dr. Radhakrishnan says that Jainism as a Pre-Āryan Religion which prevailed even before Parśva and Mahāvira the last two tīrthankaras. Zimmer says that Jainism reflects the cosmology and Anthropology of a much older Pre-Āryan Upper class of North-India. Jacobi has traced Jainism to early primitive currents of Metaphysical speculations. Many Western Scholars like, Vincent Smith and Furlong, have accepted the Pre-Āryan prevalence of Jaina Religion. Hiralal Jain has interpreted the mention of the word Keśi in the Rgveda as referring to the first tīrthankara Rṣabha. When Buddhism arose Jainism was already in existence as the ancient sect with its strong-hold near Vaiśādi which was visited and admired by the Buddha.

REFERENCES:

1. Kalpa-sūtra—tīrthankara-varṇana (Hindi)


   “Ārhatam sarvamataisca, Muktidvāramasamvṛatam I
   Dharmādvimmukterahōyam na tasādāparah paraḥ II”
   and Taittiriya Āranyaka—4, 5, 7.


11. *Viśnupurāṇa* : 3, 18, 12.


14. a) *Taittiriya Āranyaka* : 10, 63 *Sāyaṇa-Bhāṣya* Part II
    pp. 778.
   “Kanthakoupīnottara samkadinām tyāgino
   yathājatārūpadharā ‘nivgantā’ niśparigrahā iti
   samvartaṣṭīḥ”.
    b) *Jāhūlopaniṣad*.

15. a) *Daśavaikālika* : 8, 25.
    b) ibid. “Jñānamayam”.

   “Jñāvayāṇe anurattā jñāvayāṇam jē karēuti bhāvaṇa I”.


19. *Devi-bhāgavata* : 4, 13, 54,
   “Gattvātha mohayāyām sar jiputraṁ bhṛaspatiḥ I
   Jīnadharmaśaṁśyāya veda bāhyam sa vedaṁ II
   Cchamarūpa dharam soumyam bodhayantam chaśena tān I
   Jñānadharma krtaṁ svena, yajña nindāparam tathā II”.

2
   “Munayō vātarasanaḥ pīṣaṅga vasate maṇa”.

   “Ketayo Arunāsaśa āṣayō vātarasanaḥ pratiṣṭhām ātadvah āḥ samāhitā sō sahasradhayasaṁ”.

22. *Taittiriya Āraṇyaka Bhāṣya* : 1, 2, 3.
   “Ketvaruṇa vātarasana ādabā rṣi saṅghānācakṣate te sarvēpi rṣisamghāhā samāhita I Sūpramattā santa upadadhatu I”.


25. *Modern Review* August 1932 pp. 155–160 (See Plate 1.).

26. ibid. (See Plate 2.).

27. ibid.

28. *Principal Upaniṣads* : Introduction

29. *Mundaka Upaniṣad*
   “Plavā hrote āṭṭadhā yajnār pāḥ aṣṭadesokramavaram yeśu Karma I etacchva yō yēbhinandanti mūghā jărāmṛttyum te punarevāpi yānti II”.

30. *Māṇḍūkya* – (Upaniṣad) ; 1, 1, 4, 8.


33. Note : The Buddha had accepted the four-fold practice of conduct (cāturyāma).

35. Mrs. Rhys Davids: *Gautama, the Man* pp. 22–25.


40. Jacobi (H): *Studies in Jainism*: *Jainism*
CHAPTER—2

TīRTHANKARA RŚABHADEVĀ

Buddhistvamēva vibudhārcaita buddhiboddhāt I
Tvam Śankarōsi bhuvanatrayasankaratvāt II
Dhātasi dhīra śivamārgavidhārvvidhānāt I
Vyaktam tvamēva bhagavān puruṣottamōsi II

—Bhaktāmarastōtra : 25

Addressed to the 1st tīrthankara Rśabha:

You are the Buddha as you possess the enlightenment and are adored by all. You are Śankara as you give happiness to all in the three worlds; you are the Brahman, as you lead us like kindly light towards the path of perfection and you are the Puruṣottam the perfect man.
1. Civilization was not built in a day. Mankind progressed from unbridled heterogeneity to planned teleological homogeneity. In the beginning, a few men that were in this world had no cares nor did they need to work, because Nature provided them with sufficient food from fruit-yielding trees. This was the place called Bhoga bhūmi. The fruit-yielding trees were the Kalpa vrkṣas. Man was blissfully ignorant of the enormous nature of the world and of the forces of nature. He lived in constant fear of the fierce forces of nature. At every stage of human civilization there were born men of superior intelligence who gave guidance to the common men and helped them to shape their destinies towards a stable social structure that was yet to come. Before the stages of innovation and progress men lived in individual isolation and lived a nomadic life. The men of superior intelligence who came on the stage on occasions of critical development were the beacon lights in the progress of human civilization. These men were called Kulankaras in the Jaina śāstras. The Kulankaras were the builders of human society. They led men to gradual progress towards a stable diverse, yet purposeful social structure. For instance, in the beginning, the primitive man was naturally afraid of the Sun and the Moon. The first Kulankara showed that the Sun and the Moon were only phenomena of Nature and one need not be afraid of them. The second Kulankara named Sanmati showed to the people that the planet and the stars were likewise phenomena of Nature. They were neither divine nor devilish. Then the problem of living in constant fear of wild animals was solved by the next Kulankara by limiting the areas of movement of wild and ferocious animals far from the human habitation. The Kulankara named Simankara outlined the boundaries of habitation of different groups of men and made them live amicably among themselves. This was perhaps the beginning of the tribal society. By this time the off-springs of human beings could see their parents living together and the seeds of the formation of family was sown. When the parents saw the faces of their off-springs, they were filled with surprise and joy and were overwhelmed with parental love. The care of the children started in the family. The Kulankara named Yaśaswan taught men to love their children, to name them and to take care of them. Abhicandra introduced diverse forms of entertainment and play for children. Marudeva
introduced the use of navigational facility for crossing the rivers and the use of Ladders for climbing the trees and hills. The kulankara Prasena[jit introduced the system of marrying girls from other groups and clans. So far the brother and the sister used to live together. We find similar references in the Rgveda where Yama advised his sister Yami to desist from amorous gestures. In the Old Testament the story of Adam and Eve points out to the prevalence of such a practice. Nabhiraja was the last Kulankara, who introduced the procedure of separating the Nābhi (navel chord) of a new born infant. In the Mahāpurāṇa Jinasena[ārya described that Nabhiraja taught men to distinguish between different types of fruit, wholesome and unwholesome. He also taught the art of preparing earthen pots. Jinasena[ārya mentions 14 kulankaras and Nabhiraja was the last kulankaras. There is difference of opinion among the scholars regarding the number of kulankaras. The Śvetāmbara canonical literature like Sthananga and Samavāyāṇa and Bhagavati have mentioned 7 kulankaras. In the Digambara literature like Mahāpurāṇa Harivamaṇsapurāṇa and Poumacariyam there is mention of 14 kulankaras.

Nabhiraja was a towering personality. In the Śrimad Bhagavata also it has been mentioned that Nabhi[r]aja was the eldest of the nine sons of Agnindhra and Agnindhra was the son of Priyavrata and Priyavrata was the son of Sva[yam]bh[uva who was the Ādīmanu. Nabhiraja was also called Manu. By this time men had learnt to work and the world had become the Karma bhūmi where it was necessary to work for survival. New problems for existence and survival arose and Nabhiraja tried to find satisfactory solutions to them. Nabhiraja was also considered to be the 1st Kṣatriya. Ācārya Hemacandra in his Abhidhāna cintamani calls him the Kṣatriya. Ācārya Jinasena says that Nabhiraja, like the Moon, was an inspiration and a support for art: like the Sun he was full of splendour and like Indra he was full of prosperity; like Kalpatv[kṣa he was competent to fulfil the desires to men. Nabhi was also called Ajanābha and the Ārya Khaṇḍa was earlier called Nabhikhaṇḍa. In the Śrimad Bhagavata the Ajanābhavarsa was later called Bharata Varṣa.

Marudevi was the queen of Nabhiraja and Rṣabha was born as a son of Nabhi and Marudevi. Ācārya Manatunga gives a beautiful
description of the birth of Ṛṣabha as the son of Nabhi and Marudevi. As the Sun cannot rise in any other direction than the East, so also the prophet—like Son Ṛṣabha could not have been born to any other lesser parents. The queen Marudevi dreamt an auspicious dream wherein as the Svetāmbara canonical literature points out that she saw 14 objects like Ṛṣabha (bull), 2) Gaja (elephant) 3) Simha (Lion), 4) Laxmi (Goddess Laxmi) 5) Puspanala 6) Candra (Moon) 7) Sūrya (Sun) 8) Dhvaja (Flag) 9) Kumbha (Pot) 10) Padma Sarovara (Lotus lake) 11) Kṣtra Samudra (Lake of Milk) 12) Vimāna (Plane) 13) Rātana Rāsi (Heap of Diamonds) and 14) Nirdhūma Agni (Fire without smoke). But Jinasena has pointed out that the object seen was the Hasti (Elephant). He has not given a place to Dhvaja (Flag). Two more objects were included in the dream Matsyayugala (A pair of Fish) and Nāghasana (A magnificent throne). Thus the Digambara Version mentions 16 objects of the auspicious dream. This auspicious dream was interpreted by the experts of dream analysis as the heralding of the birth of the tirthankara. Hearing this news Nabhirāja was overjoyed.

The incident of the dream has been very often interpreted as purely of mythological content having no scientific and Psychological basis. But if we carefully study the psychological content of the dream, it would be apter to say that the dream was meaningful and it did prophesy the coming of a great man. Modern researchers in the psychology of dreams do point out the nature and the possibility of prophetic dreams.

In ancient India study of dreams was recognised as an important science. They called it Svapna šāstra. The science of dreams has been described, in Matsyapuruṣa and Agnipuruṣa. References to Science of dreams also occur in Lalitavistara. It is said that Bodhisattva distinguished himself in the science of dreams. There was a class of people whose vocation seems to have been the interpretation of dreams styled as “Svapnadhwai Pāthaka” and in Ancient Jaina literature we get ample evidence for the analysis and interpretations of dreams. There were experts who were adept in interpreting dreams. They (Suśina Padhaga or Suśīṇa Lakkhana Padhaga) were respected by all men including the King.
The experts of the science of dream were respected by the high and low in ancient India. It has been stated that one should not see a king, a God, a preceptor and in interpreter of dreams with empty hands. 20

In the Bhagavati Sūtra 21 the principle of dream has been explained by mentioning five kinds of dreams: (i) Yathātāthya: dream vision in accordance with truth or reality. (ii) Cintasvapna: dream based on mental construction on the basis of experiences in the waking state. These two types agree with the theories presented by Adler and Jung, "as they are the results of the process of thought to deal with the present and future problems of life. (iii) Pratana: is remified dream vision, (iv) Tadviparita gives the dream image opposite to reality (v) Indistinct and imprisable dream vision.

These are associated with some desires repressed by thought and appear in disguised form. In this sense the analysis of the three types mentioned here may be compared to the Freudian analysis of dreams as wish-fulfilment expressing the repressed wishes in disguised form.

These broad principles of dreams as embodied in the Bhagavati Sūtra touch upon all the combined theories on dream, propounded by Freud, Jung, Adler and other scholars. According to Freud dream is the fulfilment of the repressed desires which do not leave the organism but sink to a level of Unconscious state in which they are still active and apt to appear in disguised and symbolic ways. Abnormal worry, queer idea, hysterical paralysis, or blindness etc., sometimes are the effects of this disguise. In the case of a normal man a dream is the main venue of repressed desires which do not present themselves even in dream in their true shape and colour but come up to in garb of an innocent looking symbolism. So all dreams, whether adult or child, are the fulfilments of repressed desires.

The Svapna sūtra mentions seventy two dreams—forty two ordinary dreams and twenty great dreams. The mother of Arhat or Cakravarthi in wakes up after seeing dreams with fourteen or sixteen
The mother of Vasudeva sees seven objects and the mother of Baladeva sees four and the mother of Mandalika sees one.  

Psychology in the present day is an empirical science. It analyses the contents of the minds and is backward-looking in its interpretation. The Psycho-analysis of Freud unearthed the dung-land of the unconscious and tried to find the roots of the mental see in the repressed wishes in the Unconscious mostly sexual in nature struggling to come up the conscious level at least during sleep, very often in a disguised form.

The Jaina thinkers were aware of the Unconscious although a clear scientific formulation was not possible on the basis of experimental investigation. The Nandi sūtra 22 gives a picture of the Unconscious in the Mallaka Drṣṭānta, example of the earthen pot.

Prophetic dreams are a fact. They do present a problem to the empirical psychologists of today. Depth psychology has no access for the solution of these problems. A re-orientation of our outlook towards the study of dreams is necessary, and faith in ancient lore of dreams would perhaps help us.

2) The Son was born to Nabhi and Marudevi. Graphic description of the birth of a resplendent son is to be found in the Svetāmbara and Digambara canonical literature. 24 He was born on the 8th day of the (Astami) Kṛṣṇa Pakṣa of the Cāṭra month according to the Svetāmbara texts. Ācārya Jinasena says that he was born on the 9th of the Kṛṣṇa Pakṣa (Navami). 25 There was rejoining in the whole kingdom and the heavenly deities including Devendra celebrate the birth of the tirthankara. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa mentions that the child was called Rṣabhha because he was full of splendour and strength like the bull. 26 Indra named his Rṣabhadeva because the boy was beautiful, strong, and resplendent. He was called Prajāpati because he was the Chief of the subjects. He was called Hiranyagarbha because Indra showered the rain of gold. He was also called Viśva karma and Viḍhata. 26 His family was named Ikṣwaku, because, for the first time according to
Jinasena, Rşabha taught the subjects how to extract the sugarcane juice.²⁹ In the Daśavaikāliku Cūrṇi he has been referred to a Kaśyapa. ³⁰

Rşabha was married to Yaśaswati and Sunandā, two beautiful girls of Kaccha and Mahākaccha ³¹. The Bhagavata Purāṇa mentions the name of one of the girls he married as Jayanti. ³² It is possible that Sunandā was called Jayanti. In the Āvasyaka Cūrṇi ³³ it has been mentioned that Sunandā has been described as the beautiful girl who was found in the forest by Nabhirāja and Nabhiraja got her married to Rşabha. There is no mention of this in the Digambara literature. He had 98 sons and one daughter called Brahmi by Yaśaswati. Bhārata was the eldest son, Sunandā had one son called Bāhubali, and a daughter named Sundari. The Śvetāmbara canonical literature and Bhagavata Purāṇa mention slightly different versions of the number of children that Rşabha had.

The age in which Rşabha lived was a transitional period. It was an age when the old traditions were fading and new values were yet to assert themselves. Man lived with one foot in the past and the second lifted to be placed in the new social environment yet to be found. Nomadic life had ceased. Family and social stability were yet to be established. Population was gradually increasing and natural and social resources did not appear to be adequate to the requirements. The result was the emergence of the intensity of the propensity of acquisition asserting itself, and thereby promoting the tendency to crime. It was, therefore, necessary to formulate the codes of conduct in social and political sphere. It was necessary to formulate the punitive scheme for the health of the society. With a view to establishing a stable social order, Nabhī, as a kulankara, organised the people into a polity; and Rşabha was coronated as the first king (Rāja) with political authority. This was the first kingdom in Society and Rşabha was the first king to be installed at the request of the people. In this sense Ācārya Jinasena called him the kulankara and also tirthankara ³⁴. The Capital of his kingdom was Vinitanagari (Ayodhya). Rşabha, with his political authority formulated the scheme of punitive law for
the benefit of his subjects. This was the beginning of jurisprudence and law. *Sthananga Vṛtti* mentions the four-fold scheme of punitive law: 1) *Paribhāsa* (fiercely shouting at the criminal) 2) *Mandala Bandha* (Restricting the movement of the person) 3) *Cāraka* (putting in prison) 4) *Cchaviccheda* (punishing with mutilation of the organs of the body). *Ādipurāṇa* mentions the four-fold distinction of the punitive law as the legal and political technique as expressed in (1) *Sūma* (persuasion) (2) *Dama* (bringing pressure) (3) *Danda* (punishment) (4) *Bheda* (creating rift among the enemies). According to *Ācārya Abhayadeva* the four-fold scheme mentioned in the *Sthananga Vṛtti* was introduced at the time of *Bharata*, the son of *Ṛṣabha*. *Ācārya Bhadrabahu* and *Malavagri* have stated that the penal procedure of *Bandha* and *Ghāta* (use of physical force) were introduced by *Ṛṣabha*.

The next important task before *Ṛṣabha* was the problem of providing food, shelter and protection to his subjects. *Ṛṣabha* taught his subjects Agriculture (*Krṣi*) and the art of the use of arms for defense (*asi*). He introduced the use of fire for cooking with earthen pots. *Atharvaveda* therefore describes him as possessing the characteristic of *Agni-Jātāveda*.

Education was not neglected. He introduced imparting of education to his subjects and he taught 72 arts for men and 64 arts for women. *Ācārya Jinasena* has mentioned six prominent distinctions in the arts and sciences prevalent in his time: (1) *Asi* (the use of arms) (2) *Māsi* (writing) (3) *Krṣi* (agriculture) (4) *Vidyā* (Education) (5) *Vāṇijya* (trade and commerce) and (6) *Silpa* (art and architecture). *Bharata*, the eldest son, was taught *Arthaśāstra* (Economics), *Sangraha Prakaraṇa* (Social sciences) and *Nṛtya Śāstra* (Dance). *Ṛṣabhasena* was taught *Gandharva Vidyā*, *Ananta Vijaya* was taught *Citrakāla* and so on. *Bahubali* was taught aesthetics. *Sundari* was taught Mathematics and *Brahmi* was taught Alphabets and literature. The first alphabets have been therefore called *Brahmīlipi*. Thus we find that *Ṛṣabha* was the first to introduce the imparting of education among his subjects. The status of women was considered to be equal to that of men.

*Ṛṣabhadeva*, for the first time, classified his subjects into three classes (*Varṇa*): *Kṣatriya*, *Vaiśya* and *Śūdra*. This classification
was based purely on the basis of the division of work and not to be confused with the distinction based on birth as is prevalent today. *Rṣabha* wanted to bring in efficiency of work on the basis of the capabilities and performances which would lead to economic prosperity of the society. He himself taught his subjects the use of arms and the art of warfare. He is to be considered a *ksatriya* in this sense. He moved far and wide in his kingdom and inspired his subjects to promote commerce and he called persons engaged in commerce as *Vaiśya*. He also said that all should be devoted to their duties and serve the people in the capacities best suited to them. Those who served as unskilled workers were to be considered as *sūdra*. This triple division of subjects into three classes did not in any way suggest the superiority or otherwise of one class over the other. All were to be equal in the eyes of Law and society.\(^43\).

It was at the time of *Bharata* his son, as *Cakravartin*, that the distinction of *Brahmana* was also to be introduced. This distinction was introduced not because the *Brahmanas* were superior in birth but because it was found necessary that some among his subjects who have the intellectual ability should be made to take to learning and the imparting of education. In this sense we could say that the teachingaternity and those engaged in meditation and research were to be considered as *Brahmanas*. \(^44\) Earlier to this period it was not found necessary to classify a section of the population of *Brahmanas* because all are inherently *sattva* in nature, essentially good, as also all have the emotional and the conative elements which lead towards only the secular attainments. In this connection we may refer to the modern psychological concept of personality which is an integrated whole of the three characteristics of the cognitive, affective and conative aspects. Thus we find the formation of *trivarna* by *Rṣabha* and *Caturvarṇa* by *Bharata* was purely functional and it was not related to the birth of an individual to be classified as *Brahmana* or *Kṣatriya*. We are here reminded of the division of society by *Plato* at a much later date, into the guardian class, the soldiers and the working men.

Thus, the king *Rṣabha* brought all-round development among his subjects and saw to it that his subjects were enlightened and
happy. He was the first king in the hoary past and he was in inspiration and a guide to his subjects. He ruled with justice and charity, with malice towards none and love and compassion for all. Consistent with the available resources, his age was an enlightened age where, for the first time in human history, arts and sciences, like agriculture, warfare and language and literature were introduced. They developed and flourished. There are references to show that the princes and his subjects were taught to domesticate animals like cows, horses and elephants. 45 In his kingdom there was contentment and he was loved and respected by his subjects. 46

Rṣabhadeva was ruling for a long time with justice and equanimity. But his heart was elsewhere. His efforts for the betterment of society did not get him involved in empirical activity alone, as basically his hunger and thirst after the spirit and his sense of detachment with the worldly things were implicit in his personality. He desired for the good of the people, he strove to develop his kingdom for the prosperity for all. Yet he yearned within himself to look beyond and pine for what is not, with detached mind, for the spiritual perfection of man

On one spring day his courtroom was full of his courtiers and subjects. They were witnessing the dance of an ethereal dancer named Nilānjana. The dance was exquisite. The audience was swayed to the dance. Rṣabha was engrossed in seeing the dance. In the midst of the dance Nilānjana collapsed, and mythological description says that her body disappeared. But Dēvendra introduced the replica of Nilānjana and the dance continued uninterrupted. The audience could not know the collapse of Nilānjana and the introduction of a new dancer. However, with his clairvoyant knowledge, Rṣabha could see through the game and he intensely felt the phenomenality and transience of this world. He became engrossed in the contemplation of the meaninglessness of this world and its activities. And he yearned for the realisation of the spirit which is more permanent than the indulgence in the activities of this world. 47 He decided to take to renunciation. He decided to hand over the kingdom to his eldest son Bharata. He distributed parts of his kingdom to other sons. He gave the kingdom of Poudanapura to Bāhubali and then he resolved to
become a śramaṇa. He left Ayodhya and in the out-skirts of the
city in the garden called Siddhārtha-Udyanà he sat under the Aśoka
tree; removed all his ornaments and the clothes and became a
parivraja. Along with him other princes and followers numbering
4000 took the vow of renunciation.

The incident of Nilanjana may have a mythological content,
but it has a great psychological significance. Such incidents are
occasions to express the inner yearning for renunciation. These
incidents provoke the non-attached to act. There is the mental set
and sufficient intuitive insight, to distinguish the real from appear-
rance. For thousands of years men have seen apples falling from
the trees, but it was Newton who discovered the law of gravitation
in the fall of the fruits. And likewise, Rśabha was “Svayam
sambuddha” (self-enlightened). The Buddha saw the old man, the
deceased man and the dead body and he took to renunciation. It
was a caitra Kṛṣṇa Aṣṭami (8th day of the dark fortnight of Caitra)
he was first to take śramaṇa Dikṣa (renunciation). He was filled
with compassion for mankind. Inspired by his action, 4000 princes
followed his example and took to renunciation. Srimad
Bhagavata gives the description of the hardships that he suffered
during his ascetic life. But the Jaina canonical literature does
not mention the hardships of his ascetic life, because basically the
Jainas believed that the age in which he lived was an age of faith
and respect for the tirthankara. It was only later at the time of the
twenty fourth tirthankara there was prevalence of evil in the minds,
of the people and resistance to ascetic life.

One year passed in the practice of asceticism and meditation.
By this time many of his 400 disciples could not stand the severe
strain of penance and ascetic practices. They gave up his way of
life and started their own schools of thought emphasising the
middle path and rather than suffer ascetic practices.

It was an auspicious morning of the 3rd day of the lunar half
of the month of Vaiśākha, Bhagawān Rśabha entered the city of
Gajapura, (Hastināpura). The Prince Śreyāmsa approached him
with great respect and offered him the sugarcane juice. Rśabhadeva
accepted the food offered for the first time during his wanderings.
This is considered to be the first partaking of the food by Rṣabhadeva after his renunciation. For the Jainas this was an auspicious day and it is called Aḵṣaya Tṛitiya.

For a long long time Rṣabhha practised penance and meditation. During his wanderings he visited many places, many villages and towns. One day he sat under the Banyan tree for deep meditation. It was the eleventh day (Ekādaśī) of the dark part of the Phālguna month (Phālguna Kṛṣṇa Ekādaśī). In the early hours of the morning he reached the highest state of transcendental meditation and was absorbed in the realisation of the self. He became free from all Ghati Karmas (obscuring karmas). He was now the Arihanta (conqueror of the passions) and the enlightened one. This was the State of Kēvala śīna. He became the Jina.52

In this Kaivalya-hood he decided to lead the living beings towards spiritual path. He gave the sermon (pravacana). His sermon was heard with rapt attention and reverence. The congregation consisted not only of human beings but also of heavenly deities and lower animals. This was the samavasaraṇa. He said then, “the aim of life is not Bhōga (indulgence in sense pleasures) but tyāga (self-denial and sacrifice) for the sake of others. Life is not for attachment (Rāga) but it is for detachment (Vairāgya) for the sake of self-realisation. Do not fall a prey to instincts and impulses. But make efforts towards the realisation of the self.53 Tīrthankara Rṣabhadeva preached the five mahaṇvratas to the munis (monks) and the twelve lesser vows (āṇuvratas and other Vratas) to the Śrāvakas (citizens).54 Having listened to his sermons Bhaṭrata and his brothers, including his sister Sundari, accepted the Śrāvaka dharma. Bhagawan Mahāvīra the twenty fourth tīrthankara refers. in his sermons, that he is carrying the tradition of the teachings of the first tīrthankara.55 In the Brahmanda Purāṇa we get the description of the teachings of Rṣabhha mentioning the ten-fold vows.56 The Bhagavata refers to the sermons of Rṣabhadeva as leading to Mokṣa dharma (renunciation for mokṣa).57 Rṣabhha tīrthankara established the tīrtha of the four-fold division of the followers of his teachings which consisted of (1) Śrāmapa (monks), (2) Śrāmapī (nuns) (3) Śrāvaka (lay men follower) and (4) Śrāvikā (lay women followers).
Rsabhasena became the first gaṇadhara (head of the organisation) who was to carry the burden of teachings to the other followers and transmit it to the forthcoming generations. Svetāmbara tradition makes him the son of Bharata cakravarti 68; while according to the Digambara tradition he was the son of Rsabha tirthankara himself. 69 The philosophical knowledge and the imparting of knowledge of self was so far concentrated in the hands of the Kṣatriyas. According to the Purāṇas of the Vedic tradition also it has been suggested that Rsabha was the fore-runner of the Kṣatriya 66 and he preached the Mokṣa Mārga. 61

Rsabha tirthankara went from place to place preaching the eternal religion of ahīṃsa and aparigraha. He taught the seven fundamental principles (tattvas)- jiva (living substance), ajiva (non-living substance), āśrava (the influx of karma), bandha (the bondage) samvara (the stoppage of the influx of karma), nirjara (the removal of the accumulated karma) and the final end of mokṣa. These fundamental principles are metaphysico-ethical principles. Rsabha taught the theory of six substances - (dravya): Jiva, pudgala, which consists of atoms, dharma (the principle of motion) adharma (principle of rest), ākāśa (space) and kāla (time). More about this discussion in the second part of this work, where we concentrate on the study of Jaina Philosophy. This universe, he said, is neither created nor destroyed. It is eternal and the truths of the universe and religion are eternal. The universe is constituted of the ultimate particles of matter which are atoms; and the combination of atoms in various forms constitute the paryāyās (modes).

In his wanderings from place to place preaching the religion and his philosophy, he was once asked, "O Lord, how is it that you had plenty of wealth and power in this world, but with all this, you renounced everything and became a sanyāsin? "My brethren", he said, "so much in this world is meaningless, it is fleeting and ephemeral as compared to the realisation of the eternal self. Pleasures of the senses are momentary and desires are insatiable. The eternal bliss lies in the realisation of the true nature of the self. It is the consumation devoutly to be wished for".

3) In its efforts for the attainment of spiritual heights Jainism did not ignore the secular life. The cardinal outlook of the Jaina
is to give due emphasis on the spiritual without ignoring the secular values. Jainism was quite aware that we must give to Caesar what is Caesar’s and give to Gods what is due to Gods. King Bharata ruled his kingdom with justice incorporating the higher values of life. The people were happy and prosperous. 

*Vinițanagara* (Ayodhya) was a city brimming with secular wealth and prosperity. It was also a just city, just the city which promoted secular wisdom and spiritual values. On one suspicious day, king Bharata received three auspicious news: 1) Bhagavan Ršabhadeva attained the enlightenment under the *Aśoka* tree. 2) a son was born to Bharata and then 3) he also came to know that in his armoury emerged the *cakraratna* (a sacred and powerful weapon of *cakra*)

just as in the modern age we talk of the production of the atom bomb and hydrogen bomb. Bharata thought that the attainment of *Kevala jñāna* by Ršabhadeva is the expression of dharma, the highest value in the secular life; the birth of the son expresses the fulfilment of the desire (kāma); and the emergence of *cakraratna* expresses and proclaims the fulfilment of the value of social and political authority (*artha*). Therefore, he went to Ršabhadeva to give his obeisance. Then he started on his political campaign of the conquest of the neighbouring countries. This was the sequel to the emergence of *cakraratna* which made it imperative for him to follow the movement of the *cakra*, to subjugate the neighbouring Kings in the entire continent and to declare himself to be the *Cakravartin* (the Emperor). He first went in the Eastern direction and many of the princes accepted his superior authority. Then he went to the South and conquered many countries and then his conquest continued in the West and the North. All the Kings and the Princes offered their respects to him and accepted his suzerainty. He came to Ayodhya satisfied and powerful. But, to the surprise of all, the *cakraratna* would not enter the city. It stood at the gates of the city. The king Bharata and his ministers were nonplussed. They did not know what to do nor where they would be able to find out the real cause for this incidents. But, the wiser among the ministers said to the king, “O King, this suggests that you have yet to conquer some. Your brothers have not yet paid their respects to you as the *Cakravartin*. Your brother Bahubali also is to come and pay his respects” The king then sent his emissaries to his brothers
asking them to come and accept his authority. They were sad and disgusted with this way of approach by their own brother. They went to Rsabhadeva, and offered themselves to renounce the world and become prarajas (ascetics). But Bahubali was strong, handsome, upright in his behaviour and unyielding to unjustified authority. He was called Gommatadeva. He said to the emissary “O noble one, you have brought the message from the king Bharata. If your Cakravartin were to send for me as a brother to a brother I would have gladly gone and met him. But your Cakravartin is an ambitious man and ambition is made of sterner stuff; it knows no bounds. He wants me to surrender to him. Go and tell your master I would rather meet him on the battle field and ask him to be prepared for the fight” and the two armies met at the outskirts of Poudanapura. They were ready to fight and poised against each other, waiting to pounce on each other. This was a dangerous situation. The loss of life would be enormous. Thousands of innocent soldiers would sacrifice their lives at the alter of the ambition of the Emperor and the sturdy fanatical resistance of the equally powerful Bahubali. The wiser among the ministers on both sides thought that it would be prudent to request the two powerful kings to face each other singly and to decide their respective superiority. They suggested three forms of duel (dvandvyuddha); i) Dṛṣṭi yuddha, (staring steadily at each other without a wink), ii) Jala yuddha (splashing enormous quantity of water against each other) and iii) Bahuuyuddha (wrestling).\textsuperscript{66}

\textit{Acarya Jinadasagāṇi} has mentioned wagyuuddha as an additional form of duels.\textsuperscript{66} The fierce duel started, and in every form of duel Bahubali had the upper hand. In the wrestling (Bāhu yuddha) Bahubali lifted his brother, held him high and was about throw him down, when it dawned on him that it was wrong on his part to treat his elder brother who is also the Emperor in such slight manner. He brought him down slowly and kept him on the ground. There is also a description that Bharata being enraged, and burning with the desire for revenge due to humiliation, set forth the cakraratna against Bahubali. But this was injustice and not in keeping with the rules of the game. The spectators shouted “O injustice has been done!” : But, strange to say the cakraratna, which the audience expected to cut the head of the Bahubali, went
round Bahubali and came back to Bharata. This was a miracle. Bharata was ashamed of his act and stood motionless, full of repentence and humility. On this side Bahubali felt disgusted with all that happened. He felt the stupidity and meaninglessness of the glory and the achievement in the fights. That he should have to fight against his own brother was the height of ignominy. He became fully detached of this world, went to his brother Bharata, offered his praṇamas and said unto him, “forgive my brother. I have no meaningless struggle. I have decided to renounce this world and seek salvation. He became a Śramaṇa.”  He went to the thick forest and started his penance. His ascetic practices were very severe he stood in Khadgasana (standing posture) and was immersed in meditation. For one full year he practised penance but he could not get the enlightenment. Bharata and his subjects went to Rsabhadeva to enquire why it was so, Bahubali could not get the enlightenment inspite of his severe penance, because still there was a lurking passion (kaśāya) in his mind about the enormity of his meditation and the gnawing egoity. The thought that he was standing on the land of his brother Bharata was disturbing him. This was the manakaśāya (disturbing egoity). Having come to know of the plight of Bahubali, Bharata Cakravartin came down with all ministers and subjects to the place where Bahubali was practicing penance. In all humility, he bowed down to the ascetic Bahubali and said unto him “O Śramaṇa, do not have the slightest idea that you are standing on my land. All is yours. Nothing is mine or thine”. Bahubali realised the folly of his disturbing egoity (mānakaśāya). His mind become crystal clear. He attained the purity and perfection. He attained nirvāṇa. Thus Bahubali attained self-realisation. This incident of the fierce fighting between Bharata and Bahubali has a great psychological significance. It expresses the fundamental attitudes of the Jainas as presented in their outlook of anekānta and the spirit of self-abnegation. Bahubali won the duels in empirical sense, but the success led him to the realisation, that all this struggle for power and pelf is meaningless. The only way to salvation is to develop the spirit of detachment to this world and to renounce everything; and he did renounce everything. At a later stage Bharata Cakravartin renounced his kingdom and became a śramaṇa. He attained the enlightenment.
4) This country where Bharata ruled from the Himalayas to the Seas in the South has been called Bharata Kṣetra, after the Emperor Bharata, son of Rṣabhadeva, the first tīrthankara. In the Uttarādhyayanasūtra there is a description of Bharata renouncing everything and taking to sanyāsa. Bharata Kṣetra was called so after him.\(^70\) Vasudevā Hindi describes this country as Bharata Varsa because it was ruled by Bharata with great justice and that he renounced this world after having ruled justly for many years.\(^71\) In the 3rd maṇḍala of Rgveda and also in the 10th maṇḍala there is mention of Bharata giving description of the rivers like the Ganga etc. The Vayupurāṇa gives a description of the Bharatadesa as extending from Himalayas to the South upto the Sea.\(^27\) Similar descriptions are to be found in other purāṇas like Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa, Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa etc. Viṣṇupurāṇa mentions that Bharata was the eldest son of Rṣabhadeva. He was a Pṛthvipati and Bharata Varsa was called Bharata after his name.\(^73\) The Kūrma Purāṇa gives similar description.\(^74\) In the Bhagavatapurāṇa in the 5th skhandā we get the detailed description of the extension of Bharata Varsa. It has also been described that Rṣabhadeva had many sons and among them Bharata was the eldest son and after him the country is Bharata Varsa.\(^75\)

5) Rṣabhadeva preached the eternal religion of ahiṃsā and aparigriha for many many years. The description about the years that he lived has a greater mythological content than a historical description. In the last part of the 3rd phase of this Avasarpini Icon, there were three years and eight and half months to go. Bhagavān Rṣabhadeva went to Aśṭāpaḍā mountain with ten thousand of his desiples. On the 14th day of the month in the abhijita naksatra, he sat for meditation which was to be the highest point of the attainment of self-realisation. He entered into the stage of Sukladhyana and then all the aghāti karmas like vedaniya, Āyus, nāma and gotra karmas, were destroyed and the tīrthankara became pure and perfect, reached the highest state of nirvāṇa.\(^76\) The attainment of this highest state of nirvāṇa has been described in the jaina canonical literature both in the Śvetāmbara and Digambara literature. According to Śvetāmbara texts like Kaalpa-sūtra \(^77\), Triṣaṣṭi-Salākapurusa \(^78\), it was the month of Maṅgha the 13th day of the darker part of the month (Maṅgha kriṣṇa
trayodaśī). But Tiloyapaṇṇatti 79 and Mahāpurāṇa 80 mention the date as Māgha kriṣṇa Caturdaśī. The day was Sivaratri and Jainas observe this day as Jinaratri

Thus, the first tirthankara, in this eon laid the foundations of Jainism by preaching the religion of ahīṃsa and aparigraha. He was himself the embodiment of non-violence and non-attachment.

REFERENCES:

1. Mahāpurāṇa: 3, 128.
2. ibid: 3, 124.
3. ibid:
   "Tassim Kālē hodi hu bālānam Nābhiṇālāmīdīhaṁ I
tavakattanō vedasam kahadi Muṇū tē pakuvvanti II".
5. Mahāpurāṇa: 3, 204.
   b) Bhagavati-sūtra:
      "Jambuddive na bhante I dive bhārahe vāsa imise osappiniye samāe kai kulagara hotthā? Goyamā, satta"
8. Āvaśyakacūrṇī: 129.
   "Ādyah pratiśrutih proktaḥ, dvitiyaḥ Sanmatirmataḥ I
   tritiya kṣemakṣnāmnā, caturthah kṣemadhṛtanmanuḥ II
   Simakṛtpancamo jñeyah, saṁtaḥ Simandhṛdiṣyate I
   Tato vimalavāhāṅkaḥ, caksuśmanasātmam mataḥ II
   Candrabhosmānam jñeyoh, marudēvastatah param I
   Presanajītparam tasmādāḥbhirājascaturdasaḥ II


12. The *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*: 11, 2, 15.
   "Priyamrato nāma suto manāḥ svayabhūvasya yat I
   Tasmāgindhastato Nābhiḥ Rśabhastatsutaḥ smṛtah II"


   "Saśiva sa kalādhāraḥ tējasvi bhānumāṇiva I
   Prabhuh ākara ivābhiṣṭa phaladal kalpaśākhivat II"

   "Ajanāḥham nāmaitadvarṣabhāratamiti yat ārabhyā vyapadiśanti"

   "Strīgām śatāni ātaeō janayantí putrāḥ I
   Nānyāsutam tvadupamam janani prasūta II
   Sarvādiśo dadhatibhāni sahasraraśmim I
   Prācyeva digjanayati sphuradamaśujālām II"

17. a. *Trīśaṭi*: 1, 2, 229.
   c. *Couppana mahapurasacariyam*: pp. 34.

18. *Mahapurāṇa*: 12, 103–120.

19. *Lalitavistāra* Sh. 6 and 12.

   "Riktpāṇirna paśyecca daivatam gurum nimittajanam
   viśegeça"


23. *Nandisūtra* : 34.


b. *Āvasyakanirṇyukti* : 184 gāthā
   “Cettabahulaṭṭhamte jāto usabhō asādhanaṁkhatte I”.


   “Prajāpatriyaḥ prathama jījivisuh āsāsā kṛṣyadiṣu
   karmasu praja I
   Prabhuddatattvāḥ punardhātadayo, mamatvatō
   nirvividē vidambarah II”.

27. *Mahapurāṇa* : Parva 12, 94.

   “Vidhāta viśvakarma ca sṛṣṭā cetyadhīnāmabhiḥ I
   Prajāstāṁ vyaharanti sma, jagatāṁ patimacyutam II”.

   “Ākānacca tadikṣūnāṁ rasāsāṃgraḥāṇe nṛṇāṁ I
   ikṣvākuryabhād devō jagatāṁ abhisammataḥ II”.

   “Kāśyamityuccyate tejāḥ kāśyapastasya pālanat”.

   “Tanvyow kacchamahakacchābhyow soumye patimvare I
   Yasasvatīsūnandākhyā sa āva paryaṇīnayat II”.

32. *Bhagavata* : 5, 4, 8, 557.

   "Vṛṣabhatirthankṛccaiva sammataḥ I
   Bharataacakradṛccaiva kuladṛccaiv varṇitaḥ
   Vṛṣabho Bharataiśca tirthacakrabhrto manu II".
38. *Āvasyakaniruyukti* : Gāthā 217.
   "Nigadaijamō bandho ghāto daṇḍāditālaṇaya — II".
   "Tatavedas"
40. *Ādipurāṇa* : 16, 179.
   "Asirmaśih kṛṣirvidyā vānijyam ālpamāva ca I
   karmāṇimani śodha syuh praṇājtvanahetavah II".
   "Utpāditastrayo varnāh tada tenādivedhasa I
   Kṣatriyāh vānipahā sudrāh kṣatraṇādī II".
43. *Mahāpurāṇa* : 244, 16, 368.
44. ibid : 245, 16, 368.
   "Vānijyam vanijām karma ālpam syāt karaṇaśalam I
   Tacca citrakalapatracchedādi bahudhā smṛtam II".
47. **Harivamśa-purāṇa**: 9, 47.

"Sotha nilājasāṁ dṛṣṭvā nityantīmindranartakam I
Bodhasyaśūnidasya nirvīvedopayogtaḥ II”.

48. a) **Āvasyaka-nirvyuktī**: gāthā 336.

"Cettabahulaṭṭhamīye cauhīh sahassehiḥ sou avarāhē I
Sīyā sudāmsaṇāe siddhatthavaṇgammi chaṭṭheṇam II”.

b) **Kalpa-sūtra**: 195/57.

49. a) **Āvasyakaniryuktī**: gāthā 247.

b) **Kalpa-sūtra**: 195, 57.

c) **Mahāpurāṇa**: 17, 212-213.

"Catuḥsahasraganāṁ nrpāh prāvrajīṣustata I
Gurūṁmatamajānanaṁ svāṁbhaktaiva kevalāṁ II
Yadasmai rucitaṁ bhature tadasmabhyaṁ vīseṣaṇam I
Iti prasannadikṣāste kevalāṁ dravyalingīnaḥ II”.

50. **Bhāgavata S, 5, 30 ; 504.**

51. a) **Mahāpurāṇa**: 18, 55-56. pp. 402.

b) **Triṣaṭī**: 1, 2, 122-123.

"Sambhuyalaṃeva sarvepi, gangatiravanani te I
Bhējurbūhujirē svairam kandamūlapalādyatha II
Prāvartanta tataḥ kālāt tāpaśa vanavāsinaḥ I
Jatādharāḥ kandapalādyāhāra iha bhūtale II”.

52. a) **Kalpasūtra**: 196.

b) **Āvasyakaniryuktī**: 338-340

c) **Samavayanga**: 157, gāthā 33-5

d) **Mahāpurāṇa**: Jinasena : 20, 268, 272

53. **Āvasyakaniryuktī**: 340

5
54. *Tattvārtha-bhāsyā* : 7, 2

55. *Mahāpurāṇa* : 24, 177-178, 592

56. Refer: Tirtha consists of four orders:
   
i. monks, ii. nuns, iii. laymen followers
   iv. lay women followers (*Śramaṇa, Śramāṇi, Śrāvaka* and *Śrāvika*).

57. *Bhāgavata* : 11, 2, 16, 711.
   “Tamāhurvāsudevāṁṣaṁ mokṣadhravāvākṣayā”


60. a) *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa* : Purvārdha-Dhanuṣyā-pāda: 14, 60.
   “Rṣabham Pārthivaśreṣṭham sarva kṣatryasya Purvajam”.
   b) *Vayupurāṇa* : Purvārdha : 33, 56.

61. *Śrimad Bhāgavata* : 11, 2, 16.

   “Śrīmān Bharatarājarśiḥ bubudhā yugapat trayam I
   Guroḥ kaivalyasambhūtim sūtica sutacakrayoḥ” II

63. *Mahāpurāṇa* : 24, 6, 573.
   “Tatra dharmaphalāṁ tirtha, putraḥ syat kāmājaṁ phalam I
   Arthanubandhinorthasya phalamcakram prabhāṣyaram II”

64. *Mahāpurāṇa* : 24, 9, 573.
   Niscicayeti Rājendrō Gurupūjanamāditaḥ.

65. *Mahāpurāṇa* : 33, 45, 204.

67. Āvasyakabhasya gātha 32.

68. Triṣaṭī : 1, 5, 740, 742.

69. Mahāpurāṇa : 36, 186, 217.
   "Sāmkliṣṭo Bharatādhīṣaḥ sōsmatta iti yatikila
   Hariṣasya ārdaṁ tānāsit tātpūjāpekiṣi kāvalam’’ II

70. Uttarādhyayana sūtra : 18, 34.
   "Eṃ puṇāpayāṁ soccā, attha-dhammōvasehiyāṁ
   Bharahā vi bhārahavāsāṁ, ciechā kāmāipavvac’’ II

71. Vasudeva Hindi : Prathama Khaṇḍa 186.
   "Tatha bharaḥo bharaḥavāsa cūḍāmanī, tassāvā nāma
   ihāṁ Bharahavāsāṁ tī pavvuccati’’

72. Vaiṣṇavapurāṇa : 45, 75.
   "Uttaraṁ yātamsanudrasya Himavaddakṣinancya yat I
   Varṣaṁ tad bharatāṁ nāma yatrāyaṁ bhārati praṇā’’ I

73. Āgnīya Purāṇa : 102, 12.
   Bharatad Bharataṁ Varṣa.

   "Ṛṣabhadhharato Jajnē virah putraśatāgraṇaḥ I
   Sobhiṣimcyarṣabhaḥ putram-bharataṁ Prthvipatiḥ’’ II

75. Śrimad Bhagavatapurāṇa : 514.
   "Ajanābham Nāmaiteyadvarṣam Bhārataṁeti yat Ārābhya
   diśamti’’

76. Āvasyakacūrṇī : 221.
   "Culasitiyē jiṇavarō
Samapah-assēhīṃ paribudh bhagvam I
Dasahiṃ sahassēhīṃ samaṁ,
Nivvaṇamaṇuṭtaram patto” II


78. Trīṣāṭī : 1, 6.

79. Tilīyapajñatti
   “Māghassa kīpā coddasi puvvaṅhe niyaya –
   Jammaṇakhatte atṭavayammi usahō ajudēṇa samaṁ
   Gaōjjōbhi”

80. Mahāpurāṇa : 37, 3
CHAPTER—3

OTHER TĪRTHANKARAS

_Yajurveda_ mentions the names of three tīrthankaras—Ṛśabha, Ajīta and Āriṣṭanēmi.

_Radhakrishnan. (S)_
TO TIRTHANKARA PĀRVANĀTHA:

Namaste Pārvanāthaya ghatikarma Vinaśinē I
Nagarajendra-Vistirṇa – Phaṇalankṛtamūrtaye II

Salutation to tirthankara Pārvanātha, who has destroyed the ghatikarmas (destructive karma) and who has the hood of Nāgendra over his head.
1) Rsabhadeva, the first tirthankara, laid the foundations of Jaina Religion in the last part of the 3rd phase of the Avasarpini eon. It was later for the other 23 tirthankaras in the next phase of the eon to elaborate the teachings and carry the traditions of Jaina religion. This is in the 4th phase of the Avasarpini eon which may be described with the characteristic of dukkha-sukha. This was the beginning of the Krita yuga. Among them Ajita, Sambhava, Abhinandana, Sumati, Padmaprabha, Suparsva, Candraprabha, Puspadanta, Sitala, Sreyamsa, Vasupujva, Vimala, Anantanatha, Dharmanatha, Santi, Kunhu, Arahanatha and Mallinatha, preached the Jaina religion from time to time according to the needs of the people for the satisfaction of the hunger and thirst for righteousness. These 18 tirthankaras gave the elaborate study of Rsabha’s teachings. Then we come to the stage of the end of proto-history in the life of the next tirthankara Munisuvrata. Munisuvrata can be traced to the period of Ramayana at the time of Rama-Ravana. We are now nearing the period of history with the firmer footprints on the sands of time. The later tirthankaras can be fixed in the march of time, as historical figures. For instance, the tirthankara Nami can be placed between Ramayana and Mahabharata. Then comes the 22nd tirthankara Aristanemi about whom we have sufficient evidences to show the probability of his being a historical figure. He was the cousin of Lord Krisna of the Mahabharata of the Yadavakula. If Srikrisna is to be considered as a historical figure, there should be no reason to deny the historicity of Aristanemi also called Neminatha. The next tirthankara is Parsvanatha the 23rd tirthankara. His historicity has been established. The last tirthankara Vardhamana Mahavira was certainly a historical figure who preached Jainism in the Licchavi and Magadha countries, 250 years after the nirvana of Parsvanatha. There is no reason to doubt the historicity of Vardhamana Mahavira. He lived in the 6th century B.C. and he was the senior contemporary of Gautama, the Buddha. In this chapter we shall take a brief picture of the lives and teachings of the 22nd tirthankara Neminatha and the 23rd tirthankara Parsvanatha.

Before we proceed to consider the lives and teachings of these two tirthankaras, we have to be aware that the references in the Canonical texts and the Vedic classics have to be objectively studied
without bias either towards the Brahminical trend or towards the Sramanic current of thought. We find that the study of Indian Philosophy has, so far, been predominantly oriented towards the emphasis of the Brāhmaṇa course of thought. The slight recognition that the Sramana thought has received, and that too recently, is only casual and as an appendix. It is considered as a ‘revolt’ and a polemic against the ritualistic excesses of the sacrificial system predominantly Brāhmaṇa in nature. There is need, today, of reorientation of the study of Indian Philosophy. This is to be based on the clear and ungrudging recognition of the existence of a pre-Āryan śramaṇa current of thought. With a fuller perspective of the course of Philosophy in India in the light of historical imagination, we may have to recast our histories of Indian Philosophy* 1 In the background of this synoptic point of view of looking at the history of religion and Philosophy, we may study the lives and teachings of Aśṭanēmi and Pārśvanātha.

Life stories of other tirthankaras upto Aśṭanēmi have followed a particular pattern. There are five prominent stages in the life history of each tirthankara: the first is the Garbhapraśvēṣa, entering the womb of the mother preceded by the dream of the mother who sees 16 or 14 auspicious objects described by the Digambara or the Svetāmbara traditions. This is celebrated by the Jainas by the Pāja (worship) of the tirthankara as the Garbhakalyāṇa. Then comes the birth of the tirthankara. The gods and men celebrate the birth of the baby with great pomp. It is the Jāmna-Kalyāṇa. Then the coronation of the prince as the king. It is the Rajyaśriśēka. Then comes the renunciation. It is celebrated as Dikṣa Kalyāṇa (renunciation). The consummation of the spiritual effort is to be found in the mokṣa, the attainment of the highest end of perfection. This is celebrated as the mokṣa-kalyāṇa. The incidents of the life stories of these tirthankaras belong to proto-history. The references are to be found in the Jaina Purāṇas (mythological literature); and in the cases of some tirthankaras we find references in the Brahminical purāṇas, as in the case of Ajīta and Sambhava etc. But when we come to the study of Aśṭanēmi we are on surer grounds considered from the points of view of cross references and historical evidence. We enter here the vestibules of history.
There are references to Āriṣṭanēmi in the Rgveda in four places. Some scholars are of the opinion that Āriṣṭanēmi has been referred to in the Chāndogya-Upanisad as Ghora Āśīraṣa Rṣi. Āśīraṣa preached the path to the realisation of the self to Kṛṣṇa, which consisted of Rjubahava, tapas (asceticism) dana (charity), ahiṃsa (non-violence) and Satyavacana (truth speaking). Dharmānanda Kośāmbi, the eminent Buddhist scholar, maintains that Nēminātha was called Ghora Āśīraṣa. Radhakrishnan says that Yajurveda refers to Rśabha, Ajita and Āriṣṭanēmi as tirthankaras. In the Yajurveda and Sāmaaveda, as in the Rgveda, Āriṣṭanēmi has been referred to as ‘Tarksa Āriṣṭanēmi’. The Mahabharata gives a description of the teaching of the mokṣa mārga by Āriṣṭanēmi to King Sagara. This teaching must have been given by the Śramaṇa tirthankara, as, at the time of Sagara, the Vedic thought was not giving importance to the concept of Mokṣa. Modern scholars are agreed that there is reason to suppose that the historicity of Nēminātha need not be denied. Col. Todd says that according to him there were four great men, the four Buddhas in ancient times, the first was Ādinātha and the second was Nēminātha. Nēminātha may also be identified with the Scandinavian first Odan and the first deity of the Chinese called ‘Fo’. As mentioned earlier we are entering the precincts of history with Āriṣṭanēmi.

Āriṣṭanēmi was born in Souripura, the capital of a Republic in the ancient sense. This can be located near Batesvara on the banks of the Jamuna in the district of Āgra. The capital had dual rule in the sense that one part of the city was ruled by Vasudeva. He had two wives—Rohini and Devaki. Lord Kṛṣṇa was the son of Devaki and Balarāma was the son of Rohini. The second part of the kingdom was ruled by Samudraśīvāja. Śiva was his queen. She had four sons: Āriṣṭanēmi, Rathanēmi, Satyanēmi and Dhṛṣṭhanēmi. Āriṣṭanēmi became the 22nd tirthankara and his two brothers Satyanēmi and Rathanēmi were the ‘pratyeka buddhas’. According to Ācārya Jinasena Āriṣṭanēmi was born on the thirteenth day of lunar fortnight of Vaiśākha. But Svetāmbhara tradition considers the 5th day of the lunar fortnight of Śravaṇa as the birthdate of the tirthankara. Āriṣṭanēmi belonged to Herivāṃśa and Vṛṣṇi Kula. He was, therefore, called Vṛṣṇi pungava. The
heavenly deities like Indra appointed him and named him as *Ariśṭanēmi*. As a young boy, *Ariśṭanēmi* was handsome, strong, cheerful and smart; he was dark in complexion. He was brave and self-willed. When *Ariśṭanēmi* was a young boy he was very strong and showed many miraculous performances. Once he took the ‘sudarśana cakra’ from the Armoury and moved it round in the tip of his finger. Only *Śri Krīṣṇa* could touch it. He could lift the *Koumudi gada* (mace) with ease and swayed it about. He blew the famous Counc (Paṇcajanya Śāmkha) so loudly that the whole town could shudder in fright. *Śri Krīṣṇa* loved and respected *Ariśṭanēmi*.

*Ariśṭanēmi* came of age and his marriage was fixed with a beautiful girl named *Rajamati*, daughter of *Ugrasena* of Bhojakula. Preparations for marriage were going on with great enthusiasm. *Śri Krīṣṇa* took the lead in making all the arrangements. On the day of the marriage, as was wont on such occasions, a great feast was being arranged. Numerous sheep were tied to the ropes and were penned in the compound to be killed for the feast for the guests. *Ariśṭanēmi* was being brought in a procession; and on the way he heard the imploring bleat of the sheep. He asked the servants why they were tied up there. The servant replied that the animals were to be killed for the feast of the guests. It appears that it was the practice of the *Kṣatriyas* in those days to eat meat. Having heard this, he thought what a sad thing it was that, for the sake of the enjoyment of a few people, innumerable living animals had to be killed and sacrificed. And all this for his sake. He would be the cause of the death of innumerable innocent lives. It was only the pathetic pleasure. “Let evil befall on me who is responsible for this misery for the animals”. He let the sheep free.

He felt sad and decided to renounce the world and take to the life of *sanyāsa*. We get picturesque description of his marriage procession and renunciation in the *Uttara-purāṇa*, *Harivamśa-purāṇa*, *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* and *Trīśaṭṭi-Salākā-purūṣa*. Having heard this news of renunciation of *Ariśṭanēmi*, princes *Rajamati* was grieved beyond expression for sometime. She then decided to follow the husband and take to *sanyāsa*. The relation of *Rajamati* and *Ariśṭanēmi* was of a very high spiritual flavour. The relation can be compared, to the noble relation of *Rādha* and *Krīṣṇa*.
described in the Vedic literature. Now Ariṣṭanēmi left the city and went to the garden named Raivaka, removed all the valuables and clothes and took to Sanyāsa. Śri Kṛṣṇa was overwhelmed with love and admiration for his cousin and said, “Damiśvara, may you attain the highest perfection early”.\(^{18}\) On his wandering in the quest of perfection as a Pravrāja, he was offered ‘pūraṇa’ in city called Dvāravati by the king Varadatta.\(^{19}\) He wandered about in Saurāṣṭra and practised penance. According to Śvetambara canonical literature there is the description that Ariṣṭanēmi remained for 54 nights and days in meditation. He attained the enlightenment on the new-moon day of Āsvin on the mountain called Śaciyau. Ācārya Jinasena mentions that the attainment of kēvala-jñāna (bodhi) was on the pratipada (1st day) of the śukla pakṣa of Āsvin.\(^{20}\) He became the enlightened one. He preached the Daśadharma to the people in the samavasaraṇa. Thousands of devotees including princes and kings, like Balarāma took the vow of Śravaka dharma. Śri Kṛṣṇa celebrated the occasion with great pomp and dignity. Ariṣṭanēmi established the four orders, the tīrtha consisting of (1) Śramaṇa (monks), Śramaṇī (nuns), Śravaka (Lay followers) and Śrāvika (Lay Women followers). Some of the prominent scholars in those days became his disciples. Gaṇadharaś were to carry the tradition of his teachings to the lay followers. Some Śvetambara scholars and Digambara tradition mention eleven Gaṇadharas of the tīrthankara Ariṣṭanēmi.\(^{21}\) Ācārya Bhadrabāhu says in the Kalpa-sūtra that Tīrthankara Ariṣṭanēmi had 18 Gaṇadharaś and 18 Gaṇas, of which they were heads. The organisation of Gaṇa and Gaṇadhara was very useful for the propagation and of the teachings of the tīrthankara and the preservation of the organisation of the tīrtha in its purity and intact. The organisational excellence could be discerned in the gaṇa and gaṇadhara. Tīrthankara Ariṣṭanēmi moved from place to place and preached the religion of ahiṃsa and aparigraha. Many princes and their friends were over whelmed by the nobility of the teachings and they accepted the life of pravrāja (renunciation). Padmavatidevi, the chief queen of Śri Kṛṣṇa was moved by the teachings of Ahiṃṣa and took the vow of pravrāja.\(^{22}\) Then, Tīrthankara Ahiṃṣa was camping at Dvāravati. The other queens of Śri Kṛṣṇa like Gauri, Gāndhāri, Satyabhāma and Rukmiṇī took the vow of sāmyāma (self-control). One day Śri Kṛṣṇa went to
Ariṣṭanēmi and asked him "Bhante, How is it that I am not able to decide upon taking the vow of renunciation?" Ariṣṭanēmi, said, "O, Kriṣṇa, you are a karma-yogi. Your services are needed to society. You are Vasudeva and you cannot take to sanyāsa". However, Ariṣṭanēmi predicted that in the next Utsarpiṇī age, in the city called Śatadvara he would be the 11th tirthankara named Amamā. He would preach to the people for several years and then attain the highest state of perfection. Digambara tradition gives a description of the Pāṇḍavas taking Dikṣa (renunciation). The Pāṇḍavas heard the news of the burning of the Dvaraka city, the death of Śri Kriṣṇa and were awakened to the realisation of the impermanent nature of this phenomenal world. They went to Ariṣṭanēmi who was at that time in the Pālava country. They took the Dikṣa. Kumā, Droupadi and Subhadra went to the nun Ṛajamati and accepted the vow of pravrajā at her hands.

Tirthankara Ariṣṭanēmi was now moving in Saurāstra country. He realised that he was nearing the last days of his life here in this world. He then decided to go to Girnar mountain. The Aghatikarmas were destroyed. And he reached the Śveta mokṣa on the mount Girnar, along with several hundred other munis. Slightly varied interpretations about the last days of Pāṇḍavas are to be found, in the Śvetambara tradition and the Vedic Maha-bhārata. The Śvetambara version of the incident mentions the improbability of Pāṇḍavas meeting Tirthankara Ariṣṭanēmi personally on the Girnar mountain, because by the time they reached the place, the tirthankara had attained Nirvāṇa. They went to Śiddhācala mountain and there they became mukta. However, in all the traditions there is the mention of the fact that the Pāṇḍavas gave up worldly pleasures and took to renunciation. The Sangha of tirthankara Ariṣṭanēmi was very large. Harivāmśa-purāṇa gives a graphic description of the tirtha as consisting of 11 ganadharas, 400 Upadhyāyas (teachers), 1500 Avadhī-Jñānis (having clairvoyant knowledge) 9000 vipulamati manahparyaya jñānis (having telepathic cognition) and 800 vasis (logicians) and 1100 sadhus. Ṛajamati had 40,000 Āryikas. We have, here, presented a brief outline of the life story of tirthankara Ariṣṭanēmi, the 22nd tirthankara. His life is intimately linked up with the life incidents of Śri Kriṣṇa and of Yadu family. We have, as far as possible
avoided the mythological narration about the life story of both Aristanēmi and Lord Krīṣṇa and Balarāma and others. Recent researches show that Mahābhārata is based on certain basic incidents about the conflicts between Pāndavas and Kowravas which have been considered as historical. Lord Krīṣṇa has been referred to as a historical figure. The battle of Kurukṣetra was a historical fact. If Śrī Krīṣṇa were to be considered as historical figure, there is no reason to doubt the historicity of Aristanēmi. As we described earlier, we have in the presentation of the life story of Aristanēmi, stepped into the vestibules of history from the corridors of proto history.

PARŚVANĀTHA:

With Parśvanatha, the 23rd tīrthankara, we enter the portals of history. Parśvanātha was a historical figure. There are evidences to show that he preached jainism and his doctrines have been referred to as Caturyāmā dharma. It has been suggested that the first tīrthankara Rṣabha and the last Mahāvīra preached the religion of five-fold vows (Pañcayāma) while the remaining 22 tīrthankaras preached the caturyāma dharma (four-fold vows).31 Uttaradhyayana sūtra mentions the caturyāma dharma as consisting of (i) ahiṃsa (non-violence), (ii) Mūsāvādī virati (abstinence from telling lies), (iii) adattadāna virati (abstinence from taking what is not given) and (iv) Surva-bahirādhāna virati (non-possession).32 However, Pūjyapāda maintains that only Mahāvīra preached the five-fold vows.33 In the Uttaradhyayana there is a dialogue between the disciple of Parśva called Kesī and Gautama, the first Gaṇadhara of Mahāvīra regarding the adoption of five-fold vows by Mahāvīra and the modification he introduced in the four-fold practice of Parśvanātha.34 Buddhist tripitakas mention the prevailing practice of Caurijāma dharma at the time of the Buddha.35 In his early days of the search for truth, the Gautama, the Buddha was influenced by the practices of Nigghanta tradition preached and followed by Parśvanātha. The Buddha himself explains this to his disciples. “O Sāriputta, “he says, “before I attained the enlightenment, I practised the ascetic practices, moved about naked pulled my hair and ate whatever I was
The Buddhist scholar, Dharmananda Košambi, is of the opinion that the Buddha accepted the practices of the Parśvanatha tradition for sometime. Pandit Sukhlalji holds the same opinion. Mrs. Rhys Davids refers to the adoption of the Jaina practices of tapas in the early days of his search for truth. Other scholars like Radhakumud Mukarjee accept this interpretation of the adoption of the Jaina practices by the Buddha in the early days of his Śādhana. Many Western Scholars have accepted the historicity of the personality of the 23rd tīrthākara Parśvanatha. A. L. Basham in his Wonder that was India (reprinted 1956) writes that as he, Vardhamana Mahāvira is referred to as one of the Buddha’s chief opponents, the historicity is beyond doubt. Parśva was remembered as the twenty-third of the twenty-four great teachers or tīrthākaras ‘fordmakers’ of the Jaina faith. Dr. Charpentier in his Introduction to the Uttarādhyayana sūtra writes—We ought also to remember that Jaina religion is certainly older than Mahāvira, his reputed predecessor Parśva having almost certainly existed as a real person, and that, consequently, the main points of the original doctrine may have been codified long before Mahāvira. Jacobi says that Parśva was a historical person, is now admitted by all. Dr. Radhakrishnan maintains that Jainism prevailed even before Parśva and Mahāvira the last two tīrthākaras. Vincent Smith, Furlong and Zimmer have accepted the pre-Aryan prevalence of Jainism prior to the historical 23rd tīrthākara of the 9th or the 8th century B.C. Parśva preached the Jaina doctrines 250 years before the nirvāṇa of the last tīrthākara Mahāvira. It is probable that the mild protests of the performance of the Yajnas as expressed in the Upaniṣads must have been influenced by the teachings of Parśvanatha and the Jaina tradition of Ahīṃsa. It is also probable that Parśva had to go to the eastern part of the country for preaching his doctrine and to protest against the performance of Yajnas and against the perpetration of violence at the Yajnas, because, the East was mainly dominated by the Anārya people who did not practise the ritualistic practices of Yajnas. The North-Western part of the country was dominated by Aryans. It is possible that the incident about the protection given to him by the Dharanendra Pādhāvati, which we shall refer later, belonged to the Nagaloka, which we today call Nagaland.
**Parśvanātha** the 23rd *tirthankara* was born in Vārapāsi. He belongs to the Kaśyapagotra. 46 His father was Aśvasena, the king of Banaras. His mother was queen Varmala also called Vamādevi. 46 Uttarapurāṇa mentions the name of the father of Parśva as Viśvasena and the mother as Brahmi. 47 The slight difference in the mention of his birth date in the Svetāmbara and the Digambara traditions does not materially affect the dates. In the Kalpasūtra and Trisāṭiśalākapuruṣa his date of birth has been stated to be the midnight of Pouṣya Kiśaṇa Daśāmi (the 10th day of the dark half of the Pouṣya month); while according to the Digambara works like Tiloyapāṇḍatti and Uttarapurāṇa the date of birth is Pouṣya Kiśaṇa Ekādaśi (the 11th day of the month).

As a young blooming boy, Parśva was handsome and strong. An interesting incident has been described which expresses his extraordinary sense of understanding and discrimination. As a young boy he used to go with his friends for playing. Once he saw in the forest, a tapasvi (ascetic) who was practicing severe penance with fire burning surrounding him and the hot Sun shining on his head. The ascetic was feeding the fire with logs of wood. But in a big log of wood there were two serpents inside the wood writhing with pain in the fire. The tapasvi did not see them as they were inside in the hallow of the log of wood. The young Parśva said to the ascetic, “Sir, please do not burn this log of wood, because you would be causing injury to the two serpents which are inside the log”. But the ascetic would not listen, as he did not see any living creature in the wood. Then the ascetic cut the log with an axe, and, to his surprise, he found that the young boy was right. The two serpents were born, in their next lives, as king Dharaṇendra and queen Padmāvati in Nāgaland. 48

Parśva now came of age and grew into a handsome youth. His parents wanted him to get married. The Svetāmbara tradition mentions that Parśva was married to Prabhavatī the daughter of king Prasena-jit, on account of the persuasion of his parents for marriage. 49 But in the Digambara texts, like Uttarapurāṇa and Mahāpurāṇa there is no mention of his marriage. There is evidence to show that the five *tirthankaras*: (i) Vasupūjya, (ii) Mallinātha, (iii) Ariṣṭanēmi, (iv) Parśvanātha and (v) Mahāvira did not get
married. They took to renunciation in the state of their bachelorhood. This view has been corroborated by the references, to their taking to renunciation in their bachelorhood as mentioned in the Svetambara and the Digambara texts, like Sthanānga, Avasyaka Niryukti, Pounacariya, Harivamsapurana and Tiloyapaṇṇatti.

Parśva was now of 30 years of age. During that time the king Jayasena of Ayodhya sent a messenger to Parśva. This message revived his memories of association of his past life with Ayodhya. This became an occasion for him to decide to take up to renunciation. This incident need not be interpreted as the cause which motivated him for renunciation, because a tirthankara, as we mentioned earlier, is a Swayamsambuddha. Parśva had the clairvoyant knowledge in his early stages of life, which is the characteristic of the potential tirthankara. He now decided to renounce the world and take up to sanyāsa. It was Magha śukla Ekādasi (the 11th day of the darker half of the Magha month). On that auspicious day Parśva left the outskirts of the city of Banaras and took the vow of renunciation.

As a śādhaka Bhagawan Parśva wandered from place to place practising penance and in search of the eternal knowledge (kēvala jñāna). From Vāraṇāsi he went Kaligi mountain and practised penance in the garden named Kādambari. Then he went to Śhivapuri and was engrossed in meditation in Kouśambhavana. During his wanderings many princes and men went to him to pay their prāṇamas (respects). But there was a person called Sambara who was originally in the previous lives Parśva’s arch enemy named Kamatha. He created enormous difficulties in the way of the practice of penance and gave him numerous kleśas (troubles). At that time Dharapendra who was previously the serpent was burnt to death came to know through clairvoyant knowledge of the severe tortures and troubles that Sambara was giving to Parśva. He rushed to give protection to Parśva with his sevenhoods he protected Parśvanatha. We shall discuss this incident later in our analysis of the conceptual study of the incident.
After about four months of the practice of severe penance and meditation Parśvanātha attained the state of kēvala jñāna (omniscience). This was in the early hours of the morning of the 4th day Caturthi of Bahula Caitra

This auspicious news spread throughout the country. The king Aśvasena and Vamadevi, his parents along with the princes and subjects, came and offered their respects. According to the Digambara tradition the first disciple was Svayambhu and the Prathama Āryika was Sulocana. Bhagawan Parśvanātha established the tīrtha of the four orders of society. His preachings were effective and various groups called gaṇas were established. Digambara tradition maintains that there were 10 gaṇadharas and 10 gaṇas. But according to Svetambara tradition 8 gaṇadharas and gaṇas were established.

In his wanderings from place to place preaching his doctrine tirthankara Parśvanātha came to the mountain Sammeta (Sammeta Sīkharā), with 33 munis (monks). This was the finale and the consummation of his life as a tirthankara. He took the vow of fasting and sat for meditation on the auspicious day of Śrāvāṇa śukla asṭami (8th day of the brighter half of Śrāvanā). In the Viśakha Naksatra tirthankara Parśvanātha attained the highest state of perfection mokṣa.

Parśvanātha is supposed to have attained nirvāṇa about 250 years before the nirvāṇa of the 24th tirthankara Vardhamana Mahāvīra. He lived for one hundred years. He renounced the world at the age of thirty and practised severe penance on the mount Sammedaśikhara. It is located in West Bengal. The mount is even now called Parśvanātha hill. He preached his doctrines to the people for seventy years, and after attaining the age of one hundred years in 777 B.C attained the supreme state of nirvāṇa. Zimmer says, 'His life, or rather lives, following as they do the pattern typical for the orthodox biographies of Jaina saints, will serve as an introduction to the trials and victories of the last supreme of the four aims of Indian life, that of spiritual release (mokṣa). The saint's biography is offered as a model for all those who would put off the heavy load of earthly birth.'
We shall now discuss the conceptual problems in the light of the life incidents of the tirthankara:

1. the eternal conflict between the good and evil as depicted in the previous lives of the tirthankara;

2. symbolism in the mythic presentation of the story of Dharaṇendra and Padmavati.

The conflict between good and evil has been the perennial problem in philosophy. It is universal, to be found in almost all the mythological stories of the world. The Biblical conception of Satan revolting against God, the conflict between Ahura Mazda and Ahariman in the Persian religion and the Indian conception of the struggle between the good and evil present a cosmic and a panoramic picture of reality universally common in the literature of the world whether Indian or the Western. In the life stories of the tirthankara, the struggle is extended in the series of previous lives of the prophets, one going nearer to the path of self-realisation than the previous one. The whole series is a necessary concomitant to the realisation of the highest good. In the Jaina mythologies, the evil is in the end not generally crushed, but transcended and enabled into penitent goodness. The evil is transformed into goodness through forgiveness by the original goodness. This is the content of thought in the depiction of the conflict between good and evil in the previous lives of tirthankara Parşvanatha. One of the striking features of the tales of his earlier births is the emphasis on the ruthless opposition of the dark brother whose development is the very antithesis of that of the prophet, Parşvanatha increases in virtue, but his dark brother, simultaneously, in evil, until the principle of the good finally wins and the evil is also transformed into good. This is the distinguishing feature of the Jaina conception of the struggle between good and evil. Evil is not lost, it is not eternally condemned. Satan invoked evil and said, ‘evil, be thou my good’. The good-ness tries to lift evil along with itself to higher realm of values and transmutes into good. That is what happened in the struggle between Parşva and his dark brother called kanatha in continuing conflict in one of his previous lives. The enmity between the
two has been represented as having begun in the ninth incarnation before the last as the tirthankara. Then they were two brothers, *Marubhūti* and *Kamatha*. *Kamatha* was the elder brother and evil incarnate, always full of jealousy and hatred for the younger brother. *Marubhūti* was the future tirthankara. Out of disgust, *Kamatha* was sent away from the house by his father. Deprived of honour and humiliated, *Kamatha*, engaged himself in austere practices not in the humble spirit of renunciation, but with the intent to acquire demonic power for the sake of taking revenge on his brother and the family. He was practicing austerities with extreme rigour standing in the sun and holding aloft a huge stone. *Marubhūti*, the future tirthankara, out of innocent goodness went to pay obeisance to *Kamatha*. He knelt down in salutation and *Kamatha* full of rage and revenge threw the stone on his head. *Marubhūti* died. This story of revenge sets the stage for a long and complicated series of encounters and surprises. The wicked *Kamatha* passes through a number of forms paralleling those of his virtuous and gradually maturing brother, the first increasing in violence and passion and the other increasing in virtue and becoming more harmonious within himself. “Thus the brother of this Jaina legend actually serves as light— even as Judas, in the Christian, serves the cause of Jesus” 43 But in the Jaina legend the dark brother is not eternally damned. He is redeemed from the bondage in the spheres of ignorance and pain. The concepts of heaven and hell in Jaina mythology are only purgatory stations, representing degrees of realisation experienced on the way to ultimate transcendence of all empirical existence. Judas is represented in a number of medieval legends as the older brother of Jesus”. 64

In the next series of lives the enmity continues. *Marubhūti* was born an elephant named *Vajraghośa* due to the karma occuring from distressing thoughts at the time of violent death. His brother *Kamatha* was born as a huge serpent. The elephant *Vajraghośa* had developed a pious attitude. Once the huge serpent struck him dead. The series of lives and the consequent revengeful conflict between the brothers continued every time *Marubhūti* rising higher in the attainment of virtue and peace, while the dark brother falling in the precipice of revenge and vice. In these life series,
Kamatha, projects the ego not to transcend but to guarantee the rigorous practice of revengeful action. Zimmer says that in the life of Vajraghosa there is the spirit of self-abnegation in the model of a pious devotee, in the image of what is called in Christianity God’s sheep. The conflict comes to the climax in the last life of Marubhūti as the prince Parsva. His dark brother was born as a heavenly deity. One day when the prince Parsva having taken up to ascetic life, was engaged in deep meditation, the heavenly deity saw him and the old enmity was aroused. He resumed the old enmity by invoking ferocious natural forces like thunder and rain and the fury of fire. The Prince was not disturbed by the howling cyclones and the rain of terror. At that time the king Dharamendra of the subtarenian region and his consort Padmanavati gave protection to the ascetic prince. Parsvanatha reached the highest stage of perfection and the highest knowledge. His dark brother, now a heavenly deity, listened to the sermon. He was overwhelmed with remorse. He fell at the feet of Parsvanatha. He was forgiven and by his brother’s grace gained the right vision. He was placed on the way to liberation.

The concept of the conflict between the good and evil, as we noted earlier, is a universal concept present in most literature of the world. The primary emphasis in all these mythological stories is moral. The good triumphs. It suggests the possibility that the systematically dualistic years before the birth of Zoroaster. “In the folklore and mythologies of the unique pre-Aryam civilisations of the Old World the motif of the contrary brothers is by no means uncommon. One has only to recall the Old Testament legends of Cain and Abel, Esau and Jacob; and among the most ancient Egyptian tales...where we find not only a strict opposition of good and evil, but also a startling series of magical rebirths”.65 In the Jatakas we find similar description of the struggle between good and evil in the life series of Gautama, the Buddha. The Mara tried to distract the Buddha from his final aim of nirvāṇa, but he could not succeed. He tried to distract the Buddha in the form of tempting goddesses; he tried to terrify and even slay the Buddha. But the future Buddha was not moved.66 And there seems to be a close correspondence between the legend of the last life of Parsvanatha and the biography of Lord Buddha. “And in the culminating
episodes of the biographies—the attainment of fulfilment—Sāṃvara’s attack on Parśvanātha corresponds to that of Māra, the god of desire and death, on the meditating Gautama Sākyamuni.\textsuperscript{67}

2. We now come to the discussion of the concept of the Yakṣa Yakṣīṇī Dharaṇendra and Padmāvati and the symbolism involved in the cult of Yakṣa Yakṣīṇī. It is woven round a mythological story in the life incident of tīrthākara Parśvanātha. One day as we saw earlier, when Parśva, the future tīrthākara was engrossed in meditation, a celestial deity by name Sāṃvara, who was his brother and avowed enemy in the former lives, stopped in his celestial journey by the sudden splendour of the saint Parśva. Sāṃvara realised that his enemy Parśvanātha was to get the enlightenment. He wanted to distract him from the austere path to enlightenment. He brought down a dense and terrible darkness and conjured up the howling cyclone. Trees splintered and hurled through the air. The god, exceedingly wrathful, became as hideous as he could, face black, mouth vomiting fire, and he was like the god of death. The whole subterranean world began to tremble. Then Dharaṇendra and his consort Padmāvati came to Lord Parśva sensing danger to him, who was deeply engrossed in meditation and was not aware of it. They made obeisance to Parśvanātha, stood on either side of him spreading their hoods so that not a drop of the torrent touched his body. The apparitions were so large and terrifying that the god Sāṃvara, the deity who was the enemy of Parśva, turned his chariot and fled.

This incident has its antecedent incident of the previous life of Dharaṇendra and Padmāvati. Parśvanātha, the young boy, the future tīrthākara, was full compassion to the dying couple of serpents when they were axed to death by Mahipāla, his maternal grandfather. Parśvanātha had remonstrated to Mahipāla not to cut the log of wood, as ‘a serpent and his mate are dwelling inside’. Do not murder them for nothing’. But Mahipāla turned with scorn, raised his axe and cut the log into two. And there the serpent couple was writhing in pain as they were cut in half. The young prince chanted the mantras to the dying serpents out of compassion and they died a calm and meritorious death. And they were reborn in the underworld as Dharaṇendra and Padmāvati.
There is close resemblance in the life stories of *Parśvanātha* and *Buddha* in the symbolism and the image of the serpent. When the Buddha was about to get enlightenment under the *Bodhi* tree, the greater serpent called *Mucalinda* living under the trunk of the tree came out and gave him protection from the fierce winds and the force of nature released by *Mara*. He gave shelter to the Buddha under the hood. Then the serpent king, 'let neither heat nor cold, nor gnats, flies nor wind come near the Blessed one'.

Zimmer says that the precise relationship between the Jaina and the Buddhist versions cannot be reconstructed. "Both may have originated from the simple circumstance that when the wealthy lay folk of the two denominations began employing craftsmanship to fashion images of their saviours. The principal models for the new work of art had to be supplied by the older Indian prototypes, chief among which were the *yakṣa* and the *nāga*—patterns of the wise superhuman beings endowed with miraculous insight and power that had figured prominently in the household cult of India from time immemorial". As we have seen earlier, in the Persian pantheon of the gods and the conflict between the good and evil, serpent stood for evil. We find the representation of the serpent as standing for evil in the form of Satan. In the Persian art and legend also it is represented as Dāhvak the great tyrant villain. In India serpent does not always stand for evil, but is a protecting force and as *Ādiśeṣa*.

It is difficult to present a coherent picture of the teachings of *Parśvanātha*, although we find stray references about the doctrines taught by him. It appears that there is not much difference between the epistemological principles taught by *Parśvanātha* and *Mahāvīra*, the last two *tīrṇānkaras*. In the *Rāyapaseṇīya sutta*, *Keśiṃukara* a follower of *Pārśva* is described as giving the same five divisions of knowledge as are found elsewhere in the Āgamas. Regarding the metaphysical and ethical content of the *vṛatas* it appears that *Pārśva* formulated four *vṛatas* as we said earlier: (i) abstinence from injury to living beings (*sarva prāṇātikramaṇa-viramaṇa*), (ii) truth speaking (*mṛṣavāda viramaṇa*), (iii) not accepting what is not given (adattādāna viramaṇa) and (iv) (*sarva bahiṣṭhadāna*) non-possession. The fifth vow, *brahmacarya*, was
later included by Mahāvīra. The environmental circumstances, like, the laxity in general behaviour and also in the Sangha, must have caused Mahāvīra, to include the fifth injunction for the sake of maintaining the social health and the discipline in the sangha. It is said in the Mahācāra (7.36–38) that tirthankaras prior to Mahāvīra also preached the need of sāmāyika and sāmīyama. Mahāvīra brought about certain modifications in the practice of these codes of conduct.⁷⁰

One should worship the images of tirthankaras and that of Pārśva not because of any hope that the great beings might assist a worshipper, but as ideals one has to keep infront of one's mind. The tirthankaras have passed beyond the godly governors of natural order. Jainism is not atheistic, it is transtheistic.⁷¹

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2. Rgveda: a. 1, 14, 89, 6
   b. 1, 24, 180, 10
   c. 3, 4, 53, 17
   d. 10, 12, 178, 1

3. Chāndogya Upanīsad: 3, 17, 4
   “Atah yat tapōdānāmaṛjavāmaḥihsmā satyavacanamātitya
   asya daksīṇa” I

4. Bhagavatī sûtra: 1, 1


   “Soriyapurammi nayare, asi rāya Mahiddhie I
   Samudravijae nāmam rāyalakkhaṇa sanjue II
   Tassa bhajja Śiva nāma tise putto mahāyaso I
   Bhagavān Ariṣṭanēmi tti loganae damisare” II

   “Soriyapurammi nayare asi rāyamahiddhie I
   Vasudeve tti nāmena rāyalakkhaṇasamjue II
   Tassa bhajja deve asi rohipi devai taha I
   Tasim donham pi do putta ittha ram kesava II”


11. Harivamśapurāṇa : 38, 9, pp. 479 (Bhāratiya Jñānapith, Kāshi).

   “Ariha aritthanemi je se vasanam padhame mase docce
   pakkhe savanasuddassa pancami pakkhena navanham
   masanam...........”

   “Vṛṇi-pungavah - yādavapradhāno bhagavanari -
   -ṣṭanēmiritiyavat”


17. Uttarapurāṇa : 71, 163.
   c. *Triśaṣṭi*: 8, 9, 375.
24. ibid. Varga 5, Ank. 1.
25. *Harivamśapurāṇa*: 64.
   “Kunti ca droupadi devi subhadrādyāsca yositaḥ I
   Rājamatyahāsamipe taḥ samastastāpasi sthitaḥ II”
27. ibid.
31. *Sthanāṅga*: 4, 266.
   “Bharaheravaeōu nam vasesu purimapacchimavajjā
   majjhimagā
   bavisaṁ arahanta bhayavanta cavujjamāṁ pannavinti”.

8
32. Sthānanga: ibid.
   “Savvato panativayao veramanam, evam musavayao
   adinnadānao
   savvao behiddhadānao veramanam”


34. Uttarādhyayana sūtra: Introducion.

35. Diggha-nikāya: Saṃñāsa-phalasutta
   “Idha Mahāraja nigghanto savvavarivarito ca boti,
   savvavariyu
tto ca savvavaridhuto co, savva variputtho ca evam kho
mahāraja nigghanto catuṣṭāma saṁvara saṁvutto hoti”

36. a. Majjhimanikāya: Mahāsīmhananda: 1, 1, 2.


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45. Uttarādhyayana sūtra: 73–75.
46. Samavayanga: 175.
    “Rāya ya asasene ya, siddhatthacoiya khattie”

47. Uttarādhyayana sūtra: 73–75.


49. Tiṣaṭṭi: 2, 3.

50. a. Āvaśyakaniṇiyuktī: 221, 222.

    “Mallī Aritthanāmi paso viro ya vāsupujjo I
    ee kumarasiha gehao niggaya jinavarinda
    Se sa vi hu rayaño, puhai bhattuna nikkhanta II”.


   d. Harivaṃśapurāṇa: 60, 214 II.

   e. Tiloyapaṇṇatti: Adhikāra 4, gātha 670.
    “Nāmi mallī viro kumarakaṭammi vāsupujjo ya I
    Paso vi gahidatava, sesajina rajjacaramammi II”

51. Sthananga: 471.

52. Āvaśyakaniṇiyuktī: 221, 222.
    “Vitam aritthanāmi pāsam mallī ca vāsupujja ca I
    ee muttuna jine avasesa asi rayano
    Rāyakulesu vi jaya, visuddha vaṃsesu khattikulesu
    Na ya icchiyabhiseo, kumaravasa pavvaiya II”


54. Harivaṃśapūraṇa: Jinasena: Part 2, 60, 214 as above.

55. Tiloyapaṇṇatti: Adh. 4, gātha 670 as above.
56. _Uttarapurāṇa_ : 73, 119-125.

57. a. _Uttarapurāṇa_ : 73, 129.
   “Uttara-dhīmukhāḥ pōuśe māse pakṣe sitetare I
   Ekaḍāśyam supurvahāne samaṁ trīśatābhūbhum II”

   b. _Tiloyapaṭṭati_ : 4, 666.
   “Maghassidākkaraśipuvvanhe genhade visahasu II”

58. a. _Tiloyapaṭṭati_ : 4, 966.

   b. _Pāsanāhacariṇī_ : 10, 12, 138.


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   b. _Uttarapurāṇa_ : 73, 156.
   “Sattirasamunibhiḥ sardham pratiṃyogamasthitāḥ”


63. ibid. ,, : pp. 187.

64. ibid. ,, : pp. 187 footnote

65. ibid. ,, : pp. 186 footnote


69. Rāyapasenīya sutta : 165.

70. Refer (i) _Bhagavati sūtra_ : 8, 675, 25, 7, 785.

   (ii) _Uttarādhyayana sūtra_ : XXIII.

CHAPTER—4

TĪRTHANKARA VARDHAMĀNA MAHĀVĪRA

TO TĪRTHANKARA VARDHAMĀNA MAHĀVĪRA

Srimatkupḍapuradhinatha Vilasatsiddhārtha bhūvallabha I
Premārdrapriyakārīṇī Priya sutāḥ Samprāreyate Sanmatiḥ II
Salutation to thee who art the resplendent son of Siddhārtha
the king of Kupḍapura and Priyakārīṇī the queen of
Siddhārtha. Thou art aptly called Sanmati.
CHAPTER—4

VARDHAMĀNA MAHĀVĪRA

1. The 6th Century B.C. was the age of intellectual firmament in the world. In Greece several philosophical enquiries gave rise to the diversity of views, from Thales to the Sophists in the Pre-Socratic era. The Sophists were professional philosophers, who said “Homo Mensura”. Truth was considered to be subjective and relative. Objective knowledge of reality became impossible. The Sophist had created intellectual chaos. It was an age of fashionable Agnosticism and doubtful Scepticism. And Socrates came on the scene to find out the objectivity of truth. He wanted to define terms.

India too, which is considered to be one of the fore-runners of civilization, witnessed, during this period, enormous movement and chaos in the intellectual and social fields. Hosts of philosophers claiming to sell their philosophical wares to the people were roaming about the North-Eastern part of India which may be considered to be cradle of Indian culture. There were the Kriyavadins who claimed to preach that activity is the characteristic of the individual self. The Sūtrakṛtāngas gives a brief description of the various philosophical theories and intellectual activity prevailing at that time. The Kriyavadins said that individual is responsible for his actions, good or bad. There were the Akrīyavadins who believed that activity is not relevant for the good or the bad of the individual. There is neither God nor devil, neither heaven nor hell, neither pāpa nor puṇya. All activities are bereft of the good or bad results. There was the Ajñānāvadin who claimed to say that knowledge is not possible and the nature of truth is unknowable. These may be considered as Agnostics. There were then the Vinayavadins who also claimed that knowledge cannot be easily analysed. Numerous names have been associated with these theories. For instance, Pūrṇākāśyapa advocated akriyavada. Mokkhala Gośāla presented his views of thoughtless and motiveless malignity of all activity. AjitaKeśāKambalin stoutly refuted the possibility of any effects of action, good or bad. Suttanipata, the Buddhist work, has described sixty three different schools of Śramaṇa thought prevailing in the 6th century B.C. trying to assert themselves at that time. The prevalence of the numerous schools of philosophical thought created intellectual confusion in
society. Common man did not know what to accept and what to reject. In the social sphere also there was uncertainty and chaos. The Vedic ritualism was trying to re-assert itself. The performance of Yajña, with all its complicated ritualism and the consequent offerings of animals as obligation, raised its head again. Men were helpless spectators. They were in the grip of the sophisticated priestly class who was exploiting the innocent ignorance of the people. The Priests were professing to be a link between the God and men and to lead the common man to heaven through the performance of ritual of Yajña. The Priestly class, which designated itself as the custodian of the spiritual and secular good of the people, began to feel superior to the others. This was primarily Brāhmaṇa class asserting its superiority over other classes and claiming the monopoly of the preservation of culture. The other classes were treated as inferior. The śūdra was lower than the other classes of human beings. Women were also treated as inferior. The classes which were designated to promote efficiency of work were not so far based on birth but they were functional distinction. But now they began to degenerate into caste. There was frightening inequality among men. The Buddhist work Majjhimanikāya gives a discription of a pathetic incident how a śūdra was beaten and tortured because he came in front of a high caste girl on his way to his house. This was supposed to be inauspicious. Uttarādhyayana sūtra describes the pathetic sadness witnessing the condition of the times by Kesi kumāra a disciple of Pārśva. He was sad beyond expression seeing the darkness of ignorance among the people and the exploitation of the lower classes by the higher. And Siddhārtha, Goutama the Buddha and Vardhamāna Mahāvīra came on the scene. Their object was to remove the sufferings of mankind and to lead them to spiritual perfection. They were contemporaries. Vardhamāna Mahāvīra the 24th and the last tirthankara; of this age “out of dust he made us into men and he lifted us to be angels”.

Political conditions at that time were varied. Licchāvi was a republic. Sākya was also a republic. Their kings were ruling the country with the effective advice of the elected representatives. Licchāvi and Vṛdeha were confederates and it was called Vaijī gāna or Vṛjī gāna. Vaijī sangha had nine small states brought together,
Vṛjñi, Licchavi, Videha, Ugra etc... The capital of Vajjisangha was Vaiśali. It was a beautiful city and we get the description of the town in the ancient works. Harīṣeṇapakatha (55–165) describes the city and says “Atha Vajramigha desa Vaiśali nagari nṛpah”. It was ruled by the king called Cetaka. The king Cetaka had seven daughters and ten sons, the eldest son being Siṃhabhadra. The eldest among the seven daughters was Triśalā (Priyakārīṇi). She was the queen of the Siddhartha, the Chieftain of Kundapura. Vardhamana Mahāvira was their son. Rāja Siddhartha was famous as the Kṣatriya king of the jñata kula (lineage). He was the follower of the Parśvanathī tradition. Vardhamana Mahāvira was born on the thirteenth day of the lunar fortnight of Caitra Sudha (Caitra Sudha Trayodāśi) in the early hours of the morning in 599 B.C. 4 The story of the mother of a tirthankara getting the auspicious dream of 16 or 14 objects at the time of the life entering the womb of the mother is uniformly to be found in the life of all the tirthankaras. We have already discussed about the nature of the dreams and the phenomenon while describing the life story of the first tirthankara Rṣabhadeva 5 The birth of the son was celebrated throughout the kingdom in all pomp and glory. He was called Vardhamana, because the prosperity in the kingdom of his father steadily increased with his entering the womb of his mother. (garbhavataraṇa).

As a young boy, Vardhamana was handsome, brave and fearless. There are many stories about the extra-ordinarily brave acts that he performed when he used to play with his playmates. Once, the children were playing in the mango grove. At that time, a huge snake curled itself round the trunk of tree they were playing. Other boys ran for life in fight. But Vardhamana, coolly held the serpent in his hand and kept it away in a safe and quiet place. 6 On another occasion he was having a game called tindūsaka krida 7 in which the winner in the running race was to sit on the back of the fellow runners upto the destination which was usually a tree. The heavenly deity joined the game assuming the form of a young boy in order to test his strength. Vardhamana sat on the back of this new boy and the boy ran faster and grew taller and taller assuming the proportion of huge giant in order to frighten the boys. But Vardhamana was not to be frightened. He
gave him a first so hard that the deity was convinced of the enormous strength of the boy. He was therefore called, *Mahāvīra.* He was also called *Sanmati* because two ascetics belonging to the *Pārśva tradition* had some doubts about the nature and condition of the self in the rebirth. It was said, just as they saw the boy *Mahāvīra*, their doubts were cleared.

Another incident expressing his sharpness of intellect has been quoted. Once his friend asked his father *Siddhārtha* where was *Vardhamāna.* The father said he was below on the ground floor. But his mother said that he was upstairs. But *Vardhamāna* was not be found either upstairs or on the ground floor. Afterwards, *Vardhamāna* explained that both his parents were right because he was neither on the upper floor nor down below. But he was, in the central room. This was perhaps an answer which would have its root in the *ānekānta* viewpoint.

These anecdotes might contain some element of exaggeration. But they were intended to portray the distinct superiority of *Mahāvīra* in his physical and mental capabilities. And they were not inconsistent with the content of the narration of those days. We have to look at these in the historical perspective, and not in the isolated crucible of factuality. We may also note that *Vardhamāna* *Mahāvīra* possessed the extra-sensory perceptual capacity of clairvoyance (*avādhi jñāna*) in addition to the normal sensory experiences of *mātī* (sense perception) and *sṛuta* (reasoning). All *tīrthankaras* are possessed of these capacities from birth. This is not uncommon. We need not be sceptical about the possibility of possession of *avādhi,* because *avādhi* as extrasensory experience, is a psychological fact which Modern Psychical Research is accepting today. More about it is in the next part of our discussion. At the age of ten, it was contemplated that *Vardhamāna* should be given formal education under the guidance of the *Guru.* But, observation of intellectual capacities showed that he was far above the children of his intellectual capabilities, and any attempt to put him in the grill of formal education would hamper the extra-ordinary capacities of the child. *Ācārānga* and *Kalpasūtras* do not mention the problem of his formal education under *Kālācārya.* *Uttarapurāṇa* also does not refer to this incident. The first reference,
however is to be found the *Viṣeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* of *Jinabhadrangānti*. But detailed and enthusiastic poetic description of the incident is to be found in *Mahāvira Cariya, Triśaṣṭi* and some other works.

*Vardhamāna Mahāvira* grew into a handsome youth. It was but natural that eminent kings in the area having daughters eligible for marriage should have approached the parents of *Mahāvira* requesting them to consider their daughter for marriage to their son. But nothing is certain about the marriage of *Vardhamāna Mahāvira*. *Svetāmbara* and *Digambara* traditions are not agreed on this question of the marriage of *Mahāvira*. *Svetāmbara* works would like to say that *Mahāvira* married a beautiful girl called *Yaśodā* and he had a daughter called *Priyadarśanā*. *Ācārāṅga* and *Kalpa sūtra* do not give a description of his marriage but mention the name of his wife as *Yaśodā* and daughter as *Priyadarśanā*. There is the mention of his marriage in the *Viṣeṣāvaśyaka-Bhāṣya*, *Mahāvira Cariyam*, and *Triśaṣṭi*. But the *Digambara* tradition does not accept the view that *Mahāvira* was married. It maintains that he took to renunciation when he was bachelor only. He did not accept the proposal for marriage, as he was inclined towards leading the ascetic life and he thought the marriage would hamper his future plans. He sought the permission of his parents to remain unmarried. *Ācārya Jinasena* mentions the fact that *Raja Jitaśatru* had approached the parents of *Mahāvira* and offered his daughter to *Mahāvira*. But *Mahāvira* politely refused. We have already referred in the last chapter that some of the *Digambara* and *Svetāmbara* texts also refer to the five *tīrthankaras*: *Vāsupūjya, Malli, Ariṣṭanēmi, Pārśva* and *Mahāvira* took into the vow of an ascetic in their *Kumaravasta*. And *Kumaravasta* could be interpreted as *bachelorhood*, although attempts have been made to give different interpretations.

*Mahāvira* with his extreme sense of detachment towards the secular life, was craving for the spiritual life. He wanted to take to renunciation. He asked permission of his parents for his taking the vow of *sanyāsa*. But the parents asked him to wait for some days so that they would make up their minds and fortify themselves for the inevitable. His parents died when *Mahāvira* was 28 years of
age. Soon after, at his of 30 years, taking permission of his elder brother, who was also reluctant to grant him the permission, he decided to take to sanyasa. The news of his determination to take to renunciation spread throughout the country, like wild fire. The prince who had everything in this life to enjoy, giving up everything of this world and become recluse is a great thing. He had everything in this life to enjoy. But his heart was set on the transcendental. Things enjoyable in this world appeared to be insipid, fleeting and meaningless for him. The realisation of the transcendental self was the highest bliss. He craved for the highest perfection and bliss. So he set out of the house to lead a houseless life (anāgāra). Throng of men gathered to bid him a tearful good-bye. And there was an old man, called Harikeśi, who was running fast towards Mahāvira to touch his feet and offer his praṇāmas. The crowd shouted ‘Do not let him near Mahāvira’. He is a Cundala (outcaste). Mahāvira said, ‘Please do not stop him. Let him come’. He embraced Harikeśi and bid him good bye. Harikeśi was over-whelmed with gratitude and reverence for Mahāvira. With tearful eyes he offered him the praṇāmas. This incident is significant in the context of the social revolution of his type and time. Mahāvira and the Buddha brought about a tremendous social change emphasising the equality among men. No one is inferior to the other. This was the beginning of the social revolution for equality and fraternity among men. Later philosophers like Basavēśvara in the South, strengthened the process of ushering equality among men. In our time we have seen the great movement of the Mahatma Gandhi who brought in awareness of our responsibilities towards the weaker sections of our society. He spiritualised political activity. We continue the traditions laid down by greatmen. Now Mahāvira left the palace and went to the garden called Khaṇḍavāna at the outskirts of the town Kunda-pura and sitting under the Āśoka tree, he took the vow of Pravraja. It was the tenth day of the darker half of Mārgaśīra month. Prince Mahāvira become the Sramāṇa Mahāvira. Jayadhavala mentions that at that time Mahāvira was of 28 years, seven months and twelve days.10 After taking to sanyasa Mahāvira practised severe penance for 12 years. Jaina Puraṇaṣas give graphic description of the days of Sanyasa and the horrifying experiences he had to undergo while wandering from place to place in quest of
truth. Mahavira had to undergo numerous hardships and indignities during his sanyasa period. The story of his sanyasa is surcharged with mythical content. Some incidents may help us to understand the personality of Mahavira and the firm determination to pursue the course of a pravrata.

i) One day Mahavira was sitting for meditation. A cowherd was grazing his cattle nearby. He wanted to go out for some time. He said to Mahavira to look after his bullocks for some time. But Mahavira was engrossed in meditation. The cows strayed away quite a long distance. The cowherd came back he could not find his bullocks. He searched and searched, but was of no avail. Through-out the night he searched. The next morning he saw the bullocks were sitting by the side of Mahavira who was meditating. The cowherd thought the sanyasi had played mischief with him. He wanted to thrash him. Then, the story goes, Indra intervened and said to the cowherd 'Do not think that Mahavira is a thief'. He is prince. He has given up everything and has become a sanyasi. Please offer your prapamas to him. The cowherd, repenting for his thoughtless action, fell prostrate before Mahavira and asked forgiveness.

ii) Mahavira was sitting under the tree for meditation. A poor Brahmin came to him and begged for something for a gift. He could not believe that a prince could not have anything with him. Mahavira had given up everything. He had only one piece of cloth (devadusya). He gave it to the Brahmin.

iii) In his wanderings, Mahavira came to a place called Astigrama. He chose a fearful place for his meditation at night, although the villagers pleaded with him not to go there, because there was a Yaksa who would create enormous difficulties for him. Throughout the night the Yaksa gave him severe and frightening tortures. But Mahavira was unperturbed. He was engrossed in deep meditation. The Yaksa repented in the end. He asked for forgiveness. Mahavira forgave him. The reward for evil was good. A heavenly deity called Devadaja saw how difficult it was to practise penance and to attain the end of self-realisation. He offered his services to Mahavira and said, 'Sir, I have seen how
difficult it is to practise self-control and penance in the midst of innumerable difficulties. I should like to offer myself for your services during these years for your sadhaka period’’. But, Mahāvira said, ‘‘Devarâja, I thank you for your offer. But self-realisation has to be attained through self-effort only. No outside agency will help nor should we depend on the services of others’’.20

iv) Once Mahāvira was going to a village called ‘Bacala’. The passers by advised him not to go in the shortest route, because there was a huge deadly cobra. It was called Caṇḍa-Kousika. No one would be safe in that place. Mahāvira wanted to see that the place became free from the pestilence of that deadly serpent. He went by that path. The Caṇḍa-Kousika rushed with fury and bite him. But strange to say instead of injuring him, the snake felt that nothing would happen to him. Mahāvira said, ‘‘O, Caṇḍa-Kousika, why do you unnecessarily harass the people here. Is it not sufficient that you are suffering for your past deeds in the previous life?’’. The serpent repented and took back the poison. This story has an element of belief in the past lives and the concept of rebirth. The concept of rebirth plays an important part in all the stories in Indian mythology. We will refer to it later.

Thus we find that Mahāvira had to undergo enormous physical and metal tortures during the period of the sadhaka. These were the upasargas. Dīgambara tradition mentions that the seventh Twenty third and the last tīrthankara had to suffer the upasargas.21 Uttarapurāṇa also mentions some of the upasargas.22 But in Ācarāṅga-nirṇyukti there is the mention that Mahāvira alone of the 24 tīrthankaras had to suffer upasarga. The tapas of others was nirupasarga.23 Upasargas were an aid to the purification of dhyāna. As the gold is purified in the fire, so the dhyāna of the sadhaka has to be purified by suffering the upasarga (torture) patiently.

In this way Śramaṇa Mahāvira wandered from place to place practising penance. A Śramaṇa cannot reside in a place for a long time. He has to move from village to village. In the rainy season alone, he is permitted to stay in a place. It is Varsavāsa.
v) There is a pathetic but the ennobling incident of the offering of food by Candana. Candana was the youngest daughter of king Cētaka. She was the sister of Mahāvīra's mother Trīśala. Once young Candanabala was playing in the garden of her palace. She was young and beautiful. A Vidyādhara (heavenly deity) was fascinated by her beauty. He kidnapped her; but being afraid of his wife, he left her in the forest. In the forest she was caught by a hunter named Dhanadattu. He sold her to a merchant called Urṣabhadatta. The merchant was kind-hearted. He treated her very kindly, not as a slave but as his daughter. But being young and beautiful and as ill-luck would have it, the merchant's wife became suspicious and she began to give her all kinds of trouble. She was chained in the dungeon and coarse food was given to her.

Once Sramaṇa Mahāvīra was coming in the town for food. The entire town was eager to receive him. Candanabala heard of this news. She was sad. She wanted to offer food to Sramaṇa Mahāvīra. But she had only coarse food that was given to her. She yearned for the opportunity for giving food. Her pious and sincere desire to offer food to Mahāvīra broke off all the chains she rushed to the street and offered the same coarse food. Mahāvīra accepted the food with all grace. The merchant and his wife came o know that the princess was in their house, and not a slave. She was to be sent to her place with all protocol and grace. But Candana was disgusted with the transience and sufferings of this world. She decided to take to the life of 'Pravrajya'. Candana became the first to take renunciation. She was the Heads of the Āryika sangha.²⁴

Sramaṇa Mahāvīra spent 12 years of severe penance moving from place to place and observing silence. Śvetāmbara tradition says that Mahāvīra, during the Varṣāvāsa period used to give discourses. But in the Acarangasūtra Tika by Sīlānka there is the mention of the practice of silence by Mahāvīra during the Sādhaka period Dhavala describes the period of his ascetic life as 12 years and 5 and half months.²⁵ And he came to the village called Jmbhika near Rājagṛha. He sat under the tree Sila tree on the banks of the river Ṛjukūla. It was the tenth day of the brighter half of Vaiśaka (Vaiśaka āukla daśami). All the ghāti karmas were
destroyed and the ascetic Mahāvira got enlightenment. He attained the highest state of omniscience and attained the state infinite knowledge (ananta jñāna), infinite intuition (ananta darśana), ananta virya (infinite energy) and ananta sukha infinite bliss. He became the sarva darśi (all-knowing). And there was the noble transformation in the environment. The living beings who were naturally and instinctively to each other like the deer and the lion, the cow and the tiger, sat together under shade of the tree experiencing peace and joy. This is not perhaps mere phantasy. Love begets love. Under the peaceful manner of the intense nobility of love, one can experience the pure and supreme joy and peace. Peaceful co-existence is a possibility under the cool shade of love. Patañjali therefore describes “that we give up enmity under the influence of non-violence”. Ahimśa pratisthāyam tatsannidhou vairutyaṅgaḥ.

Sramaṇa Mahāvira got the enlightenment. He was now Bhagavān Mahāvira. There was rejoicing everywhere. All the living creatures, including the heavenly deities were eager to listen to his sermons. The Samavasarāṇa was to be formed wherein all the creatures were to assemble to listen to him. But Mahāvira remained silent. He did not preach the religion that had ripened after patient ascetic practices and the attainment of enlightenment. He wandered about in silence during that period for 66 days without preaching. Lord Mahāvira was in search of a competent disciple, well versed in the Darśanas (Philosophy) and a seer of high order, who could understand his teachings and interpret the same in simple and effective way to all those who hunger and thirst after righteousness. Indra, with his clairvoyant knowledge could understand the difficulties and preceded to find out suitable and competent disciples. He went to Indrabhuti Gautama a great Brahminical scholar and said to him, “Sir, my master has given this verse. He is now observing silence”. Would you explain to me the significance of this verse ?

“Pañceva atthikāya chajjivanikāya mahavvaya pañca I
Atthaya pavayanamada saheuo bandha mokkho II

Indrabhuti Gautama desired to meet Mahāvira and discuss with him the implications of this verse and get some of his doubts
cleared. In the meantime, Mahāvīra after 66 days of wandering in silence, went to the Mount Vipulagiri. The samavasaraṇa was formed and huge gathering assembled there to listen to the enlightened one. Indrabhūti Gautama came to the mountain with his brothers and disciples. Lord Mahāvīra gave the sermon and the audience was spell-bound. The great scholars like Indrabhūti and his brother Agnibhūti and their disciples were impressed by the profound teachings. Then Mahāvīra addressed Indrabhūti, and said unto him “Oh Indrabhūti, you have doubts about the self-evident nature of the self”. Indrabhūti was surprised, because he had not even talked a word about his lingering doubts. Mahāvīra said “Self is pratyakṣa (self-evident), and no proofs would be needed to demonstrate the existence of the self either through sense experience or through the means reasoning and intellectual discrimination. The foundational principle ‘I think’ leads to the establishment of self-evidence of the self. The very fact that I am aware of my experiences, like doubting and memory lead to the establishment of the self-evidence of this fundamental truth. The attributes of the self like thinking imagination and doubting are experienced. The substance of the attributes must also be self-evident. Just as the experience of the attributes and modes lead to the establishment of the substance, so also the experiences of the modes of the self lead to the establishment of the self. Here we are reminded of the attempts of modern Western Philosopher, Rene Descartes, to prove the existence of self by means of its activity like thinking, “I think; therefore I am”. Indrabhūti could understand this concept. He found it difficult to understand the problem of the knowledge of other selves. Could we understand the otherselves through observation of the behaviour of others on the basis of our own experience and behaviour on the grounds of analogy? Could we prove the existence of other selves on this ground? Mahāvīra explained the problem with reference to the cognitive functions of the senses and the sense organs. The senses are only response functions of the stimuli. They cannot experience the sense-functions. There must be an experiencer. Just as Devadatta experiences the external world through the five windows, so also the self experiences the external world through the five senses and mind as the quasi-sense. The jīva (the self) is different from the body. Jīva is characterised by consciousness
and Upayoga (home) while body is unconscious (ja\da). The existence of the self is a presupposition. But from the point of view of pure knowledge, omniscient cognition, “the self is pratyaksa to me, just as your doubt is pratyaksa”. Such cognition is pure, “Clear and distinct” free from ‘ragadve\sa’ attachment and aversion.

Indrabhuti was again tormented by the doubt whether, just as the modes of self in the experiences in the empirical world are not permanent, so also the empirical self is impermanent. Mahavira, explained the distinction between pure self (atman) and empirical self (Bahir\atman). The self is pure and perfect, it is eternal; it is indestructible. We have referred to the problems in brief. The doubts of Indrabhuti Gautama were cleared. He was satisfied. The great scholar became the disciple of Mahavira with his five hundred followers. He became a pravraja. He was designated the first Gaya\advara of Bhagavan Mahavira. Agnibhuti got his doubts cleared about the doctrine of karma. “O, Agnibhuti ‘Karma is pratyaksa to me, the omniscient one, just as your doubt is pratyaksa to me.” Mahavira convinced Agnibhuti about the principle of karma as the operating principle in the shaping of our personality. Then Vayubhuti presented his doubts about the relation of the body as material and consciousness and self as different principle. Can it not be said, asked Vayubhuti, that consciousness and what we call our self is nothing but the product of the material elements of the body, and consciousness as the product of the metabolic changes in the body, just as the mixture, of the gh\ataki flower and gaggery gives rise to intoxicating liquor? The soul and consciousness are not different from the body. Therefore, could we not say that when the body is destroyed, the soul is also destroyed? Mahavira said that the soul is different from the body. The soul cannot be created by the combination of the material elements. Each element of the components cannot be considered to have the characteristics of a substance different from the material elements. Otherwise we could get oil from sand also. The Atman is different from body and sense-organs. It is eternal. It is indestructible. It is the spiritual substance. Mahavira explained the permanence of the self on the basis of the memory and recognition of the previous births. Vayubhuti was satisfied and with great reverence for the master, he took the vows of pravraja along with
500 of his followers.\textsuperscript{51} In this way 11 Ganudharas, along with their five hundred followers each, became disciples of Mahavira.

We shall discuss the philosophical aspects of Jainism in the next part. We shall also present the brief picture of the pontifical hierarchy in the next section.

In his first sermon at Vipulacala mountain, and the subsequent sermons at Rajagaha and other places, Bhagavan Mahavira presented the essence of Jainism in the fundamental principles of Ahimsa, Anekanta, and Aparigraha. He said that everything has its origin, permanence of the nucleus and the modes. The Dravya (substance) and the paryaya (modes) are equally real. There is diversity in unity. To deny the reality of diversity and multiplicity and to assert the exclusive reality of unity is dogmatic (ekanta). In the same way it is equally dogmatic to deny reality to the unity and the assert the exclusive reality to diversity. The one and the many are equally real. Reality is complex. It can be looked at from different points of view. Each point of view gives an aspect of reality which is equally real but partially real. But to assert that the picture of reality present from a particular point of view is the only real, is to be one-sided and dogmatic Anekanta expresses the Catholic approach to the problems of reality. Non-violence (ahimsa) is the expression of the spirit of anekanta in the sphere of action. And anekanta is intellectual non-violence. Similarly the spirit of anekanta pervades the life and thought of Jainas. Aparigraha is the expression of the spirit of anekanta in the social sphere of ethics. More about it in the next part.

Indrabhuti Gautama acquired the kinds of knowledge mati, sruta, avadhi (clairvoyance) and manahparyaya (telepathic cognition) at the moment of his diksha. Then he imbibed the essence of the teachings of the master. With his vast knowledge of the Vedas as the background, he could become the master of transcendental knowledge. The 12 Aṅgas and 14 Pūrvas were composed\textsuperscript{52} His brothers Agnibhuti and Vayubhuti mastered the Aṅgas and the Pūrvas.
Bimbasara (Srenika) king of Magadha heard of the Samavasara of Mahavira on the mount Vipulacala. He went to the mount for darśana of the tirthankara and listened to the sermon. He was supremely happy and offered his praṇamas to the prophet. On this day Candana, the daughter of king Cēṣaka of Vaiśali, took the vow of pravrajya and took to renunciation. She became the first Āryika (nun) and became the head of the Āryika Sangha (order). The first sermon was given on the early hours of the morning of the 1st day of dark half of the Śrāvaṇa month (Śrāvaṇa krīṣṇa pratipada).

In this way Bhagavan Mahavira went about the places preaching the religion of anekanta and ahimsa for nearly thirty years. In his itinerary, he visited important places like Kosi, Kosala, Vatsa, Campa, Pañcala, Magadha, Rajagṛha, Āṅga, Vaṅga and Kalinga and other important places. Those who heard the teachings were enobled by the pure and perfect words of the prophet. The Jaina canonical works, like Trisāṭṭi, Bhagavati, Mahavira Cariyaṁ, Harivaṁśa-purāṇa, and a host of other works have given graphic description of the wanderings of Mahāvira and the benefit that the people derived from his noble teachings.

Bhagavan Mahāvira went to BrahmaṇaKuṇḍa after completing his 23rd Varṣāvaṇa (stay in the rainy season). Vanjyagava Jamali, with his disciples, was staying in that village. He came to Mahāvira and said, ‘Sir, if you permit me, I shall move to another place with 500 disciples’. Mahāvira was silent. Thrice did Jamali ask this question and thrice was he silent. From BrahmaṇaKuṇḍa he went to Vatsa desa, Kosi Raśtra and then to Rajagṛha. In this place there were the followers, of Parśva. They were practising Cānurāṇa (four-fold vows). Indrabhuti Gautama arrived, during his wandering, to Rajagṛha. He found that there were many followers of Parśva practising the four vows. He asked Mahāvira the reason for the modification of the four vows to the five vows of Mahāvira. Mahāvira explained that it was necessary to expand the fourth vow of uparigraha so as to include the practice of Brahmacarya. Brahmacarya became the fifth vow. He also explained the concept of Saṃyama (self-control) and the state of perfection is possible by the attainment of ‘akriyapana’ (non-activity) after the destruction of all forms of karma.
Having spent his Varsavasa in Rajagaha, Mahavira went to Campa. The king Ajatasatru (Kunika) had made this city his capital. He was received by the king with great reverence. There is a detailed description of the reception of Mahavira by Kunika in the Aupapattika-Sutra. There is a controversy regarding the faith that King Kunika of Campa was following. It has been suggested that he was a Buddhist. It has also been suggested that he was following the Jaina faith and the follower of Mahavira's teachings. The Buddhists and the Jainas both claimed him as one of themselves. "The Jaina claim appears to be well founded."

Radhakumud Mukarjee also thinks that the Jaina claim that king Kunika was a Jaina, appears to be more cogent. For us the problem is not very much relevant for ascertaining this historical incident. One thing is certain that at the time of Kunika, both Buddha and Mahavira being contemporaries moved about preaching their own teachings from place to place. Both visited different places like Rajagaha, Sravasti, Campa and other places in Magadha and Vaishali. Both were received with respect by the kings and peoples of these places. There did not seem to be confrontation or rivalry between the two faiths. But strange to say, Buddha and Mahavira never met. There is an incident mentioned how Buddha and Mahavira showed great respect to each other. Buddha expressed his regard to Mahavira whenever he talked about him to his disciples. Once Buddha went to Vaishali and there he said to Simha, his disciple, "Simha, your family has been serving Niggaathas for a long period. When they arrive you should not refrain from giving them alms". Buddha said to Upali, when the great Niggaaththa Nataputta (Mahavira) was moving along with a large number of disciples, "Your family has been serving the Niggaathas for a long time: when they arrive, you should not refrain from serving them with alms." During the stay of Mahavira at Campa many princes and common men took the vows of renunciation. The sons of King Srenika, like Padma, Mahapadma, Bhadra, Subhadra and others took the vow. Then Mahavira went to the Videha country. After his Varsavasa at Mithila he went towards Vaishali and he was camping at Sravasti. Mankhaliputta Gosala was also camping there. He had seperated himself from the Sangha of Mahavira and declared that he was also a jina. Gautama went to Mahavira and asked whether the claim of Mankhaliputta Gosala to be the Jina
could be acceptable and true. Mahâvîra said, “Gautama, Manikhalitputta Gosaîa is not the Jina, but Jina prâjapâ (Professing to be Jina but anti Jina). Gosaîa heard of this and was infuriated. He had not conquered the passions and emotions. He was angry with Mahâvîra and did his utmost to hit him hard somehow. But he could not succeed. At last he repented and destroyed himself with extreme tortures and sufferings.\(^4^2\)

Bhâgâvân Mahâvîra now reached the city of Vaiśāli, the capital of Videha. And there was raging a furious and famous war called “Mahâsilakântaka Yuddha”. It was a furious war between king Kuniku Ajâtaśatru and king Cetaka of Vaiśāli. On both sides were huge armies. On the side of Cetaka there were the 18 kings of Kâshi and Kośala, the nine Maillas and the nine Licchavis with their huge armies. The fierce battle went on for ten days. Cetaka was defeated. Cetaka had to enter the fray not for the sake of any gain or aggrandisement nor for any ambitious designs. He had to fight the famous battles for the sake of giving protection to the two brothers, Itala and Vitalla kumara. We mention this incident because it has historical reference. The description of Mahâsilakântaka Yuddha is to be found in the Jainâ and the Buddhist literature as well. The Bhâgavati sūtra gives the description of the battles Rasa musala Saṅgrāma with reference to Mahâvîra’s mention of it to Gautama, and his prophecy.\(^4^3\) Mahâsilakântaka yuddha was staged in the historical perspective in the development of the teachings of Buddha and Mahâvîra. In this itinerary Bhâgavân Mahâvîra went to Hastinapura. At that time Indrabhuti Gautama was in Śrâvasti along with his disciples. There, in Śrâvasti, in the Tinduka Udyâna (Garden named Tinduka), Śramaṇa Keśi was camping with his disciples. Indrabhūti Gautama and Keśikumara discussed about the four fold vows of Parśva and the five-fold vows preached by Mahâvîra.\(^4^4\) Regarding the conceptual discussions of the distinction between the four-fold and the five-fold vows we have already referred to it earlier. On this topic, Jarl Charpentier, in his Introduction to the Uttarâdhyayana sūtra says, “I feel convinced that there is preserved in this lecture a kernal of real old tradition concerning the differences in the opinion between the two ancient divisions of the Church, the followers of Parśva, who seem to have kept a somewhat less severe rule of asceticism and those of Mahâvîra”.\(^4^5\)
Mahāvira preached the doctrine for thirty years as tirthankara moving from place to place, towns and villages. Thousands of men, including the kings, princes and the common men, accepted his teachings and took the vows of śravaka (lay follower) or the Pravrajā (muni) according to their capabilities. His tīrtha consisting of the four orders of 1) Muni (Monks) 2) Āryikās (nuns) 3) Śrāvaka (householder) and 4) Śrāvika (women householder followers) increased by leaps and bounds. The Saṅgha that he built was severe, organised and disciplined. But in the case of the Buddha, his Saṅgha was large but not built on solid foundations of discipline, but on the principles of the middle path. It was for this reason, perhaps, the disintegration of the Saṅgha and easy modifications were more possible more in the Buddhist Saṅgha than in the Jaina order of the Saṅgha. The Jainas have not increased in their tribe but have retained their original tradition to a great extent. The Buddhist tradition has undergone decaying changes and taken new patterns different from the original Buddha's Saṅgha. It was perhaps for this reason of the severity of discipline and the clinging to the original tradition that the Jaina order has not swelled in numbers but has remained steady in India; while the Buddhist tradition has almost disappeared from its motherland and has shown itself in other Asiatic countries in unrecognisable and varied forms.

We may, here, refer to some of the salient features of the lives and teachings of Mahāvira and Buddha and conceptual analysis of teachings. Buddhism and Jainism have enriched the cultural heritage of India. The two belong to the Sramanīc current of thought. They have influenced the Indian Weltanschauung by presenting some fundamental metaphysical and moral concepts which were assimilated in the main stream of Indian thought. There have been some striking similarities in the incidents of the lives of Buddha and Mahāvira and their forms of teaching, although there are fundamental differences in their metaphysical standpoints. And there appears to be a common social canvas on which the lives of the two and their teachings were set. The fundamental concepts of their life incidents and teachings need to be studied in the panoramic picture with the historical and sociological setting. A few of the concepts may be mentioned:
1) The historical Buddha called ‘Sākya muni’ was the last of the Buddhas in this eon. He began to prepare himself to this task thousands of years ago under the guidance of Dipankara, the first Buddha. The Buddha was at that time a Brahmin young boy named Mēgha. He bowed to Dipankara. And then said the Perfect one, Dipankara, “You shall be, young Brahmin, in a future period, after an immeasurable and incalculable time, in Kapilavastu, a tathāgata by name Sākyamuni, an Ārhat, a fully enlightened Buddha. 46

Similar incident has been mentioned in describing the gradual preparation of Mahāvīra, the twenty-fourth Tīrthāṅkara, for the attainment of perfection. The first tīrthāṅkara, Rṣabha, thousands of years ago realised, by the Kāvala Jñāna, that his grandson Marici would be the last tīrthāṅkara, Vardhamāna Mahāvīra. Rṣabha, the first tīrthāṅkara said to his son Bharata that Marici, his son would be the last tīrthāṅkara, Vardhamāna Mahāvīra. There are many such parallel situations in the mythical content of the lives of both the prophets, Buddha and Mahāvīra. 47

2) The mother of Siddhārtha Gautama, like the mother of Mahāvīra dreamt a dream that an elephant entered her body. We have referred to the incident of dream and the dream analysis in the earlier section.

3) It has been said that when Siddhārtha Gautama left his home taking the vow of renunciation, he first moved about like the Nīgīgantika muni in the forest. We have discussed this incident with reference to Buddha’s saying to the disciple, Sariputta. He then came to the conclusion that extreme indulgence in pleasure and extreme self-denial are both to be avoided Buddha preached the middle path (madhyama mārga).

4) The doctrine of ahimsā has played an important part in the Jaina and the Buddhist ethics. Buddha was compassionate and he was averse to causing slightest injury to any living being. For the sake of liberation, one should give up causing injury to the vitalities of living beings. 48 Buddha instructed his disciples to see that the remains of the food after eating should be thrown devoid
of living beings. Sramaṇa Gautama does not eat at night and he keeps himself aloof from destroying the seeds and group of beings. The protection of vegetable life should also be cared by the monks. In describing the daily conduct of monks, it is said that they should avoid destruction of seeds and creatures; such as grown through roots, grown through trunks, grown through fruit, grown through fruit stem and grown through seeds. In the Dīga-Nikāya it has been stated that the form of yajña which is performed with ghee and oil and without any form of injury is the true yajña.

The Jaina conception of ahimsa is all pervading. For Jainism, ahimsa is the cardinal ethical principle. Ahimsa paramāduḥkharinah is the primary motto of Jainism. Jainism forbids any one to cause injury to any living being however small it may be or a life force of an organism (pṛāṇa) directly with our own hands, by causing some one to do so, on our behalf or giving consent to the act of injury caused by others. Himsa has been defined as injury caused to the living organism due to carelessness and negligence and actuated by passions like pride and prejudice, attachment and hatred. Jainas give importance to the psychic violence which must be avoided. Harbouring the wish to harm constitutes psychic violence. Acharāṅga-sūtra gives detailed description of the codes of conduct of the monks in practising ahimsa and other vrataś. In the Ratnakarapāḍaka-Sravakacāra, we get the description of the social morality for the Laymen for practising the vrataś in the form of aanu-vrataś. Non-violence is not mere non-injury in the negative sense. It has a positive content in the expression of love and compassion. Buddha was the embodiment of compassion. Religion of Jesus is the religion of love. In this sense, there is identity of expression of love and compassion in Buddhism, Jainism and Christianity.

Yet, it has been suggested that the Buddha and Buddhism had to compromise their position in the practice of ahimsa. It is said that monks and the laymen were permitted to eat flesh. Certain references are quoted in this connection. It was maintained that Buddha allowed the monks to eat flesh of the animals killed not for their sake. Buddha is supposed to have accepted a meal from
the Jaina General Siha who had provided meat. The report was that he killed an ox for the sake of Buddha. It has also been reported that Buddha ate the flesh of a pig (sukara maddava) at a meal given to him by Candā, a blacksmith.

But, it is difficult to believe that such a conception of permitting to eat flesh for the monks and the lay-men was preached by Buddha as it would not be consistent with the abounding love and compassion, almost superhuman, that Buddha embodied in himself. It is very much unlikely that such a wide-spread and inconsistent concession to the practice of ahimsa was seriously entertained as a principle of conduct, although there must have been stray references to eating of flesh depending on the circumstances that the Buddhist monks had to face after Buddha’s Nirvāṇa. For instance, (i) it is difficult to believe that the Jaina commander, Siha killed an ox for the sake of providing a meal to Buddha. It seems impossible. It must have been a form of a parody. (ii) The last meal of Buddha with the Blacksmith Candā might not have contained the flesh of a pig. ‘Sukara maddava’ was also translated as some form of peas or rice (iii) In the Lankāvatāra-sūtra there is explicit prohibition from eating flesh. The followers of Buddha should not eat flesh, and one who is kind and compassionate to animals cannot eat flesh, as it involves killing of animals for whatever motivation. It appears that when the Lankāvatāra-sūtra vigorously protested against the eating of flesh which was the practice when Buddhism entered Ceylon. The Pali texts mentioning the concession for eating flesh must have been written at that time. And Lankāvatāra-sūtra was a vigorous protest against that practice.

5) Buddha and Mahāvīra were against the sacrificial rites in which the animals were sacrificed. They protested against sacrifices and held that sacrificial rites would not bring lasting peace to man. If by sacrificing a goat at the altar of Yajña, the performer of sacrifice would go to heaven, it is much better for the person to sacrifice himself at the altar. Buddha said ‘I do not approve of sacrifices; for I do not care for happiness which is sought at the price of other’s sufferings. “That sacrifice is glorious in which the cows and the goats are not killed...even the grass is not cut. One who follows the vrātas performs the real sacrifice.” Mahāvīra
protested against the elaborate ritualism of worship and causing of injury to animals at the altar of sacrifices. The vigorous protests of Buddha and Mahāvira against killing of animals during sacrifices had the salutary effect on the minds of the people. As Radhakrishnan says, the Upaniṣads also, like Buddhism, protested against the practice of killing animals during the sacrifice.61 In the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, we are asked to meditate on horse sacrifice.62 But, as Radhakrishnan, says, the authors of the Upaniṣads were cautious enough to give mild protests so as not to disturb the social stability.63

6) Buddha and Mahāvira were against caste distinctions that have vitiated the lives of the innocent people in society for centuries. Buddha said that one cannot become a Brahmin by birth: one does not become an outcaste by birth. One becomes a Brahmin or an outcaste by acts.64 “The Brahmin who has removed all sinfulness, who is free from haughtiness, from impurity, is self-restrained and an accomplished master of knowledge... is the true Brahmin.65 Mahāvira decried caste system which brought misery and inequality among men. No one is inferior to another man. No one is a Brahmin by virtue of his birth or a kṣatriya by virtue of his birth. One is a Brahmin or kṣatriya by virtue of his actions.66 Similarly, one cannot become an ascetic by pulling one’s hair on the head (keśalocana) or a Brahmin by repeating Onkāra mantra, a muni by residing in a forest nor an ascetic by wearing the bark of trees as clothes.67 One has to experience the fruits of karma. He cannot be free from the bondage of karma.

In the chandogya Upaniṣad we get a similar protest but in milder form. Satyakāma Jābali went to Gautama, son of Haridrumat and said, ‘I wish to become a Brahmācārin’. He explained that he did not know of what family he belonged. His mother conceived him in her youth when she was a servant. ‘I am Satyakama, the son of Jābali. He was then initiated, as “no one but a true Brahmin would thus speak out.”68

7) Buddha and Mahāvira did not claim to present new theories. They revived and regenerated the concepts in the Sramānic tradition. Mahāvira did adopt the teachings of the
twenty third tirthankara Parśvanatha and modified them in respect of the number of vratas to be practised by the monks and the laymen alike. Buddha said that Tathāgata had no theories of his own. Buddha did not feel that he was announcing a new religion. Radhakrishnan says that Buddha carried the tradition of the Upaniṣads. 69

8) Buddha and Mahāvira were not fatalists. They taught that we are shaped by the karma that we earn by our activity. The statement Kurmanye radhikārasre presented in the Bhagavadgītā, can well be interpreted in the light of the teachings of the two prophets as: ‘We are the masters of our own karma’. We earn the karma that accures to us and we only are responsible for the fruits of the deeds that we do.

9) In this sense, we have not to depend on the grace of any higher being and even of God. For the Jainas it is not necessary to surrender to any higher being, nor to ask for any divine favours for the individual to reach the highest goal of perfection. There is no place for divine grace; there is emphasis on individual efforts in the moral and spiritual struggle for self-realisation. 70 Buddha said to his disciples “And now, brother, I take leave of you; all the constituents of beings are transitory; work for your own salvation with diligence”. 71 These were the last words of Buddha.

Mahāvira was now 72 years old. For nearly 30 years he went about the country preaching the religion of anekamā, ahimsā and aparigraha. He reached the last lap of his journey. He came to Pava. Raja Hastipala was ruling the country. The Samavasāraṇa was arranged. Mahāvira gave the last sermon at Pava. He was in the garden. He sat for his last meditation in the centre of the lake on a fine slab of stone. It was in the early hours of the 14th day of the dark fortnight of Karika (Karika caturdāśi). 72 He was deeply engrossed in the highest form of meditation called the ‘Sukladhyana’. He attained the state of Nirvāṇa in 527 B.C. All the aśhati karmas were destroyed. His perfection was the consummation devoutly wished for. Uttarapurāṇa describes the attainment of nirvāṇa by Mahāvira in graphic terms. 73 One thousand munis attained the siddhahood along with him. At this time,
Gautama Gaṇadhara was out of station. At the same time elsewhere Gautama attained the enlightenment (Kevalajñāna). The Nirvāṇa of Mahāvīra was celebrated with great serenity in which the kings and the princes of 9 mallas, 9 licchavis and of 18 Kāśi and Kośala kings and thousands of the lay followers participated. For over two thousand and five hundred years now the Jainas have been observing this day with serenity as the day of illumination. It is the Dipotsavaday. It is the Dipavali day.

At the time of Mahāvīra's nirvāṇa, the tīrtha of the tīrthankara was very large and organised. Kalpa-sūtra describes the enormous number of his followers in different orders. There were 14 thousand monks including the top-ranking 11 gaṇadharas, 36 thousand Śramaṇīs (nuns), there were one lakh and 59 thousand Śravakas (lay followers); 3 lakh and 18 thousand Śrāvikās (Women householders).

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3. : Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy pp. 281.
4. a) Tiloyapaṇṇatti: 4, 549.
   “Siddhāttarāya piyakārinī hi nayarammi kunḍala viro I
   Uttara phagguṇirikkhe citta siya terasie uppanno” II

b) Nirvāṇabhakti:
   “Caitra sita phalguni sasankayogc dinc trayodaśa I
   Jajne svoccasthesu graheśu soumyesu śubhalagne” II

c) Jayadhavala: 1, 76-77.
“Asadha jonhapakkha-chhatthie kundapuranagarahiva-
nahavamsa
siddhattha narindassa tisaladevie gabbhamagantuna
tattha attha divasahiya navamase acchiya caittasukkha
terasie rattie uttara phalguni nakkhatte gabbhado nikkhanto
vaddhamana jinindo”


   Note: Uttarādhyāyana does not mention the Tindusaka kriṣā.


    “Adha tam ammapitare janitta adhiya atthavasayam I
    kutasoutualankaram tehayariassa uvanenti” II

11. Triśaṭi : 10, 2, 138-146.

12. a) Avasyaka cūṇi : 00.269.

   b) Avasyaka-Malagiri : 267.


15. Sīhanāṇa : 5, 3, 543.
    “Paṇca titthayara kumaravasamajjhe vasitta mundajava
    pavvaiya tam jaha : vasupujje, malli, arithanemi pase, viśe”

   a) Padma-puruṣa :
    “Vasupujyo mahāviro mallih pārāvo yaduttamah
    Kumāra nirgata gehat Pṛthipatyuopare”
b) *Harivamsapurana* : 60, 214.

"Niśkriyantirvāsupūjyasya mahānemīṣījanantyaoc I
Pañcanaṁ tu kumāranaṁ rājāṁ śeṣajīnesinām" II


"Martuvayattane suhmatulam devakāmam seviunam vasai I
atthavisām sattā ya māse divase yā barasayam II
Aminibhiya buddho cchattena ya maggasīsa bahulae I
dasamie nikkhanto sura mahido nikkhamannupujjo" II

17. a) *Āvosiyaucūrṇī* : 274.

b) *Mahāvira-carīyam* : 5, 154.

c) *Trīśaṣṭi* : 10, 3, 29-31.


"Sattama tīvisantima titthayaranam ca uvasaggo"’


"Savvesi tavo kammaṁ niruvasuggaṁ tu vanniyaṁ jīnānaṁ
navaram tu vaddhamānassāvasaggam muniyaṁvam" II


"Nānāvidhāḥ bipatato ghorāṁ pariṣahopasarganapi sahamano
mahasattvatatvayamlecchanapyupasamanam nayata-
dvādasavargaṁi
sādhaka chadmasto mounavratti tapasoācara"


27. ibid 1557-1579.

28. ibid 1611-1612.

29. ibid 1642.

30. ibid 1671.

31. ibid 1686.

32. Tiloyapaṇṇatti: 1, 78-79.

"Vimale godama gotte jadēṇaṁ indabhuti nāmeṇa I
cau veda pārāgeṇaṁ sisseṇa visuddha silena II
Bhāvasuda pājayaheṁ parināda mayina varasaṅganaṁ I
Coddasa puvvānaṁ taha ekkamuhuttena viracina vihido II"

33. Harivamśapurana: 2, 70.

"Sutta Cetakarajasya kumāri candana tada I
Dhoutaikabarasaṁvita jataryanaṁ purah sari II"

34. Tiloyapaṇṇatti: 1, 69-70.

"Vāsassa paḍhama māse sāvana nāmammi bahulapadivaṁ I
abhijinakhattammi ya uppatti dhammatītthassa II
Sāvana bahule padiva uddmuhutte suhodae ravino I
Abhijassa paḍhama joc jugassa adi imassa puḍham II"


36. Bhagavati: 2, 5.

"Savane nāne vinnāne paccakkhane ya saṅjame I
Anannhave tave ceva vodane akiriya siddhi II"

37. Aupapāṭika sūtra: 12.


40. *Aṅguttara-Nikāya*: 8–2, 1, 7.


42. *Bhagavati-satīka*: 15

   “Goyama, Rahamusale na saṅgame vatthamāne ege rahe anasae asarahie anarohae samusale mahaya–mahaya janavahāṁ janappamahāṁ jahasamvatthakappamruhira –kaddāṁ karemāne savvao samanta paridhavitta se tenatthena java rahamusale saṅgame”


45. Jarl Charpentier: *Introduction to Uttarādhyayana* refers to the conclusion drawn by Jacobi (H) in the S.B.E. XLV: pp. 119.

46. *Buddha Cariya*.

47. *Kathakosa*: of Prabhācandra, 52.


54. Majjhima Nikāya : Sallekha Suttam Atthaman.


56. Aṅguttara Nikāya : 2, 4, 4.


59. Ibid.

60. Majjhima-Nikāya : Jivaka-sutta.


62. Br Upaniṣad : 1, 1, 2.


64. Jainism and Buddhism : Brahmacari Sītalaprasadji.

65. a) Buddhacariyāni : IX, 64.

66. Mahāvira Vāṇi :

   "Kommuṇā bambhano hoi, kammuṇā havai khattio I
   Vaisso kammuṇā hoi, suddo havai kammuṇā II".

67. Ibid.

   "Na vi mundiena samaño na omkhāregya bambhano I
   Na muni ragṇavāseṇa, kusa cireṇa na tavaso II"

68. Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad : 1, 1, 2.

69. Radhakrishnan (S) : Indian Philosophy : pp. 148.

71. *Dhammapada*: Ch xxvi.

72. a) *Jayadhāvala*: I. pp. 81.

"Paccha pavañayare kattiyamāse kinha coddasie I
Sadie rattie sesa rayaṁ cchettu nivvao" II

b) *Tilopaṇṇatti*: 4, 120.

"Kattiyakiuhe coddasi paccuse sādināma nakkhatte I
Pavae nayarie ekko vire saro siddha" II

73. *Uttarāpurāṇa*: parva 63, 509-512.

74. *Kalpasūtra*: 127.

"Jaṁ rayaniṁca naṁ samane java savvadukkhopahine
tam rayaniṁ ca naṁ nava mallai nava licchavi kāśī
kośālga attharasa gaṇa rayano amāvasac
parabhoyam posahovasam patthavai su, gate se
bhavujjovam karissamo"

75. *Harivamśapurāṇa*: 76, 95, 21.

76. *Kalpasūtra*: 127, 147.
EPILOGUE-I

As a prologue to the discussion of the Jaina philosophy and ethics, we may here mention a few verses expressing the fundamental teachings of Lord Mahavira in his sermons in the Samavasarana. It is Mahavira vani.

1. Dharma: Dharma may be rendered not as religion in the traditional sense, nor as mere piety. It is excellence of the spirit, and not mere animal excellence.

Dhammo maṅgalamukkhiṭṭham ahiṁsā sanjamo tavo I
Devā vi tathā namaisanti jassa dhamme saya māno II

Dasavaikalika 1, 1.

One who is steeped in righteousness and has the moral and spiritual excellence practicing non-violence, self-control and tapas (self-discipline, both physical and mental), to him even the Gods bow down in reverence. The Jainas advocate self-effort for the sake of self-realisation. No grace of God of any form is possible nor necessary.

2. Ege dhamma paṭimā, jaṁ se aya pajjavajae I

Sthanāṅga : 1, 1, 40.

Purification of the self is possible only through righteousness, And,

3. Sāmāyaṁ mūḍhe dhammaṁ nābhijanai I

Acarāṅga : 3, 1

One who indulges in the pleasures of the senses will not be able to grasp the importance of self-realisation, of righteousness. Therefore,

4. Ekko hu dhammo, nara-deva, tanoṁ, na vijjai annamihei kinci I

Uttarādhyayana 14, 40.
O, king, dharma alone can protect you and nothing else can help you in this world.

5. Ahiṁśa saccaṁ ca atenagāṁ ca
tatto ya bambhaṁ apariggaṁ ca I
Padivajjiyā paṁca mahavvayāṁ,
Cārijjāṁ dhammaṁ jinadesiyāṁ vidu II

Uttarādhyayana II 2.

The essence of religion consists in the practice of the five vrataḥ (vows): ahiṁśa (non-violence), Satya (truth), asteya (non-stealing) brahma-carya (Celibacy) and aparigraha (non-attachment and non-possession). These vows have graded practice. The munis have to practise the vrataḥ very rigorously as far as the human capacity permits. They are called mahavrataḥ (greater vows). But in the case of the householder or a citizen, he cannot practise the vrataḥ with the same vigour as the munis will be able to do, because he has to perform other social duties and responsibilities. For him, the vrataḥ are to be practised as far as possible, keeping in view the social responsibilities. They are called Agunivrataḥ (lesser vows). We shall discuss about this problem in the Jaina ethics, in part II. And,

Javanti loe pāṇa, tasa aдуva thāvara I
Te janamajanaṁ va, na hane no vi ghayaae II

Uttarādhyayana II a. 1

All living beings, whether moving animals or stationary vegetable kingdom, desire to live. Therefore, we should not injure them either directly by us nor allow others to cause injury to them. We should not hurt them physically, harbour ill-feelings of injury. It is as good as causing injury. We should not talk of hurting them. These are the three ways of injury, physical, mental or injury by speaking harsh things about them.

The Jainas give supreme importance to the vow of non-violence. `Ahiṁśa paramodharmaḥ`. 
“Truth is God” and Taṁ saceṁ khu Bhagavan” (Praśna 2,2), Gandhiji said “Truth is God”.

And we should speak the truth which is pleasant. Do not hurt others with unpleasant truth.

“Bhasiyam hiyaṁ saceṁ”

Uttarādhyayana 19, 28.

Brahmacarya is the practice of celibacy. It has been interpreted in the mahāvrat and anuvrat senses. For the pravrajya (muni), the practice is to be pure and complete. But for the citizen and the lay followers it consists in the contentment one should have with his own wife. All others are his sisters or mothers: and,

“Anāga guṇa ahinā bhavaṁti ekkammi bimbhaçere”

Praśna Vyākaraṇa : 2, 4

The practice of brahmacarya leads to the development of personality and greater self-confidence.

The practice of the Brahmacarya for the lay follower (citizen) has been beautifully described in the Ratnakaraṇḍaka S'ravakacara of Ācārya Samantabhadra (Cārītrādhikāra : 60):

“Na ca paraḍāraṅgacchati na parān
gamayati ca pāpabhitaryat I”
Sa paraḍārānvrttih svadārasantośanāmapi II”

One should be content with one’s wife. One should not indulge in creating situations for indulgence in the other women. More about it in the next part.

Attachment is the expression of parigraha. To desire the possession of objects is parigraha:

“Muccha pariggaho vutto I”

Daśavaikalika : 6, 20
Therefore, we should desire less. We should have least attachment with our possessions.

And Jñāna (knowledge), Śraddhā (faith) and tapa (self-discipline) are the pre-requisites of a righteous life.

Mahāvira was against ritualistic formalities of tapas if the mind were not pure:

We have seen that one cannot become a Śramaṇa by shaving one’s head, he will not become Brahmāṇa by chanting ‘Om kāra’ mantra. One will not be a muni by residing in the forest, not a tapasvi (ascetic) by external ascetic practices.

Samavāc samaṇo hoi bambhacāreṇa bambhaṇo I
Nāpeṇa muṇi hoi, tavena hoi tavaso II

Uttaradhyayana: 25, 32

One becomes a Śramaṇa by acquiring the spirit of equanimity, the practice of brahmacarya will make a brahmāṇa, one can become a muni by knowledge and ascetic by purity of mind, self-discipline.

We have just mentioned glimpses of the fundamental teachings of Mahāvira. We shall study the philosophical implications of the problems of Jaina thought in Part-II of this work.
EPILOGUE – II

1. The study of the problems of Jaina Philosophy requires a brief survey of the source material that we can find in the Jaina canonical literature and the later commentaries on the canonical literature. The fundamental principles of Jainism have been preached to the people for ages by their tirthankaras who may be considered as the prophets of religion. Somehow; the teachings of these prophets up to the time of Pārśva, the 23rd tirthankara are not available for the benefit of mankind. When we go back from history to proto-history we have to fall back upon tradition and secondary sources. It is with Lord Mahāvira, the last tirthankara that we can find ourselves on surer grounds. The original source material for Jainism can be found in the Āgamas and their commentaries.

2. The period of Āgamas may be traced to the time of parinirvāṇa of Mahāvira in 527 B.C. The teachings of Mahāvira has been collected by the Gaṇadharaśu. The conceptual content has been crystallised in the form of sūtras by the disciples. It is sūtrāgama.

Tirthankara Mahāvira preached the doctrine to his Gaṇadharaśus who were the principal disciples. His teachings were oral. Gaṇadharaśus and their disciples downwards formulated the teachings of the master in a systematic way and presented in the form of codified expression. The formulated expression of the teachings of the tirthankara Mahāvira and to some extent of the earlier tirthankaras, is the Saḥdāgrantha. And it forms the beginning of the canonical literature. The teachings of the earlier tirthankaras were incorporated in the Pārvas. The Pārvas contained philosophical discussion which it was difficult for the later generation of followers to definitise and to codify as all the teachings were first transmitted orally from teacher to the pupil for centuries. It is one of the marvels of history that the great teachings of the prophets were transmitted orally for centuries. And the philosophers of the two sections of Jainism (Śvetāmbara and Digambara) are not agreed as to the quantum of the original teachings remaining intact. Some of it must have been efaced. But the essence of the
content of Pūrvas has been incorporated in other works like Aṅgapravīṣṭa literature and the Drṣṭivāda. This problem is not relevant for us.

Without entering into the controversy regarding the extent of the nature of the Āgamas, we shall enumerate the salient features of the Āgamic literature, making a brief mention of the Svetāmbara and Digambara points of view. From the point of view of the structure of the Āgamic literature we have two distinctions: Aṅga Praviṣṭa which consists of the original teachings of Mahāvīra codified by the Gaṇadharas and the explanations given by the elder Muniṣ. From the point of language, canonical literature can be classified into two eras—the first era is from 400 B.C. to 100 A.D. The Āgamas written during this period are in Arūdhāmāgadhi. The second era can be stated to be from 100 A.D. to 500 A.D. and the writings in this period have been in Jaina Mahāraṣṭri Prakrit. The twelvelfold Aṅga literature can be mentioned as: (1) Acarāṅga (2) Sūtrakṛtaṅga (3) Sīhanāṅga (4) Samavaya (5) Vyakhyāprajñāpti, (6) Jñāthadharmakathā (7) Upāsadhyayana; (10) Prāṇavyākaraṇa (11) Vipākasūtra and (12) Drṣṭivāda.

In addition to the Aṅgas we have works which are called Upāṅgas. The term Upāṅga was first used by Ācārya Umasvāti in his Tattvārtha Bhāṣya. Then there are the Cheda sūtras. Daśavai-kalika and Uttaradhayayana are the mūla sūtras. At the basis of all the Canonical and perhaps the earlier part of the Āgamas, are the Pūrvas, which are considered to be the original teachings of tirthankaras. The Pūrvas have presented the subtle metaphysical problems and also the prevailing philosophical schools. There are fourteen pūrvas. There is a difference of opinion among the Svetāmbara and Digambara Scholars regarding the availability of the Pūrvas. The Digambara tradition does not accept the view that the Pūrva literature is not extinct. The original Pūrvas are not to be found, although the essential teachings of the Pūrvas have been incorporated in the Aṅga and the Upāṅga literature.

A fundamental question arises regarding the authenticity and continuity of the Jaina tradition through the teachings of the twenty-four tirthankaras. Was there not the possibility of
variations and changes in the content of the Pūrvas and also the Aṅga literature with reference to different conditions of time, as long periods of time have elapsed? The Ācarāṅga-sūtra points out that there is uniformity and continuity in the teachings of the tirthankaras as presented in the Aṅga literature, because the Arihantas had the same approach to the problems of life, and their teachings are similar. From the noumenal point of view, the Jaina canonical literature is eternal (Śaśvata). But from the practical point of view the canons are Pouruṣeya, as they were given by the tirthankaras.

Digambara tradition distinguishes the canonical literature into two major divisions: (a) Aṅga Praviṣṭā and (b) Aṅga-Bāhya. In (a) Aṅgapraviṣṭa we can mention the 12 Aṅgas with Drṣṭivada. (b) Aṅga bāhya mentions the 14 works. Drṣṭivada has 5 parts. It is maintained, as we saw earlier, that major portion of the 12 Aṅgas and the Pūrvas have been lost and some portion of Drṣṭivada is available in the Saṅkhārandagama commentaries in the canonical literature, and the works of Kunda Kunda and Umasvati and others form important sources of the philosophical literature of the Jainas. They may also be considered to be included in the Canonical literature. Ācārya Kundakunda is held with such esteem that he is mentioned in the invocatory mantra (hymn) along with Lord Mahaviru and Gautama Gaṇadhara.

The teachings of Mahavira are crystallised in the Canonical literature, which have been copiously interpreted in the numerous commentaries written by the great Ācāryas. These commentaries are known as Niruykti, Cūrṇi, Bhāṣya and tiṅka. The Jaina contribution to Indian literature embraces various subjects and they are to be found in different languages, Prakrit (including Ardhamāgadhi), Sanskrit, Tamil, Kannada, Old Hindi, Old Gujarati, etc. "The Jaina authors have considered language only as a means to an end, they never invested any language with religious sanctity". Buhler wrote many years ago about the content of the Jaina literature. In grammar, in astronomy as well as in all branches of belles lettres the achievement of the Jainas have been so great that even their opponents have taken notice of them and that some of their works are of importance for European science even today.
The Jainas have preserved their works with meticulous care. We can see the vast collections of the manuscripts in the libraries of Jaisalmer, Jaipur, Patna and Mudabadri in the South. These have become a national wealth. They built these collections with such an academic and catholic outlook, that there was hardly any place for religious bias. In the Jaisalmer and Patna collections, we could trace certain original Buddhist works which otherwise were known to us only through Tibetan translation.¹

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Article by Dr. A. N. Upadhye, PP. 7.

_Epilogue II_

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   Tam buddhimaena padena gaṇadhara girihaumnravasesam I
   89–90
   Atthaṁ dasai araha suttaṁ ganthanti ganaharaniantam I
   Sasannasa hiyattae tae suttaṁ pavattei II
   192

2. ibid.


5. Āvâṣyakanirṇiyuktî : 89–90 (quoted above).
6. 12 Angas of Angapraśīta are:
   1. Ācāraṅga,
   2. Sutrakṛṣṭaṅga,
   4. Samavayaṅga,
   5. Vyakhyapraṇāpti,
   6. Ānātadharmanakatha,
   7. Upāsakadosa,
   8. Aṅtakṛṣṭaṅga,
   9. Anuṭāropapatiṅka-āśa,
   10. Praṇāvyakaraṇa,
   11. Vipāka,
   12. Drśṭivāda

7. Angabāhya works are:
   1. Samayika,
   2. Caturviṃśati-stava,
   3. Vandana,
   4. Pratikramaṇa,
   5. Vainayika,
   6. Kṛṣṭikarma,
   7. Daśaśaṅkulaṅka,
   8. Uttarādhyaṇa,
   9. Kalpavyaharā,
   10. Kalṇaṅkalpa,
   11. Mahakalpa
   12. Pūndarka,
   13. Mahapūndarka,

8. Drśṭivāda has give divisions:
   1. Parikarma,
   2. Sūtra,
   3. Prathamaṅnayoga,
   4. Pūrvagatha.
   and 5. Cūlika. Each has sub-divisions. Pūrvagatha has
   14 sub-divisions.

   The works of Kundakunda and other Ācāryas may be included
   in the Angabāhya canonical literature.

9. “Māṅgalaṁ bhagavāṁ vīra,
   Māṅgalaṁ goyamogani I
   Māṅgalaṁ Kundakundānvaiy,
   Jaina dharmottu māṅgalaṁ II”
EPILOGUE - III

Digambara and Svetambara sects:

There are two main sections called Digambara and Svetambara among the Jainas. Each has its sub-divisions. The distinctions forming the sub-divisions among the two sects have been mainly due to sociological forces arising out of the exigencies of time and procedural and ritualistic differences, like the worship of the images of tirthankaras and the use of materials like the flowers during worship.

There has been a vigorous controversy regarding the antiquity of the two sects, each claiming to the earliest and the original sect following the true traditions of the teachings of the tirthankara.

Digambaras claim that the schism between the two sects developed at the time of Shrutakēvali Bhadrabahu, the last pontifical head before the Ācārya tradition developed. He came to Sravanabelagola in Karnataka. He was accompanied by Candragupta Mourya. He practised Sallekhana on the mount Candragiri in Sravanabelagola in 297 B.C. Those who remained in the North were to form the Svetambara sect. But the Svetambara tradition claims that Bhadrabahu went to Nepal and remained there engaged in deep meditation. Sthūlabhadra and some other monks went to him to learn from him Drṣṭiṇāda. The controversy is more concerned with the historical setting and it does not in any way affect the ideological problems, because there are no differences in the development of the philosophical concepts of Jainism in the two sects. The differences are superficial affecting the fringe of the ideas and the ritualistic and procedural practices. Certain minor differences not vitally related to the philosophical concept may be mentioned as instances:

i) The Digambaras believe that the original canonical texts have not come down in their original form. But, the Svetambaras maintain that the Canons have been preserved in their original form.
ii) Digambaras say that Tirthankara Mahavira was not married. He took to renunciation as a ‘Kumara’ as he was bachelor. But the Svetambara works suggest that Mahavira was married and had a daughter before he took to Dikṣa.

iii) Digambaras are very insistent that salvation is not possible without entering into the stage of nakedness (niggaṇṭha or acelaka state). That is a difficult stage of attainment where we do not have even the attachment to clothes or the sense of shame or other mental inhibitions. Svetambaras accept the possibility of the attainment of mokṣa even in the Saceḷaka stage.

iv) Digambara think that women cannot attain the highest stage of mokṣa due to certain physiological and psychological impediments which are inevitable and which make it impossible for women to undergo rigorous ascetic discipline and to adopt acelakatva. There has been abundant literature on this question written by later Ācāryas. But the Svetāmbaras do consider that women can reach the highest stage of mokṣa and the physiological and psychological problems do not affect the higher concentration. In fact one of the tirthankaras, they contend, named Malli, was a woman.

v) According to Digambara tradition, the omniscient one no longer takes any earthly food, as the common men do. But the Svetāmbaras do accept the fact that the omniscient ones do take food.

vi) The Digambaras do not use any decoration for the images of tirthankaras. But the Svetāmbaras do decorate the images of tirthankaras.

These distinctions do not touch even the fringe of the basic philosophical positions and the development of the metaphysical and ethical thought. Both are in agreement in the fundamental thought. Some differences need to be ignored and eliminated.

If we survey the pontifical genealogy of the Digambara and Svetāmbara traditions, we find there slight variations in the names.
But Bhadrabāhu, the last in the list has been accepted by both. The years of their pontifical rule have slight variations. We give below the list of the Ācāryas after the Nirvāṇa of Mahāvīra upto Bhadrabāhu with the years of their pontifical headship.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Digambara³</th>
<th>Svetambara⁵</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kevalī. Gautama</strong></td>
<td>12 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sudharma</strong></td>
<td>20 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jambu</strong></td>
<td>44 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Srutakevali-Visānu</strong></td>
<td>11 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nandimitra</strong></td>
<td>23 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aparajita</strong></td>
<td>50 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Govardhana</strong></td>
<td>8 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bhadrabāhu</strong></td>
<td>14 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>---</strong></td>
<td><strong>---</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>162 years</strong></td>
<td><strong>170 years</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the Daśavaikālikaka Sūtra, Ācārya Sayyambhava has referred to the Sačelakatva as not contrary to the rules.⁴ It would not be considered as parigraha. It was, perhaps at the time of Bhadrabāhu after nearly 160 years of the Nirvāṇa of Mahāvīra, the distinction became prominently argued and felt. It must have become an issue at the conference at Paṭaliputra called for the recitation and codification of the Canonical texts.⁵

In the Sangha of Bhagavān Mahāvīra there were monks of different categories: some were sačelakas who used some cloth to cover their bodies; and there were the acelaka monks who were
naked. This practice depended on the physical and mental acquirement and capacity of the monks. Kalpasūtra gives the description of the distinction stating that the Acelaka muni was Jina-kalpita (approved by Jina) and the Sacelaka was Sthavira-kalpita (approved by the elders). We have also referred to the Sangha of Parśvanātha which had nigganta munis (naked munis). In the Buddhist literature, Mahāvīra has been described as Nigganta Nataputta. It is difficult to say as to when the schism between the two sects of the Digambara and Śvetāmbara became pronounced. It appears that when the logical disputations began to gain ground the Ācāryas took up the hair-splitting arguments to establish the respective superiority. The distinction had became an issue for argument by the time of Kundakunda acārya. It is referred to in the Satprākhṛta. However, attempts were made to bring the two sects together by the Yapaniya Sangha. In this Sangha the monks accepted the Digambara tradition of acelakaśta for salvation as also the possibility of women getting salvation.

Epilogue - III

REFERENCES:


4. ibid.

PART—II

PHILOSOPHY OF JAINISM
CHAPTER—5

JAINA LOGIC & EPISTEMOLOGY

"And Anekānta would give us a
'Weltanschauung' and a scientific
interpretation of things"

CHAPTER—5

Right understanding (Samyagdarsana), right knowledge (Samyaghana) and right conduct (Samyagcaritra) constitute the triple path towards self-realisation.¹ There is need to a harmonious blending of the three paths. Right understanding is the basis; it leads to right knowledge. This is faith rooted in intuitive grasp of the truth and not related to superstitious uncritical acceptance of truth. It is looking inward and it may be referred to as the “mental set” in the psychological sense.

Acarya Samantabhadra has mentioned 8 characteristics of Samyagdarsana.²

1. Nihshankita is the deep-rooted faith in the persons who are authorities and in the validity of the sacred texts.

2. Nihkankshita spirit of non-attachment towards the fruits of Nihkanksa. It should be purely spiritual craving.

3. Nirvicikitsa: is to be free from illusions and stupor.

4. Amudhadra is to be free from the perversity of beliefs, which may be called amudhatra.

5. Upaguhana refers to the emphasis on the right aspect of the Samyagdrsti in the sense that we should discourage to aim at partial and half-hearted right-mindedness.

6. Sthitikaraṇa is to secure steadfastness and to lead towards rightness of understanding. The ‘fallen angels’ in the path have to be restored to the path of right direction.

7. Vatsalya emphasises that we should have love and kindness towards those leading the path of righteousness, without of course showing ill-will towards the fallen. “Those who hunger and thirst after righteousness shall be filled.”³

8. Prabhāvāna is to kindle the light of right understanding, by removing many misconceptions, inadequacies and deficiencies.
The hurdles in the path of right understanding are many and varied. Some of the difficulties are psychological. Acarya Samantabhadra has given an enlightened and able descriptions of the psychological and sociological impediments in the acquisition of rightness of outlook and right understanding.4

Saṃyagdarśana itself is intuitive understanding and faith. But faith is not mere blind faith which we find expressed in customary morality, a “copy-book morality” or mechanical action due to habit or custom. Faith with understanding is the solid foundation for right knowledge. Right knowledge is the knowledge of the highest principles of the truth. The Jainas would maintain that right knowledge is the knowledge of the seven Tattvas (principles) and six dravyas (substances). Right knowledge is to be considered as the knowledge of the truth, the knowledge of the self. Socrates also considered knowledge of self as the highest end of life. “Know thyself” was his motto of life. And right-knowledge harmonised with right understanding translates itself into right action (Saṃyag-caritra). In this sense Socratic dictum “Knowledge is virtue” has relevance and importance. Kundakundacārya, therefore, gave prominence to Saṃyag-Jñāna for the expression of Saṃyag-Caritra. Saṃyag-Jñāna springs from Saṃyag-darśana which then enables right conduct in the true sense of the word.

The Jainas have significantly qualified understanding (darśana), Knowledge (Jñāna) and conduct (Caritra) with Saṃyaktva (rightness). Otherwise mere knowledge and conduct will lead us nowhere. Saṃyaktva is necessary. It is not an easy task. One has to be ripe for it. But the Jaina is a through-going realist. Anekānta is the foundational outlook of the Jainas in looking at reality.

A clear expression of the spirit of anekānta is seen in the dialogue between Mahāvīra and his disciple. Gautama asked, “O Lord, Are the souls eternal or non-eternal?”

“The souls are eternal in some respects and non-eternal in some other respect. They are eternal, O Gautama, from the point of view of substance and non-eternal from the point of view of modes”.
Again, the problem of body and mind was answered by Mahavira as—"The body, O Gautama, is identical with the soul and not identical with the soul in different respects."  

The application of the principle of Anekanta can be seen in their analysis of the metaphysical question concerning the categories. The Jaina theories of atoms, of space and soul, to mention a few instances, illustrate the pervading influence of the Anekanta viewpoint. Atoms are of the same kind; they can yet give the infinite variety of things. Pudgala has certain inalienable features, but within limits it can become anything through qualitative differentiation. The transmutation of elements is quite possible in this view and is not a mere dream of the alchemist.  

The Jainas have given the example of the elephant and the seven blind men. The seven blind men, with their sense of touch, pass their hands in different parts of elephant’s body and describe the elephant like rope, the mat, the trunk of a tree etc  

In the Anga literature of the Jainas the doctrine of Anekanta was briefly and incidentally discussed. But in the commentaries of the Jaina scripture written in Prakrit it has received greater attention. But when the Sanskrit language found a place in the Jaina literature, it occupied an important position. The commentary on the Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati gives an exhaustive description of the problem. Later, a systematic exposition of the doctrine was given by Jaina scholars like Samantabhadra, Siddhasena Divakara, PujyapaDa Akalanka, Vidyanandi and others.  

The Anekanta view does imply the principles of reciprocity and interaction among the reals of the universe, as given by Kant, although this Principle is more implied than expressly stated in Jainism.  

Anekanta emphasises the complexity of reality. Truth can be looked at from various points of view. Two doctrines arise out of this principles; Samyak-caritra is possible for one who has attained Samyag-drsti and Samyag-Jñana.
Without entering into the minor discrepancies of the Digambara and Svetambara versions of the essential qualities of Saṃyaktva, we may mention the characters of Saṃyaktva. Saṃyaktva (rightness) is characterised by (i) Saṃvega (spiritual craving), (ii) Sama (stilling of the passion) (iii) nirveda (disgust for sense pleasures), (iv) bhakti (devotion) (v) anukāmpa (compassion), (vi) niśda (remorse for the evil acts of relatives and others), (vii) garṇa (repentence expressed in the form of atōcana made in the presence of Guru) and (viii) vatisiya (loving kindness to the living). Saṃyaktva expresses itself in niḥśanka (freedom from doubt), niḥkāṅkṣa (desirelessness), nirguhāna (absence of repugnance), amūdha-dṛṣṭi (absence of perversity of attitude).

The description of the nature of Saṃyaktva as shown above has a great psychological significance. It presents the mental setting required for developing character and personality as needed for spiritual progress. The instinctive tendencies and emotions have to be channelized and directed by transformation and sublimation with a view to attaining mental equipoise. Ethically considered the characteristics of Saṃyak-caritra present a background and a canvas for the illumination of one’s self towards the goal of attaining perfect equanimity and spiritual strength.

In Kantianism as in Jainism, the principle of reciprocity goes beyond the ‘co-existence’ or the inter-relatedness of the substances and explains the ‘dynamical community’ among them. But the Jaina is a through-going realist. Anekāntavāda is a theory of reality which asserts the manifoldness and complexity of the real. In apprehending the complexity of the universe, it has crystallised itself into the two-fold dialectic of Nayavāda and Syādvāda; and they are complementary processes forming a normal and inevitable development of the relativistic presupposition of the Jaina metaphysics.

Nayavāda is the analytic method investigating a particular stand-point of factual situation. Syādvāda is primarily synthetic designed to harmonise the different view-points arrived at by Nayavāda. Nayavāda is ‘primarily conceptual’ and the Syādvāda is synthetic and mainly verbal, although it is sometimes maintained
that conceptual is also verbal and the verbal method is so much changed with epistemological characters.

a) Different points of view are the Nayas. Various nayas have been mentioned. Umasvati first mentions five nayas then adds sub-divisions. The Agamas have mentioned two points of view Saṅgraha naya, the synthetic point and paryāyika-naya, the analytic point of view. Siddhasena Devakara in his Sammati-Tarka adopting this points of view has distributed the nayas under two heads. But generally accepted classification of nayas is seven-fold, although Siddhasena Divakara says that Saṅgraha and Vyavahara are to be included in the Dravyārthika naya.

The conceptual content of the seven nayas could be analysed thus:

1. Naigama naya: It refers to the purpose or the end of an activity. For instance, if a man, carrying firewood, were to be asked what he is doing, he would reply that he is cooking. Cooking is the object for which he is carrying firewood.

2. Saṅgraha naya is a synthetic point of view. It gives prominence to the seeking of the universal or the general amidst the particulars. It seeks unity in the diversity.

Saṅgraha naya is the synthetic point of view which seeks to find unity in diversity. Every object is the synthesis of many qualities, the generality and the particularity. Saṅgraha naya seeks to establish the common points between objects and to bring them together as belonging to one category. The Vedanta and Sankhya darśanas look at reality from the synthetic point of view. Saṅgraha naya seeks to find reality as one without distinction.

Saṅgraha naya is of two types: Parasaṅgraha and Aparasaṅgraha. The first aims at finding out unity which is of the metaphysical nature. The second seeks of find unity and generality in the empirical world, as for example, we seek the general concept of cowness in the individual cows.
3. *Vyavahāra nāya* is the practical point of view; it is the analytic point of view. It is to be considered as the empirical approach to the problems of grasping the objects in the phenomenal world. The *Vyavahāra nāya*, therefore, comprehends reality from the practical and the common-sense point of view.\(^{15}\) *Vyavahāra nāya* is of two types: (1) *Samānyā Bhedaka*, where in we are concerned with presenting the general nature of the object; (2) *Viśeṣa Bhedaka* which analyses a special nature of a thing in its various distinctions. *Naigama*, *Saṅgrahā* and *Vyavahāra nāyas* are *dravvārthika nāya*.

4. *Rjusūtra nāya* is restricted to the understanding of the modes and the states of the momentary present and not as a continuum. It looks at the object as modification of the momentary present.\(^{16}\) The past modifications are destroyed; the future modifications are yet to come. What we can get to know is the momentary present. According to the *Rjusūtra nāya* reality of the object cannot be established, because it is only a state. *Rjusūtra nāya* is the point of view adopted by the Buddhist philosophers. It is of two types: (1) *Sūkṣma Rjusūtra* and (2) *Sīhūla Rjusūtra*. The *Sūkṣma Rjusūtra nāya* comprehends the state of the object at a particular moment only; but *Sīhūla Rjusūtra nāya* looks at the state of the object as it is presented in the series of moments.

5. *Śabda nāya* has a reference to the word and its meaning. It analyses the meaning of the work in the context of the agent, gender, number and the prefixes that are prefixed to the word. For instance, a word in a masculine gender has different meaning from the same word in the feminine gender. Similarly the prefixes like, “a. vi, pra, and saṁ”, to the word *hāra* have different meanings with different connotations. *Āhāra*, *Vīhāra*, *Praḥāra* and *Saṁhāra* connote different meanings.

6. *Samabhīrūḍha nāya* is the application of the *Śabda nāya*. It has reference to the etymological meaning. For example, the words *Rāja* and *Nṛpa* may refer to the same person but the first means one who shines and the second means one who rules. *Indra* has been called by different names like *Śakra* and *Purandara*. These connote different meanings. In this way, *Samabhīrūḍha-nāya*
refers to the distinctions in the meanings of the words with reference to its root meaning and modifications.

7. *Evaṁbhūta naya* not only sees the difference between words with their etymological meanings, but it also sees the difference between one and the same word with its distinctions with reference to the present context of its function. For instance, a priest (Pujārī) would be called a priest and the name priest would be relevant to him actually at the time of worshipping the deity.

The Cambridge philosophers and the Analytic school of philosophy in the present day are very much concerned with the exclusive application of the *Śabda naya* in its various forms.

So far we have analysed the conceptual content and the logical implications of the different *nayas*. The metaphysical implication of the concept of *naya* is equally important. From the metaphysical point of view *naya* can be distinguished into two forms: (1) *Niścaya naya* and (2) *Vyavahāra naya*. *Niścaya naya* is the ultimate noumenal point of view, while *Vyavahāra-naya* is the practical phenomenal point of view.17 *Niścaya naya* grasps reality in its ultimate aspect, while *Vyavahāra-naya* is practical in its approach. It attempts to understand the phenomenal nature of reality.

In the Jaina Āgamic literature there is the distinction between *Niścaya* and *Vyavahāra naya* whose functions are to look at reality from the noumenal and phenomenal points of view. The Buddhist mentions the “Paramartha and Saṁvṛti” points of view. The *Upaniṣads* mention the *Sthūla* and *Sūkṣma dṛṣṭi*. Jainas look at reality from the *Niścaya naya* in order to find out the real nature of the object with reference to its substance and not so much with reference to its modes, although the consideration of the modes is secondary.

Ācārya Kundakunda has given prominence to the distinctions between *Niścaya naya* and *Vyavahāra naya*. They are both complementary to each other; both are necessary for the full understanding of the nature of reality. He has given elaborate
interpretation of the application of the concept of naya to the various problems of logic and philosophy. Kundakunda’s emphasis on the distinction between Niścaya and Vyavahāra naya is his special contribution. This distinction has a psychological content. The approach to the understanding of the nature of things depends on the capacity of the individual to grasp the nature of the thing. In the *Samayasāra* Kundakunda explains that it is necessary to present the nature of reality to different individuals from different angles according to the capacity of the individuals to understand the nature of things. For some, it would be sufficient to present abstract principles. But for others whose ability is less, it would be necessary to explain in allegoric and pictorial language. For the common man the metaphysical principles have to be explained in empirical terms.

Kundakunda has thus presented the distinction between the metaphysical and practical approaches to the problems of philosophy. He has interpreted the concepts of Jiva, Saṁpaktvā, Upayoga and the concepts of theory of knowledge from the Niścaya and Vyavahāra naya. For instance, while analysing the distinction of the concept of naya from the practical and the noumenal points of view, he mentions that Subha and Aśubha Upayoga are concerned with presenting the problems of the worldly conduct, while Suddha Upayoga is the characteristic of the pure and perfect soul.

*Syadvāda* is the logical expression of the nayavāda. It is expressed in the seven-fold predication. It is called ‘sapabhaṅgi’ because of its seven-fold predication. It is the formulation of the doctrine of the possibility of apparent contradictions in a real whole. In the *syādvāda* all the aspects of truth are woven together into the synthesis of the conditioned dialectic. It is that conditioned method in which the modes, or predications (bhaṅga), affirm (Vidhi), negate (niśedha) or both affirm and negate severally and jointly in seven different ways a certain attribute (avirodhena) in an certain context (*Preśuvasat*).

*Syādvāda* is based on three fundamental predications: (1) Affirmation (*asti*), (2) Negation (*nāsti*), (3) Indescribable (*avaktavyaṁ*). These three predications have been developed into
the seven predications with their possible permutations. In the Syadvada the word "Syāt" has been very often interpreted as 'perhaps' connoting uncertainty or doubt. But it would be aper to interpret the word Syāt as 'in a particular context', from a particular point of view, in a universe of discourse. The Syadvada has been generally expressed in the seven-fold predication: (a) Affirmation (asti), (2) Negation (nasti), (3) Affirmation and Negation (asti-nasti), (4) Indescribable (avaktavyam), (5) Affirma- tion and indescribability (asti-avaktavyam), (6) Negation and indescribability (nasti-avaktavyam) and (7) Affirmation-Negation and indescribability (asti-nasti-avaktavyam). These seven-fold predications constitute the elements of Syadvada and they can be considered as saptabhaṅgi.

Syadvada shows that there are seven ways of describing a thing and its attributes. It attempts to reconcile the contradiction involved in the predications of the thing.

(i) Syād-asti: asserts the existence of the thing. From the point of view of the substance (dravya), attribute (bhava), space (kṣetra) and time (kala) – that from the context of these relations existence and other attributes are predicated. For instance, the Jar exists as it is made of clay in a particular place and time.

(ii) Syād-Nasti involves the negation of its opposite; and such a negation is a logical necessity. One is a necessary concomitant of the other. The two predications-affirmation and denial of the opposite are meant to rebut the possibility of unqualified and absolute existence and non-existence. It cannot be denied that it is possible to conceive the existence and non-existence of a thing though not ontologically real. The predications are, therefore, logically necessary to rebut such a conception of absolute existence and absolute non-existence. 21

The Vedantin believes in the absolute existence of the one reality. The Buddhist does not accept the principle of a permanent reality. But Jainas contend that the two may be predicated in different contexts. The first two predications we may refer to the Hegelian contention that the opposite predications in different
contexts are limited to the dialectical process and are ultimately to be reconciled by a higher unity. This we find in the third synthetic predication.

(iii) *Syad Asti Nasti* is a synthesis of affirmation and negation in a different context. It is not a mere sum of the first two predicates but an organic synthesis. For instance, a garland of flowers may be said to be flowers, as it contains flowers, and also not merely flowers at the same time, as there is a complex relation between the flowers in a particular arrangement.

(iv) *Syad Avaktavyam* is a new predication. It is possible that the real nature of the thing is beyond predication, or expression in the form of words. In metaphysical speculations, the ‘unknowable’ of Herbert Spencer may be likened to predication of this type. ‘The given indefinite’ – ‘the unspeakable’ or *avaktavya*, as it has been called, as distinct from the definite existence, presents something other than consecutive togetherness; it implies *saharpana* or co-presentation, which amounts to non-distinction or indeterminate distinction of being and negation.²²

For instance in the case of a jar it exists in the *Svadraavya, Svakssetra, Svakala* and *Svarupa*: does not exist in the *Paradraavya, Parakssetra, Parakala* and *Pararupa*: yet its real nature is indescribable. The common man describes water as liquid which he drinks; the chemist says it is *H₂O*, while Physicist may describe it in terms of electrons and protons. But still from a higher point of view we may just say its nature is indescribable.

Dr. Padmarajaiah discusses the four stages through which the concept or ‘inexpressible’ has developed: i) The naïve negative attitude in the *Rgveda* as expressed in the song of creation (Book V, 129) ii) A positive attitude as expressed in ‘*sadasadvareṇyaṁ*’, in the *Mundaka Upanisad*. It conceives with being and non-being as inherent in reality, owing to the positive character, this tendency has been discussed as the *ubhaya* phase of the concept. iii) The third phase is the logically sophisticated phase of the ‘negative tendency’ as shown in the expression like *sa eṣa neti neti* (Br. Up. IV 5-15). In this phase here is the clear awareness of the inexpressible nature of the ultimate as efforts to express the reality would be
beset with contradictions. The *Vedanta* conception of *anirvacaniya*, the Buddha's *avyākta* and Nagarjuna's conception of the ultimate as being *catuskotivinirmukta* come under this stage. iv) The last phase in 'the dialectical evolution' of the idea of the inexpressible is expressed in the *avaktavya* of the *Syādvāda*. It is a relativistic (*sāpekṣa*) view and not the absolute view as presented in *anirvacaniya*. The Jaina states that *sat* and *asat* in these combinations, are inevitable and distinctive feature of our objective experience.²³ Again the *avaktavya* may show the inability to embody, within one symbol, the two fundamental aspects of reality with equal prominence. But this limitation is itself a necessary step in the dialectical movement of *Syādvāda*.

K. C. Bhattacharya states 'If the inexpressible is objective as given, it cannot be said to be not a particular position nor to be non-existent. At the same time it is not the definite distinction of position and existence. It is a category by itself.'²⁴

(v) The fifth predication is formulated as *Syād Asti, Avaktavyam*. From the point of view of its own contexts – (*dravya*, *rūpa*, *kāla* and *kṣetra*) a thing is and is indescribable. It asserts the co-presence of the two attributes, existence and inexpressibility.

(vi) *Syād Nasti Avaktavyam*: The sixth proposition expresses the negative aspect together with inexpressibility. In a context, it is not and is indescribable. In relation to the *para-dravya*, *para-rūpa*, *Para-kṣetra* and *para-kāla* it is not yet, it is indescribable.

(vii) *Syād Asti Nasti Avaktavyam*: is the seventh predication. It asserts existence, non-existence and inexpressibility. This predication gives a fuller and a more comprehensive picture of the thing than the earlier ones. The predicated attribute is a synthesis of the three attributes; still, it is not a mere summation of the attributes. It brings out the inexpressibility of a thing as well as what it is and what it is not.²⁵

III. The theory of seven fold predication has been subjected to severe criticism from different quarters. From *Sankara, Ramanuja* to modern thinkers like *Belvarkar, Syādvāda* has been
severely criticised. Belvarkar, says that Syadvada is sceptical and non-committal in its attitude. With this agnostic and negative attitude one cannot have any dogma; and Sankaracarya lays his finger accurately on the weakest point in the system. When he says: ‘As thus the means of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge, are all alike, indefinite, how can the Tirthankara (Jina) teach with any claim to authority’? Prof. Hiriyanna makes syadvada a variety of scepticism. But it may be said that the conditions of doubt are not present in this assertion. Doubt presents lack of determination between the specific features of the object. But in the case of the sevenfold predication the attributes of existence and non-existence are each defined by their specific determination

Sankara points out the intrinsic impossibility of the predications of affirmation and negation because of the inherent contradiction involved in it. It violates the law of contradiction. But if we take into consideration the different contexts referred to, contradictions can be reconciled.

Sankara says that the saptabhaṅgi doctrine is inconsistent with the other views of Jaina Philosophy. The assertions of existence, non-existence and indescribability are alike applicable to the doctrine of the soul and the categories. Similarly, the final release may exist and not exist and may be indescribable. But, as Radhakrishnan points out that the Syadvada doctrine is not inconsistent with the other views of the Jainas. And it is a logical corollary of the Anekkantavada. “All that they say is that everything is of a complex nature and identity in difference. The real comprehends and reconciles differences in itself.”

In the Western thought Zeno, among the Greeks, formulated the dialectical method of approach to the problem of reality. He established the theory of Being by proving that becoming is not. That was the beginning of the dialectical movement in Western Philosophy. In modern philosophy the Hegelian dialectic comes nearer to the Anekanta and its expression in Syadvada. In Hegelian dialectic thought moves from thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis. Being, nothing and becoming is the first Hegelian triad. The
second category of negation is not brought in by Hegel by any external source. It is deduced from the first category of affirmation and therefore, the first category of affirmation contains its negation and is identical with it. There is no contradiction, because being involves non-being and it is both is and is not when it becomes. The third category contains within itself the opposition of the other two and it also contains the underlying harmony. The exclusion is not absolute. It is identity of opposites. The opposition is just as real as identity. If we forget this and try to maintain that identity implies the illusory nature of the opposition we fall into the gravest of the dialectical fallacy. But Hegel did not work out the dialectic rigorously in all cases. Had he brought about the synthesis, the synthesis between understanding and reason, he would have brought the spirit of anekânta in his system. He would have made his philosophy more synoptic and comprehensive and not merely rigorously rationalistic, formal and deductive.

In recent Western Philosophy A. N. Whitehead's theory of 'coherence' expresses the concept of anekânta. It presents his attitude to reality by the complete problem of the metaphysics of substance and of flux as a full expression of the union of the two notions. Substance expresses permanence and flux emphasises impermanence and change. Reality is to be found in the synthesis of the two. Both are real. Whitehead showed that reality can best be understood by the integral approach in which the ultimate postulates of permanence and change are harmoniously blended. "No entity can be conceived in complete abstraction from the system of the universe, and that is the business of speculative philosophy to exhibit this truth. This character is its coherence." "All general truths condition each other; and the limits of their application cannot be adequately defined apart from their co-relation by yet wider-generalities".

And Bertrand Russell's "doctrine of perspectives" does bring us nearer to the Anekânta view of understanding reality. Like the Jaina view, Russell believes that the world is objective and that reality is manifold. The object presents many appearances at a moment. These appearances are sense-data revealing different aspects of the object. All these different aspects are real, but
the object as a whole cannot be identified with any one of the aspects. It is logically constructed out of sense data. "All the aspects of a thing are real, whereas the thing is a merely logical construction." A thing, therefore, is complex and Russell does not identify an aspect of a thing with the whole thing. The thing is perceived by an individual in one aspect or the other. This is the private view. This does not lead to subjectivism, because the thing is real and it does not consist of the totality of the perceptive views, but also of the logically possible views. It is possible to know the thing in entirety if all its perspectives, perceived and unperceived are known. But this is not possible. Therefore we cannot comprehend the nature of a thing in entirety at any one moment. Thus the Jaina conception of relativity of knowledge, and not as subjective alone, finds its expression in many modern Western philosophers.

**Syadvada or Saptabhaṅgi** presents a methodology of predications which is meant for giving a comprehensive picture of reality. Modern science has realised that the methodology adopted by *Syadvada* is very useful for statistical investigations of probability, quantum physics and quantum mechanics. Professor Mahalanobis and J.B.S. Haldane have discussed the importance of *Syadvada* in the theory of probability. Professor Kothari has presented the analysis of the application of the methodology of *Syadvada* in Quantum Mechanics. J. B. S. Haldane and Mahalanobis have emphasised the value of the Jaina theory of *Syadvada* for the methodological investigations of science.

Recent researches in the theory of probability and statistics have shown the enormous importance of the Jaina theory of *syadvada* in understanding the problems of probability. In the journal *Sāṁkhya* Vol. 18 Parts 1 and 2, Dr. Mahalanobis has discussed the impact of *Syadvada* doctrine in the interpretation of the theory of probability in statistics. In his paper entitled *The Foundations of Statistics* in the journal mentioned above Dr. Mahalanobis has made certain observations on the implications of *Syadvada* to the problems of probability. He says that there are certain ideas in Indian-Jaina logic in *Syadvada* which seems to have close relevance to the concepts of probability. He makes certain observations on
the relevance of the doctrine of *syadvada* in understanding the foundations of statistics:

1) The fourth predication of *syadvada-avaktaavayam* or the 'indeterminate' seems to be in essence the qualitative (but not quantitative) aspect of the modern concept of probability.

2) The Jaina concept of the real as a particular which possesses the generic attribute is very close to the concept of an individual in relation to the population to which he belongs.

3) Jaina philosophy emphasises the relatedness of things and the multiform aspects of reals which appear to be similar to the basic ideas underlying concepts of association and correlation.

4) The Jaina view of 'existence, persistence and cessation' as the fundamental characteristic of all that is real necessarily leads to a view of reality as something relatively permanent and yet relatively changing which has a flavour of statistical reasoning.

5) The important feature of Jaina logic is its insistence on the impossibility of absolutely certain predication and its emphasis on non-absolutist and relativist predication. "All predications have margin of uncertainty which is somewhat similar to the concept of "uncertain inference" in modern statistical theory. However, the Jaina view is essentially qualitative in this matter. Jainas rely on the data supplied by experience and show the inadequacy of formal logic.

I do not know whether it would be correct to say that the sevenfold predication implies 'margin of uncertainty', because every point of view, *naya*, does present a clear picture of things though a partial picture.

J.B.S. Haldane, in the same issue of the journal *Sañkhya* has applied the Jaina logical methodology of the seven-fold predication to the statistical analysis of the problems concerning the physiology of the sense organs.
J.B.S. Haldane has made, in this paper, an elaborate and critical analysis of the sevenfold predication of the Jainas with reference to the statistical study of the physiological problems of sense organs. He shows that he has come to conclusions similar to those of Bhadrabahu. And he says, "No doubt we reached it by different methods, Bhadrabahu by meditation, I, by thinking about the results of concrete experiments on animals'. It is unrealistic to pretend that ancient philosophers anticipated all modern intellectual developments. And I believe that we, today, can do more honour to their memories by thinking for ourselves, as they did, than by devoting our lives to commentaries on them. But if we do so, it is our duty to point out cases where it turns out that our own thought has run parallel to theirs.

Professor N. Umakantha, Department of Physics, Karnataka University, Dharwar, has prepared a paper on the epistemological significance of Syadvada with special reference to the theory of probability. In that paper he has made use of a new concept "Repreental" in addition to the particular denoting an individual and the universal connoting the universal signifying the particulars of the same class. Man is a universal. Mr. Smith is a particular. "Our main point is that in statistical analysis (and in the theory of probability) we need a new kind of abstraction which we call "repreental". With reference to vision, for instance, Man has different possible states of vision. A particular man, Mr. Jones, for instance, has only one of these states of vision at any time. In between these there is an intermediate level of cognition of which we are not interested in which particular man has which state of vision but only in the number of men having different states of vision. This is statistical analysis. Prof. Umakantha considers that with the concept of the 'repreental' whose epistemological status is in between a particular and the universal Syadvada becomes the foundation of epistemology.

The synoptic presentation of reality by Syadvada gives a true picture of reality in all its aspects and that is the essence of the Jaina outlook, which helps to remove the intellectual cobwebs arising out of ekanta. The Syadvada of the Jainas affirms that a thing is never destroyed; and that which is not, never comes into
being. In this sense the Syadvada presents the possibility of predicating different characteristics of the object from the points of view of substance which is permanent and the modes which are changing.

The theory and methodology of Syadvada need to be studied in all its implications in the scientific and metaphysical concepts. It needs to be analysed in the methodological schemata by further extensive research not only with reference to the ancient texts but more specially with reference to modern advanced concepts in logic, metaphysics and empirical sciences. Syadvada is as much a theory of logic as a methodology of investigation.

This is the Anekanta attitude of the Jainas. The Jaina emphasis of the material and the spiritual as the synthesis of opposites leads to a concrete universal involving unity in diversity. It is comparable to Jasper’s ‘unfanatical absoluteness’. Jainas in their theory of Anekanta illustrate a non-attachment of partial truths; and they have made creative use of the contradictions by removing the sting out of them, Heidegger presents a similar view.

Anekanta is the panacea for the ills of the present day society. In political life, Panchasila expresses the spirit of Anekanta.

The conditions of society in the present day world demand that we adopt such a catholic outlook or else we perish. We are in the midst of a life where hatred, injustice and intolerance reign supreme. A new orientation of values would be necessary for us to destroy the inverted values and then ‘rebuild to our heart is desire’. What we need today is love and sympathy and not prejudice and pomp. We need understanding and a sense of fellowship between the peoples of the world. And Anekanta would give us a ‘Weltanschauung’ and a scientific interpretation of things. We shall then learn to love our neighbours as ourselves. We can still cherish the hope when power becomes ashamed to occupy its throne and when the morning comes cleansing the bloodstained steps of the nation, we shall be called upon to bring the spirit of Anekanta to sweeten the purity of human destiny.
THE JAINA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

The Jainas have developed a systematic theory of knowledge which analyses the problems, like the nature of knowledge, the relation of knowledge to the self and the types of knowledge.

Upayoga is the essential characteristics of the soul. In the Gommatesaara Jivakanda, Upayoga is described as the drive which leads to the apprehension of the objects. \(^{38}\) It is the source of the psychical aspect of experience. All the three aspects—cognitive, affective and conative spring from it. It is described as that by which the subject is grasped. \(^{39}\) In my book Some problems in Jaina Psychology, I have interpreted Upayoga as “harmic energy” which is responsible for the flow of knowledge and intuition. Jñana and Darśana spring from Upayoga. \(^{40}\) The Āgamas make a clear distinction between Jñana and Darśana from the empirical and transcendental points of view. He says that Ātman, its knowledge (Jñana) and intuition (Darśana)—All these are identical and they reveal the self and the non-self. \(^{41}\) Upayoga has been distinguished as Antakara Upayoga which is to be identified with Darśana and Sākara Upayoga which is Jñana. \(^{42}\) Acārya Virasena in his commentary, Dhavala, on Saṭkhaṇḍagama of Puspadanta says ‘What comprehends an external object of the nature of the universal—cum—particular is Jñana, and comprehension of the self—same nature is darśana’. \(^{43}\) The awareness of one’s self which shows the striving for knowledge, and the subsequent determinate knowledge is Jñana. The self—same consciousness is called darśana as well as Jñana when it is referred to the self or the object of cognition.

Knowledge is inherent in the self. It is the essential characteristic of the self. But the relation need not be construed as the relation of substance and attribute in term of Nyāyavaiśeṣika theory. From the practical point of view, however, we may distinguish between self and knowledge and say that self has knowledge. But from the noumenal point of view there is no distinction between knowledge and self. \(^{44}\) Knowledge and self are intimately connected and we may say that from the noumenal point of view they are identical.
Knowledge is self-illuminative and it also illumines the object of knowledge (svapara prakāśika). Cognition cognises itself and also illumines other objects, just as the lamp illumines the objects around it and illumines itself. From the point of view of identity, the self and knowledge are identical. From the point of view of difference the self has a quality of knowledge. From the point of view of identity and difference the self can be said to be neither completely different nor completely identical. This is because knowledge is the quality of the self and also because the object of knowledge is related to the knowledge as of external relation.

In the Rājapraśnīyasūtra, Kēśikumāra explains to Śramaṇa Rājavṛdeśi the theory of knowledge as presented in the Āgamas. Kēśikumāra belongs to the Pārśvanātha tradition. Kēśikumāra explains the classification of knowledge into five types according to the Pārśvanātha tradition:

1. abhinibhodhika jñāna (sense experience) which is also called Matijnāna.
2. Śruti-jñāna (indirect knowledge)
3. avadhijnāna (clairvoyance)
4. manahparyayajñāna (telepathy)
5. Kēvalajñāna (Omniscience).

In the Uttarādhyayana sūtra there is a dialogue between Kēśikumāra and Gautama. From this it is clear that there was no difference between the Pārśva and Mahāvīra, traditions regarding the nature and the types of knowledge. Similarly the Digambara and Śvetāmbara traditions accept the distinction of five types of knowledge, although there seems to be some difference of opinion regarding the nature of Kēvalajñāna.

Jaina theory of knowledge has undergone modifications keeping in view the development of theory of knowledge in other darśanas in Indian philosophy. Originally, the Jainas said that sense experience (indriya pratyakṣa) is indirect knowledge
(parokṣajñāna), because the sense organs are the impediments in the acquisition experience and knowledge. They are like windows which give limited perception. That is what we get false sense perception like illusions and hallucination. The self is obstructed in getting direct cognition in this type of experience. The knowledge that the self gets directly without the help of the sense organs is direct knowledge (pratyakṣa jñāna). Sthānāṅga clearly makes this distinction.

But the original stand of this distinction could not be retained because later developments required interaction and discussion with the other systems of Indian thought. The terminology had to be common. Therefore, the Jainas modified the use of the terminology by saying that the sense experience (indriya pratyakṣa) was called Samvyavahāra Pratyakṣa. From the practical point of view while the cognitive experiences like (i) avadhi (clairvoyant cognition) (ii) Manahparayaya (telepathic cognition) were real or immediate pratyakṣa (Nijapratyakṣa) in broad sense. But Kēvala jñāna (Omniscience) is the real pratyakṣa.

Accordingly the Jainas gave a new classification of knowledge:

1. Matijñāna – (Sense cognition) – Samvyavahāra Pratyakṣa.

2. Śruta Jñāna (indirect cognition like inference and testimony etc – Parokṣa (indirect knowledge).

3. avadhi (clairvoyant cognition) as pratyakṣa in a broad sense).

4. Manah pariyaya (telepathic cognition) Nijapratyakṣa in a broad sense)

5. Kēvala Jñāna (Omniscient cognition) Nija Pratyakṣa in its real sense.

These stages of knowledge have been systematically analysed by later Ācāryas who were great Logicians. The mental states like Smaraṇa (memory) and pratyabhijñā (recognition) have also been considered as valid sources of knowledge. They are to be classified with parokṣajñāna.
We may consider in brief the nature of 5 types of knowledge:

1. Matijñāna (sense experience) is arrived at with the help of sense organs and the mind. In the Āgamic literature it has been called abhinibodhika Jñāna.\(^{48}\) Višeṣavasyakabhasya mentions the equivalent terms for matijñāna: Iha, apoha, vimarṣa, margaṇa, gaveśana, samjñā, smṛti, mati, prajñā, etc.\(^{49}\) Nandisūtra also mentions equivalent words for matijñāna. Matijñāna may be referred to as knowledge arrived at through the operations of the sense organs and the mind. Mind is a quasi-sense organ. Without the help of the mind it would not be possible to get the full knowledge of an object.

Sense experience is possible with the help of the sense organs and the mind. The sense organs receive stimulations and mind organises the stimulations. These two are physiological and psychic conditions of perceptions. But that is not sufficient. We have also to remove some psychic impediments which affect the nature of perception. These impediments are the knowledge and sense obscuring karma. Through the subsidence and destruction of the knowledge obscuring karma we can get perception. This is the psychic condition, wherein by removing the psychic impediments as mental set is prepared which is necessary for perceptual experience.

According to Jaina's sense perception can be analysed into four stages: 1) avagraha 2) iha 3) avaya and 4) dhāraṇa. In the Nandisūtra we get the analysis of the four stages.\(^{50}\) Avagraha is the first stages of sense experience. It is analogous to sensation. In the Āvaśyaka Nirvyakti, avagraha has been defined as awareness of the sense data.\(^{51}\) Jinabhadra describes avagraha as undeterminate perception, and avaya is the higher stage. It is more appropriate to say that avagraha is mere awareness, mere cognition of the object without the knowledge of the specific nature of the object nor of its name.\(^{52}\) Nandisūtra makes a distinction of the two levels of avagraha as vyañjanavagraha and arthavagraha. Vyañjanavagraha is the earlier stage in which there is physiological stimulus condition of the sensation, of the immediate experience. Nandisūtra gives the example of Mallakadṛśānta.\(^{53}\) Vyañjanavagraha is,
therefore, the stage of first awareness, the threshold of awareness. It is the physiological stimulus condition of awareness and it gradually gives the sensation, and that is the *arthavagraha*. *Arthavagraha* is the stage of sensation where there is experience of "that" but still we do not know what it is. In the *Vīcesāyaśyakabhāṣya* there is the discussion regarding the nature of *arthavagraha*. In the *Nandisūtra* there is a statement that in this stage we are aware of the sound or colour but we do not cognise the nature of the sound or colour. On the basis of such a distinction of the two stages of *avagraha* it is said that *vyākhyānāvagraha* lasts for indefinite moments, gradually proceeding towards the level of consciousness.

*Iha* is striving for determinate and specific cognition. It is a tendency towards cognising the specific feature of the object. *Iha* has been translated as 'speculation'. But it would be more appropriate to use the phrase 'associative integration'. Cognition of objects in empirical experience is not complete with mere awareness *Iha* introduces integrative process with the help of mental activity. It is striving of the mind towards coherence and integration of the sense impression. Thus *iha* is a stage in the formation of perceptual experience.

Next comes the stage of *āvāya*. From the associative integration (*iha*), we come to the stage of interpretation. In this stage the sensations are interpreted and meaning assigned to the sensation. That would be perception *Nandisūtra* gives the following synonyms for *āvāya* : 1) *avartanata*, *Pratiavartanata*, *buddhi* and *vijñāna*. Some Jaina logicians say that *āvāya* has only a negative function. In this stage of experience there is merely the exclusion of non-existing quality. Now we need the cohering and retaining factors. That is provided by *dhāraṇa*. *Nandisūtra* defines *dhāraṇa* as the act of retaining the perceptual judgement (*āvāya*) for a number of instants or innumerable instants. *Nandisūtra* gives *Sthapana* and *Pratistha* as synonyms of *dhāraṇa*. *Dhāraṇa* has been described with reference to two functions, the negative and the positive functions. Negative function implies retention as a factor of the absence of forgetting. It is retaining the impression received from sense organs. The positive function consists of the stage for recollection. Retention is the basis for recollection.
This analysis of dhāraṇā as retention and condition of recollection has been worked out in greater detail with reference to the psychological analysis by later Jain scholars like Umasvati, Akalanka, Hemacandra and Vadideva. This analysis is a later development with reference to the logical and psychological analysis presented by other scholars in the Vedic tradition. In this sense it would be apter to say that Jaina logic and epistemology are later developments as a consequence of its interaction between the different scholars of Indian Philosophy.

However, the analysis of the perceptual experience shows that the concrete psychosis involves four factors: 1) Reception of stimulation as expressed in the sensational stage 2) Associative integration of the stimulations as we find in iha. 3) Perceptual judgement which is yet unverbalised. 4) Retention of the impressions received and organised so far, as expressed in dhāraṇā. Dhāraṇā is a condition of recollection also.

Other sources of knowledge implied in the śrutajñāna like smṛti and pratyabhijña (recognition) have been recognised as valid sources of knowledge. Anumāṇa (inference) has been recognised as a valid source of knowledge. Among the Jaina logicians, Bhadrabahu seems to be in favour of ten-membered syllogisms. The Āvaśyaka Niryukti describes the ten propositions constituting a syllogism.

Now we come to the study of the direct experience of pratyakṣa jñāna mentioned by the Jainas. This is paramārthika pratyakṣa which we may call as para-normal experience, and in the case of highest experience it is ‘super-normal’ experience. In the case of the Nījapratyakṣa, the self gets the experience directly when the veil of karma obscuring knowledge is removed. This was called pratyakṣa. It is of two kinds. 1) Vikāla which is imperfect and incomplete and 2) Sakāla which is complete and perfect. Vikāla is divided into two types: 1) Avadhi (Clairvoyance) and 2) Manahparyaya (telepathy). Perfect transcendental perception is omniscience. It is kēvala. This is the stage of super-normal perception. It should be necessary to analysis the three forms of pratyakṣa that we have just mentioned: 1) Avadhi 2) Manahparyaya and 3) Kēvala.
Avadhi is a form of direct perception. It is para-normal and it may be compared to the clairvoyant cognition. In this we get perception of the object without the help of sense organs, and we apprehend objects which are beyond the reach of the sense organs. In avadhi we perceive only such things as have form and shape. This can be compared with clairvoyance, which Modern Psychical Research calls a form of extra-sensory perception. Things without form, like the soul and dharma, cannot be perceived by avadhi. Clairvoyance of this type differs with different individuals according to their capacity developed by them through their merit. The highest type of avadhi can perceive all objects having form. Regarding the capacity of perceiving objects in avadhi in terms of time, the lowest type of avadhi can last only a short time, a second. It cannot be extended beyond a second. Similarly it cannot know all the modes of objects. It can cognize only a part of the modes.

The Jaines have given a detailed analysis of avadhi and of beings who possess avadhi. Heavenly beings and beings in hell possess avadhi naturally. Similarly some lower animals possess avadhi by birth. This is called bhāvapratyaya. In the case of heavenly beings and beings in hell bhāvapratyaya avadhi is possible because they do not possess bodily sense organs like human beings. In the case of human beings as well as five sensed lower organisms, avadhi is possible due to the destruction and subsidence of the relevant veil of karma. Thus, human beings and some lower organisms have to acquire avadhi due to merit. This is called gunapratyaya. Viśeṣāvaśyaśakhāśya gives a detailed description of avadhi from fourteen points of view and its varieties with reference to spatial and temporary extension. Pañcāstikāyāstāra divides avadhi into three types: with reference to spatial extension, Deśavadhi, Paramavadhi and Sarvavadhi. All the three are conditioned by psychic quality but Deśavadhi is also conditioned by birth in the case of heavenly beings and beings in hell. Deśavadhi is divided into two types: Guṇapratyaya and bhāvapratyaya with their sub-divisions. Nandasūtra gives six varieties of avadhi which are possible in the case of ascetics.
Modern Psychical Research has recognised the possibility of the possession of extra-sensory perception like that of *avadhi* in some individuals. The psychic phenomenon called 'French sensitiveness', sometimes called as 'psychometry', may be included as a form of *avadhi*, although the mind and the sense organs do play their part. Modern Psychical research has accepted the fact of clairvoyant cognition. Eminent philosophers like Sidwick, Price and C. D. Broad, have admitted the existence of such clairvoyant experiences.

In this connection, we are reminded of the enormous research work being done by the Duke University under the guidance of late Dr. Rhine. But there is a difference in the approaches to this problem by the Western Psychical Research and the Jaina Studies. I had the privilege of corresponding with late Dr. Rhine on this problem. Dr. Rhine's contention was that para-normal experiences like these are accidental in some individuals only. But I believe that para-normal experience are potential in every human being. We have only to remove the impediments to get the same expressed. The impediments may be physiological or psychic due to dispositions. We may interpret the operation of the impediments as the case of the operation of *karma*. If the karmic impediments are removed, para-normal experiences get expressed.

*Manahparyaya* is the next form of super-normal perception. The Jaina conception of *Manahparyaya* is based on their doctrine of mind. Mind, according to the Jainas, is a particular material substance composed of a specific form of *varganas* or group of atoms. It is composed of an infinite number of atoms called *manovarganas*. The finer atoms form the *karma*. Next in fineness come the *manovarganas*. In the *Manahparyaya*, telepathic experience, there is the interaction of mental states; mental states coming into contact with other mental states without the normal channel of communication. It is mind contact between different individuals. *Manahparyaya* cognizes mental states of others without the instrumentality of the sense organs. The *Avashyaka Nirvukti* mentions that only human beings of character, specially the ascetics, can acquire *manahparyaya*. The *Nandisutra* gives description of the possibility of *Manahparyaya* for human beings having physical
and mental discipline. The conditions of the possession of the Manahparyaya can be mentioned as i) developed human beings in the Karmabhumi ii) with sanhyakrṣṭi and iii) with self-control and righteousness.

There are two types of Manahparyaya: i) Rjumati and ii) Vipulamati. Rjumati is less pure and it sometimes falters. Vipulamati is pure and more lasting. Pañcavistikayāsarasā gives a description of the distinction between the nature of Rjumati and Vipulamati manahparyaya.

Rjumati gives direct intuition of the thoughts of others, while in the Vipulamati the process of knowing the ideas of others is manifested in an irregular way. One who is on the higher stage of spiritual development acquires Vipulamati manahparyaya, while one who is in the lower scale of spiritual development gets Rjumati manahparyaya.

In the West interest in the study of such extra-sensory perception is increasing. The Society for Psychical Research is investigating the phenomenon of telepathic cognition. Prof. Oliver Lodge carried out experiments on telepathy when he was a Prof. of Physics. Some Psychologists, like McDougall, were inclined to accept the fact of telepathy. Prof. H. H. Price is of the opinion that there is abundant evidence for accepting the telepathic intuition. Dr. Rhine maintains that extra-sensory Perception in the form clairvoyance and telepathy are actual and demonstrable accurances. They are not sensory phenomena.

Kēvala is omniscience. The soul in its pure form acquires this knowledge due to the removal of karma. Perfect knowledge (omniscience) is gained by the destruction of the four types of karma: Jñanavarāṇiya, darśanavarāṇiya, mōhanīya and antarāya karmas. The total destruction of the mōhanīya karma is followed by a short interval of the time called Muhūrtā. The other karmas obscuring jñāna, darśana and antarāya are destroyed. Then the soul attains omniscience. The moment the darkening karmic substances of the six leśyas are removed ignorance disappears.
Omniscience intuit all substances with all their modes. Nothing remains unknown in omniscience. There is nothing to be known and nothing is unknown. It is the perfect manifestation of the pure and perfect soul, when the obstructive and obscuring veils of karma are removed. The omniscience is co-existent with the supreme state of the absolute purity of the life monad.

Some distinctions have been made in the nature of omniscience as kēvala jñāna. It is said that kēvala jñāna is of two types: 1) Bhavastha, the omniscience of the liberated who still live in the world. For example the omniscience of the Tirthankaras is of this type. 2) Siddha it refers to the omniscience of the liberated soul who no longer remains in this world. There are sub-divisions of the two, as for example the bhavastha may be sub-divided into sayogi and ayogi. Sayogi refers to the omniscience of the tirthankara while still preaching in this world. But when his body is cast off, his omniscience is Ayogi kēvalajñāna. Similarly, the siddha omniscience is of two types as anantara and parampara with their sub-divisions. 75

"It is not possible to establish the possibility of omniscience on the basis of the methods of investigation which psychology and the empirical science follow." However, its logical possibility cannot be denied. Progressive realization of greater and subtler degrees of knowledge by the individual is accepted by some psychologists, especially since the introduction of Psychical Research for analysing the phenomena of extra-sensory perception. A consummation of this progressive realization would logically be pure knowledge and omniscience, a single all embracing intuition.76

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2. Rānakarandesāka Sravakacāra, 11–18.

6. Hiriyanna: *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* p. 212.


8. Based on the analysis in the Jaina Yoga with slight modifications.


   “Vavahāro abhūdatto bhūdattho desido du suddhaṇayo Bhūdattho massido khalu sammāditthi havadi jīvo”.

14. *Anuyogadvāra* :

   “Sanghahiyapindiattam, Sanghahavayanaṁ Samasaobinti”


16. *Anuyogadvāra* :

   “Paccupannaggahi ujjasuo nayavihi muneavvo”


18. ibid.

19. ibid.


32. ibid. : sec. 4,


34. ibid. : 1926, p. 96.

35. *Bhagavan Mahāvīra and his relevance to modern times* (edited by Premsuman Jain, Bikaner); Article by Kalghatgi (T.G.) entitled Jaina dialectic and Modern Thought.
36. Pañcaśāstikāyāsāra: 15.
37. Anuyogadvāra.
38. Gommatasāra: Itivakānda, 672.
43. ibid. Ch. 3.
44. ibid.: Jaina View of Life, Ch. 4.
45. ibid.: Some Problems in Jaina Psychology, Ch. 3.
47. Sthānaṅga: 71.
   "Tattha pañca-y āhām maṇḍam suṣṭam abhinibohīyaṁ
   Ohiṇāgam tu taiyaṁ maṇḍanām ca kevalāṁ".
49. Viṣeṣāvāsyakabhāṣya: 396.
51. Āvaśyakaniruykti: 3.
52. Viṣeṣāvāsyakabhāṣya: 25, 2, 6.
53. Nandisūtra; Mallakadṛṣṭanta.
55. Nandisūtra: 35.
56. ibid
57. ibid
58. ibid 32.
59. ibid 35.
60. ibid
61. ibid 16.
62. ibid
64. Sīhānāṅga: 7; Nandisūtra: 8.
66. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhaṣya: 569.
68. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhaṣya: 669 and 814.
69. Āvaśyakaniryukti: 76.
70. Nandisūtra: 39–44.
71. Sīhānāṅga: 72.
72. Pañcaśikāyāsāra: 45 and its Commentary.
73. Philosophy: October, 1950.
75. a) Sīhānāṅga: 226.
   b) Pramāṇa–mīmāmsa: 1, 1, 15.
77. Kalghatgi (TG): Jaina View of Life:
CHAPTER—6

JAINA PHILOSOPHY

Jivājīvāśravabandhasaṁvaranirjarāmokṣāstattvam

Tattvartha Sūtra – 4

Jīva, ajīva āṣrava, bandha, saṁvara, nirjara and mokṣa are the fundamental principles of Jainism.
Jainism is a realistic philosophy. It is empiricist in outlook. It is analytic in methodology. It starts with experience in this life and derives its conclusions from the rational analysis of experience. Then it transcends the stage of reason to enter into the stage of intuition and direct experience. In this sense it is synoptic and comprehensive in its approach to the problems of philosophy. The philosophical problems, like the fundamental categories and the psychic and non-psychic substances of the universe, are the philosophia perennis of Jainism. For the Buddha, metaphysical problems were not relevant for his enquiry, as he was primarily concerned with ethical problems of life. For, his metaphysical problems were aryaśta. When the Buddha was asked questions regarding metaphysical problems of ultimate reality, he said, “Mahāyāna, consider – if a man were to be wounded by an arrow and needed to be treated, consider again if the man were to refuse treatment unless he was told who shot the arrow, a brahmī, a Kṣatriya, or a śūdra, would this be relevant?” “No my Lord”, said Mahāyāna, “So is your question” said Buddha.1 Mahāvīra faced philosophical questions in the realistic spirit and attempted to give solutions to these problems.

In surveying the field of Indian Philosophy, Dr. Padmarajaiah mentions five types of philosophy considered from the point of view of the nature of reality. They are: 1) Philosophy of Being as we find in the Advaita of Śaṅkara. 2) Philosophy of Becoming as presented by the Buddhists. 3) Philosophy subordinating difference to identity as we find in the Viśistadvaita. 4) Philosophy subordinating identity to difference as is presented in the Vaishesika and the Dvaita of Vedānta. 5) Philosophy that co-ordinates both identity and difference as is presented in the Jaina theory of reality.

According to the Jainas identity and difference, the one and the many, the universal and the particular, and substance and its modifications are equally real and they are co-ordinate with each other. For instance, change is as much real as identity. Becoming and modes are as much real as being and substance. This is the basis attitude of the Jaina philosophy. In this “coherent” view of reality equal emphasis is given on the substance and its modes, identity and difference and universal and the particular.
From the metaphysical point of view Jainism is pluralistic. Jainism mentions seven fundamental principles (*tattvas*). They are *jīva* (living being), *ajīva* (non-living substance), *āśraya* (influx of karma), *bandha* (bondage in this wheel of life), *saṃvara* (stoppage of the influx of karma), *nirjara* (removal of the accumulated karma) and *mokṣa* (liberated state). This classification of the fundamental principles into seven principles is metaphysical with overtones of spiritual values. To these seven principles, *pāpa* (sin) and *punya* (merit) have been added. The nine principles inclusive of the two constitute the *padartha*s and it gives a flavour of religious content with the introduction of *pāpa* and *punya* (Table I). From the point of view of the analysis of the cosmos, *jīva*, and *ajīva* have been classified into six substances (*dravyas*). They are (1) *jīva* (living substance), *ajīva* (non-living substance), *Ajīva* has its forms: 2) *Pudgala* (matter), 3) *dhārma* (principle of motion), 4) *adharma* (principle of rest), 5) *Ākāśa* (space) and 6) *kāla* (time). These are the six *dravyas*. *Dravya* is the substance because it possesses the fundamental characteristic of existence (*astiwa*) and substantiability (*dravyatva*). Excepting *kāla*, all other substances are called *astikāya*, because they have the characteristic of *astiwa* (existence) and *kāyatva* (dimensions). But *kāla* is not an *astikāya* because it has no *kāyatva* (dimension); it is mono-dimensional. It has linear dimension. *Pāṇcāstikāya* mentions the characteristics of *dravya* as substantiability and existence. Therefore, *dravya* is real. It is characterised by the origination (*utpāda*), permanence (*dhārayya*) and disintegration (*vyaya*). These are the modes of the substance. The substance (*dravya*) can be considered from two points of view, i.e., from the point of view of substantiability and from the point of view of its modes. For example gold as gold is substance, it is permanent. But it may be used for preparing bangles and ornaments. They are the modes of the gold. The modes are relatively permanent in the sense they may be changed. They have duration and have no absolute permanence. Yet there is no difference between the substance and its qualities and modes. One cannot exist without the other. There is neither substance without modes nor modes without substance. The concept of the *astikāya* is a significant contribution of the Jains to the metaphysics of the world. In the *astikāya*, they do not include *kāla* because *kāla* is undimensional
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jiva</th>
<th>Ajiva</th>
<th>Āsrava</th>
<th>Bandha</th>
<th>Samvara</th>
<th>Nirjara</th>
<th>Mokṣa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Note:** With the addition of **Pāpa** and **Punya** the 9 principles attain the status of Padārthas. That gives spiritual content to the principles.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE - II</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Saḍdraśya</strong> (6 substances)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living substance (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-living substance</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pudgala (Matter) (2)</th>
<th>Dharma (3)</th>
<th>Adharma (4)</th>
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<th>Kala (6)</th>
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<td>which is constituted of ultimate indivisible particles called <strong>āṇu</strong> (atoms)</td>
<td>(Principles of motion)</td>
<td>(Principles of rest)</td>
<td>(Space)</td>
<td>(Time)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Excluding Kala the other five substances are called **astikayas**
and the points of time are always in the linear motion. Therefore there is no kṣaya for time.

The universe is constituted of the two fundamental substances of jīva and ajīva. Jīva is active and has the characteristic of upayoga (hormic energy). It comes in contact with the ajīva, there is activity. This activity is both psychic (kāṣayas) and physical (yoga). The psychic activity translates itself into emotional states like attachment and hatred, anger and greed. The physical activity is the bodily activity. Both influence each other and these activities have after effects which are expressed in the encrustation of the karmic particles. And this activity in the world brings the jīva in contact with the karmic particles. And the karmic particles get encrusted with the soul, thereby bringing the soul to come in contact with the external world; and the consequence is, there is bondage. In this sense Jainism is dualistic. There is a dichotomous division of the categories into the living and the non-living.

Jainism considers the soul from two points of view. (1) Noumenal (niṣcaya) and (2) phenomenal (vyāvahāra). Kundakundacārya points out that the practical point of view is as much necessary to understand the concepts of the self as the real point of view, just as a Non-aryan is never capable of understanding without the non-aryan tongue.

The existence of the soul is a pre-supposition in Jaina philosophy. No proofs are necessary. And Mahāvira said, “O Gautama, the soul is pratyakṣa, for that in which your knowledge consists is itself soul”. It is pratyakṣa owing to the ‘aham pratyakṣa’, the realisation of the self.6 The existence of the soul can be inferred. And Mahāvira said the soul exists because, “it is my word, O Gautama”. 7 The soul is different from the senses and the body. The sense organs are like the windows through which the soul sees, just as Devadatta perceives the external world through the windows. 8 From the noumenal point of view the soul is pure and perfect. It is pure consciousness. It is no other than itself. Kundakundacārya says that from the noumenal point of view the soul and the body are not one. The soul is pure and perfect. It is simple and not composite.
In the Śāhāṅga we get the description of the soul as one. In Sama-
vasāra Kundakundacārya describes the absolute oneness of the soul
on the strength “of myself realisation”. This does not mean that
the soul is one Advaita in the Vedantic sense. It only emphasises
the identity of the content of the soul. If the souls were one, then
“O Gautama, there would be no sukha, dukkha, bandha and
mokṣa”. The individual souls are different like the kumbhas.

The nature of jīva has been described by Nēmicandra from the
numenal and the phenomenal point of view. From the numenal
point of view the soul is pure and perfect. It is consciousness, but
from the phenomenal point of view soul is characterised by upayoga.
It is the agent, it has the same extent as its body, it is the enjoyer
of the fruits of karma, it is in saṁsāra. The characteristic
‘upayoga’ of jīva has to be re-defined in terms of psychology. Very
often it has been translated as the result of consciousness. But in
my book Some problems in Jaina Psychology, I have interpreted the
term upayoga as “horme” as it has conative prominence. I have
there used the word horme in the sense of McDougall’s use of the
word horme. Jñāna and darśana are manifestations of upayoga in
the light of the cētana.

From the phenomenal point of view, jīva is also described as
possessing of prāṇas, life forces: indriya prāṇa, bala prāṇa, ayu
prāṇa and annaprāṇa. The jīva is the doer (karta), enjoyer
(bhokta), limited to his body (dehamatra), still incorporeal and it
is ordinarily found with karma. As the potter considers himself
the maker of the pot, so also the mundane soul considers itself to
the doer of activities. However, from the numenal point of
view, jīva is the doer of ‘suddhabhava’, pure thought and from the
phenomenal point of view it is the doer of pudgala karma.

Pañcastiṅkaṭṭa describes the atman as the agent of its own
bhāvas. But it is not the agent of the pudgala karmas.

We have seen that due to the contact with ajīva the jīva
engages itself in activity and activity brings in the influx of karma.
Due to the influx of karma the soul gets entangled in the wheel of
saṁsāra and embodied through the operation of karma. When the
soul is embodied it is effected by the environment like the physical and social environment in different ways. This entanglement is beginningless. But it has an end. The end is perfection which the soul attains when it gets itself free from the encrustations of *karma*. Regarding the characteristic of its pervasion, it has been suggested that the soul has the power of pervading the entire body, big or small, just as the light of the lamp illumines the room big or small.\(^9\) Jacobi says that Jainas have a tenet of the size of the soul which is not shared by the other philosophers.\(^{20}\)

*Jiva* is characterized by the upward motion (*ūrdhva-gati*). *Nēmicandra* describes the pure soul as possessing *ūrdhva-gati*.\(^{21}\) In the *Paññastikāyasāra* it is said that when the soul is free from all impurities it moves upwards to the end of the *lōka*.\(^{22}\) The Jaina conception of soul as possessing *ūrdhva-gati* has more an ethical content than a metaphysical status. The main purpose appears to be to lead the soul to perfection in the *Siddhaśīla*. And this is possible if it has its inherent characteristic of upward motion. Similarly in the *Paññastikāyasāra* the soul is described as imparting lustre to the body, just as a lotus hued ruby, when placed in a cup of milk, imparts its lustre to the milk.\(^{23}\)

The embodied souls have been classified on the basis of various principles like the status and the number of sense organs possessed by them. There are the *sthāvara jīvas*, immovable souls. This is the vegetable kingdom. Then there are the *trasa jīvas*, mobile souls. *Trasa jīvas* have two to five senses. Worms, oysters, conches etc., possess taste and touch. They are two-sensed organisms. The five-sensed organisms are *amanaśka* and *Samanaśka*. In *Gommatasāra jivakāṇḍa* detailed classification of *sahasri jīvas* is given as in table No. 3.

From the phenomenal point of view *jīvas* have been classified into fourteen types on the basis of *Margaṇa* and *Gunasthāna*. But from the pure point of view all souls are pure.\(^{24}\) These distinctions have been based on the ethical and spiritual considerations, more than the metaphysical consideration. The purification of the soul depends on the subsidence and destruction of the *karmas*. When the *karma* is removed, the soul becomes pure and perfect. In the
liberated state the jiva resides at the top of the loka and is possessed of the 8 supreme qualities: Samyaksha, Jñāna, Darśana, Virya, Sūksma, Avagāhana, Agurulaghu and Aryābadha. The liberated soul lives in eternal bliss. But the state of the soul is not to be considered as that of identity with the Absolute. Each soul retains its identity and lives in its pure and perfect state. In this connection, we may draw the analogy from a Western thinker regarding the status of the self in the perfect state. McTaggart's analogy of the "College of selves" would appear to be apter, although what type of spiritual unity there is in mokṣa, Jainism cannot say. The neverceasing struggle of the soul is an important tenet in Jainism. The universe is not, then, an amusing pantomime of infallible marionettes, but a fight for perfection, in which "something is eternally gained for the universe by the success."

The next principle is Ajiva. It is the non-living principle. It is complementary to the Jiva and in fact contrary to the Jiva. The Jaina view of the universe consists of a dichotomous division of the universe into the living and non-living, jiva and ajiva. Ajiva is of two kinds: Rūpi Ajiva (non-living substance with form) it is matter and Arūpi Ajiva it is form-less. Matter is called pudgala. The other four principles of Ajiva are Dharma (principle of motion) Adharma (Principle of rest) Ākāsa (space) and kāla (Time). They are substances. In the Āgama literature substances having form are called "mūrta" and those substances which have no form are called "amūrta". This classification of the Ajiva substances has the cosmological overtone. (See Table No. 2). The Jainas, being realists in their approach, have attempted to present the foundational principle of the universe from the points of view of matter and energy. Both of them are equally important. Sthanāngā gives the metaphysical analysis of the distinction between the living and the non-living substances.

Jainas have made a significant contribution to the understanding of the non-living substance called matter. It is Jada in the Āgamas, sometimes Atman embodied and associated with matter is also called Pudgala. But primarily the word Pudgala refers to the non-living substance which has form. We have already seen, five of the six substances except kāla are called astikāya, because
TABLE—III

JIVA

Samsāri  Mukta

Sthāvara (possessing one sense)

Trasa

Badara  Sūksma

Possessing two senses  Possessing three senses  Possessing four senses  Possessing five senses

they have the characteristic of *astitva* (existence) and *kāyatva* (extension). *Jīva, Dharma, Adharma* and *Ākāśa* do not possess the characteristic of *saṁyoga* (conjunction) and *Vibhāga* (disjunction). These disjunctions are denoted by means of atoms. If we imagine extension, if possible of the four substances, we find that *Jīva, dharma, adharma* have innumerable parts; while *Ākāśa* is indivisible and endless. *Pudgala* is divisible and the last point of division of matter is the atom. Atom can be considered as micro-cosm and the cosmos can be looked at an macro-cosmic. It is mentioned as *mahāskandha* as it pervades the entire universe.

*Pudgala* (matter is a substance and it can be classified into four distinctions: 1) *Skandha* (aggregate), 2. *Skandhadeśa* (aggregate occupying space), 3) *Skandha-pradeśa* (aggregate occupying limited space) and 4) *Paramāṇu* (atom). The unit of formed matter (*mūrti dravya*) is *skandha*. It is the aggregate of atoms. It may be considered to be a molecule. It may be constituted of two atoms, three atoms or a number of atoms. Such an aggregate of atoms is a unit. This can be measured by mental construction and it is called *skandha deśa*. The inseparable unit of a *skandha* is called *skandha pradeśa*. *Paramāṇu* is the indivisible point of matter which is the minimal limit. Atoms constitute the universe and atoms combine into various forms in order to form the objects. Jaina theory of atomism is very ancient because Jainism is based on its theory of atomism and matter.

*Paramāṇu* is indivisible. It is indestructible, inaccessible to senses and it cannot be further divided. The description of the characteristics of an atom as given by the Jainas may raise certain difficulties in the light of the study of atom in modern science. Modern science has shown that atom can be split. But if *paramāṇu* is indivisible, is it possible to go below this limit or above it for the sake of finding out whether there is any possibility of understanding the concept of the splitting of the atoms. In the *Anuyogadvara* we get a satisfactory answer to the problem of splitting of atoms in the modern science. It has been suggested that *paramāṇu* is of two forms: 1. *sūkṣma paramāṇu* (subtle atom) and 2 *Vyavahara paramāṇu* (*paramāṇu* in the practical sense). *Sūkṣma paramāṇu* is indivisible and indestructible. *Vyavahara*. 
paramāṇu consists of aggregate of endless sūkṣma paramāṇus. The Vyavahara paramāṇu can be split and splitting of the atom can be understood in this sense.

Pudgala has four primary characteristics: 1. sparśa (touch), 2. rasa (taste), 3. gandha (smell), and 4. varṣa (colour). In every paramāṇu of the matter, these four characteristics are present expressing themselves into variations into different intensities. From the point of view of substance paramāṇu is partless and indivisible, but from the point of view of the modes it is not so. Paramāṇu is accessible to sense experience. It is formless. It is so subtle that even when it has form the senses cannot grasp. The omniscient souls alone can see the paramāṇu both in their formed and formless states. But one who has only sense experience cannot see the paramāṇu.

The paramāṇus combine themselves into skandha (molecule). The process of combination is not to be traced to any outside force or agency. They are due to certain characteristics like viscosity and dryness. In this we find that the Digambara and the Śvetambara traditions present slightly different versions of the process of combination of atoms. They have given a detailed schemata of process of the combination on the basis of Sadṛṣṭa and Visadṛṣṭa combinations. We need not go to the details of the analysis.

Pudgala (matter) can be classified into atom (paramāṇu) and the combination of atoms (molecules). Matter has also been classified on the nature and the intensity of the combination of molecules in various forms. There are six types of matter on the basis of such distinction: 1. Sthūla–Sthūla (very gross) like objects—stone etc., 2. Sthūla (gross like liquids—milk, curds, water etc., 3. Sthūla-sūkṣma (gross subtle) like—light, electricity, heat etc., 4) Sūkṣma–sthūla (subtle gross) like—vapour, wind, etc., 5. Sūkṣma (subtle) – Manovargānas, 6. Sukṣma-sūkṣma (very subtle) – paramāṇu.

Combinations of paramāṇus have been considered on the basis of the degree of subtlety of combination. In this there are several combinations from the gross objects to the manovargānas. Eight
combinations have been mentioned. It would be desirable to make a thorough study of the Jaina theory of matter in the light of the researches in modern physics. We are likely to get startling similarity in the conceptual analysis of the matter as given by the Jainas and also of the recent study of matter in physics.

Dharmastikāya - in this universe jīva and pudgala have the capacity to movement. They have motion as a capacity; the other four dravyas have no capacity of motion. Therefore Jīva and pudgala have been considered as gatiśīla and the others are sthitīśīla. For this kind of movement and rest their need to be media. They are the principle of motion and the principle of rest Dhṛma is the principle of motion and Adharma is the principle of rest. The terms dhārma and adhārma are here taken in the cosmic sense and have no ethical flavour. Dhṛma is the principle which is one and eternal. It is the principle of motion by which things in the world move. Movement is possible because of this principle. Dhṛma is itself unmoved. But movement is possible because of this principle. It has been suggested that Ether is this principle. There is an analogy very often quoted in this connection. Just as the movement for the fish is possible in water, so also movement in this universe is possible through the principle of dharmā. Water itself may not have motion but the fish in the water can move because they are in water, in this sense water is the medium of motion. Similarly dharmā is the principle through which motion is possible.

Gautama asked Mahāvīra what is the principle of Dharmastikāya for the jīvas? Mahāvīra said, “O Gautama, if the principle of dharmā were not operative there would be no motion – who would come? and who would go? how could the waves of the sound travel? how could the eyelids open? How would you talk? the whole world would have remained stationery, but for the principle of dharmā. Adharmastikāya – it is the principle of rest. As dharmā is necessary for movement, adharmā is necessary for rest. It is also the cosmic principle because of this, things in the world are sometimes stationery, when it is necessary to be stationery. Just
as the shade of a tree induces rest for the tired and the weary, so also the principle of adharma is the basis of rest. It is the cosmic principle and it is indestructible. The two principles of dharma and adharma are necessary for the functions in the universe. They are operative in the limited sphere of the stellar universe and not beyond in the limitless.

Gautama asked Mahavira, “what is the use of adharmastikaya for the jivas?” Mahavira said, “O, Gautama, if the adharmastikaya were not to operate as the principle of rest, who would stand, who would rest, who would sit, who would sleep and who could remain silent? The world would have been in constant movement without break if the principle of adharma were not to operate. All that is steady and at rest is due to this principle of rest”. 89

A question has been asked; Dharma and Adharma are formless. Being formless how can they assist motion and rest? The answer is that the capacity to help for rest or motion does not depend upon its characteristic of formlessness. Just as Akasa is formless but it still accommodates various things, so also dharma and adharma assist motion and rest, although they are formless.

Another question has been asked regarding the all-pervading nature of dharma and adharma. If dharma and adharma were to be all-pervading, then they must interpenetrate each other. But the interpenetration, is not necessary, although they co-exist. Just as numerous lights illumine the room and each light pervades the entire room, so also dharma and adharma are all-pervading, and there should be no contradiction. Some have suggested that the principle of dharma is the gravitational field. Some others have suggested that the principle of dharma may be compared to the laws of motion but these problems need further study.

Akalasa is that substance which accommodates jiva, pudgala, dharma, adharma and kala. It is Akasa dravya. 40 It is the basis of all dravyas and therefore it has a special function. 41 Akasa is not specially a dravya although it is called dravya, because it is empty space and it accommodates all things. It is all-pervading (sarvavyapi), formless (amurtta) and it has infinite points of space
(anantapradesi). Akasa is divided into two forms: Lokakasa (limited space) and Alokakasa (limitless beyond). As a Lake gives space to the water, similarly Akasa accommodates all things. Akasa is a limited space and the limitless beyond is alokakasa.

A question has been asked that if Akasa were to be one and continuous how can there be distinction between lokakasa and alokakasa? The answer is that this division is not on the basis of substance but it is with reference to the function of dharma and adharma in space. In the alokakasa the principles of dharma and adharma do not operate. Similarly, a question has been asked as to why alokakasa is called akasa although it does not accommodate anything. For this we can say that alokakasa has the capacity of accommodation but as dharma and adharma do not operate accommodation of thing is not possible.

Lokakasa has infinite number of pradesas (space point) while alokakasa has limitless space. Akasa itself is limitless and endless, because, if infinite pradesas are taken out from the limitless akasa, still infinite pradesas remain. Therefore, considered from the point of view of the capacity of accommodation and also extension, akasa is considered as limitless.

From the point of view of extension akasa is limitless, and from the point of view of time akasa is beginningless and endless. But from the practical point of view and for the sake of conventional measurements akasa has been divided into different measures of time, like Dik and other conventional measurements of meter, kilometer etc. The directions like the east and the west, upward and downward (Urdhwa and Adhodisa) are also measurements from the practical point of view. Disakam commences with two points of space of Akasa and desa increases every thing by two pradesas and it covers infinite number of pradesas. Urdhwa and Adhodisa begin with four pradesas till the end. The directions like the east and the west are conventional measurements of time. In the Acaranga sutra we get a similar description of the direction (dik) from the practical point of view. Suggestions have been given as to how to recognise east and the west etc. This distinction is called prajnapaka disa (empirical direction). But we
should note that \textit{diśa} is not an independent substance. It is a conventional form of measurement. Similarly, \textit{pradeśa} gives a pattern for the empirical measurement of \textit{akāsa}.

Sometimes Jaina concept of \textit{Akāsa} has been compared with newtonian conception of space. But the Jaina conception of space has reference to the two other principles like \textit{dharma} and \textit{adharma}. They are also substances. These two principles and \textit{akāsa} are not inherent. In this sense Ether as a substance cannot be explained without the conception of \textit{Akāsa}. Therefore, it is difficult to have comparison with the Jaina concept of \textit{Akāsa} and the modern scientific theory of space.

\textit{Gautama} asked \textit{Mahāvira}, “what is principle of substance of \textit{Akāsa} and what is the purpose of \textit{Akāsa} for the \textit{jīvas} and \textit{ajīvas}?'' \textit{Mahāvira} said, “If \textit{akāsa} were not to be there where would the \textit{jīvas} be? where would the \textit{dharma} and \textit{adharmastikāyas} pervade? where would the \textit{kāla} extend? where would the dance of \textit{pudgala} be possible? the whole world would be without foundation.’’

\textit{Kāla} : \textit{Kāla} is the substance in which the movement of the object would be experienced. In Jaina metaphysics there are two prominent views regarding nature of \textit{kāla} (time). According to one view \textit{kāla} is considered to be the mode of the substance of \textit{jīva} and \textit{ajīva}. In this sense \textit{kāla} cannot become the expression of change in the objects, although it is the medium of change. \textit{Kāla} is the \textit{dravya} (substance), though it is not an \textit{astikāya}, because it has no \textit{kārya} (multidimensionality) it has only linear dimension. In the Svetambara agamic literature there is the mention of both the views in the \textit{Bhagavati sūtra}, Uttarādhyayana\textsuperscript{47} and Prajñāpandat\textsuperscript{48}. The Digambara ācāryas like Kundakunda,\textsuperscript{49} pūjyapāda,\textsuperscript{50} Akalanka\textsuperscript{61} and Vidyānandi\textsuperscript{52} have mentioned \textit{kāla} as an independent substance.

On the basis of the first view of \textit{kāla} as a mode of substance, the measurable distances of time like \textit{samaya}, \textit{muhūrta}, day and night are modes of \textit{kāla} from the practical point of view. These modes are special features of the substances \textit{jīva} and \textit{ajīva} and these modifications with their clusters are considered as \textit{kāla}. \textit{Kāla} by itself is not an independent substance.
According to the view which makes kala an independent substance like the other substances jiva and ajiva, kala is a substance and change is possible in kala. However, the two views are not inconsistent with each other. From the noumenal point of view kala is the mode of the jiva and ajiva and is not an independent substance. But from the phenomenal point of view kala is considered to be an independent substance. The changes in the various objects are possible in time and the conventional measurements of time have reference to the modes of substances of jiva and ajiva.53

In the Digambara literature kala is not merely considered as an aspect of or an expression of human intellect with reference to human activity but it is also pervading the entire universe. We have seen that although time is a substance it is not to be included in the six substances because of its mono-dimensional characteristic. It has no magnitude. It is linear. Therefore time is always forward looking.54 From the empirical point of view Sthānakaśa mentions four types of kala: 1) Pramāna-kāla (measurable time) 2) Yathayunivṛti-kāla (time with reference to duration) 3) Maranakāla (moment of death) 4) Addhakāla (based on the revolution of the Sun and the Moon).55

The Jainas have worked out the schematic presentation of the empirical time in mathematical terms. The unit of time forms the present. The particles of time are innumerable, invisible, inactive and without form. These particles exist, each in its own capacity, and are without activity. The present forms one unit (saṁaya) the future has as many saṁayas as the past plus one. The past has as many saṁayas as the future minus one. Total time will be twice the amount of past plus one or twice the amount of future minus one. Even the smallest calculable fraction of time, the avatiya, consists of as many saṁayas as all the remaining others that are being recorded.56

From the spiritual point of view the fundamental principles like Āśraya, bandha, Saṁvara, nirjara and mokṣa have been considered as significant for the realization of the highest perfection. We have so far analysed the fundamental principles of jiva

20
and ajiva as the essential constituents of the universe. We shall now present a brief survey of the principles mentioned above from the spiritual point of view. The ultimate end of life is to attain perfection. It is moksha. That is the end for all Indian philosophers except Carvaka. The soul due to contact with Ajiva has its activity. Due to the activity of the soul (yoga) karmic particles flow in into the soul. This influx of karmic matter is called Aśrava. The soul forgets its original nature due to the encrustation of karma and gets involved in wheel of life. This involvement is beginningless but it has an end. The involvement in the wheel of saṁsāra is due to the influx of Karma. Just as water flows into a pond from different streamlets, so also karma flows into the soul from different directions due to various types of activity.87

This influx of karma has been distinguished into two types: 1) Dravyaśrava and the other 2) Bhavaśrava. The influx of karmic matter which causes jñānavaraniya and other karmas is dravya Aśrava.88 The karmic matter enters into the soul and obscures its capacity of knowledge, intuition and activity. That modification of the soul by which karma gets into it is called the Bhavaśrava. The Bhavaśrava refers to the psychic impediments which are responsible for the creation of the conditions of the influx of karmas. And dravyaśrava refers to the corpus of the karmic particles flowing into the soul and causing bondage. The Bhavaśrava would in a sense become the condition for the influx of the karmic matter. But at the same time Dravyaśrava does bring certain psychic accompaniments which are responsible for the psychic states and events producing the conditions for the influx of the karmic matter. Aśrava refers to the source through which karmic matter flows into the soul. In this sense we may distinguish five sources from which karmic matter flows in.

1) Mithyaśrava: It is the perversity of outlook. It may be distinguished into two types: i) sahaja mithyaśrava (inherent perversity) and ii) grahita mithyaśrava it is acquired perversity. In both these forms there is the absence of a hunger and thirst after righteousness. Perversity of attitude is the root cause of all evil and it binds the jīva to the endless wheel of saṁsāra.
2) **Avirati**: It is absence of self-control. A person who has no control over his senses indulges in sense pleasures and he loses direction for the attainment of self-realisation.

3) **Pramāda**: It is negligence or indifference to the higher values of life. Indulgence in the sense pleasures leads one to negligence, and it again leads to the interest in listening to stories which are connected with sense pleasures. We fall from the spiritual values and it leads to pramāda. Therefore, Mahāvīra said, "Do not be negligent in your duties, not even for a moment".

4) **Kṣāya**: It refers to passion. It creates mental states which are intensely affective in nature. They are intense feeling and emotions like anger (krodha), egoity (māna), infatuation (māya) and greed (lobha). These passions are responsible for the influx of karma. Just as a field is ploughed and made ready for sowing, so also kṣāyas prepare the mental-set and mental readiness for the influx of karmic particles.

5) **Yoga**: It is activity which is possible through body (kāya) speech (vāca) and mind (manasā). The ātman is active and these activities are bodily, mental and through the speech. All such activity prepares the ground for the influx of karma.

Āśrama has also been classified into two types on the basis of the nature of the source through which karmic particles flow in:

1) **Kṣāyanirajita Āśrama**: It is due to the affliction of passion. It is also called saṃparāyika āśrama.
2) The second type of āśrama is due to activity (yoga) and not so much due to the affliction of passions. It is Iryāpatha āśrama.

The Buddhist conception of āśrama in Pali literature is referred to as āsava. Āsava is the perverse expression of avidyā and klesa. It is a specific form of perversity. Jacobi says that the concept of āśrama, saṃvara and nirjara used in Jainism are very ancient. The Buddhist conception of āśrama is similar to that of Jainas. Therefore, it is clear that the karma theory and the conception of āśrama of the Jainas is much earlier to the Buddhist conceptions.
Bandha: The principle of bandha is an important spiritual concept in Jainism. It is bondage, and it leads one to the ever-recurring involvement in the wheel of life. The bondage is due to the influx of karma. Aśrava brings bandha.

Bandha may be considered as of two types: 1) Dravya bandha. It is the bondage that is due to the influx of karmic particles into the soul. 2) Bhāvabandha refers to the psychic states that lead us to the involvement in this wheel of life. These two forms of bondage due to karma are complementary to each other. And the one is intimately connected with the other. Just as the dust particles settle securely on a piece of cloth which is soaked in oil, so also the karmic particle gets settled in the soul due to kasya and yga.

The bandha has been distinguished into four types: i) Prakṛti bandha – it refers to the nature of karma that has entered into the soul. ii) Sthiti bandha – it has reference to the state and the limitation of karmic particles in the soul. iii) Anubhāga bandha – it refers to the intensity of experience of karma which leads to the intensity of the bondage. iv) Pradeśa bandha – it is concerned with the extensiveness and the aggregates of the karmic particles associated with the soul. Just as a pudding (modaka) with its medicinal values may be used for curing several types of diseases, similarly some form of karma is responsible for some types of difficulties like the obscuration of knowledge. Others inhibit energy of the soul, similarly just as some puddings have efficacy for a day and some others for longer time, similarly the karmic particles have their intensities in their experiences in varying degrees. Thus the prakṛti, sthiti, anubhāga and pradeśa bandha are intimately associated with the karmic particles and they are effects in the soul.63

So far we have seen that the soul gets involved in the wheel of life and is bound (bandha) due to the influx of karma. This bondage, as we said earlier, is beginningless but it has an end. The soul in its inherent capacity is pure and perfect and the ultimate end of life is to remove this bondage and to be free from the shackles of karma. This is possible by means of a process
which gradually eliminates the karmic particles and sometimes reduces the intensity of the effects of karma (kṣayopātama). From now onwards the upward process for self-realization starts. We have to take two important steps in this direction. 1) Saṅvara refers to the stoppage of influx of karma and 2) Nirjara – which refers to the removal of the accumulated karma. These two are graduated steps. Saṅvara has first to be there and then we can adopt Nirjara.

Saṅvara is the stoppage of the influx of karma. As the inflowing water through the inlets is prevented from coming in order to clean the tank, so also the influx of karma from different sources has to be stopped first if the bondage is to be removed. The function of saṅvara is the first step towards the realization of the self in the spiritual sphere.

Saṅvara is of two types: 1) Dravya saṅvara and 2) Bhava saṅvara. Dravya saṅvara refers to the stoppage of the influx of the karmic particles of matter. It helps reducing possibilities of the long duration of saṁsāra. The psychic accompaniment of the influx of karmic particles have also to be stopped. The stoppage of the psychic accompaniments and psychic causes of the influx of karma is the bhāvasaṅvara.

The process of saṁvara would be possible through its various forms which primarily consist of mental and moral discipline. It has been suggested that there are 57 ways of saṁvara: a) 5 samitis (Īrya-samiti, bhasa samiti, Ėśaṇa samiti, Adana nikṣepaṇa-samiti and Utsarga samiti, b) 3 Guptis (kāya, vāca and Manasa), c) Control of 22 pariṣahas (affections), d) 10 duties (daśalaksana), e) 5 Caritraś (Rules of conduct) and f) 12 Anuprekṣaś (Reflections). "In the Sūtra-kṛṣṇa it is said that he who is purified by meditating on these forms of saṁvara is compared to the ship in water which is sailing towards the other shore of perfection.

It has also been suggested that saṁvara is of 5 types: These five types are 1) Vyāta (Practice of vows), 2) Apramāda (Deligence), 3) Saṁhyaktva (Right attitude of mind and right knowledge), 4) Akaśaya (avoiding the passions), 5) Ayōga. It is cessation of
activity. In addition to these it has been suggested that we should avoid violence, untruth, theft, non-celibacy, and possessions (*parigraha*). Similarly we should control five senses. All these physical and mental discipline are aimed at the moral and spiritual development in the direction of the preparation of the further ground for the removal of *karma*. *Dvadasi-nupreksa* gives a similar description of the four forms of *saṁvara* as: 1) *Saṁyaktva saṁvara* 2) *Deśavrata saṁvara* 3) *Kāṣāya saṁvara* and *Yoga-saṁvara*. In the *Samayasara* also *saṁvara* has been distinguished into four types of processes like the removal of *mithyātva*, of perversity, of ignorance, practice of self control and the curtailment of activity *yoga*. Similar conception of *saṁvara* has been presented by the Buddhist for the sake of self-realisation. The *Tathāgata* has mentioned six types of *saṁvara*. In the *Aṅguttaranikāya* it has been suggested that the stoppage of influx of *karma* is possible by the removal of *avidya*.

*Nirjara*: After *saṁvara* we come to the processes of *Nirjara*. The function of *saṁvara* is to arrest the influx of *karma* through different sources by stopping the inlets. But the function of *Nirjara* is to remove the accumulated *karma* already present in the soul. Just as, if a tank is to be cleaned, we first stop the inlets of water and then remove the accumulated water, similarly *saṁvara* stops the influx of *karma* while *Nirjara* removes the accumulated *karma*. In the *dvadasi-nupreksa* it has been said that the *karma* that has already been accumulated has to be removed, that is *Nirjara*. The processes of *Nirjara* is a gradual processes of purification of soul. That would lead to *Moksa*. *Nirjara* is of two types: 1) *Sakāma-Nirjara* and 2) *Akāma-Nirjara*. In *sakāma* *Nirjara* the karmic particles are removed through the practice of *vṛata*. But in the case of *Akāma* *Nirjara* the removal of *karma* is possible by the gradual process of the activity of the soul in its pure nature. In this, the righteous activities refer to the very nature of the soul. It has also been suggested that *Nirjara* is of two types: 1) *Abuddhipūrvaka* which is a natural process of exhaustion of *karma* through the experiences of life as in the case of Denizens of hell who exhaust *karma* through the compulsory tortures. 2) *Kuśalāmūla-Nirjara* is possible through the practice of austerities (*tapas*) and the conquest of trouble.
In the Candra-prabhacarita we get a description of the two-fold function of Nirjara as 1) Kalakṣaṇa Nirjara in which there is a natural process of the exhaustion of karma and 2) Upakramakṣa Nirjara which consists of the voluntary efforts of the removal of karma. Similar distinction have been mentioned in dvādaśānu-prekṣa. In the śiśāntaṅga Nirjara has been distinguished into various forms. The processes of Nirjara has been referred to on the basis of the austerities which may be external as well as internal. External austerity (tapas) may be bodily which consists of the practices like fasting, abstaining from certain types of food, controls of certain activities of the body through the control of the senses and through Yoga which is primarily concerned with practice of silence and other practices. Internal austerities are of six type: like 1) Confession 2) Vinaya (Reverence) 3) Vaiyavṛtiya (service) rendered to humanity and to the ascetics 4) Svadhyāya (self-study of the scripture) 5) Dhyāna (Meditation). Meditation has four forms, two auspicious and two inauspicious. Inauspicious meditation is more concerned with mental agitation regarding the things of the world and mental disturbances like revengeful activity. Auspicious meditation leads us to spirituality and finally to the attainment of the highest stage of concentration, this is śūkla-dhyāna. 6) Utsarga absolute indifference to the body and the material needs. This leads to the ascetic practices. Ascetics alone can reach this stage. The analysis of dhyāna has a great deal of psychological acumen, in the analysis of the mental processes in the dhyāna. In the practice of Kāyotsarga it is possible to have all forms of difficulties and obstacles; it is possible to suffer physical and mental tortures. But one who is engaged in the practice of dhyāna accepts these troubles with equanimity. Kāyotsarga has been distinguished into physical and the mental forms which refer to as dravyakāyotsarga which is concerned with the bodily aspects self-control and bhāvakāyotsarga which refers to the psychic accompaniments of the processes of self-control.

Mokṣa: When the self is freed from the bondage of karma and has passed beyond the possibility of rebirth it is said to have attained mokṣa. Mokṣa is the highest ideal to be attained by the self at the time of perfection. Sri Arabindo considers the concept of mokṣa to be the central point of Indian thought. All the systems
of Indian philosophy, except the Carvaka, accept the concept of mokṣa.

According to the Jainas the soul in its real nature is pure and perfect. But due to its activity owing to its contact with ajiva it accumulates karma and gets involved in the wheel of life. But the end of the removal of karma is possible for a jīva if his eyes turn towards spiritual realisation. By his voluntary efforts and not depending on any superior deity or God for grace, one can attain the state of highest perfection by one’s own efforts. This state of highest perfection is called mokṣa. Jainas say that the jīva has a characteristic of Urdhvagati (tendency to move upwards). When the karmic particles are removed and when the soul is free from all the karmic encrustations, it moves upward to the end of lokakaṣa and remains in its pure form in the siddha loka, at the end of lokakaṣa... It does not move further because there is the absence of the dharmastikāya in the alokakaṣa. The Jain literature presents a picture of Siddha Śīla, and the description of the Siddha Śīla, given by the Jainas is its peculiarity. According to the Jainas the world where the human beings inhabit has the extension of 45 lakhs of yojanas and the extension of Siddha kṣetra has also 45 lakhs of yojanas. In this there is a special point about the possibility of attainment of mokṣa by the jīva. The efforts for the attainment of mokṣa are possible only for human beings and in this karmabhāmi. Even the Gods in heaven have to be reborn as human beings if they have to strive for the attainment of mokṣa.

The final stage of self-realisation is the stage absolute perfection. In this stage all empirical adjuncts, like the bodily functions are removed. The soul enters the third stage of sukladhyāna. This state lasts only for the period of time required to pronounce five short syllables. At the end of this period the soul attains perfect and disembodied liberation. This is a stage of perfection. However, the Jaina conception of mokṣa does not obliterate the individuality of each soul. It is neither merged nor is identical with anything higher than itself. Its individuality is not lost. There is a permanent personality of the soul even in the state of perfection. We have elsewhere referred to McTaggart’s analogy of the “College of selves” in order to explain the status of the soul in the state of perfection.
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10. a) Samayasāra : 5.
    b) Dravyasamgraha : 2, 3.

11. Gaṇadharaṭa : 34.


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16. a) Pañcāstikāyasāra : 27.
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17. a) *Pañcabhyāṣṭi* : 20–27.
    b) *Dravyasamgraha* : 8, 9.


23. ibid : 33.


25. ibid : 14.


27. *Śīhāṇāgā* : 2, 1, 57.


29. a) *Bhagavati* : 2, 10, 66.
    b) *Uttaradhyayana* : 36, 10.


31. *Anuyogadvarā* : *Pramāṇa Dvāra* :
    “Paramāṇu duvihe pannat teḥ
    jaha : suhumeya vavahāriyeya”

33. Sthanaṅga : 4, 135.
   “Caovihe poggalapariṇāme
   Paṇṭatte, tām jaha
   Vaṇṇa Pariṇāme, gandhapariṇāme,
   rasapariṇāme, phāsapariṇāme”

34. Bhagavati : 18, 8.

35. a) Niyamasāra
   b) Gommatasāra : Jivakanda : 603.
   Bādara-bādara, bādara, bādara-suhuma
   ca suhumaṣṭhūlaṁ ca /
   Suhumaṁ, suhumaṣuhumaṁ,
   dharadiyamodi chabbeyaṁ / /

36. Bhagavati : 8, 1, 1.

37. ibid : 18, 7-10.

38. ibid : 13, 4.

39. ibid

40. a) Dravyasamgraha : 19.
   b) Tattvartha sūtra : 5-8.

41. Uttarādhyayana : 28, 3.
   “Bhayāṇāṁ savvadavvāṇāṁ nahāṁ ोgahalakkhaṇāṁ I”

42. Uttarādhyayana : 36, 2.

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   “Cincanti Mualaim punabhavassai”

61. Dhavala:
   “Dukkha sasyaṁ karmakṣetram kṛṣānti phalavatkurvanti Iti kaśayah”

63. a) *Dravyasaṁgraha*: 31-35.
   b) *Gommatesvara*: *Jivakaṇḍa*: 300-305.
   c) *Kartikeyanupreka*: 88.

64. a) *Sthānaṅga*: 1, 14 Tika.
   b) *Pañcaṣṭikayāsara*: 2, 142 and *Vyrtti of Amrutacandra*.
   c) *Dravyasaṁgraha*: 2, 34.

65. a) *Kartikeyanupreka*: 89-90.
   b) *Dravyasaṁgraha*: 2, 36-37.

66. a) *Sthānaṅga*: 4, 2, 418.
   b) *Samavayaṅga*: 5.

   b) *Sthānaṅga*: 5, 2, 418 and 10, 1, 709.

   “Sammattam Desavayaṁ Mahavyanṭaḥ Jao Kasyapam
   Adede samvaram ana mana jogabhavo tahaccheva”

   “Micchattam annam avirayabhavo ya”
   “Jogo ya”
   “Heu abhāve niyama jayadi nanissa asava niroho”

70. *Āṅguttaranikāya*: 6, 58.

71. a) *Sarvartha Siddhi*
   “Ekedesakarma samkṣaya laksṇa Nirjara”
   b) *Tattvārtharājavartika*: 1, 4, 17.
   “Vaddhapadesaggalāṇaṁ Nijjarāṇaṁ idi jineham Pannattam”

73. *Tattvartha bhasya* : 9, 7.


75. *Dvadaśanuprekṣa* : 103, 104.

76. *Sthanaṅga* : 1, 16, Tika.

77. *Āvaśyaka Niryuktī* : 1549.

78. *Āvaśyakacūrpi* :
   “So punna kaussaggo davvato bhavato ya bhavati
   Davvato kayacetta hiroho bhavato kaussaggo jhanam”

79. *Uttaradhyayana* : 19, 82.
   “Uddhaṁ pakkamai disam”

Whom dost thou worship in the dark lonely corner of temple with doors all shut?........

God is there with the tiller tilling the hard ground and the pathmaker breaking stones

*Rabindranath Tagore*
CHAPTER—7

THAT THOU ART

Philosophy in India, like religion, as way of life, is the man's reaction to totality of things. It implies the interpretation of nature and the meaning of the Universe. And the presence of 'god' gave strength to man's enquiry. God was for man a natural and psychological necessity. As Prof. Leuba pointed out that fear was the first emotion to become organised in human life. And out of this fear, God was born. Perhaps love and admiration mixed with gratitude were equally important and an integral part of man's nature. We do not know. It is possible that men have looked upon gods with a living sense of kinship.¹ In the higher religions fear is sublimated by love into an adoring worship.² Man created god and then was subjected to the will of god.

In India, in the Vedic period, we find a movement of thought from polytheism to monotheism and then to monism. Many gods were created many gods were worshipped. A weariness towards the worship of numerous gods began to be felt. A theistic conception of God as the creator was crystallised. In ancient Greece, Xenophue was against the polytheism of his time. Socrates had to drink hemlock as he was charged of denying the national gods. He distinguished between the many gods and the one God who is the Creator of the Universe. As Compte said, modern science has dispensed with gods in general and the God as a creator. Modern science has conducted God to the frontiers and bowed Him out with thanks for his past services.

The Jainas, like the Buddhists, were against gods in general and the God as the creator in particular. They presented several arguments against the theistic conception of God. The Naiyayika argument that the world is of the nature of an effect created by an intelligent agent who is God (Īśvara) cannot be accepted for the following reasons:

i) It is difficult to understand the nature of the world as an effect:

a) If effect is to mean that which is made of parts (saavyaya) then even space is to be regarded as effect:
b) It means coherence of a cause of a thing which was previously non-existent, in that case one cannot speak of the world as effect as atoms are eternal;

c) If it means that which is liable to change, then God would also be liable to change; and he would need a creator to create him and another and so on ad infinitum. This leads to infinite regress.

ii) Even supposing that the world as a whole is an effect and needs a cause, the cause need not be an intelligent one as God because;

a) If he is intelligent as the human being is, then he would be full of imperfections, as human intelligence is not perfect;

b) If his intelligence is not of the type of human intelligence but similar to it, then it would not guarantee inference of the existence of God on similarity, as we cannot infer the existence of fire on the ground of seeing steam which is similar to smoke;

c) We are led to a vicious circle of argument if we can say that the world is such that we have a sense that some one made it, as we have to infer the sense from the fact of being created by God.

iii) If an agent had created the world he must have a body. For, we have never seen an intelligent agent without a body. If a god is to produce an intelligence and will, this is also not possible without embodied intelligence.

iv) Even supposing a non-embodied being were to create the world by his intelligence, will and activity, there must be some motivation:

a) If the motive is just a personal whim, then there would be no natural law or order in the world;
b) If it is according to the moral actions of men, then he is governed by moral order and is not independent;

c) If it is through mercy, there should have been a perfect world full of happiness;

d) If men are to suffer by the effects of past actions (adṛṣṭa) then the adṛṣṭa would take the place of God.

But, if God were to create the world without any motive but only for sport it would be 'motiveless malignity'.

v) God's omnipresence and omniscience cannot also be accepted, because:

a) If he is everywhere, he absorbs into himself everything into his own self, leaving nothing to exist outside him;

b) His omniscience would make him experience hell, as he would know everything and his knowledge would be direct experience.

vi) It is not possible to accept the Nātyayika contention that without the supposition of God, the variety of the world would be inexplicable, because we can very well posit other alternatives like (i) the existence of the natural order and (ii) a society of gods to explain the universe.

But if a society of gods were to quarrel and fall out as it is sometimes contended, then the nature of gods would be quite so unreliable, if not vicious, that we cannot expect elementary cooperation that we find in ants and bees.

The best way, therefore, is to dispense with God altogether.

We find similar objections against the acceptance of a theistic God, in Buddhism also. The Buddha was opposed to the conception of Isvāra as a creator of the universe. If the world were to be thus created, there should be no change nor destruction, nor sorrow nor calamity.
If Isvara were to act with a purpose, he would not be perfect, that would limit his perfection. But if he were to act without a purpose his actions would be meaningless like a child’s play.

There is nothing superior to the law of Karma. The sufferings of the world are intelligible only on the basis of the law of Karma. Though the Buddha admits the existence of the gods like Indra and Varuna, they are also involved in the wheel of Samsara.

We have, so far, seen that the Jainas, as also the Buddhists, were against the theistic conception of God. God as a creator is not necessary to explain the universe. We have not to seek God there in the world outside, nor is God to be found ‘in the dark lonely corner of a temple with doors all shut’. He is there within us. He is there with the tiller tilling the hard ground and the ‘pathmaker breaking stones’, in the sense that each individual soul is to be considered as God, as he is essentially divine in nature. Each soul when it is perfect is God.

The Jainas sought the divine in man and found the essential divinity in all living being. This conception of the essential divinity of all creatures has been systematically worked by the Jaina Acaryas. Every soul is divine in its essence. It is involved in the wheel of samsara (worldly existence) due to the encrustation of karma. It has to experience and exhaust the fruits of karma. Every soul is responsible for accumulation of karma in a being. Nor can one’s karma be exchanged with another man’s karma. Karma cannot be compared to the pieces of money which can be exchanged. Unless we exhaust our karma we cannot find a way to salvation. No God nor any spirit will help us. No grace of God is necessary nor possible. The entanglement in the wheel of samsara is beginningless but it has end. The end is due to self-effort only, by voluntary means. When all the karma is removed soul reaches its essential state of perfection. That is divinity. In this sense, we can interpret the famous dictum Tat Tvam asi (That Thou art) as the essential nature of divinity of the soul. Every self is divine. It is That; it is God.
However, the struggle for perfection is long and arduous. Few reached perfection; and perhaps, as tradition would say, none would become perfect in this age. Among those who have reached omniscience and perfection are the Tirthankaras, the prophets, who have been the beacon lights of Jaina religion and culture. They have preached the truth and have helped men to cross the ocean of this worldly existence. They led men, like kindly light, to the path of spiritual progress.

Therefore, they need to be worshipped. The Jainas worship the Tirthankaras, not because they are gods, nor because they are powerful in any other way, but because they are human, and yet divine, as every one is divine, in his essential nature. The worship of the Tirthankaras is to remind us that they are to be kept as ideals before us in our journey to self-realization. No favours are to be sought by means of worship, nor are they competent to bestow favours on the devotees. The main motive of worship of the Tirthankaras, therefore, is to emulate the example of the perfect beings, if possible, at least to remind us that the way to perfection lies in the way they have shown us. Even this worship of Tirthankaras, arose out of the exigencies of social and religious existence and survival and possibly as a psychological necessity. We find a few temples of Gandhiji to-day; perhaps, there would be many more. The Buddha has been deified.

Apart from the worship of Tirthankaras, we find a pantheon of gods who are worshipped and from whom favours are sought. The cult of the Yakṣīṇī worship and of other attendant gods may be cited as examples. This type of worship is often attended by the occult practices and the tantric and mantric ceremonialism. Dr. P. B. Desai shows that in Tamilnad Yakṣīṇī was allotted an independent status and raised to a superior position which was almost equal to that of the Jina. In some instances the worship of Yakṣīṇī appears to have superceded even that of Jina. Padmavati, Yakṣīṇī of Parsvanatha has been elevated to the status of a superior deity with all the ceremonial worship, in Pombuccapura in Karnataka area. These forms of worship must have arisen out of the contact with other competing faiths and with the purpose of popularising the Jaina faith in the context of the social and
religious competition. The cult of *Jvalamalini* with its *Tantric*
accompaniments may be mentioned as another example of this
form of worship. The promulgator of this cult was, perhaps,
Hēlācārya of Ponnur. According to the prevailing belief at that
time, mastery over spells or *Mantravidya* was considered as a
qualification for superiority. The Jaina Ācāryas claimed to be
master *Mantravadins.* Jainism had to compete with the other
Hindu creeds. *Yakṣi* form of worship must have been introduced
in order to attract the common men towards Jainism, by appealing
to the popular forms of worship.

However, such forms of worship are foreign to the Jaina
religion. They do not form an organic and constituent features of
the Jaina worship. These tendencies have been absorbed and
assimilated, in the struggle for existence and survival. We may,
here, refer to the inconceivable changes the Buddhist forms of
worship have undergone in the various countries of the world, like
the Tantric forms of worship in Tibetan Lamaism.

We have still some gods in Jaina cosmogony. They are the
devas, the gods living in heavens like the *Bhavanavāsī, Vyantaravāsī,*
*Jyotiska and Kalpavāsī.* But they are a part of the *Samsāra* and
not really gods in the sense of superior divine beings. They are
just more fortunate beings than men because of their accumulated
good karma. They enjoy better empirical existence than men.
But we, humans, can pride ourselves in that the 'gods' in these
worlds cannot reach *mokṣa* unless they are reborn as human beings.
The gods are not objects or worship.
REFERENCES


4. ibid : 6.


6. Aśvaghoṣa’s *Buddha Carita* gives detailed description of the topic. Also refer to *Syādvāda Mañjari*.


8. ibid pp. 74.
CHAPTER—8

DOCTRINE OF KARMA

"The doctrine of karma is one of the most significant tenets of Indian thought. It has profoundly influenced the life and thought of the people in India".
DOCTRINE OF KARMA IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY

I. There is apparent inequality among men. Happiness misery are distributed in unequal ways. Very often we find good men suffer and men of evil prosper. King Hariścandra suffered untold misery for his truthfulness. The book of Job presents the life of Job which is at once noble and poignant misery. Personal and social inequality has been the perennial problem of inscrutable providence and social injustice. Attempts have been made to find a suitable philosophical solution to these problems and to justify the ways of God to man. Various theories, like the theories of Accident, Fatalism and the that of Natural Necessity have been suggested as possible solutions to this inscrutable problem. But, Omer Khayyam said:

“Myself when young did eagerly frequent
Doctor and Saint, and heard great Argument
About it and about: but evermore
Came out by the same Door as in I went”.¹

If we survey the ancient Indian thought, doctrine of karma has been suggested as the possible solution to this problem and it is intimately connected with the concept of rebirth. “The common basis of all the religious systems of India is the dogma of retribution causality of the deed (Karma) and conditioned by this the beginningless chain of existences following one another”.²

“O Gautama, just as a sprout has a seed for its hētu, as there is a hētu for happiness and misery; since it is a Kārya. That hētu is the karma.”³

The doctrine of karma is one of the most significant tenets of Indian thought. It has profoundly influenced life and thought of the people of India. It has become the logical prius of all Indian thought.⁴ It is the basal presupposition of Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism. The Jainas have developed the doctrine of karma on the realistic approach. They have given the analysis of the principle and the operation of karma on a scientific basis, with its empirical and anekānta approach.
In modern psychological studies, C. G. Jung, while distinguishing the Personal from the collective Unconscious, hints at the possibility of comparing the archetypes of the Collective Unconscious to the Karma theory in Indian thought, as the collective level comprises the pre-infantile period, that is the residue of ancestral life. Had he developed the Collective Unconscious, he would have reached the doctrine of karma.

It is difficult to say when and where the concept of karma originated in India. It has sometimes been traced to the principle of Īta. But the concept of karma must have existed at least a thousand years, before the beginning of the Christian era, and has since become the basis and the centre of religions. It must have been a pre-Āryan doctrine which was in the Śramaṇa culture and later assimilated and developed in the Brahminic thought by the time of the Upaniṣads. The Indian view of karma is doubtless of pre-Āryan prominence and it was a kind of natural law. However, the doctrine became widely accepted in all systems of Indian thought except the Carvaka. In the Sannyasa Upaniṣad we are told that jivas are bound by the karma. The Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad endorses this view. The Mahābhārata emphasises the force of karma. The Bhagavadgītā mentions the three types of karma—prārddha, Samcita and āgami. In Buddhism, although there is no defined belief in the concept of a permanent soul, the chain of births is due to the force of karma. Venerable Nagarjuna explained to the King Milinda “So it is, O, King, men are not alike because of karma. As the Lord said, each being has his own karma, it is karma that divides them into the high and low”. But idea of the force of karma and the pollution of the soul due to karma has existed from the pre-Buddhistic time. “The Jainas have adopted it in the real sense of the word and have worked out into an original system.” The Jain conception of Karma must have been completely developed after a thousand years of Mahāvīra’s Nirvāṇa. The Sthānāṅga, Uttarādhyayana-sūtra and the Bhagavatiśūtra contain general outline of the doctrine, and the details have been worked out in the Karmagranṭha, Pañcasatāgraha and the Karmaprakṛti. In working out the details, there have been two schools of thought: i) Āgumika and ii) Karmagranṭhika.
II. a) We have seen in the earlier chapter that Jainism is dualistic. The universe is constituted of the two fundamental categories: *jīva* (living) and *ajīva* (non-living). From the pure and ultimate point of view, *jīva* is pure and perfect. It is characterised by *upayōga*, hormonal energy. It is immaterial and formless.\(^{14}\) It is characterised by *cētana*. It is pure consciousness. From the phenomenal point of view *jīva* is described as possessing four *prānas*. It is the lord (*prabhu*) limited to his body (*dehamātra*), still incorporeal, and it is ordinarily found with *Karma*.\(^{16}\) The *Jīva* comes in contact with the external world. *Ajīva*. The *Jīva* is active, and the activity is expressed in threefold forms – the bodily, in speech and mental. This is called yoga. Yoga brings its after-effects in the form of Karmic particles which veil the pure nature of the soul. The inherent capacity of the soul for self-realization is obstructed by the veil of *Karma*.\(^{16}\)

*Karma*, according to the Jainas, is material nature. It is subtle. It is a substantive force. It is constituted of finer particles of matter. It has the special property of developing the effects of merit and demerit.

"No-where has the physical nature of *Karma* been asserted with such stress as in Jainism".\(^{17}\) A moral fact produces a psychophysical quality, a real and not merely a symbolic mark, affecting the soul in its physical nature. This point of view has been worked in detail in the form of mathematical calculations, in the *Karmagrantha*.

The Jaina tradition distinguishes two aspects: i) the physical aspect (*dravya-karma*) and ii) the psychic aspect (*bhāva-karma*). The physical aspect comprises the particles of *karma* (*Karma-pudgala*) accuring into the soul and polluting it. The psychic aspect is primarily the mental states and events arising out of the activity of mind, body and speech. They are like the mental traces of the actions, as we experience the mnemonic traces long after the conscious states experienced vanish. The physical and the psychic *karma* are mutually related to each other as cause and effect.\(^{18}\) The distinction between the physical and the psychic aspects of *Karma* is psychologically significant, as it presents the
The bondages of the soul to Karma is of four types, according to nature (prakriti), duration (sthiti), intensity (anubhaga or rasa) and quantity (pradeśa).¹⁰

Even as a pudding (modaka) used for curing gastric trouble, cures the ailment, so also the Karmic particles get converted into Jñāna-varaṇiya Karma which veils knowledge and darśana-varaṇiya which obscures darśana. Similarly modaka expresses its effect for different durations as of one or two days, so the Karmic effect works for Thirty Sāgarpamās or short time of forty-eight minutes. As a lamp, with its wick, drawn in the oil and converts it into a flame so does the soul attract, due to attachment etc., the material particles and transforms them into karmic matter.²⁰

b) Karma can be distinguished into eight types: i) Jñāna-varaṇiya, that which obscures right knowledge; ii) Darśana-varaṇiya, that which obscures right intuition; iii) Vēdaniya, arousing affective states like feelings and emotions; iv) Mōhaniya, that which deludes right faith; v) Āyukarma, determining the age of the individual; vi) Nāma karma, which produces various circumstances collectively making up an individual existence, like the body and other special qualities of individuality; vii) Gōtrakarma, determining family status etc., of the individual; and viii) Antarāyaka-karma which obstructs the inborn energy of the soul and prevents the doing of good actions.

Each kind of Karma has its limits in time within which it must exhaust itself. The accumulated Karma brings a transcendental hue or halo to the soul which is called lēṣya. There are six Lēṣyas. These Lēṣyas have predominantly a moral resultant.

The Karmic particles build up a special body which is called Karma-śarira which does not leave the soul till its emancipation. Karma has its psychic effects also. Bhāva-karma is immediate to the Jīvas, while Dravya-karma belongs to the body. Five classes of Karmic conditions are mentioned. •On account of the rise
(udaya), Suppression (upasama), annihilation (ksaya), suppression and annihilation (ksayopatana) and psychological effect (Pariṇāma) the soul has five conditions of thought and existence. In the usual course of things, Karma takes effect and produces results; the soul is said to be in audāyika state. Karma may be prevented from its operation for sometime. In this state it is still present, like fire covered by ashes. The soul is in the aupasaṃāka state. When karma is annihilated, it is in a ksāyika state. The fourth state is the mixed state. The last, unconditioned state leads to mokṣa.

c) Karmic matter undergoes various processes due to the different types of activity. The Pañcasamgraha describes eight processes of expression of energy (Karma) in its limited form. The influx of Karma (āśrava) into the soul and the consequent bondage involve certain process like i) transformation (saṁkrāmapa) of one type of Karma into that of another ii) endurance of Karma for a certain time (sattā), iii) endurance without producing the effect (abādha) and iv) coming into effect (udaya). Transformation is a process by which the soul transforms the nature, duration, intensity and extensity of Karma into those of another, just as electrical energy is transformed into heat or light energy. This transformation is generally restricted to the change of one sub-type of karma to another sub-type of the same kind. For instance, in the Vēdanya-Karma, soul can transform the Karma producing pain (aśāta-vēdaniya) into that producing pleasure (sāta-vēdaniya). In the Jñānavaraṇiya Karma it can transform cakṣu-jīvāna. A person having right intuition (saṁyag-darsana) can either transform the karma leading to perversity (mithyātva) to that leading to partially right and wrong intuition (saṁyag-mithyātva). But we are told any Karma cannot be transformed into any other. One cannot transform Karma obscuring intuitive experience (darśana mōha) with the Karma obstructive conduct (cāritra-mōha) into that of āyu-Karma (determining life duration).

Transformation of Karma may also effect increase (udirāpa), decrease (apavarāna), duration (sthitī), and intensity of the function (anubhāga) of Karma. The Jainas have worked out a
scientific and detailed analysis of these processes with a view to explaining the process of the operation of \textit{Karma}.

While discussing the Process of operation of \textit{Karma}, sometimes eleven process of the states of the karmic operation have been suggested \cite{26}:

1. \textit{Bandha} : It refers to the close association of the karmic matter with the soul, just as water and milk are mixed as one.\cite{26}

2. \textit{Sattā} : It refers to the potential or dormant state of the karmic presence in association with the soul. It is the state of karmic particles held in tension in the soul before it is expressed for giving fruits.

3. \textit{Udvartana} : \textit{Udvartana} is the state in which the intensity of the karmic process is increased.

4. \textit{Apavartana} : It refers to the decrease in the intensity of the karmic state.

5. \textit{Saṅkramaṇa} : It is, as we mentioned earlier the process of the transformation of one form of \textit{karma} into the other with specific limitations. It has been considered into four states like, i) \textit{prakṛti}, ii) \textit{sthiitī}, iii) \textit{anubhāga} and iv) \textit{pradesa saṅkramaṇa}\cite{27}

6. \textit{Udaya} : It is the state of the rise of the specific type of \textit{karma}. If the rise of the \textit{karmic} state brings in the fruits of the \textit{karma} and by exhausting the karmic particles, it is called \textit{‘phalādaya’}. But if the karmic rise gets exhausted without expressing in the specific fruits of the rise of the \textit{karma}, it is called \textit{‘pradeśodaya’}.

7. \textit{Udiraṇa} : It refers to the premature rise of the karmic process. This is possible by practice of moral codes and psychic processes.
8. *Upasamana*: In this, the karmic encrustation is held in abeyance and suppressed, just as the burning coal is covered by the layers of ashes.

9. *Nidhati*: In this state, there is neither the rise nor the transformation of the karmic process. But there is the possibility of increase or decrease in the intensity of the karmic state. It is also of four types: i. *prakṛti*, ii. *sthitī*, iii. *anubhāga* and iv. *pradeśa nidhatī*.

10. *Nikācita*: In this state there is the absence of the four states of *udvartana*, *apavartana*, *samkramaṇa* and *Udiraṇa*. The soul has to exhaust the *karma* and experience the fruits in the way in which the karmic bondage has taken place. There are also four forms of *nikācita*.

11. *Abadha Kāla*: This state refers, as we mentioned earlier, to the unexpressed, dormant and the potential state of the karmic encrustation. It is the state where the karmic particles have yet to express themselves and fructify.

*Yaśovijaya* compares these processes with some concepts of *karma* in the *Patañjali Yoga*. The five affiliations of the egoism, nescience, attachment, repulsion and the will to live are the particular states of the rise (*udāya*) of *mōhanīya karma*.

Having explained the elaborate processes of the operation of the *karma*, the Jainah seers said, “*Alam Vistāreṇa*”.

d) The aim is to seek freedom from the miseries of this life, to seek deliverance. But the path to *Mokṣa* is long and endless. We have to free ourselves from the *karma* that has already been accumulated and to see that no new *karma* is added. The soul gets bound by the constant flow of *karma*. This is called *Bandha*. Mental states, like passion, attachment and aversion, which prepare the ground for the binding of the soul by *karma* are called psychic bondage (*bhāvabandha*); and the actual binding by the particles of *karma* is called *dravya-bandha*. When passions overcome us, the particles get glued to our souls and bind them, just as a heated iron
ball when immersed in water, absorbs water, but the first step to
the realization of the self is to see that all channels through which
Karma has been flowing have been stopped so that no additional
karma can accumulate. This is saṁvara. We have been in the
earlier chapter. Saṁvara is of two kinds: Bhava-Saṁvara which is
concerned with mental life, and dravya-saṁvara which refers to the
removal of karmic particles. This is possible by self-control and
freedom from attachment. The practice of vows (yātā) carefulness
(sāmiːt). Self-control (gupti), observance of ten kinds of dharma,
reflection (anuprekaːṭa) and removing the various obstacles, like
hunger, thirst and passion, will stop the inflow of karma and
protect us from the impurities of fresh karma. Here, saṁyag-
cāritra (right conduct) is of help. The next important task is to
remove the kṛma that has already accumulated. The destruction
of karma is called Nirjra. Nirjra is of two types: bhava-nirjra and
dravya-nirjra. The karma may exhaust itself in its natural
course when the fruits of karma are completely exhausted. This is
called savipaka or akama nirjra, where no efforts would be
required. The remaining karma has to be removed by means of
penance. This is avipaka-nirjra. The soul is like a mirror which
looks dim when the dust of karma is deposited on its surface.
When the karma is removed by Ni jra, the soul shines in its pure
and transcendent form. It then attains the goal of mokṣa. The
Ghati karmas are first removed. Still, the Aghati karmas, like ayu,
nama, gōtra and vedāntiya have to disappear. The highest stage is
the final ayoga state of Kēvala.

III. It is difficult to give logical proofs for the reality and the
operation of the principle of karma. Discursive arguments with
hair-splitting logic cannot be presented for proving the extent of
the operation and the fruition of karma. The prevalent inequality
in the status and the experiences of individual lives is an evidence
for the proof of the principle. To insist on proofs of discursive
logical argument is to assume with impunity that we can operate a
suffering patient with the same knife by which we cut our bread to
eat. Logic is one for the knowing the phenomena. It is not the
only way, nor is it the most important way. In the absence of the
belief in the operation karma it is difficult to explain the variety
and the inevitable inequality among the living beings.
For all the great systems of Indian philosophy, *karma* is just the all-ruling principle operating in the Universe. It is the guiding force to which even the God must conform, as is presented in the Vedic systems of Indian philosophy, for the creation and the governance of the world.33

The doctrine of *karma* is the self-evident principle which cannot be proved nor need it be proved. It may be considered as a postulate which no Indian philosopher found it necessary to prove.

The real proof of the truth of the *karma* theory is to be found in the words of the revealed scriptures or in the utterances of the great enlightened ones. In them we seek the unshakeable foundation of faith, "just as the Christian theologians derive the unavailable certainty of the immortality of the soul not from rational proofs but from the revelations of the *Bible.*"34

The logical justification of the principle of *karma*, Jainas say, is not possible from the rational point of view. It is the expression of the highest knowledge and experience of the seers. And we must accept it as authority. "Oh, *Agnibhūti, karma* is *pratyakṣa* to me."35 It is they who are in constant touch with innermost depth of life and to them we are to look for guidance. Such 'enlightened ones' or 'sages' are the first-hand exponents of philosophy.36

IV. *Karma* theory has been criticised by some philosophers. It is suggested that the *karma* doctrine suffers serious defects:

1) *Karma* leads to the damping of the spirit and men suffer the ills of life with helpless equanimity of attitude because the course of their life is determined by *Karma*. *Karma* leads to fatalism. It does not give any incentive to social service.

But it is not true to say that the *karma* theory does not give any incentive to social service. The *Upaniṣads* enjoin social service. The Jaina ethics is based on service and sacrifice, although on the highest level one has to transcend social morality. The five vows
to be observed by an ascetic and the layman (śrāvaka) imply the recognition of dignity and equality of life. Schweizer maintains that the problem of deliverance in the Jaina and the Buddhist thought is not raised beyond ethics. In fact, it is the supreme ethic. Jainism gives importance to social ethics as a means to the realization of the highest end of perfection.\textsuperscript{37} It is full of significance for the thought of India.\textsuperscript{88} And karma is not a mechanical principle but the spiritual necessity. It is the counterpart in the moral world of the physical law of uniformity.\textsuperscript{89} Unfortunately the theory of karma became confused with fatality in India and man grew feeble and helpless.\textsuperscript{40} Fatalistic theory of life was presented by Makkhali Gosāla, a contemporary of Mahāvīra. He considered himself a rival of Mahāvīra. He said, that happiness and misery are measured to one as it were in bushels.

But we should realise that our actions are determined by the karma that we earn due to our own actions. The after-effects of action in the form of karma have to be experienced and exhausted. In this sense our actions are determined. But the karma that we have accumulated is due to our own activity for which we are responsible. Therefore, we earn the karma by our own activities and we have to exhaust the karma that we have accumulated. In this sense we can interpret the famous verse of the Bhagavadgītā – “Karmaṇyeva dhikaraste” so as to emphasise that my authority and the right is on the action and the after-effects of action in the sense of the karmic after-effect.

2) It is alleged that karma theory connects actions and its effects in a mechanical way. It over-emphasises the retributive aspect of punishment.

But we have seen that by suitable moral and spiritual efforts, we can transform one type of karma into another, reduce the intensity of karma and to some extent by repentence we can create an atmosphere as a psychological means for moral and spiritual efforts, although repentence alone without the requisite moral effort may not help in the exhaustion of karma.
3) It is said that *karma* doctrine implies that the individual is in the grip of power, which heedless of his wishes, is working out a burden of an immemorial past. Pringle-Pattison shows that the whole emphasis of the *karma* theory is on retribution. There is nothing redemptive in its operation. The clockwork of requital, in running down, always winds up itself again, and so in perpetuity. *Karma* only perpetuates the curse of existence. And ‘to conceive this Universe as primarily a place for doling out punishment is to degrade it to the level of a glorified police court’.

But this is a mis-interpretation of the doctrine on the basis of the inadequate knowledge of problem. This Universe is not merely pantomime with fallible marionettes, nor place for retributive punishment. It can best be described as the “vale of soul-making”. Living beings earn their *karma* by their activities. They are responsible for their action. Dr. Radhakrishnan says that *karma* is not so much a principle of retribution as one of continuity. One needs to be immersed in the tradition and the element of Indian thought, if one is to understand the proper significance of the operation of *karma*.

4) Some have suggested that the doctrine of *karma* leads to unbridled individualism. It fails to see that we belong to a community, that there is what is called ‘corporate sin’; It allows the fortunate ones to boast of their self-merited happiness.

But we should not ignore the fact that *karma* does not imply a hedonistic outlook on life. It does not envisage a judicial theory of reward and punishments in the hedonistic sense. Realisation of the highest self is end of life: and life of sense pleasure is an impediment in the pathway to self-realisation. **Moksha** or perfection is to be attained through the practice of goodness, charity and compassion. It would be more appropriate to say that *karma* theory awakens us to our responsibilities to society and does not make us isolated and self-centred.

Therefore, we should realise that in the *karma* theory there is the first assurance that in the mental and the moral worlds, as in the physical, there is no chaos, no fortuitous chance nor more
probability, but an ordered energy that leads us towards the fulfilment of our goal of self-realisation. *Karma* theory is an explanation of the moral justice of the universe. "It satisfied my sense of justice and threw light on the problem of unmerited suffering." Judged by the historic standards, *karma* theory does much to raise man's status and to 'wean him from coaxing fods through sacrifice and prayer. It insisted on individual expiation and emphasised the moral continuity of life, here and hereafter'. It is in fact a striking answer to the fathomless injustice to the nature of things.".

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9. *Sanyāsa Upaniṣad* : ii. 18, (*Karmaḥa badhyate jantuḥ*).


22. *Karma Prakṛti*:

   Bandhanakaraṇa; “Saṃkramaṇyante nyokarmarūpa – taya vyavasthitah prakṛti-sthityanubhāga-pradeśā anyakarmarūpataya vyavasthāpyante yena tat saṃkramaṇaṁ”.

23. ibid.

24. *Karmaprakṛti*;

   Bandhanakaraṇa: Cf. Saṃkramaṇaṁ, tadbhedavevodvartanapavartane, te ca karmaṇaṁ sthityanubhāgaśraye


26. a) *Tattvārtha sūtra* : 1.4 Sarvārtha Siddhi.
   
   b) *Uttarādhyayana* : 28/24 Nemichandra tīka.


31. a) *Bhagavati* : 2, 3.
   

32. a) *Saṅkhya sūtra* : V, 20 VI. 41.
   
   b) *Karmagrantha I*.

33. Glassenapp: *Immortality and Salvation in Indian Religions* p. 34.

34. ibid.


39. ibid. 211.

40. *Manusmṛti* : 12.5.7.


43. ibid.

44. ibid.


48. Holmes (Edmond) : The Quest of an Ideal as quoted (p. 98) in the *Idea of Immortality* (p. 120)

CHAPTER—9

JAINA ETHICS

The Rsis who discovered the law of non-violence in the midst of violence were greater geniuses than Newton, greater warriors than Wellington.

Romain Rolland.
JAINA ETHICS

The ultimate ideal of a Jaina is perfection here and here-after. It is not the entire negation of the empirical values but only an assertion of the superiority of the spiritual; empirical values are a means to the realisation of the supreme values. Artha (economic value) and Kama (desires for empirical good) are to be geared to the realisation of the spiritual value, Dharma. Dharma leads to Moksa. Moksa can also be interpreted as self-realisation and the self to be realised is the transcendental self. The ultimate excellence of the spirit could be attained by the gradual process of getting moral excellence. There is no short cut to moksa. As Schweitzer maintains the problem of deliverance in the Jaina and the Buddhist thought is not raised beyond ethics. In fact it was the supreme ethic and it was an event full of significance for the thought of India. In the West the Hellenic ideal was to be a good citizen to attain excellence in his life. The Jaina seers, as in other Indian thought except the Carvaka, realised that we have to transcend the empirical to reach perfection. Yet the empirical is not negated. It is the stepping stone for the perfection. Saivyak Caritra (moral life) is important as the pathway to perfection. Of the triple pathways, Saivyak-Darsana (right faith), Saivyak jnana (right knowledge) and Saivyak Caritra (right conduct), Saivyak Caritra is equally important. Without hunger and thirst for righteousness we shall not enter the kingdom of perfection. Ethics, for the Jainas, is working in righteousness all the days of one’s life. Mathew Arnold said morality is the three fourth of life. In fact it is the whole of life. Morality has no holidays. And it is not only the conventional morality that the Jainas emphasise, but is the moral excellence with conviction. Saivyak-Caritra presents the canvas for the illumination of one’s self towards spiritual strength.

Saivyak-Caritra has been distinguished into two levels: Sakala (complete) and Vikala (Partial). Sakala Caritra is the vigorous practice of dharma and it is to be adopted by those who renounce the world and became ascetics. It is munidharma. It may be considered as individual ethics. But for those who have not renounced the world, it is still possible to seek the truth and pursue the path of righteousness though in a convenient and a
lesser degree. That would be *vikala-caritra* the way of the householder. This is social ethics. There are thus two levels of morality. The polarity of the householder and ascetic is one of the most characteristic features of the Jaina social structure. The layman has the obligation to cherish his family, the monk must sever all ties with them. The monks are excessive since their lives are a negation of compromise; while moderation is the key note of the life of the householder. It is rooted in compromise.¹

*Muni-dharma* aims at seeking salvation through the practice of strict moral and spiritual injunctions. Of these, the five *vratas* (vows) are important. They are: 1) *ahimsa* (non-violence); 2) *satya* (truth); 3) *asteya* (non-stealing); 4) *brahma-carya* (celibacy); and 5) *aparigraha* (non-possession). It is difficult to translate these words in proper form. The *Vratas* have to be practised rigorously and without exception. In this sense the *Vratas* to be practised by the ascetics are called *Mahavrata* (great vows). "The reverence towards life, Albert Schweitzer has put it by which the realm of life was so immeasurably extended, permeates the discipline of *Mahavira*'s order in a way no other ethical prescription does."³ We can observe it entering into the fields of other vows like truthful speech as arising out of passion. The vow of non-possession is equally important. A monk is not allowed to possess anything, in some cases including a piece of cloth, except a *kamandalu* (a pot for water) and *Piśca* (a broom like thing generally made of pea-cock feathers). Later it is sometimes suggested that the sixth vow *rai-bhoyanaś veramanam* (abstaining from taking food at night) was added with the main intention of avoiding injury to life in the dark. This was primarily meant as injunction for the householder, as the ascetic takes only one meal a day at midday. It is a special case of *ahimsa* In fact the entire ethical structure of the Jainas is centered around the fundamental principle of *ahimsa*. We find this expressed in the other injunctions to be followed by the ascetics. The ascetics have to practise: 1) the five *mahavrata*, 2) five *samitis*, 3) the control in five senses 4) six *avasuṣkas*, other practices like i) *loč* (plucking the hair on the head with hands), ii) *acesakata* (abstaining from the use of covering of any sort), iii) *asana* (abstaining from bath), iv) *Pratitiśayana* (sleeping on bare ground), v) *adantadhavan* (abstaining from
cleaning teeth), vi) sthitibhojana (taking food offered by the lay disciple, by using the palm only and by standing), vii) ekabhukta (taking one meal a day). The five samitis are: i) iryā-samiti (restriction on movement), ii) bhasa-samiti (restriction on speech), iii) esāra-samiti (taking pure and permissible food), iv) adana-niksepana-samiti (careful use movement of the necessary objects like kamandalu, a pot for use of water etc.,) and v) pratiṣṭhapanā-samiti (answering the nature calls in solitary places). The practice of vows and other injunctions has to be carefully done by the ascetic without exception. The life of a monk is hard and rigorous in this sense. His object is to attain Mokṣa, and for this purpose rigorous mortification of the body has to be practised. The practice of vows is threefold: in body, mind and speech.

The infraction of the practice of vows and other injunctions has also to be threefold: i) by one self, ii) by getting others to commit violation, and iii) by acquiescing in the act of violation.

A muni is not to cover himself with any type of clothes or decoration made of cotton, wool, bark of a tree or even grass. He is forbidden to take bath (asnana). He should sleep with care on one side where there is little possibility of injury to living being including the tiniest insects. He should not clean his teeth, nails and other parts of the body nor should he decorate himself in any way (adanta-dhavana). He should eat taking the food on the palm standing on a clean and purified place, and he should eat only once a day after midday. These are included in the twenty-eight basic mûlagnonas of a Muni. Rigorous restrictions are imposed on an ascetic; which if imposed on the layman, it would not be possible for him to practise in conformity with his responsibility of household life.

The Daśavaikālika-sūtra gives description of the essential qualities required of an ascetic. One who is self-controlled, who is free from passion and is non-attached is a real Muni. He saves his soul and those of others. Such self-controlled persons go to heaven (deva-loka), or are freed from the bonds of life according to the degree of destruction of Karma. One who goes to heaven is reborn and has to continue his struggle for the destruction of the remaining Karma ultimately to attain Mokṣa.
A true monk should have no desires, nor attachments and should wander about as the known beggar. He should live as a model of righteousness. He is not to live by any profession or occupation; possessed of full self-control and free from any ties, he should live the life of a homeless mendicant.

The daily routine of a monk is well regulated and regimented. He has to be severely solemn and is obliged to behave in a strictly reserved and inobtrusive manner. He cannot indulge in singing, dancing, laughing or any other form of merry-making. He has to devote much of his time to meditation, study, and in the third part of the day he has to go only for food and drink.

The Ācārāṅgasūtra and Daśavaikālika present a detailed picture of the strict rules for taking a midday meal. He has to be modest in behaviour and give precedence to other receivers and even to animals. And such a monk practising the rigours of an ascetic for the sake of a fuller and more perfect life here and hereafter is superior to all others, like a trained ‘Kamboja steed’ whom no noise frightens, like a strong irresistible elephant, like a strong bull and a proud lion. And one who has given up all worldly ties, is well-versed in the dharma, who practises all codes of ascetic life is the Śramaṇa, a bhikku.

But all cannot renounce the world. It is not possible nor necessary that we should all follow the path of renunciation. We have to live the lives of citizens with numerous social responsibilities. The performance of social responsibilities will certainly lead to the path of the spiritual perfection, in its own way. Living as citizens doing our social duties, it is not possible to practise the vrataś (vows) with the same rigour and discipline as would be required of a monk. We have to practice the vrataś with less rigour as far as possible, still without sacrificing the spirit of the vows. Social obligations are the major duties of citizens. Therefore, the ethical code of the citizen or the house-holder may be called Social ethics. It is Sravaka-dharma. In the Jaina conception of moral life we find, there is the harmonious blending of the secular and the spiritual. The secular has not been neglected. It is a stepping stone for the spiritual perfection. One cannot become
a saint overnight. One has to train oneself to be a good citizen first before entering into the life of a muni, except in the case of superior men, ‘heaven born prophets’.

The ethical code of a citizen (Śravaka) is twelvefold: a) Five vrātas which are common for the ascetic and the householder, except for the fact that they have to be practised with less vigour without sacrificing the spirit of righteousness. They are Anuvrātas. They are: 1. Ahimsa (non-violence), 2. Satya (truth), 3. Asteya (non-stealing), 4. Brahmacarya (self-control) and 5. Aparigraha (lesser possessions). b) In addition to the five anuvrātas, one has to practise three Guṇavrātas; are: 1. Digvrata, 2. Bhogopabhogaparimanaṇvrata and 3. Anarthadandaṇvrata. Digvrata restricts the movements in different directions. The purpose is to reduce the possibility of committing violence, and this is to be achieved by circumscribing the area in which injury to the living can be committed. For example, one is forbidden to climb a mountain or a top of a tree, descend into a well or underground storage of a village, to travel beyond a stipulated limit prescribed by the Ācaryas, and to move at random. These would be infractions of the vow. In the Ratnakaranḍaka, Digvrata is defined as the resolve to desist from injury by circumscribing one’s range of movement. As to the limits of time, it is to be practised until death. The Bhogopabhogaparimanaṇvrata forbids or limits one in the use of ‘consumable’ goods like food and durable goods like furniture in the house. The Anarthadandaṇvrata restricts an individual from certain activities, from harmful professions and trades, because they would lead to harmful activities which serve no purpose. Four types of Anarthadandaṇa are mentioned in the Śvetāmbara texts, while Digambaras have five. We have tried to avoid the discrepancies in the presentation of the Śvetāmbara and the Digambara writers on the different problems as they are largely concerned with minor details. The five types of Anarthadandaṇa are: i) apadhyāna (evil concentration like ārta-dhyāna and raudra-dhyāna), ii) pramadacaritra (negligent mischief or addiction to vices like alcoholism and gambling). It also includes witnessing dancing, sex displays, cock-fighting and other combats of animals. It may include many others bringing about incitement of excessive instinctive activity; iii) himsā-pradāna (encouraging injury, pison,
weapons, fire, rope, swords and other articles for destruction of life.\textsuperscript{12} iv) pāpōpadeśa (sinful advice) like instruction in evil trade. It is also mentioned that sometimes such advice, like giving instructions to the farmer to plough when the rains are on, cannot be avoided when a question of being helpful is involved, but it should never be given out of mere garrulity.\textsuperscript{13} v) duḥṣruti (bad reading); it consists in reading kamaśāstra, sex and spicy literature including yellow journalism and listening to the faults of others. It is the study of works that disturbs and spoils the minds with harmful thoughts, worldly attachments, perverse attitude and excitement of passions\textsuperscript{14}

The Sṛavaka has to practise four śikṣāvrata: i) Samayika, ii) Deśavakāśika, iii) Prōsadhōparasa, and iv) Atithi-sāmivibhaga. Samayika is one of the important practices for the layman; and it is one of the six avaśyakas (necessities) for the layman and also for the ascetic for whom it has to be practised lifelong. It consists in the attainment of equanimity and tranquility of mind.\textsuperscript{15} It is a process of becoming one (ekatva-gamana), of fusion of body and mind and speech with the Ātman.\textsuperscript{16} Samayika may be performed in one’s own house or in a temple, in the presence of Guru or in a specially built hall according to the needs of the time and individual. Sometimes a distinction is made between the ordinary laymen, affluent men, and men of official status. Special procedure for Samayika is laid down with the intention of increasing the prestige of the Jaina community by emphasising the fact that he has adhered to the sacred doctrine.\textsuperscript{17} In performing the Samayika one should observe the five Samitis and three Giptis and avoid all harmful speech. He should recite prayākhyana avoiding harmful actions and pratikramaṇa expressing remorse for past deeds and pray (alocātti) that whatever acts in speech, mind and body made by him in the past may be atoned for. It is to seek forgiveness for what has been done so far. During the period of samayika the layman becomes like an ascetic.\textsuperscript{18} Samantabhadra shows that a layman performing samayika is like an ascetic draped in clothes,\textsuperscript{19} although this likeness is only apparent like the description of a woman as cundramukhi.\textsuperscript{20} Samayika has to be performed at regular intervals of the day. The object of this practice is to gain mental equanimity surcharged with righteousness. Deśavakāśikāvrata is a
modified version of Digvarta. It restricts the movement of an individual to a house or village or a part thereof for a period varying from a muhurta (about 45 minutes) to a few days or even a couple of months.\textsuperscript{31} The basic idea in such restriction of movement seems to be that it would create mental preparedness for the practice of Vratas more rigorously almost leading to the Mahavrata temporarily in the state of an ascetic. Proshadho-pavasa-vrata enjoins one to fast at regular intervals in the month, say on the eighth (astami) and fourteenth day (caturdasi).\textsuperscript{32} One should avoid adornment of the body including use of garlands, perfumes etc... One should abstain from engaging one-self in worldly duties. This is an important step in the direction of mental purification.

\textit{Danavarta} covers the most important single element in the practice of religion, for without alms-giving by the laity, there could be no ascetics; and Dharma could not easily be preserved and continued.\textsuperscript{33} It is also termed as atithi-sanvibhaga-vrata or paying due respects to the guest. Specific injunctions have been given regarding the qualifications of an atithi and the mode of giving alms. Varied interpretations have been possible, the Sadhu or monk being accepted as the best atithi as he is charged with imparting religious instruction. In giving alms one should consider the following five factors: i) praty (the recipient), ii) dira (giver), iii) dhatarya (the object given), iv) dana-vidhi (the manner of giving), and v) dana-phala (the fruits of giving alms).\textsuperscript{34} We should consider the place and time while giving alms. Due respect should be given to the recipient and the giver should be free from any taints of passions. He should give with full faith in the act of giving. Act of charity has no ethical value, if it is to be done with questionable motives. If it is to be done out of anger or filled with maudlin sentiments of pity, it would not be considered to be of usual significance. Nor is it possible to justify the act of charity if it were not to produce any tangible welcome result. Thus the ends and means must justify each other. The Jainas present a synthetic picture of the problem of motive and intention in the act of righteousness. The spirit of Anekanta forbids us to take a partial view emphasising either the motive of action or merely the consequences. However,
in early days, dāna to ascetics formed an important duty of laymen. Food and shelter and books are to be supplied to the monks, so that they can devote themselves to study and meditation. Concentration (dhyāna) is not possible without the minimum necessary physical comfort. In addition to dāna to the ascetics it is good to do charity to the distressed, strangers from other lands, to the lowliest and the lost. This is karuṇā-dāna. Above all dāna nullifies greed and acquisitiveness, and acquisitiveness is a manifestation of hiṁsa. Paradoxically enough the layman charges himself with restrictions exceeding in number than those accepted by the monk. This is due to the large diversity of the evil life in which the layman still stands.\(^{25}\)

We may now consider the conceptual content of the apaṇṇṛṭas which are vital for the development of the human personality. The five ṛṛṭas are important for the social development also. Among them ahīṁsa is more equal among the equals. The jainas have the dictum: Ahīṁsa paramādharmaḥ (Ahīṁsa is the supreme righteousness). The practice of aparigraha ṛṛta which is also called Parimitaparigraha (restriction in possessions) is very much relevant to the development of a democratic socialistic society.

Ahīṁsa enjoins us not to injure any living being, big or small. We are not to injure any living organism however big or small directly with our own hands, by causing some one to do so on our behalf, or even acquiescing in the act of injury caused by others. These are the three yogas. For instance, we should not kill an animal. We should not mutilate a sense organ of the animal. We should not ourselves do this, we should not cause others to do this nor should we consent to injury caused by others. Practice of Hiṁsa is further qualified by three Guptis they refer to three Karuṇās. We are asked not to injure any jīva or prāṇa physically or in speech or in mind. We should not speak about injury nor should we harbour any thought of injuring an animal.\(^{26}\)

The consequences of violating the principle of non-violence are misery in this world and in the next.\(^{27}\) He who commits violence is always agitated and afflicted. He is actuated by animosity. He suffers physical and mental torture in this world. After death he is reborn taking a despicable life.\(^{28}\)
The Jainas were aware of the difficulty of the exclusive and rigorous practice of the vow of non-violence, as it would lead to abstractions without reference to the concrete situations and impossibilities of the situations where exceptions will have to be completely excluded. It would then assume the purely formalistic interpretation of the Kantian Categorical Imperative. The practice of ahimsa by the Sravaka has to be with reference to the concrete situation that one has to face in society without sacrificing the spirit of the principle of ahimsa. It is therefore called apryātta in the case of sravaka. We can appreciate the point better if we analyse the concept of ahimsa as mentioned in the philosophical texts like Tatvarthasūtra. In the Tatvarthasūtra we read that hiṃsa is injury or violence caused to the living organism due to carelessness and negligence, and actuated by passions like pride and prejudice, attachment and hatred. In Yaśastilaka, Somadeva defines Hīṃsa as injury to living beings through error of judgement. He says “yat syät pramadaysyena pratiṣṭh prāṇahapanaṁ”. This definition of hīṃsa has two elements: i) injury to life and ii) the motivation of causing injury. To injure another life is to cause pain to it, but mere injury may not be characterised as hīṃsa. It has to be considered with reference to motive. It would be called hīṃsa if it is impelled by passions and feelings like attachment, hatred and prejudice, if it is due to negligence or carelessness. Such injury is contaminated with feelings. Similarly violence caused or induced with a specific and conscious purpose would be hīṃsa. For instance, negligence brings sin; and the soul is defiled even though there may not be any actual injury to life. On the contrary, a careful and a pious man who is not disturbed by passions and who is kind towards animals will not suffer the sin of violence even if, by accident, injury is caused to life. We may call this motivation for violence “the mental set” for hīṃsa. This analysis of hīṃsa gives the emphasis on the motive theory of conduct in morality although consequences are not altogether ignored. The utilitarians emphasised that rightness of an action depends on the consequence of the action and not to be determined by the motive. The Jainas have in a sense, combined the two views, from their Anekanta attitude. One of the conditions of hīṃsa is physical injury to life. But more important than the physical injury is the inner motive. Speaking harsh words
is *hiṁṣa*; harbouring evil thoughts is also *hiṁṣa*. However, the inner motive of injury to life does bring its own consequences in the form of accumulation of *karma* and the defilement of the soul. In the *Ratnakarapādana Śravakacāra* the *śravaka* is enjoined not to cause injury or to be an agent for causing injury knowingly (*Saṁkalpa*) and on purpose. He should be free from *śhūla-hiṁṣa*. In his case the prohibition of *hiṁṣa* begins with two-sensed organisms, because it would be impossible for him to practise non-injury to one-sensed organisms, intentionally or unintentionally in the conduct of his daily life. He is, therefore, exempted from this restriction.³¹

Even in this practice of non-violence, certain forms of injury are permitted as exceptional cases. For instance, it is recognised as a duty of *Kṣatriya*, the warrior class, to defend the weak even with arms. In the *Adipurāṇa*, there is a description that *Rṣabha*, the first *tirthankara*, gave training to his subjects in agriculture, in trade and in the use of arms. However, the house-holders are strictly forbidden to cause injury even in the lowest animals wantonly and on purpose. *Hiṁṣa* caused to animals while doing his duty, accidentally and unintentionally and while in the pursuit of just cause is not considered to be a sin. In the *Yaśastilaka*, Somadeva forbids the *Kṣatriya* from indulging in indiscreet killing even in battle.

In this connection Gandhiji’s words are significant when he said that violence is preferred to cowardice. He exhorted the Indian women to resist the attacks of the *gundas* even with violence, if necessary. He said: ‘I do believe that where there is a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence. Hence it was that I took part in the Boer War, so called Zulu Rebellion and the late War.’³³ But Gandhiji said that non-violence is infinitely superior to violence. Forgiveness adorns the soldier. For the Jainas also, non-violence is not the policy of the weak. It needs self-control. A self-controlled man is free from fear, fear of doing injury or injustice. The bases of *Ahiṁṣa* must be self-confidence and peace of mind. A coward has no moral strength to observe non-violence. One who stands courageous and undisturbed in the face of violence is a true follower of *Ahiṁṣa*.
He looks at the enemy as a friend. Gandhiji said that a mouse hardly forgives a cat when it allows itself to be torn to pieces by her. He said non-violence is the law of our species, while violence is the law of the brute.

Non-violence is not mere non-injury in the negative sense. It has also a positive content. It implies the presence of cultivated and noble sentiments, like kindness and compassion for all living creatures. It also implies self-sacrifice. The Buddha renounced the pleasures of the world out of compassion for all living creatures. Jesus was filled with compassion when he said “whoever shall smite these in the right cheek, turn to him the other also”. He demanded self-sacrifice. In the Yaśastilaka, Somadeva enumerates qualities that should be cultivated to realise the ideal of Ahiṃsa. The qualities are i) maitri, a disposition not to cause any suffering to any living in mind, body and speech, ii) pramoda, affection coupled with respect for men eminent for their virtues and religious austerities, iii) kāruṇya will to help the poor and iv) mādyayasthya, an equitable attitude. Ahiṃsa is, thus a positive virtue and it resolves itself into jīva-daya, compassion, for living creatures.

It may be noted that the practice of Ahiṃsa is primarily meant to save our souls. Hiṃsa and Ahiṃsa relate only to one’s soul and not to those of others. Ahiṃsa is kindness to others, but it is kindness to the extent that we save others from the sin of violence. If we give pain to anyone we lower ourselves. Self-culture is the main problem in the practice of Ahiṃsa. In the Sūtrakṛtāṅga it is said that if a person causes violence out of greed or if he supports such violence of others, he increases the enemies of his own soul.

In the Ācaraṅga sūtra we are asked to consider ourselves to be in the position of the persons or animals to whom we want to cause injury. Gandhiji said, “I believe in loving my enemies, I believe in non-violence as the only remedy open to Hindus and Muslims. I believe in the power of suffering to melt the stoniest heart”.

The practice of Ahiṃsa with reference to concrete social situations would be better understood if we analyse the codes of
infractions in the practice of non-violence. They are called aticāras and we are forbidden to commit such aticāras. They are

i) Bandha tying up, keeping in captivity, men and beasts. However, the restraining of cattle by means of ropes and restriction on our children for corrections may be permitted.\(^{40}\) So may a thief be bound. ii) vadha (beating): It refers to wanton and merciless whipping of animals out of anger and aroused by other passions, although some exceptions like mild beating, pulling the ears or slapping for correction are permissible. iii) chariccheda: This applies to acts of injury to the body with sword or sharp instrument. Operations by a physician would be exceptions.\(^{41}\) iv) atibharāropāna: It refers to heavy and merciless loading of beasts by a burden greater than they can bear. Certain types of occupations have been tabooed for a Jaina layman v) bhaktapāṇa-vyāvace eda: It refers to making the animal suffer from hunger and thirst for no reason, out of anger or negligence. The context and the implications of ahimsā vrata are much wider than the aticāras indicate.

Similar aticāras have been mentioned in the cases of the practice of other vrata:s:

2. Satya-VRata (truth-speaking) has also a wide connotation. It has been interpreted as abstention from untruth spoken out of passion, and even from truth if it leads to the destruction of the living being.\(^{42}\) We may mention some of the infraction of this VRata i) Sahasabhyākhyāna: It consists in casually or intentionally imputing false charges against a person as: 'he is a thief, or an adulterer'. Friends of Othello committed this grievous crime and sin against Desdemona even if it were in jest. ii) Svadāramantra bheda: It consists in divulging to others what has been said by one's wife in confidence under special circumstances.\(^{43}\) iii) Mrso-padeta: It refers to perverse teaching and advice leading to evil consequences. iv) Kūtalekhhakaraṇa is preparing a false document like forgery etc.,

3. Asteya-VRata forbids us to commit theft or even to take others articles not specifically meant for us. It forbids us from
i) accepting stolen articles at cheaper rates, ii) instigating others to steal, iii) acquiring property in a country which is hostile to our own. Even grass or wood obtained under such circumstances must be regarded as stolen.\textsuperscript{44} Even transgressing the frontiers forbidden by the State is an infraction of this vow.\textsuperscript{45} Black market is covered under this aticāra. kūṭa-tula-kūta-māna: using false weights and measures and taking exorbitant interest on loans is an infraction of this vow.

These Aticaras are mainly concerned as a warning to the community in which individuals and groups are likely to violate the five vows here and there. Similar infractions of this Vṛata have been mentioned with reference to officials as well in the state. Corrupt officials are also to be considered as thieves.\textsuperscript{46}

4. Brahma-vṛata is important in Jaina ethics. It has been considered from the points of view of personal efforts for salvation and of social health. Detailed classification of the vows and their infractions have been worked out. In their analysis we find psychological acumen. The Vṛata has negative and positive aspects. In the negative aspect a house-holder has to abstain from sexual contact with other's wife (paradāra-gamana), and positively he has to be satisfied with his own wife. He cannot even arrange marriages of other women, except in the case of his own children. He should avoid sex literature and sex brooding. The aticāras of this Vṛata cover most aspects of sexual deviation including that with the lower animals and even with inanimate objects like the figures of women. From the earliest days of Jainism, the horror or incest has been constantly felt, as described by Haribhadra, \textsuperscript{47} while mentioning the desastrous consequences of the violation of this vṛata.

The Jaina theory of ahimsā has influenced the way of Indian thought for centuries. Gandhiji's Satyagraha was built on the Jaina conception of ahimsā. Zimmer says that Gandhiji's progress of Satyagraha as an expression of ahimsā is a serious very brace and potentially vastly powerful modern experiment in the ancient Hindu science.\textsuperscript{48}
Aparigraha Vrata, as apravata, enjoins us the practice of limited possession, because a citizen cannot give up all possessions. A house-holder has to engage himself in fruit-ful professions in society consistent with the needs of the promotion of righteousness. In fact, he has to be a good citizen in the Socratic sense. This is the parimita parigraha (Vow of limited possessions).

Parimita parigraha consists in restricting one’s possessions in respect of wealth, grain and other forms of material possessions. It also consists in not desiring these over and above the limit which is self-imposed. This is also called icchāparimāṇa vrata⁴⁸. Parigraha is of two types: a) material, bāhya parigraha and b) psychic, antara parigraha which consists of craving for material things.

a) The material possessions are of different kinds: dhana (wealth), dhānya (grain), vasu (other objects), Ksetra (land), dvipāda (men and women servants), catuspāda (beasts of burden and cattle), sayyandasa (beds and seats), yāna (vehicles like ratha). kūpya (clothes) and bhanda (utensils and pots). These are the ten bāhya parigraha articles which we try to accumulate even beyond our needs.⁶⁰ The material possessions create a craving for more. The more we get them, the more we want. Desires are insatiable. We will never be happy if we pursue desires for possessions.

b) The antara parigraha is the psychic factor of attachment. There are fourteen types of antaraparigraha: i. mithyātva (perversity of outlook), ii. Vedana (feeling), iii. rāga (attachment), iv. dveṣa (hatred); v. krodha (anger), vi. mana (self esteem), vii. māya (infatuation), viii. lōbha (greed), ix. hāsya (laughter), x. rati (sex infatuation), xi. arati (dislike), xii. śoka (grief), xiii. bhaya (fear), and xiv. jugupsa (disgust).⁶¹ These are the affective states corrupting the development of personality unless sublimated.⁶² Desire leads to craving. Craving leads to affection. Affection generates excitement in the expression of emotions. The possession of the object brings temporary satisfaction, which leads to further craving and further emotional disturbances. The loss of the loved object brings dis-satisfaction for not getting it. It creates fear and hatred for those who possess it. Even when we
get the object desired, it may create fear of the loss and a craving to hold on it. Possession and the craving for possession are the root causes of misery. The Buddha, while explaining the pratītya-samutpāda has stated that the craving for worldly things arises due to vedanā and vedanā is created due to the contact of the senses with the objects of the world. Craving gives rise to attachment and the consequent misery of birth and death. Mc-Dougall says that the propensity to acquire things and possess them is a powerful propensity as strong as the hunger and sex propensities. If we are to control ourselves we have either to suppress them or to sublimate these natural inclinations. Suppression is difficult and dangerous, as they might erupt any moment in greater force or disturb the equilibrium and the harmonious development of personality. Sublimation of the natural instincts would be a better way for the spiritualisation of human instincts. In the Kārīkeyanupreksā it has been pointed out that the sex instinct cannot easily be conquered by men of lesser mettle. It destroys the human dignity and would make one a slave of passions. Therefore one who gives up the bahya and antara parigraha will subdue the passions and be calm.

Parigraha is infatuation. Infatuation (mūrccha) brings about craving for the objects. Craving produces attachment which in turn sets in motion the psychological process of identification. This is the psychological process of 'antaraparigraha' which leads us to the possession of objects (Bahya parigraha). The Jaina Acarāyas had the psychological sense to understand the limits of aparigraha in the normal course of things. Therefore, they advocated the anuvṛata of parimita parigraha to the citizens.

Parimita parigraha is limiting one's possessions. Parimita parigraha consists in restricting one's possessions in respect of wealth, grain and other forms of material possessions. It also consists in taking less responsibilities of administrative or academic type. While determining the limitation of possessions it would be necessary to keep in view the functional and social needs of an individual. There cannot be dead equality of men. "Democracy is not the standardising of every one so as to obliterare peculiarity. We cannot put our souls in uniform - A just organisation of
society will be based on spiritual liberty, political equality and economic fraternity”.

However, in the practice of *parimita parigraha*, it is necessary to use the right means for the acquisition of possessions. Property earned by wrong and unrighteous means, even if it is within the self-imposed limit, is to be considered as sinful earnings. In the case of those who have not got even the limited possessions, they are enjoined to earn with righteousness. They should not express attachment and regret for the state they are in. To express deep attachment for that which they do not possess is *parigraha*. It is an expression of *antara parigraha*.

The schematic presentation of Jaina social ethics mentions the detailed list of the violation of *anuvratas*. They are the *aticaras*. *Acarāya Samantabhadra* mentions five forms of *aticaras of aparigraha anuvrata*. We should not violate the *vrata* in the practices mentioned below as they would be the *aticaras*.

i. *Ativahana*: Making animals work severely or run to exhaustion. It is a form of *himsa*. We should not over-work a beast of burden beyond its easy capacity. Similarly, we should not make servants and other dependents walk or work more than their capacity.

ii. *Atisamgraha*: It is hoarding of possessions more than is permitted. The merchants who hoard the articles with a view to getting higher prices commit such *aticra*. Similarly, we should not collect things, like furniture and other articles, more than our requirements. It would be violation of the vow of *parimita parigraha*.

iii. *Vismaya*: It is an expression of surprise mixed with sadness and envy at seeing others acquiring property. Expression of surprise at listening to the acquisition of property by others. This is *Vismayaticra*.

iv. *Lobha* is excessive greed for acquiring property. One who has greed does not get satisfied even if he gets his legitimate share of profit.
v. *Atibhāra vahana*: is an infraction of the vow of *parimita-parighraha* when one, out of greed for more profit, overloads an animal like the horse and bullock carts. This is a form of *hīṃsa*. The animal suffers due to heavy weight of loading beyond its capacity. In the modern age, even over-loading a truck for quick profit will be an infraction of this vow. The underlying principle is abstention from greed. These are the *aticarās* one should avoid, while practising the *aṇuvṛata* of *parimita parighraha*.

*Aparighraha vṛata* has a great social significance, specially in the modern society when the ethical values are fast disappearing. We find that, greed for material possessions will lead a son to ignore his father and countless evil consequences will follow.⁵⁷

Present day society is dangerously beset with disvalues. Old values have been lost, the new have not yet emerged. We are blind to higher values of life, while pursuing social and political ends. Power and self are the ultimate ends for us today. Half-educated immature political morons are corrupting the lives of the people in society. We are talking of socialism and the good of the common man without in the least thinking of the common man's interest. Socialism is a slogan for a vote-catching technique. By restricting the fundamental right to property, we are taking away the incentive to work. By this the rich are becoming poor and the poor are poorer. We have become helpless spectators in the fierce drama of hatred, avarice and violence. Under the baneful garb of ideologies and committed society, we are destroying the very foundations of society.

Socialism brought by force, violence and hatred will not bring lasting happiness to man. Western ideologies may not all be suitable for us in the way that are being practised there. We can harness our spiritual tradition to the social and political problems of the present day. Gandhiji spiritualised social and political life of our country to a great extent. Our spiritual socialism based on the principle of love and sacrifice will be far superior and more lasting. If we understand the implications of the *aṇuvṛata* movement in the proper perspective, our social and political problems will be solved without the use of force and with love and
understanding. The decadent society can rise again if only we practise the anuvrata of parimita parigraha in the right spirit and then socialism will be right in the corridors for us. Then, in the words of Shelley, we can ask, 'If winter comes, can spring be far behind?'.

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EPILOGUE-I

Four things of supreme value are difficult to get in this life: 1) human birth, 2) instruction in the Dharma (Law), 3) belief in the Dharma and 4) the energy in self-control. We, as human beings, should not lose this opportunity, because we should realise that human beings alone can make efforts and succeed in the attainment of self-realisation. Even the gods as heavenly beings have to be reborn as human beings to attain perfection. In this Karma-bhūmi (place of efforts) alone efforts for spiritual perfection are possible. We must, therefore, make the most of what we have, not because tomorrow we die, but because we become immortal and perfect. Knowing this, we should avoid the pursuit of sense pleasures which are fleeting and short-lived. We should aim high at the attainment of pure and serenity here and hereafter.

But the tragic irony is man very often forgets his goal and gets involved in the pursuit of the transient, knowing them to be harmful for the higher end of self-realisation. He forgets the predominant misery that he suffers in this life; and he forgets that life of pleasures is not the end, but only an illusion. This noble truth has been piquantly presented in the Parable of the Well, given in the Samastraccaaka.²

A certain man, overcome by dire poverty, was depressed and frustrated. He left his home and wandered about in search of happiness and peace. He went through the forest, and one day he lost his way in the midst of the frightful thick forest. A fierce mad elephant started chasing him with upraised trunk. In front of him was the most evil demoness holding a sharp sword and rushing towards him. He saw them. He trembled with fright. He began to run for life. In the eastern direction, he saw a banyan tree. He reached the mighty tree, but he could not climb it. He looked around and saw an old well whose borders were covered with marshy grass. Afraid of death, craving to live if only a moment longer, he flung himself into the well at the foot of the banyan tree and caught a clump of reeds, held them fast. He hung himself precariously at the edge of the well. Below him in the well he saw terrible snakes enraged at the sound of his falling. At the very bottom of the well there was a black mighty python with terrible red eyes and with its mouth agape. Then he thought,
"My life will last as long as these reeds hold fast". He raised his head and he saw that two large mice, one white and the other black, gnawing at the roots of the clump of reeds. Then came up the elephant. It shook the tree with wild fury. There was a honey-comb in the tree. And due to the violent shock of this charge by the elephant, the bees in the honey-comb were disturbed. The man's whole body was stung by the swarm of angry bees. But, just by chance, a drop of honey fell down on his head, rolled down his brow and somehow reached his lips. This gave him a fragment of sweetness. He craved for more drops; and in the excitement of his craving for uncertain drops of honey, he thought nothing of the python, the snakes, the elephants and the impending disaster.

This is the pathetic picture of our life in this world.

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EPILOGUE - II

The Jaina Weltanschauung is melioristic. It expresses the spirit of *anekānta*. It is catholic in its outlook towards life and its approach towards other faiths. It gives respect and takes it from other faiths. The catholic outlook pervades the Jaina way of life. This can be seen in some of the devotional verses and the prayer of benediction given below:

A. \[ \text{Yo viśvaṁ veda vedyam jananajalanidherbhbanginaḥ pāraḍṛṣṭvā I} \]
\[ \text{Pourvāparyaviruddhāṁ vacanamanuparamāṁ niṣkalankaṁ yadiyāṁ II} \]

\[ \text{Taṁ vande sādhuvandyāṁ sakalagunānīdhiṁ dhvastado śadviṣantaṁ I} \]

\[ \text{Buddhāṁ vā Vardhamānāṁ śatadalaniyāṁ keśavaṁ vā śivaṁ vā} \]
\[ \text{II} \]

— Akalanka

Obeisance to him who is all-knowing, whose speech is free from contradictions and is pure, who is free from all blemishes and who is pure and perfect; be he the *Buddha*, *Vardhamāna Mahāvīra* or *Brahma*, *Viṣṇu* or *Śiva*.

This is the noble spirit, the spirit of *Sarvodaya*.

B. The prayer of benediction expresses the same spirit of *anekānta*.

\[ \text{Kṣemaṁ sarvaprajānāṁ prabhavatu balavān I} \]
\[ \text{Dhārmiko bhūmipalāḥ II} \]

\[ \text{Kāle kāle ca vṛṣṭīṁ vitaratu maghava Ī} \]
\[ \text{Vyadhaya yāntu nāsam II} \]

\[ \text{Durbhikśāṁ couryamāri kṣapamapi jagatāṁ I} \]
\[ \text{Masmabhujjivaloke II} \]

\[ \text{Jainendraṁ Dharmacakram prasaratu satataṁ I} \]
\[ \text{Sarva soukhya pradāyī II} \]

"May the people in the world be happy and prosperous;
May the rulers become righteous and good;
May there be plentiful of rain and crops;"
May all the evils like the diseases, famine, want and evil deeds like theft be no more;
May the wheel of righteousness ever be present for the good of all”

C. The cardinal prayer of the Jainas to be recited every day expresses the catholic outlook. The spirit of anekānta and the fervent recognition of the greatness present in all who are great, irrespective of the distinctions of caste, creed and race, pulsates in every letter of the prayer:

Om namo arihantānām
Om namo siddhānām
Om namo Āiriyānām
Om namo uvajjhayānām
Om namo Loe savva sāhūnām

This is the cardinal pāñcamaṇaskara (five fold prayer). Obeisance to those who have conquered the enemies in the form of passions and have preached the truth to mankind.

Obeisance to those who attained perfection (Siddhi).

Obeisance to those who are the teachers of righteousness to mankind (Ācaryas).

Obeisance to all the preceptors (Upādhyāya). And obeisance to all the saint and the sages of the world (Sadhus).

This is the Jaina Weltanschauung expressing the spirit of Sarvodaya (benediction for all living creatures).

D. Tirthankara Mahāvira in all humility said:
Khamemi savve jīvā savve jīvā khamantu me I
Mitti me savva bhuesu veram majjham na kenai II

“I crave forgiveness from all the creatures of the world; and may all living beings forgive me. I crave love and friendship with all creatures of the world and no enmity with any”.
TERMINOLOGY

Ajiva : Non-living substance, like matter.

Apu : Atom.

Adharma : The cosmic principle of rest. It is also referred to as Adharmastikāya.

Ananta : limitless.

Anekānta : the fundamental and the basic principle of the Jaina outlook which emphasises that reality is complex; it can be looked at from different points of view. This spirit of anekānta pervades the entire philosophy and the life of the Jainas.

Antardyā-karma : the type of karma which inhibits activity which is essential for the self-realisation.

Apavartana : It is the process of the expression of the operation of karma in which the intensity of the karmic experience is affected.

Abadhakala : The period of time in which the karmic effect remains unexpressed and potential.

Arthavagraha : Sensational stage in the perceptual process. It is an element in the concrete psychosis.

Aloka : The infinite space beyond the universe space. It is limitless and unbound.

Avagraha : Sensation.

Āvāya : An element in the perceptual process in the concrete psychosis. It refers to the formation of perceptual judgement.

Āgama : Scriptural texts coming from the teachings of the tīrthankara.
Aśrava: Influx of karma.

Indriya: Sense-organ.

Iha: It is stage in the perceptual process. It refers to organisation of the stimuli. It is an element in the concrete psychosis.

Udirāṇa: It is a process in the operation of karma by which the speedy exhaustion of karma would be possible in its process of varying the intensity of karma.

Udvartana: It is a process in the operation and the transformation of karma with a view to exhausting the karma. It refers to varying the intensity of karma.

Upayōga: It is the essential characteristic of the soul. It has been interpreted here as 'hormic energy'.

Upāsama: It refers to the process of exhausting the karma by means of the subsidence of the karmic effects.

Rūṣūtra-naya: It is one of the nayas (points of view). It refers to the momentary presence of the characteristic and does not look at a thing from the whole or permanent point of view. The Buddhist approach expresses this point of view.

Evaṃbhuta-naya: It refers to a naya. It is the linguistic point of view. It refers to the meaning or the function of a term at a particular moment. It generally refers functional point of a word in the present context. Ex: the name Raja generally refers to the king. But for the present it may refer to a peon in the office.

Audyāyika bhāva: It refers to the rise in the karmic effect.
**Terminology**

**Karma:** The after-effect of every action, physical, mental or moral. The Jainas have given a scientific theory of *karma*.

**Kașaya:** Passions; affective intense states affecting the psycho-physical activity disturbing the process of self-realisation.

**Kārmānaśarīra:** Karmic body, like the electric body, the *Taijasa-śarīra*.

**Kāla:** Time.

**Kēvalajñāna:** Omniscience. It refers to the knowledge.

**Kēvala darśana:** Perfect, omniscient form of intuition.

**Kṣaya:** Destruction. It refers to the destruction of *karma*.

**Jīna:** The one who has conquered the passions and imperfections, both bodily and mental. The *Tirthankara* is referred to as *Jīna*.

**Cakravartin:** Emperor.

**Tapa:** Austerity.

**Taijasa śarīra:** The electric or the energy form of the body.

**Darśana:** Intuition.

**Prśītvāda:** The canonical text supposed to have been directly received from the *Tirthankarās*. It contains philosophical discussion including other systems of philosophy.

**Dravya:** Substance: There are six dravyas: *Jīva*, *Ajīva* (*pudgala*), *Dharma*, *adharma*, *aκāśa* and *kāla*. 
Dravyārthikāṇaya: The point of view from the substance.

Dharmadravya: The principle of motion. This is considered to be substance.

Dharana: Retention: It is also condition of recall. It is an element in the perceptual process.

Dhāravya: It refers to the permanence of a thing. According to Jainas permanence and change are equally real.

Nikācita: It is the process of the operation and the movement towards the exhaustion of karma. In this stage, the four states of udvartana, apavartana, saṃkramana and udīrana are absent.

Nidhatta: In this state, there is neither rise nor transformation of the karmic process. But there is the possibility of the increase or decrease of the intensity of karmic state.

Nirjara: It is the tattva, the fundamental principle, which explains the possibility or removing the accumulated karma by the self-control and ascetic practices.

Nirvāṇa: Freedom from the imperfections of life.

Niścaya-naya: The Noumenal point of view.

No-indriya: It is quasi-sense-organ. Mind is a quasi-sense organ.

Pramāda: Negligence.

Papa: Sin.

Puṇya: Merit.
**Pudgala:** Matter.

**Leṣva:** Kind of radiation which affects the personality type, due to psychic activity. It is considered as the colouration of the soul, although soul has no colour. It is the expression of the psycho-physical activity.

**Sramaṇa:** Monk. It also refers to the current of thought, which is different from the Vedic. It is pre-Āryan current of thought prevailing in India. The Indian culture is the synthesis of the Sramaṇa and the Brahmaṇa current of thought.

**Samkramaṇa:** The process of karmic operation in which the transformation of one form of karma into the other form, like different forms in the Jñānavaranīya karma.

**Samvara:** The principle of Jainism which emphasises the need for prevention or of influx of karma for the sake of the self-realisation.

**Syadvada:** The syadvada is the methodology of predication for expressing the different points of view. It is also called saptabhaṅgi because there is the seven-fold predication.

**Kṣama:** Forgiveness. It refers to the mental state where there is equanimity of mind and the broad feeling of one being an insignificant atom in the cosmos.

**Ksayopāśama:** Subsidence and destruction of karmic matter.

**Jñāna:** Knowledge.

**Jñānāvārāṇīya karma:** The karma which obscures knowledge.
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