Jaures, Jean

Democracy and military service.
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DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY SERVICE

JEAN JAURES

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Democracy and Military Service.
Democracy & Military Service

An abbreviated translation of the "Armée Nouvelle" of Jean Jaurès.

Edited by G. G. Coulton.

With a Preface by Pierre Renaudel
Editor of L'Humanité.

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PREFACE.

(By Pierre Renaudel, Deputy for the Department of Var, and successor of Jaurès as Editor of l'Humanité.)

If Jean Jaurès had lived to face the misery into which mankind is now plunged, it would certainly have been a great pleasure for him to see his Armée Nouvelle translated into the language of democratic Britain. Though circumstances have forbidden a complete translation, the essential portions of his book will be found here reproduced in full, and the rest has been faithfully summarized.

The great and terrible lessons of war, so far from rendering Jaurès's military ideas obsolete, have on the contrary strengthened them and given them a more living actuality.

Many French politicians, while they rendered homage to the mass of technical knowledge displayed in his Armée Nouvelle, had affected to believe that the ideas here put forward were impractical. Many of these same men now recognize that the book is illuminated by the prescience of genius. It never was a work of mere political opportunism; and therefore the actual events, so far from diminishing its value, have enormously strengthened its position.

It was no mere move in the political game when Jaurès brought before our Parliament his Bill for the military reorganization of France. To him, the Nation in Arms represented the system best calculated to realize national
defence in its supreme and fullest form. At the same time, he looked upon it as the only military system possible for a country which wishes to gain nothing by aggression, but which is resolved to defend itself to the death against any unjust attack.

"The Nation in Arms," wrote Jaurès, "is necessarily a nation actuated by justice" (chap. III). That is why this great Socialist statesman insisted so forcibly on the connexion between the military force of the nation and the organization of International Arbitration; the one, he held, is the guarantee of national independence, while the other guarantees international justice. Hence it was his constant preoccupation to associate National Defence with International Organization.

Moreover, it must not be imagined that the system which Jaurès advocated was, in his eyes, a system involving less effort than that which it would have replaced. When he insisted on the diminution of barrack-training, it was less for the sake of relieving the people from a long sacrifice of time, than because barrack-training seemed to him inefficient and wasteful. He knew that his own proposal for drilling and training the Reserves would involve, in peace-time, an unselfish effort renewed from year to year; and he knew that this effort would not be heartily made unless the citizen-soldier felt sure that France was following a settled policy of peace—and, therefore, that neither the citizen's time nor his blood would be wasted on the mere hazard of an international gamble, or on some imperialistic impulse of aggression.

How often have we heard Jaurès proclaim that the nation must come to a definite decision, and choose between the burden of a barrack-army on the one hand, with all
its anti-democratic disadvantages, or, on the other, the loyal acceptance of the obligations of a citizen-militia—a militia which could never truly solve the problem of democratic national defence but by accepting the burden of repeated and regular manoeuvres.

At the present moment, the iron necessities of war are imposing the hardest sacrifices upon the nations engaged. In most countries, every able-bodied citizen is called out to secure the safety of the nation. Where all are in equal danger, equality of sacrifice is the necessary consequence. We do not know what will come out of this war. We know not what benefit peace will be able to extract from this frightful chaos. It is unfortunately beyond doubt that the nations will be obliged to keep up some sort of military organization, if only because such forces will be needed to guarantee the loyal execution of the verdicts of international arbiters. Great Britain herself will then be obliged to consider how she can effectively secure her national defence. This is why I myself believe (as Jaurès believed before this war) that she will be compelled to face the problem from a point of view different to that which she has taken hitherto. British democrats, and the British working-classes, are justly jealous of their independence; yet it is possible that this book of Jaurès may teach them how the noblest traditions of liberty can be reconciled with the organization necessary for national defence.

PIERRE RENAUDEL.

House of Deputies,
Paris,
April 14th, 1916.
EDITORIAL NOTE.

The Editor alone is responsible for this collection of summaries and translations from Jaurès. More than half the work has, in fact, been done by two friends who have generously helped him out of their very scanty leisure; but the Editor has prepared all for the press, and is in fuller sympathy with Jaurès’s theory, in both its aspects, than his colleagues are.

So far as space and time would permit, we have given actual translations; these passages are distinguished by inverted commas. The rest we have summarized, omitting a good deal which refers to purely French politics, and which would be scarcely intelligible without a crowd of explanatory notes.

The work, like others which aim at reconciling all sensible people, will perhaps begin by startling a good many sensible people. Our democrats, who are often painfully ignorant of democratic thought outside their own four seas, will in some cases be shocked to find the Compulsory Principle treated as practically self-evident,—as a matter almost beyond argument,—by one who was not only an apostle, but even a martyr of pacifism. (cf. Chapter XV). On the other hand, many military critics will be shocked at the idea of admitting the Elective Principle into the army under any form whatever, and will perhaps scent almost as much heresy in the emphasis which Jaurès lays upon the equality of First Line and Reserves. (Chapters II
and XVI). Like all would-be reformers on a great scale, Jaurès is met on both sides by the cry of "My Principles!"

But there are few greater principles than that of the Open Mind. The work is not offered to the public as a pill to be swallowed whole. We need only point out that Jaurès is by far the most distinguished statesman who, in our own generation, has worked out a complete and serious theory of National Defence in connexion with Social Progress. He wrote with full responsibility as Leader of a Party—the party which he himself had consolidated out of the hitherto disunited sections of Socialism.*<br />
His width of reading was enormous, and almost unrivalled among practical statesmen. This Armée Nouvelle formed, in his mind, only one link in the chain of constructive Socialist proposals which he had intended to submit successively to Parliament. If, therefore, the Editor had been far more doubtful of Jaurès’s proposals than in fact he is, he would still have thought it worth while to put them before the British public as a basis of discussion. We live in a world in which things need to be done, in one way or another. Few Britons would seriously propose that we should follow exactly the same course in army matters which we have followed for some generations past. Fewer still, it may be hoped, would venture to insist that we should arm on the present German scale. We have to steer some sort of course between the two fatal shoals of unpreparedness and militarism. A course has here been marked out by a man who combined speculative and practical statesmanship in a very extraordinary degree, and who sealed his faith with his blood. We need not ask<br />

* See the brief sketch of his life in Appendix III.
ourselves whether all Jaurès's suggestions are immediately and wholly applicable to our difficulties; the Editor himself would not put them forward in that light. But all Britons, really concerned for peace on the one hand and national independence on the other, do need to find a better reply to one of the most stimulating books of modern times than the ordinary answer "I have never heard of it."*

Jaurès's main contentions may be briefly summarized as follows:—

1. That, disarmament being outside practical politics for the present, all countries must be adequately defended; for this purpose the only just and efficient system is that of the Nation in Arms. As he writes on pp. 319, 356: "So long as we have any army at all, it would be a crime against France and against the Army itself to separate the Army from the Nation. . . . It is the workmen, the Socialists, who demand that military service shall be universal."

2. The final effect of such a National Army will be, not to militarize the democracy but to democratize the military system. Democracy need not fear contact with Militarism; here, as everywhere, the juster principle will prove the stronger, the good will finally drive out the evil.

3. Since modern inventions give such an enormous advantage to the defensive, a great nation may ensure peace by foresight and self-control. By adopting a con-

* It is to be hoped that many readers may pass on from our brief and necessarily imperfect summary to the original book. The new edition is published at the office of *L'Humanité* (142, Rue Montmartre, Paris: price 2f. 50c.).
sistently defensive policy, both in diplomacy and in war, it may arm so carefully as to secure a real balance of forces. A France thus armed would have been far less tempted to follow any policy of adventure than the France of 1913; and, on the other hand, far better prepared for such a defensive campaign as we are now seeing.

4. With such a Nation in Arms, with such a defensive policy and strategy, a country can always bring its older men into the field simultaneously with the younger; for the married men, though less useful for an aggressive campaign, are even better than the younger men for home defence. France, if she had been prepared after the prescriptions of Jaurès, would have faced the German invasion with 700,000 men more than she actually had in August, 1914; and one distinguished expert has already emphasized the supreme importance of this one consideration.*

Jaurès's book, though planned as early as 1907, was published only at the end of 1910. Almost at the same moment, Lord Haldane and Sir Ian Hamilton published their "Compulsory Service," a far briefer book covering part of the same ground. On the question of the defensive spirit of an army recruited under any system of universal liability, the British writers are in complete agreement with Jaurès. They write of Universal Service: "Its tendency is in the direction of the merely defensive"; and again "it is less aggressive, less of a danger to the world at large." Of the Voluntary System they say "all

* See Appendix II.
the other classes . . . pay for war, not with their persons but with their purses. For this very reason the bulk of the nation views war with less tragic regard." So far, then, they agree with Jaurès and with all other observers; but their deductions present a curious contrast. Jaurès argues logically that this defensive spirit is the spirit of true democracy; and that a nation which really desires peace must interest as many citizens as possible in the frightful risks of war. Lord Haldane and Sir Ian Hamilton, on the contrary, complain that this defensive spirit is incompatible with "the inheritance" of our people from Chatham and from Nelson." They argue again: "there is hardly a Territorial, I believe, who does not, at the bottom of his heart, hope to go into one historic battle during his military existence"; "if a rich nation turns its mind entirely to defence, it commits the deadly sin of tempting others to transgress"; "whatever you do, remember, I beg of you, that the best defence to a country is an army formed, trained, inspired by the idea of attack. If I have succeeded in bringing prominently to your notice the dangers of the mere defence, then indeed I shall feel I have not written in vain" (pp. 41, 50-51, 121, 142, 148).

The present Editor, as a lifelong Liberal, appeals earnestly to his fellow-Liberals to free themselves here from the hypnotism of party-catchwords and party-persons. No true Liberalism was ever built upon any foundation but that of "prove all things, hold fast that which is good." Lord Haldane has since frankly confessed that he has not always told us all his thoughts, since "the democracy in this country was suffering from an indisposition to reflect, and in consequence was not disposed to listen to the few who preached." Jaurès, on the other hand, always tried
to give the people his highest and truest thoughts; he was incapable of time-serving, and held that it is a statesman's duty to awaken the people from all mere "indispositions," at whatever cost of trouble or risk of unpopularity. He dictated L'Armée Nouvelle in the rare intervals of an extraordinary busy life, at times when nearly all other men would have been resting. Whether we accept his views or not, these are the words of a man whose extraordinary powers of thought and work were equalled by his outspoken sincerity. And, the more he startles us, the more we may gain by looking seriously at his arguments.

G. G. COULTON.

Great Shelford, Cambridge,
March, 1916.
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CHAPTER I.

THE NEW ARMY.

(p. 1).

"It is from the point of view of National Defence and International Peace that I propose to begin explaining the plan for the organization of the State upon a socialistic basis, which I shall submit to Parliament in a succession of Bills.

"It is imperative, both for Socialism and for the Nation, to define what the military institutions and the external policy of Republican France should be. In order to hasten and to accomplish its evolution towards entire social justice, to inaugurate, or even to prepare, a new order in which labour shall be organized and supreme, France needs, above all things, peace and security. We must not allow her to be tempted into the sinister diversion of foreign adventures; on the other hand, we must protect her from the threat of foreign violence.

"The first problem, therefore, with which a great party of Social Reform has to deal is this:

"How can we best secure the chances of peace for France and for the uncertain world which surrounds her? And if, in spite of her efforts and her wish for peace, she is attacked, how can we best secure the chances of safety, the means of Victory?*

* These and similar italics are Jaurès's own—Ed.
"It would be childish and futile to propose a great programme, a great sustained and systematic project of reform to a Country which is not its own master, which is ever at the mercy of adventurers within who are anxious to fish in troubled waters, or exposed to aggressors from without, and hence always under the threat, and on the brink, of War.

"To ensure peace by a plain policy of wisdom, moderation and rectitude, by the definitive repudiation of all aggressive enterprises, by the loyal acceptance and practice of the new methods of international law which are capable of solving conflicts without violence; on the other hand, to ensure peace, courageously, by the establishment of a defensive organization so formidable that every thought of aggression is put out of the mind of even the most insolent and rapacious: these are the highest aims of the Socialist Party. Indeed, I ought rather to say that they are the very condition of its action and of its life. It is not enough that we should aim equally and simultaneously at international peace and national independence; we must persuade the whole country, the whole democracy, of the sincerity and the strength of our aims. For how can we invite and persuade the Nation to a bold policy of social reform if it has reason to think that its very existence is menaced by our doctrines? In order to perform the task of higher justice at which Socialism aims France needs the whole of her life, that is, the whole of her liberty: and how shall the sap rise to the fruit of the tree if the roots are injured? Above all, how can the Socialist Party speak with authority in proposing that form of national defence which seems to us most efficacious, if there is a doubt in the mind of one single individual as to whether we have a real interest in national defence itself?

"It is, then, by action, and by action alone that the Socialist Party will dissipate the misunderstandings created by ignorance or bad faith, or by those paradoxes
which are inseparable from great ideal movements. It will, alas, not disarm the slanderers and the charlatans of patriotism, who hide the greed and the violence of class spirit under the cloak of national interests; but it will earn the confidence of all good citizens, who wish to spare France both the convulsions of War and the humiliation of servitude.''

Socialism must pursue indeviatingly and with all energy and sincerity every ideal of social and international amelioration. It must aim at freeing the proletariat and securing to it the right to live and to develop the full life of free citizens. But, in pursuing this high aim, it must "watch constantly over the independence of the country and its means of defence. It must not content itself with vague formulas in favour of a Militia System, but must show precisely the strong system of organization at which it aims. Socialism must prove this by the conduct of its advocates and by their propaganda among the working-classes, by their assiduity and their zeal in the living work of military education, in the gymnastic societies, and the Rifle Clubs, in those field exercises which are so much more valuable than the sterile mechanism of the barrack square. They must show, in fine, by their joyous activity that, while they fight Militarism and War, it is not from timid egotism or a cowardly servility and indolence, and that they are as resolved and ready to secure the full working of a thoroughly popular and defensive military system as they are to beat down the breeders of strife. If they act in this manner they may defy all slander, and they will carry with them, not only the strength which their historic country has garnered through the ages, but the ideal strength of a new country, the Motherland of Labour and of Justice."

It is very important for the Nation too, that the misunderstandings between itself and Socialism should disappear, for it would be sad indeed if, in the day of crisis and danger, it were not able to rely absolutely upon the national devotion of the working-classes. The latter
simply ask that neither France nor they shall be plunged into War with their fellowmen belonging to another country, until it is clear that France has right on her side. The fact that France has taken part in the Hague Conferences makes it inevitable that she should take precisely the same point of view; and surely the working men of France have the right to ask her not to tear up, on frivolous and insufficient grounds, the ties of solidarity which unite them to the workers of other countries.

"But on the other hand, they also demand, as they are entitled and obliged to demand, that the Nation shall organize its Military Forces without any regard for class or caste, with a single eye to national defence itself."

Jaurès proceeds to plead with the officers of the French Army for a more sympathetic understanding and appreciation of the aims and objects of Socialism. He asks them to understand the deep patriotism which inspires the working-classes and the leaders of Social Reform, and to recognize that such a close understanding is necessary, not merely from the point of view of fair play, but in order that the officers, to whom is entrusted the noble responsibility of leading their fellow-countrymen in War, may not find themselves divided from them in sentiment and in sympathy by a chasm which could easily have been bridged. "When these men are defending the Country of their traditions, they ought to feel that they are serving a great design and are helping on a great future of power or of justice."

And for that design, for that future, Jaurès looks beyond even the limits of France, its welfare and its glory, to a high ideal of international brotherhood.

"There is only one social rôle which France can fill in the world to-day, which can give universal value to her actions and inspire the souls of Frenchmen with a higher emotion in which the life of France shall vibrate in accord with the life of humanity. That rôle is to help the workers of France to achieve the rights of property
with the whole strength of the Republican Democracy. It is to help the World to the attainment of peace by an emphatic repudiation of all aggressive thought, and by an ardent propaganda in favour of arbitration and equity. The People, defending itself against aggression and acting as the champion of this ideal, would feel inspired with the nobility of a great national tradition and the grandeur of a human hope, and this great concentration of moral power would radiate Victory.”

"At the same time there is no need that officers should swallow any particular scheme of Social Organization. The point is that they should understand and appreciate the wealth of moral driving power which is to be found in the Socialism of the Working Classes, who aim both at national liberty and the solidarity of mankind. For without the driving power derived from such a faith and from such ideals it will be impossible for the officers adequately to fulfil their own mission, which is to protect the Mother country from every threat of attack from without.

"In order to appreciate the advantages of the military system which Socialism puts forward, and which aims at identifying the Army with the Nation, the officer class must understand that the strength of the Army as an instrument of defence lies in its close union with the people, which represents productive labour and is inspired by the energy of its ideals. Thus they will understand the value of that diplomacy of peace which the working class desires to found on certain clearly defined lines.

"In fact, the organization of national defence and the organization of international peace are but two different aspects of the same great task. For whatever adds to the defensive strength of France increases the hope of peace, and whatever success France attains in organizing peace on the basis of law and founding it upon arbitration and right will add to its own defensive strength. This is the reason why I put forward my projects for the or-
ganization of defence and the organization of peace as parts of the same scheme. I am not working simply for the propagation of ideas and the creation of mental tendencies. I am not devoting myself merely to the task of preaching a doctrine; my object is not merely to sweep away misunderstandings which tend to injure both the noble Country which I love and the great Party which I serve. I aim at a practical result, which is enormously important both for the present and for the future.

"I am convinced that the work outlined at the Hague can be defined and strengthened if we are determined to obtain that result. And I am convinced that the Military System of France cannot long remain in the doubtful and contradictory position in which it is at present under the law of two years' service, and that it must be transformed either in a retrograde direction towards the old forms,* or in a strongly conceived system of National Militia Forces."

Jaurès proceeds to deprecate any criticism of his proposals which is based simply on the ground that he is not a military expert. He points out that in a Country ruled by Parliament, which is certainly not composed of military experts, no intelligent citizen should be regarded as incompetent to offer advice and to put forward projects of reform. He has studied the matter profoundly and taken the opportunity to obtain information from the highest military authorities. He holds that many of the latter are only prevented from arriving at the same conclusions as himself from the fact that their professional training does not allow them to follow out logically the results of their own critical observations.

* i.e. the longer term of service. The general tendency in all European countries has been to shorten the term during the last few generations. France (as Jaurès points out later on) began with seven years, which has been cut down by successive stages to five, to three, and to two.

Since l'Armée Nouvelle was written, the German menace compelled France to raise the term to three years again, an increase which Jaurès stoutly resisted.—Ed.
The New Army.

He attributes Messimy's failure, as he regards it, to appreciate the real meaning of the introduction of the Two Years Service, to the same cause.

Messimy speaks of the reduction of the French term of service to two years as "revolutionary." This Jaurès regards as an exaggeration. That reduction marks, not the beginning of a new era, but the close of an old one, and it is this fact which makes it so important. It is the last possible compromise between the professional army, the army of a caste, and the armed nation: the last product of a hybrid.

The next step must result in the true form, which is only to be found in the Nation in Arms.
CHAPTER II.

THE ACTIVE ARMY AND THE RESERVE.

(p. 17).

"The radical fault of our Military System is that, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, it does not really represent the Armed Nation. Though the Country bears a heavy burden, it is far from obtaining from the wealth of the national resources that Nation in Arms which could be provided at a much smaller expenditure of time and energy.

"In theory the law lays down the duty of compulsory and equal service for all citizens. There are neither exceptions nor exemptions. Every man who is physically fit falls within the scope of the Military Law during the greater part of his life. According to Article 32 of the Law, every Frenchman fit for Military Service serves for 2 years in the Active Army and for 11 years in the Reserve, after which he passes into the Territorial Army for 6 years, and the Reserve of the Territorial Army for another 6. Every French citizen serves for two years in Barracks, and all are obliged to come up for training from time to time after they have left the regiment. Rich and poor, employers and employed, fall under the same obligation, share the same life as soldiers, bear the same burden.

"Surely then, this is an enormous accumulation of national power, and the most striking demonstration of equality before the Law. It is The Nation in Arms.

"To all appearance that is so, but as a matter of fact it is only a shadow of the truth. Our Military System is vitiated from the first by the prejudice which prevents
the Nation from regarding any other part of the Army as really important except the Army which is actually in barracks.

"The service in barracks has been reduced from seven to five years, and subsequently, to three, and then to two. And yet Thiers's fear of great masses of untrained men has survived. Hence there are really only 2 classes in the Active Army and, even if we leave out the whole of the Territorial Army, there are 11 classes in the Reserve. It is clear, then, that the Reserves form the principal part of the Army. And this is admitted, or apparently admitted, in theory, and General Langlois draws a sharp distinction between the German system and the French, because, according to him, the German Army looks to its first line as forming essentially the Army itself, whereas in France, we rely chiefly on our Reserves; and he goes so far as to say that our system is the natural outcome of our political and social life, and that we must make a point of taking full advantage of these conditions."

But these statements fail to take account of the facts, which show plainly that the whole French system is based upon the supposed inferiority of the Reserves as compared with the Active Army. Everything conspires to strengthen this attitude, even the words "Active Army" as compared with "Reserves."

This is the real explanation of the excessive length of the service in barracks. Two years in barracks are at least four times as much as is really necessary to teach the soldier his business before he joins the cadres of the Nation in Arms. Jaurès denies that, in expressing this opinion, he is playing up to popular prejudice or asking less from the Nation than is necessary to secure absolute efficiency in national defence.

"Any political party which is too cowardly to demand from the Nation the sacrifices which are necessary to its life and its liberties is beneath contempt, and cannot survive. But I am convinced that long service in barracks
is the outcome of erroneous ideas, and is part and parcel of a system which seriously undermines the defensive power of France by diminishing the value of her reserves, which are her real Active Army."

An examination of the Swiss system shows that the Two Years’ Service is not based upon any technical needs. Of course it would not do to adopt the Swiss System in France without modification. But it is obvious that the Swiss period of service is founded upon the conditions which are necessary to produce thoroughly efficient soldiers and, if three or four months are sufficient to give the Swiss soldier his Military Education, it is clear that two years cannot be necessary to make a French soldier. Nor let it be alleged that the training of the Swiss Army is inadequate. The German General Staff has expressed itself in terms of high praise with regard to it, and General Langlois has also expressed a very favourable opinion on its value.

Switzerland has recently increased the period of service roughly by one third and, in carrying out this reform, an appeal was made to the patriotism of the people and to their love of national freedom and independence. But it was never suggested, even by the Military Party, that the system itself was inadequate. On the contrary the reform was pressed upon the people, and accepted, as one which would secure for the Country the independence to which it is so passionately attached.

It is true that the success of the Swiss system is largely due to the thorough preparatory training of the youth of the Nation in cadet corps, gymnastic societies and so on, and by the frequent and strenuous "repetition courses" which every Swiss soldier goes through in the years which follow his recruit training. And one of the worst drawbacks of long service in barracks is that it makes the men stale, and anxious to avoid the vigorous subsequent training which is indispensable for the efficiency of a really live defensive system.
As a matter of fact the French authorities tacitly admit the adequacy of the Swiss recruit training of a few months. For the French recruits' course lasts five months, and the recruit who joins in October forms part of the first line of the Army in the following March, and would take his place in the ranks if war were to break out in the Spring.

A great deal too much importance is attached to the supposed result of a prolonged period of service, in producing a sort of automatic and mechanical perfection of discipline which will carry men through the most terrible ordeals and enable them to continue to advance under a hurricane of fire even when they are in widely extended order. Although there is the widest divergence of opinion among military authorities as to the real lessons to be drawn from the South African and the Russo-Japanese wars, there is general agreement as to the uselessness of formal perfection of drill, and the importance of developing individual intelligence and initiative. Manœuvres over varied ground are far more effective in producing these qualities than the mechanical exercises of the drill ground, and such training can be secured without condemning men to two years of barrack life.

In support of this view Jaurès quotes General Langlois' condemnation of the present system as failing to give practical training to the troops, owing to the want of adequate manœuvring grounds, which can only be secured for a fortnight every year after the crops have been cut. General Langlois contends that the training will never be satisfactory and adequate until the Nation allows the troops to get nine months in the year in camps of exercise provided for that purpose; the other three months being amply sufficient for close order drill. In his view the present system* is a delusion and a snare as regards practical training for war.

The logical deduction from General Langlois' criticisms

* He was writing before 1910—Ed.
would be one year's service. For it would be impossible to enact a second period of nine months' continuous training in camps of exercise, with the tremendous physical and moral strain which such training would involve. But the general would refuse to accept the logical consequence of his criticism, for that would mean the recognition of the failure of the old long service barrack system and the necessity of a radical reform. But is it not just this radical reform which is wanted? We must abandon the fallacy of regarding the "active" army, serving 2 years in barracks, as the really important one, and we must recognize in the vast trained reserves the real military strength of the Country.

Under the present system a man practically drops his military duty when he has finished his two years' service; and when he comes up, in his thousands, to do his 28 days' reserve training he is regarded as an unmitigated nuisance by the then occupants of the barracks, who often take advantage of his temporary intrusion into their routine to foist upon him all the "fatigues" and non-military duties which they can shuffle off their own shoulders. Hence there is an appalling waste of time and energy, and the reservists are only too well aware of the fact. They are quite prepared to make any sacrifice for some useful purpose, but they feel disgusted and discouraged at having their time wasted in this way.

Jaurès points out that the reduction of the three years' period of service to two years leaves these grave faults unremedied, thus falsifying the hopes of those who had thought that if there was not so much time to spend on the soldier's training it would be more profitably employed. He contends that the two years' service retains the same fault as the three years' course in a somewhat less degree. For, as the recruit training of the soldier is finished in five months, and he then joins the first year's men and would be called out with them for active service in time of war, there is an enormous waste of time in the second year, which is really quite unnecessary and leads
to many soldiers being taken away from their military duties and put to all sorts of civil work in order to fill up the time. For it is impossible to work the men at the high pressure which an intensive military training requires for anything like two years at a stretch.

Hence military service, under the present system, provides a somewhat lazy education for the "Active Army" and has a depressing and deadening influence on the Reserves.

"The only way to solve the difficulty and to provide a vigorous, sustained and serious military education is to do away with the fetish of the barrack system and to look upon it simply as a means to give the recruit the foundation of his military training in the course of a few months. After that the units organized on a territorial basis would be called up periodically to go through a thoroughly practical field training."

Turning to enquire why the present system of long service in barracks has been maintained in spite of its many obvious and admitted drawbacks, and its failure to produce in time of peace vigorous and efficient fighting units, Jaurès finds the explanation in the influence of routine and tradition. For generations past all the armies of the Great Powers have been "barrack-armies." It never entered into anyone's head to think of a standing army as anything else but an army living permanently in barracks. Even the adoption of the principle of the armed nation, implying enormous numbers of men trained for national defence, has not dissipated the obsession of the old ideas, and the modern army has come to be modelled on the old régime in this respect. Hence, "we have, consciously or unconsciously, come to look upon the small portion of the Army which happens to be in barracks as the whole; we have mistaken the school of training for the Army itself; we have taken the scaffolding for the solid framework which is to carry the whole building."

New ideas only succeed by a series of compromises with
tradition and prejudice, and the present military system,* which is the latest stage in the process of evolution which has been going on for the last thirty years, is hampered and confined by a habit of mind which belongs to the past. This mental attitude finds its support, too, in the spirit of caste and of the vested interests of a class, which clings to the idea of commanding great masses of men segregated from the nation in a world of its own, with its own laws, its own pomp and circumstance, rather than of accepting their position as the leading citizens in an armed nation.

"Just as those who have been brought up under the traditions of a monarchical system can only recognize the majesty of force if it is concentrated in a family or in a man and are inclined to look upon the sovereignty of a democracy as something vague, dull and unsubstantial, so those who have grown up under the old military traditions can only think of the strength of an army as embodied in a concentrated, autonomous system, living its own life apart from the nation. And the more political and social necessity compels this army to throw open its gates to the nation, the more these people cling to the idea that its strength lies in those aspects of the old régime which made it a thing special and apart. But they are very much mistaken. Just as there is no power more majestic than that of the national will embodied in law, so there is no army more powerful and more capable of endowing its leaders with moral authority and prestige, if they are in harmony with it, than an army which is the armed nation itself, inspired with the determination to defend its independence and organized for the purpose."

As a matter of fact the "barracks-army" is, in Jaurès's opinion, a serious obstacle to the effective organization of the defensive system of France, and has, in effect, deprived the Country of half of its fighting forces by the exaggerated importance which has been attached to this "active" Army, to the detriment of the "Reserves."

* He is speaking of the two years' service which had not been extended when he wrote.—Ed.
CHAPTER III.

A MUTILATED AND INCOMPLETE DEFENSIVE.

(p. 40).

In view of all the talk about the "armed nation" it might be supposed that the eleven "classes" of the Reserves would be mobilized on the outbreak of hostilities and would form part of the great army which would spring to the defence of France. It would, indeed, be a most formidable army of 2,000,000 men, all fully trained and all under the age of 33. But, alas! nothing of the kind is contemplated. Only five of the eleven "classes" of the Reserves are intended to form part of the first line and to act as a means of hurling back the enemy at the first critical onset. Seven classes, the whole of the men between 27 and 34 years of age, are excluded from the Army of the first line, and France will thus be deprived of a million men in the full vigour of life, in her first effort to hurl back the invader by the overwhelming weight of numbers thrown against him at the outset. Indeed, it is suggested that even so the Reserves are too large, a view which can only be due to the influence of old prejudices in favour of the "barracks-army" as being the only one that counts. Strange to say, those who maintain this view tell us that the fate of the war will practically be settled by the first battles. Yet, they are prepared to throw away the immense military resources which the seven last classes of the Reserves represent, apparently because they think these men will already have forgotten what they learnt in their two years' service in barracks and will have become stiff, "soft" and unfit for service with the first line.
This attitude is only another proof of the folly of keeping men two years in barracks and then letting them 'go to pieces,' instead of giving them a much shorter period of recruit training, followed by frequent repetition courses which would keep them 'fit' and constantly in touch with active military operations.

There is, of course, another reason for this hesitation in taking advantage of the whole of the youthful manpower of the nation. It is felt that young unmarried men who have no family ties can be more easily led to war, especially if it be a war of aggression or adventure, than the great body of men who have settled down to married life. And that is true enough. The real Nation in Arms is ill adapted to the methods of aggressive and predatory war favoured by the dynasties and oligarchies of the past, and, for such a purpose, it is no doubt a sound plan to utilize the "Active Army," which is actually in barracks at the outbreak of war and which can easily be inflamed by jingo and chauvinist ideas, counting on the patriotism of the nation, once the war has begun, to rally to the support of the first line with all the solid weight of its millions of responsible citizens.

But these considerations which impel the militarist to exclude the mass of the nation's manhood, and especially the married men, from the first line of defence, are precisely those which demand that they shall be included in a military system which is really based upon the ideals of a true defensive.

"Assuming that a nation is firmly bent on following a policy of peace and justice, that her only object in view is self-protection, that the government, controlled and inspired by the people, loses no opportunity of proving to its own people and to other nations that its intentions are peaceful and just, why should such a nation and such a government hesitate to call on every man in the country for the common good?"

"Can such a government be blamed if it is obliged to
arm all its citizens, even those who have families, whose duty towards their families conflicts with their duty towards the State? The nation, in defending itself, defends the families, the liberty, the rights, the feelings of all its citizens. They should all obey the summons issued by the nation in the name of justice. In putting themselves at the disposal of the nation, they do not abandon their homes: they protect them and do them honour. How can they best serve the interests of their children? By giving them the chance of living as free men in a free country? or by endangering, from a mistaken sense of parental duty, the liberty and existence of the State which are essential to their welfare?

"A government which is genuinely and demonstrably a government of national defence, which can give proof of its reverence for law and justice, is entitled to call on every available man in time of need. The resentment which men feel at being obliged to leave their families will be directed against the aggressor, and will strengthen their resolve to defend their country. It will be the duty of the country, defended by all its citizens, to provide for the families of those who fall in its defence. A government which looks forward to putting the entire fighting forces of the country into the field at the outset is necessarily obliged to follow a policy of peace and justice. No government could reasonably hope for the support of the nation, if there were any doubt as to the justice and necessity of the conflict to be undertaken. There can be nothing dishonest, nothing obscure or doubtful about the policy of a government which counts on the armed force of the entire nation.

"A Nation in Arms is necessarily a nation actuated by justice and uprightness. Governments which shrink from the immediate use of all their reserve forces confess, by their hesitation, the existence of elements of aggression and injustice in their policy. The rulers of Germany, imbued with military imperialism, are consistent in relying
more and more on a barrack-trained, first line army, in refusing to use the reserves, that is to say the armed force of the nation, for the first battles, which will, in their opinion, be decisive."

The apparent solicitude of French military writers for the interests of the married men is obviously due to this desire to be able to use the first line freely and suddenly, before the nation has had time to weigh the questions at issue between the two countries and make its desire for the maintenance of peace felt.

The fact is,—and Jaurès recurs to this point over and over again—that France is clinging to an illogical system which represents a lopsided compromise between political democracy and social oligarchy, between the traditions of conquest and the ideals of peace. Hence, though she assigns a more important place to the Reserves in her military system than Germany does, yet at the same time she does everything possible to lower the value of the Reserves and to make use of them merely in the last resort as a sort of unpleasant necessity.

France will be really strong and secure when—and not until—she brings her military organization into complete harmony with a democratic and peaceful policy. When the rulers of France adopt the dignified and manly policy of disclaiming, definitely and publicly, all idea of a war of revenge: when they renounce, deliberately, openly, and without any reservation, all idea of following an aggressive policy: when they prove to the world that they are prepared to submit all questions at issue to international arbitration: then they will be able, if danger threatens, to call on all the available forces of the nation for the earliest, as for the later, stages of the campaign.

"France would have more moral possibility than Germany in calling upon her reserves; for (under my hypothesis) France would be clearly suffering from foreign aggression, and Germany would feel the maximum effect of those political and social reasons which make her hesitate
to mobilise her reserves for the first battles. Again, strategic possibilities would here be on the side of France against Germany. Not only would France be the defender, but the fighting would be on her territory; and it is easier for a nation to concentrate all its reserves on its own soil, always supposing that it has had courage and foresight enough to prepare for this contingency—to choose zones of concentration to which, each in its own time, all its forces can be collected. This strategy is far easier than that which compels an invader to carry all the weight of his own forces, by a single rush, into a foreign land; especially when the nation is distressed by uneasy doubts bred of a cowardly complicity in unjust aggression. If France and Germany stood in these relations to each other, I venture to say that militarist and absolutist Germany would not risk the attack; or, if she did, she would suffer one of those disasters which, when a government is founded upon naked force, are the prelude to a revolution. If France were known to be supported, from the first day of conflict, by her whole available reserves and by the unanimity of all hearts, she would be so strong that the boldest enemy would think twice before attacking her. Therefore, this policy of supreme national defence would soon gain for France not only peace, but the certainty of peace; in other words, the beginning of the clearest and most beneficent revolution which has been accomplished in this world for a long time past. It is in the name of that possible peace, which might be secured by utilizing our full forces of national defence, that we protest against the absurd system which deprives France of so large a part—perhaps even the best part—of her defensive forces. It is our wish to give the country those million soldiers whom our professional patriots and militarists would furtively deprive us of, behind our backs. For, under the present state of things, it is strange how little the nation knows about all these problems on which, after all, national life itself depends.”

* See note at end of this chapter.
Both the Nation and its military system are suffering from this fact that the country knows so little about its system of defence and is so little interested in it. One of the results of the reforms projected by Jaurès would be that the creation of the Nation in Arms would awaken the public national interest in military matters and create, as regards the supreme question of defence, a thinking nation. Jaurès proceeds to protest against the fatal mistake of making the French system a feeble and abortive imitation of the German, and he reminds his countrymen of the deep significance of the marvellous achievements of the German Landwehr (reserve) troops, trained on lines similar to those which he proposes, against Napoleon's armies in 1812 and 1813. It would be madness for France, with a much smaller population and a very low birth-rate, to attempt to base her hopes upon a first line army trained in barracks. Moreover, any attack by such an army inspired by the idea of the revanche might well reawaken in Germany that immense strength of the true defensive, turning eventually into an irresistible offensive, which produced such prodigious results in 1813.

There is no necessity for France to follow Germany's example in concentrating her attention on a barrack-trained first line army, in hesitating to make the fullest possible use of her reserves. Far from doing that, France ought to develop her military organization on the lines of her national characteristics, in harmony with the ideal law of an all-embracing democracy devoted to the cause of peace: she ought to train all her reserves so as to make them into her first line army. It would be fatal to the national genius and to the independence of France if she were—as regards military organization—merely a feeble imitation of Germany: the first essential step towards attaining her national ideals without war is to set her national genius free from the influences of German militarism. A strong democratic militia system: barrack life reduced to a minimum: the whole nation a vast army
for the maintenance of national independence and the preservation of peace: in that way and in that way alone can France be truly free.

Note. Jaurès would doubtless have been astounded, as the whole world was, by the docility with which the German democracy has allowed itself to be used for aggressive purposes in this present war. Even those of us who were most convinced that German Socialists would march with the rest—as Bebel himself had frankly warned us—have yet been surprised at the completeness of their surrender. But this need not blind us to the fact that the German example, which superficial writers constantly quote as a normal case of militarism, is really an abnormal case. A succession of startling victories in war, followed by an equally startling development in the arts of peace, have made Germany (in Bebel's words) "drunk with victory"; the military caste, therefore, rules supreme; democracy has as yet shown little power of resistance. Yet the general fact remains true, to which even Lord Haldane and Sir Ian Hamilton appeal, that "the tendency [of Universal Service] is in the direction of the merely defensive"; "should statesmen endeavour to use such a machine for distant or dynastic purposes they betray an idea, and will ultimately have to pay the penalty." (Compulsory Service, pp. 41, 49-51). And, no thinking person can doubt that, unless this present war ends in a real German victory, the military caste will have to reckon with a very different democracy in future years. The King of Prussia, in 1793, refused to imitate the compulsory recruiting system which was enabling the French to win successive victories over his troops, because it would be "infinitely dangerous" to his throne to arm the whole people. (European Magazine, July, 1793, p. 11). We must remember, also, that the present war did not find France prepared with the carefully-studied defensive organization and defensive strategy for which Jaurès contended; and it may fairly be contended that General Joffre, after his first unsuccessful offensive, has adopted with conspicuous success the very strategy which was preached in season and out of season by Jaurès.
CHAPTER IV.

A WARNING AGAINST THE REVIVAL OF THE MILITARY IDEAS OF NAPOLEON.

(p. 59).

Jaurès devotes himself in this chapter to a vigorous and eloquent protest against the tendencies of the modern leaders of military thought in France to base the whole system of national defence upon a blind imitation of the Napoleonic ideas of the offensive as the only true principle of military action. This tendency he attributes to the influence of Captain Gilbert, a distinguished writer who published several important essays, *Essais de Critique Militaire* (1890) and *Sept Etudes Militaires* (1892) which have left a profound and lasting impression on present military policy and on the teaching of the *Ecole Supérieure de Guerre*.

Gilbert's teaching is the more dangerous because it makes a specious appeal to French patriotism and legitimate pride in the glorious achievements of the Napoleonic period. He argues that Clausewitz and all great German military writers have learned their theory simply from the study of Napoleon; therefore we must study Napoleon at the fountain head; and we shall study him more fruitfully than the Germans, since Napoleon's methods were designed for French armies and for the French character. Napoleon, (argues Gilbert,) not only inherited the Revolutionary forces but consciously based himself upon the Revolution; he thus seized all the possibilities of the new world which that Revolution created. His method, therefore, is essentially the method which must dominate in
the modern world; and this method was always based on a vigorous, concentrated, purposeful offensive. From which it would follow that the true strategy for France is an offensive strategy.*

This is, in brief, the essence of Gilbert's teaching. While recognizing the generous strength of his mind, Jaurès proceeds to point out the fatal consequences which the adoption of his views would entail for France and for national defence.

For, in his view, Napoleonism is dead, both in a military sense and from the political point of view. The hybrid system by which he tried to combine the old régime and the new has practically disappeared; and the idealists, whom he condemned, the Jacobins whom he hated, have triumphed in the establishment of the full sovereignty of the people, ruling through its representatives, who carry out its mandates and can be dismissed at will. The last remnant of the Napoleonic régime, the attempt to reconcile liberty of conscience and a state religion, is gone.†

Napoleon was in fact the most chimerical of men, the most narrow-minded of ideologues, and the whole body of his ideas is out of date and unsuitable to modern conditions.

Napoleon was never willing to see—he never did see—any more of reality than the part which he could make use of for his own purposes. All his thoughts, all his creative energies, were directed to the maintenance of his momentary power. If he had to choose between two solutions of any problem, the one disinterested, far-reaching, satisfying the immediate necessities of the situation and likely to pave the way for better things in the future: the other selfish, crude, narrow, clear-cut by its very crudity and narrowness, he chose the latter. France,

* A fuller summary of Gilbert's views will be found below, in the Appendix I.—Ed.
† Jaurès refers to the abolition of the Concordat.—Ed.
exhausted and torn by civil dissension, needed a strong and impartial government: and Napoleon could conceive of no other means of supplying the need than by crushing out, in pursuit of his own ambition, every chance of liberty, present or future. Every noble impersonal impulse was scouted by him as being vague and illusory; and his views of men and things, clear cut, short-sighted, imperious, were the outcome of his narrow egotism.

Men who only survey the horizon in search of prey cannot be said to have a wide outlook, be their appetite never so large. And the apparent clearness of their plans has no more than a momentary influence on the march of events. If France were to adopt a mental attitude so lacking in breadth, her national genius would suffer a sad decline. Even in the military sphere—since it is an integral part of the intellectual life of the nation—excessive reverence for a man who crushed out so many hopes, sterilized so many germs, dried up so many springs, would exercise a sterilizing and narrowing influence on the mind of the nation. The military theorists who are reviving Napoleonic formulas, already seem to be suffering from this sterilizing and narrowing influence. They are losing the wide sense of perspective as regards both the past and the future. Wrapped up in admiration of the master and of his methods, they fail to do justice to the glorious achievements of pre-revolutionary times. They undervalue the military spirit and the technical triumphs of the Revolution. They make insufficient allowance for the new possibilities, as regards defensive action, which would be open to a democratic and peace-loving France, if, realizing and following her own instincts, she were—as a means of ensuring peace—to carry the principle of the nation in arms to its logical conclusion.

Jaurès proceeds to emphasize the magnificent military achievements, based upon a profound grasp of true military principles, of the great generals of the time of Louis XIV, Turenne and Condé, as proof that many of the principles
attributed to Napoleon had been practised by men whose genius Napoleon himself was the first to recognize, but who receive but scant notice from Gilbert in that writer's desire to extol his idol. Jaurès protests, too, against the idea that any model, however admirable, can be slavishly imitated for all time; and he pleads for a complete freedom of mind, for that attitude of philosophic thought of which Clausewitz was the great exponent. Moreover, he claims that the essential features of the military system which Gilbert attributes to Napoleon were all created by the Revolutionary minds and that, as a matter of fact, Napoleon, far from having developed and improved that system, really restricted and weakened it.

In technical matters, in strategy and in tactics, the Revolutionary leaders introduced new methods, and Bonaparte could do no more than improve the mechanism, and increase the practical utility, of the ideas they had originated. Nay, more, the military achievement of the Revolutionary France was infinitely greater than that of Napoleon. The boldest and most far-reaching innovation, the element which, adapted to modern needs, can be best turned to account for the future, was abandoned by Napoleon. The unparalleled achievement of the Revolutionary leaders was that while inspiring a whole people with military ardour they created organized and disciplined armies by the force and enthusiasm of an ideal.

Paradoxical as it may sound, the immense enthusiasm of the revolution, with its rousing spirit of self-sacrifice to the ideals of liberty, produced in the military sphere a marvellous organization and the most perfect discipline; and this despite the chaos, riot and disorder which characterised the first ragged armies of revolutionary France. And these facts have a most important bearing on the question of the future military system of France.

The question is whether modern France should look to the Republican, or to the Napoleonic period, for instruction as to the scientific training of officers and the organization
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of national defence. It would, of course, be absurd to expect to draw definite formulas from either period. It is however safe to say that for twentieth century France, whose strength will depend on the genuineness of her democratic principles, and on her ability to shape her military system in accordance therewith, the Republican tradition remains far more fruitful than the Napoleonic.

The curious thing is that those who, like Gilbert, warn France against a sort of Prussomania, a slavish imitation of German military methods, are the very men who lead France astray from her own real traditions; the Napoleonic system has far more in common with the Prussian, both politically and in a military sense, than with the spirit of Revolutionary France, as mirrored in its armies and their superb and disciplined enthusiasm.

The German Empire represents a compromise between the historic Prussian ideals of the Hohenzollerns and the historic European ideals of the Revolution, just as the empire of Napoleon was a compromise between the Roman monarchical tradition and the French Revolution, the latter element having been so far degraded as to be no longer a principle, but a force capable of being subdued and made use of. Hence, on the military as on the political side, in both cases we perceive an element of incompleteness, of lack of assimilation. When Napoleon was engaged in the supreme struggle against invasion, he did not venture to try to rekindle in his subjects the passion of enthusiasm, which they had felt during the revolutionary epoch. And the German Empire, with its autocratic diplomatic system and its militarist system, by which the principle of the Nation in Arms is cramped and half paralysed by the class spirit, would certainly not have at its disposal, in a great national crisis, the same resources as an enthusiastic and thoroughgoing democracy. France stands alone among the nations by virtue of her republican Revolution, by virtue of her open adherence to the principle of absolute democracy. France is the only nation
in Europe which, in order to develop the democratic element to its fullest extent, on the national and military side as on the political and social side, only needs to be true to her own instincts, to realize and to develop her own tradition.

The misconceptions which underlie Gilbert's deductions from the study of Napoleon have also misled him in his interpretation and appreciation of the great German master Clausewitz, whom they admired so much because of his analysis of the greatest traits in Napoleon's system of military thought. Hence he and his disciples accuse Clausewitz of inconsistency because he insists upon the superiority of the defensive, in spite of the clearness with which he brings out the marvellous results which Napoleon achieved by a bold, rapid, and concentrated offensive. But there is no inconsistency. Clausewitz is great enough to see both sides of the question and to see them whole; above all, he is never hypnotised by one theory to the exclusion of another; he is not ridden by the obsession of the "offensive" which has apparently captured the military thought of France by the attraction of a sort of spurious boldness. Thus he insists over and over again on the advantage of the defensive, and nowhere more than in his treatment of the campaign of 1813-14.

What we are here discussing is not a sullen, despairing, unchangeable defensive, but a defensive full of eagerness, ready to take the offensive whenever occasion offers. If this interpretation of Clausewitz is correct, the action of the allies in the German campaign of 1813 may be called defensive for the following reasons. First and foremost, all the moral forces of the nation are brought into play: all hearts are filled with slowly gathering hatred of the invader. For years before—ever since the battle of Jena—the idea of defending the country at all costs had been taking shape as part of the national military system. Finally, the Prussians, forbidden by Napoleon to maintain an army of more than 40,000 men, had resorted to two
methods of making this restriction of no avail: they had built up a first line army which, within a few months, could be mobilized to a strength of from 120,000 to 150,000 men; and they had "completed their military system by adding to it the idea of defending their territory by means of auxiliary troops." That is to say, the arrangements made for a rapid increase in the first line army had been supplemented by "the creation of a national militia."

Here we have enthusiastic approval of a national defensive campaign. It should be remarked that the defensive character of the campaign did not prevent the army from undertaking a vigorous offensive at a chosen spot: nor did it prevent offensive action by the whole army after a period of time spent in gathering reinforcements.

And, when the steady defensive had succeeded in wearing out the enemy and had given time for the accumulation of great forces, the Allies were able to turn the defensive into the vigorous offensive, which overthrew Napoleon at Leipzig. It was then that the great leader found his methods incompatible with a true defensive; or, rather, his political career had made it impossible to organize the defensive force of France, still potentially vast, against the invaders.

When Napoleon was invaded, when he was reduced to defending French soil against the armies of Europe which he had so often scattered to the winds, his tactics should probably be looked upon as being, so to speak, a continuation of his offensive tactics rather than as being a serious attempt to organize defensive operations. To organize a national defensive, a commander must have time at his disposal and a nation at his back. In Napoleon's case the nation was worn out. He had exhausted its material resources and its confidence. The country was no longer able to supply him with men: even the moral support of the nation could no longer be counted upon. If Napoleon had been able to feel sure that Paris would hold
out he might have been able to withdraw his troops far enough to gain time for the organization of fresh units. Paris, however, was exhausted and no more to be counted upon than the rest of France. So Napoleon, although he was reduced to defending himself, was not able to change his tactics from the offensive to the defensive in any real sense.

But this failure of a defensive, which was not really a defensive—since all the essential conditions of defensive operations were wanting—does not disprove the value of defensive tactics undertaken as the necessary fore-runners of a vigorous offensive.

It is much to be regretted that our military theorists—even those who praise Clausewitz for having grasped the extent and the greatness of Napoleon’s methods, should omit all mention of the approval which Clausewitz bestows on the defensive. And yet they know that Clausewitz was by no means of a timid or shrinking nature. If at the very time when Napoleon—acting on the offensive—attained the most striking and terrible results, Clausewitz gives his verdict in favour of the defensive, the reason is that he was able to grasp the total meaning of a tragic period rich in lessons of all sorts. It would be dangerous if writers were led, by a sort of obsession in favour of Napoleon, to misrepresent the meaning of facts. It would be fatal if, actuated by a prejudice in favour of an immediate and superficial offensive, which as regards France is inconsistent with existing conditions, our leaders were tempted to risk the safety of the country. It would be at least equally fatal if, unable to decide between their fondness for the offensive and the conditions which make defensive tactics necessary for France at the outset of a campaign, they were to hesitate and be lost amid the conflicting opinions. It is for France herself to take charge of the problem. Her life is at stake.
CHAPTER V.

THE FUTURE: THE OFFENSIVE AND THE DEFENSIVE.

(p. 109).

In the event of war between France and Germany the latter will at once assume the offensive with the object of dealing a crushing blow at the outset, a blow so deadly as to make it impossible to recover from the shock and to restore the fighting spirit which eventually leads to victory.

Germany has left us in no doubt about her intentions in this matter. Indeed, the Prussian Great General Staff, as regards the supreme importance of the offensive, strategic as well as tactical, have set aside the teaching of Clausewitz and Von Moltke.* They are convinced that if the former had seen the enormous progress of military organization and the technical advances which have accompanied it he would have abandoned his predilection for the defensive. And Moltke's insistence on the advantages of the defensive referred (they say) to the tactical problem, not to the general principles of military action on a large scale; not, therefore, to strategy. In any case, while the defensive may, in certain circumstances which rarely occur, be the right prelude to a successful tactical offensive, it must not influence us in the general conduct of affairs. An invading army cannot be hampered by the delays of defensive tactics. The general offensive upon which the action of such an army must be based inevitably leads to

* See the third volume of the Studies of the Great General Staff, "Success in Battle and how to obtain it," published in 1901.
the tactical offensive in detail. The great, illuminating feature of Clausewitz's teaching lies in his grasp of the great attack, bold, sudden, impetuous, crushing. "What gives lasting value to his work," say the Prussian General Staff, "apart from its great moral and psychological importance, is his constant insistence on the idea of annihilation, as the dominating principle in strategy and tactics."

Thus Clausewitz's emphasis on the value of the defensive is swept away, and the offensive is the only thing in his teaching to which the Prussian General Staff clings, to that and to the great weight which he attaches to moral forces.

Similarly, Moltke would, they contend, be the first to agree that the tactical defensive must be subordinate to the general scheme, which consists of the determined offensive of a great army marching to overwhelm the enemy. Thus all thought of the defensive, even in combination with the offensive, has been discarded by the German mind. "It is to be the absolute offensive. It is to be an invasion, not for the purpose of occupying territory, not in order to compel the enemy to a weak and hesitating capitulation by the disorganization produced in his economic and social life. No: it is to be an invasion which is intended to destroy the principal armies of the enemy by enveloping them."

The ideal is to have a very clearly defined object and the greatest possible freedom of choice as to the methods by which that object can be attained.

The object is to seek out the enemy, to get to close quarters with him at all costs, to try to turn his flank. A frontal attack which forces him to retreat without crushing loss of men does not suffice. An army forced to retreat still remains in being: its material value is only lessened, its moral value may remain almost unimpaired. An army which is surrounded can be made to suffer a disastrous defeat, disastrous in the material sense because a large
part of the enemy's forces is destroyed, disastrous morally because the success of a bold and enterprising plan leaves the enemy disheartened and discouraged.

Such a plan of action has been laid down by all German exponents of military science, from Von der Goltz to Bernhardi. Bernhardi says:

"In the case of two opposing concentrations of approximately the same strength, the chief object is to find out the direction of the proposed attack, in order to be able to strike at one of the enemy's flanks and to cut his communications. With anything like equal forces, the defensive cannot be overcome by a frontal attack. A flank attack is the most fruitful method."

And the German General Staff, summing up the facts set forth in Volume III, gives as its conclusion:

"The examples which have been cited prove clearly enough that the best effects are attained by a flank attack which threatens the enemy's rear. It is true that the enveloping action hoped for cannot always be carried through, but a real leader will always do his utmost to accomplish it. The length of modern lines of battle, and the difficulty of transporting modern armies from one position to another may necessitate exclusively frontal attacks, leading to no decisive result. This is a real danger from which a leader can only be saved by a sound conception of the art of war. Clausewitz supplies such a conception."

These are the words of the German General Staff, and the French journal—La Revue Militaire—sums up the doctrine in the following terms:

"Concentration of troops at such a time, and in such a way, as to be able to strike at the enemy in full force, the attack being made, as far as is possible, on one of his flanks with the intention of crushing him at a single blow—this is the interpretation, equally bold and true, which the German General Staff gives to the facts of history and to the teachings of Clausewitz and Moltke."

These then are the avowed aims of the German General
Staff. And they are fully confirmed by the preparations which are being carried on close to the frontier under its direction.

The German Staff would not have established the debarkation-points of its strategic railways in such close proximity to the French frontier if its members had not intended to forestall the enemy: otherwise their concentration-plans would be at the mercy of the French. Almost all these railway stations are within thirty miles of the frontier. There are eighty such stations in Lorraine, half of them having platforms more than five hundred yards long. There are about thirty in Alsace, one-third of them having platforms of equal length. It is useless to discuss here the probable alignment of the German armies. What is certain is that rapid offensive action will be undertaken by the troops massed beforehand in Alsace-Lorraine and reinforced with all speed.

The line of frontier acquired by the Germans in 1871 runs in such a way that they can without difficulty concentrate their troops for a decisive blow, that they can throw their armies on to the frontier and at the same time on to the flanks of the French forces. This seems to be the ideal state of things for offensive action.

We shall meet the enemy's offensive with scientifically organized defensive action, and with a strategical scheme inspired by unflinching willingness to make whatever sacrifice may be necessary for its execution.

Germany, then, knows what she wants, and knows it thoroughly. Does France know her own mind in the same way? Major Rosse1 (the Socialist military writer) says emphatically that she does not. He first lays down what should be the natural system of defence for France from a socialist and truly national standpoint.

"The strategical conception which corresponds to the idea of a war of national defence involves, on the one hand the massing of troops in a position of security, and on the other a general offensive at the right.
place. Such is the only plan of campaign—at once defensive and offensive—for a nation which wishes for peace while it wages war, and which derives its power in war from its very wish for peace."

Major Rossel proceeds to ask whether France is properly prepared, under the guidance of her military thinkers, either for the offensive or the defensive; and he unhesitatingly answers the question in the negative, and urges the nation to insist upon a plain statement from the Staff on this fundamental point. There is here no question of public discussion of secret plans of campaign; no idea of intruding into the sphere of military science in its detailed execution of the fundamental principles of national defence. But the French people have a right to know what those principles are, and to ask that they should be in harmony with their political and social aims; for it is the nation which must be prepared to carry them out.

The whole of the military organization, the whole system of mobilization and of concentration must be radically different, according as France chooses to adopt the policy of a national offensive on the Prussian principle or the system of national defence as indicated by Major Rossel. As the offensive can only succeed by extreme rapidity of action, with something of the element of surprise, so it is clear that the Armed Nation is not the appropriate weapon for the purpose. It is too big and too slow in its action. In other words, the theory of a national offensive implies the abandonment of the principle of relying on the nation itself. The centre of gravity is, by this theory, transferred to the vanguard of a limited army which must, by the natural course of events, inevitably become a permanent frontier army. Thus the theory of the offensive extends its baneful influence to the very foundations of military organization, and tends to mould the whole system according to its principles. It reacts on mobilization, by leading to a kind of mobilization in successive lines; its effect is seen in the method of concentration, by compelling this process to be carried out as close to the frontier as possible.
Similarly, the defensive as understood in its widest and boldest sense demands the most thorough preparation in time of peace. But here the massive power of the Nation in Arms takes the place of surprise attacks, of partial concentration and of risky movements. And the deplorable separation of the reserves from the active army disappears.

But the nation must be prepared for the initial sacrifice which this sovereign method entails.

Sheltered from the blows of the enemy, safeguarded against all surprise attacks, the gigantic concentration of millions of citizen soldiers will be carried out. It is possible that, at the beginning of the war, some portion of national territory will have to be temporarily abandoned. The first-line armies, consisting of men belonging to the frontier districts, strengthened possibly by troops drawn from all parts of the country, will be merely a covering force: their duty will be to withdraw as slowly as possible, fighting rearguard actions, not attempting to bring about decisive battles. The national resources will meanwhile be gathered together for a supreme effort: but the essential thing is that there should be no panic among the people. The mind and the soul of the country must be prepared for this bold scheme of temporary retreat as a preliminary to an irresistible offensive.

But such a system implies a clear grasp of the principles involved, and a resolute choice between the offensive and the defensive. The most disastrous thing that could happen would be for the General Staff to hover undecided between these two contradictory principles. But that is in Jaurès's opinion precisely what has happened in France. The whole military system is, he declares, vitiated by the hybrid system of a tentative offensive combined with a half-hearted defensive, not fully thought out on clearly conceived principles. On the one hand the French Staff must be well aware that a French offensive against Germany would be fraught with infinite difficulties and
danger, since Germany has the advantage and practically every factor which makes for a successful offensive. Both the political and the military initiative in aggression is infinitely easier for Germany than for democratic France. This would give her an advantage of several days in mobilization, and her larger population enables her to maintain a first-line army at least as large as the French without counting on any reserves. Finally, the form of the German frontier gives her great facilities for the initial movements preparatory to the first contact of the two forces.

The chances for a successful French offensive are, therefore, small indeed, and it would seem that such an idea must necessarily be condemned by the French General Staff. Yet the latter hesitates to renounce it frankly and definitely, owing to the constant obsession which has influenced the whole school of military thought since Gilbert’s erroneous reading of Clausewitz’s teaching. We are hypnotized by the fallacy which looks upon the defensive as something timid, leading to a slavish imitation of the enemy’s initiative, whereas the offensive is bold, and enables the attack to follow out a definite plan of its own and to bring superior forces to bear at the decisive point.

Gilbert shows the most extraordinary inconsistency in dealing with the subject. At one time he seems to realize the enormous advantages which would accrue from a utilization of the whole of the military resources of France. He says:

"The great battles which will follow close on the preliminary strategical movements must be entered upon in full force and not until all preparations have been made, even if this process should entail the postponement of decisive action, the withdrawal of the armies to the rear, and their re-alignment at the greatest possible distance from the enemy."

He emphasizes these views in the following passage:

"Under all circumstances we must act on the principle
Offensive and Defensive.

laid down by Clausewitz, that the retention or the abandonment of territory is not a decisive consideration: that no serious disadvantage is entailed by the temporary abandonment of a certain stretch of territory if it thereby becomes possible to strike decisive blows at other points. Only by making such a sacrifice can we carry out with the necessary thoroughness the essential, yet so frequently disregarded, principle of absolute concentration of forces."

The meaning of this evidently is, that if France had at her disposal, for the defence of her territory, two million men *thoroughly fit to take the field*, if for instance she could count on all her citizens between twenty and thirty-five years of age, *trained and organized in time of peace*, her leaders ought to wait, before undertaking decisive action in the field, until these two million men had been concentrated; and that their concentration area ought to be fixed far enough from the frontier to enable this concentration to take place. Gilbert seems to recognize the necessity of carrying out these plans of mobilization and concentration, but he proceeds to argue that the greater part of the forces thus mobilized and concentrated should be limited to a subordinate part in the operations.

This leads him into great inconsistencies. He recognizes that, if we fought at all, we should probably have Russia for an ally. Russia would mobilize slowly; Germany would doubtless attempt to deal us a crushing blow first; and therefore, (writes Gilbert) "we must consider whether it would not be advantageous to decline the first battles which the Germans would offer us." But how can a battle be declined, when the enemy is pressing on and straining every nerve to come to hand-grips? Only by a system of well-planned and carefully arranged retirements: in other words, only by adopting precisely those defensive tactics, (including actual abandonment of home territory) which Gilbert always repudiates. Gilbert, again, would "utilize the whole forces of the nation"; but he would relegate all men over 29 years of age to a
secondary sphere of operations. The Swiss, far more wisely, recognize the great military value, (for defensive warfare) of men from 29 to 35. The Swiss allot to their élite (men from 20 to 35 years of age) the role which Gilbert assigns to men under 29 only; and use their Landwehr, i.e. men from 40 to 45, for the tasks which the French writer places in the hands of men from 29 to 34 years of age. These glaring inconsistencies must be due to that old obsession in favour of the offensive, which in turn impels Gilbert and his school to favour the barrack-trained army and to undervalue the great military strength of the armed nation.

The fact is that even the most intellectual of our military leaders have not yet taken the idea of the Nation in Arms seriously. They recognize and tolerate the existence of the idea, but they do not accept it. They do not venture to attack the principle openly: that would be tantamount to attacking the sovereignty of the principle of democracy, but they hamper and impede the application of the principle in practice. I have shown how this is done by our military organization, which reduces the value of the reserves almost to vanishing point. I have now shown the same influences at work in our plans for carrying on war, in which our military leaders, on the pretence of wishing to adopt offensive action, neglect and set aside the vast strength of the Nation in Arms.

It is only by the adoption of a defensive strategical method from which decisive offensive action can soon be developed, that the combined energies of France can be brought into play for her defence.

There is no question here of an inert and passive defensive: on the contrary what I advocate is an energetic defensive accumulating its forces for the attainment of decisive results, like a strongly beating heart gathering in all the blood of the country so as to put fresh life into the struggle. That portion of territory which will have to be temporarily abandoned for the better concentration of force will not
be abandoned without resistance. The fighting forces of the frontier districts and of the neighbouring provinces will form a sort of great covering vanguard which will dispute every inch of ground. The chief thing is that this covering force will not attempt to strike decisive blows. Its function will be to hamper and exhaust the enemy’s offensive, not to smash it, and to withdraw, step by step, towards the concentration zone.

Then at last the armed nation brought together for the decisive battles will take the offensive. Why should it be said that in these circumstances the French armies will not have a positive result in view, and that their movements will be dictated by the enemy, whose every step will be watched and followed by them? On the contrary, the enemy will be dictated to by France invaded and menaced: the advantage which he hoped to gain from decisive battles at the outset of the campaign will have been withheld from him. He will be forced to fight the decisive battles not on the ground chosen and prepared beforehand by him, but on the ground chosen by France. He will be met not by a weak vanguard hastily detached from the armed nation, but by the armed nation itself. He will be obliged either to join battle under unfavourable conditions, or to abandon the strategical plan he had adopted.

The simultaneous mobilization and concentration of the twelve classes of what is now the reserve will bring into line for the first decisive battles a vast army of two million men, supported by the Territorial units, and consequently able to undertake a fresh campaign in case of any serious reverse.

But why should not Germany bring into play equal or larger forces? She cannot do so, replies Jaurès, without mobilizing her reserves, and to do this would be to lose the whole advantage of the surprise upon which, intending the offensive, she reckons.*

* For the testimony of a French military expert to the extent to which these ideas have been justified by the present war, see Appendix II.
It must be borne in mind that the ideas and methods here put forward and advocated are integral parts of a coherent whole. The adoption of a militia system, the organization of the armed nation, the strategical method of national defence have no meaning unless the French people have foresworn all thought of war and warlike adventure, unless they have made their desire for peace so clear, so self-evident that no doubt or misunderstanding can possibly arise. It would be useless to ask the French people to co-operate in ensuring the successful working of a militia system if they did not know that their cooperation was required for no other purpose than for the maintenance of peace and justice.

"A people, animated by a sincere love of peace, and by an equally sincere and fruitful determination to make ready for war—taught beforehand to look forward to the adoption of this great strategical scheme of defensive action—such a people would not, I think, be exposed to the danger of attack from any quarter. I confess that it is this hope, this certainty, of peace which enables me to deal with the ideas regarding war which I am obliged to examine and discuss. When it becomes evident that a great republican nation has carried its love of peace and its love of liberty to their natural conclusion, the world will obtain the first assurance of the advent of universal peace: the armed multitude organized now by France for the defence of her independence, will some day give way, not to the brutal violence of an invader, but to the approach of world-wide peace filling the horizon with the light of confidence, shedding its rays on all the countries of the world."

CHAPTER VI.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY TRADITION.

(p. 146).

In pleading for a National Militia, we are not under the illusion that any number of untrained, or even half-trained troops, can form a strong foundation of national defence. But let us look clearly at both sides of the militia question. Historians have pointed out, only too truly, the weakness of the hasty levies raised in 1792, and again, after the defeat of our regular armies, in 1870. But there are two facts worth noting on the other side. First, even these half-baked militiamen of 1792 and 1870 did sometimes fight with startling success; and, if Germany had been a less tenacious and well-organized foe, they might have secured us a drawn contest, or even final victory, in 1870. Secondly, these militias were raised suddenly under stress of a sudden crisis; everybody knows how difficult it is to extemporize armies under stress of actual war. The militia which we propose, on the other hand, will be an integral part of the national life, as in Switzerland. "What real parallel is there between those hasty formations of the past, patched up under the shadow of a great catastrophe, and a great popular army with its permanent organization in time of peace, with its serious apprenticeship even at school, with its periodical manœuvres, its thorough preparation of rank and file, adequately armed and equipped, arrayed for a most formidable defence, with its own theory and practice of war which has long
been rehearsed by officers and soldiers alike?" "It would be a national crime to allow men to believe that the sudden inspiration of courage, enthusiasm or genius can make up for a patient, methodical and strong organization." We propose no such thing; we propose a militia even more systematic and better trained than that of Switzerland. It was under the inspiration of this Swiss system that the armies were formed which saved the French Republic.

As early as December 12th, 1789, a few months after the storming of the Bastille, Universal Military Service was proposed by one of the most prominent Radicals, Dubois-Crancé. In his great speech in the Chamber, he said: "I lay it down as an axiom that every French citizen must be a soldier, and every soldier a citizen, or we shall never have a Constitution. . . . We must face our enemies with 150,000 regular troops, to cover our frontiers and to march whithersoever they may be needed for defence. Behind these, we must have 150,000 provincial militiamen, to supply the wastage of the regular army, when necessary; these will cost nothing. Finally, I propose a third line of more than 1,200,000 armed citizens, ready to defend their homes and their liberties against all comers. . . . I believe that France, by adopting this system, might realize St. Pierre's dream of perpetual peace; for what power would dare to despise alliance with a nation which can raise an offensive force of 300,000 soldiers, and defend its own frontiers by a barrier of more than 1,200,000 men?" And, if the revolutionaries themselves had had sufficient self-control to follow a purely defensive policy, the anticipations of Dubois-Crancé might have been realized. He proposed to keep even his first-line troops in barracks for only a quarter of each year, and to regulate promotion by a double system of election. The Captains and Majors of each regiment were to form an Administrative Council. When a corporal was wanted, all the corporals would vote for candidates from among
the privates; the three who received most votes would be presented to the Administrative Council, which would choose one for corporal. If a candidate, twice refused by the Council, be presented a third time, the Council must either accept him or justify their refusal by court-martiaulling him. In the same way the sergeants would propose three corporals for a vacancy, and so on up to major. The major is elected by uncontrolled vote of the captains, and the Colonel is promoted automatically by seniority from the lieutenant-colonels. But all such proposals were premature; and the Chamber, which had abolished the old semi-compulsory militia, decided to trust entirely to the voluntary system. The Regulars were professionals, serving for pay, drawn from the poorest classes, and officered by aristocrats or rich men. Behind these stood a National Guard, from which the poorest classes were excluded. Firstly, no man could legally serve in it who was not a voter; and more than a third of the male population were excluded from the suffrage by a property qualification. Secondly, even the poorer among the voters were excluded by the fact that the National Guard found their own equipment and received no compensation for loss of time at drill. Yet the nascent Revolution preferred this system, with its obvious social defects, to Dubois-Crance's too bold proposal for distributing the military burden over the whole able-bodied population. The first stage towards democratization was the introduction of the elective principle into the National Guard. Then, with the growth of Republican feeling and the embodiment of a great part of the National Guard as a paid force, many of the poorer citizens insisted on their right to serve: Danton, in the midst of his preparations for the storm of the Tuileries, proclaimed "that no one class of citizens has a right to claim for itself the exclusive privilege of saving France." On the 18th of August, 1791, the Chamber decreed that all the nation might be armed; and, some ten days later, it decreed universal
suffrage. "How many historians fail to observe that this general arming of the people and this idea of a national militia were born of the same movement which created universal suffrage and the Republic!"

In April, 1792, the French Government, already almost Republican, declared war upon Prussia and Austria, who were plotting an invasion to restore the despotism of Louis XVI and to crush the whole work of the Revolution. There was a splendid response to the first call for volunteers; but Carnot, one of the most determined Republicans and the future organizer of victory, saw further than this. In presenting the report of the military commission, he wrote to the National Assembly (Aug. 1, 1792) "Your Commission proposes that you should furnish muskets and uniforms to all men who have the will and the strength to help in the national defence. We propose it to you as the only act of rigour proportionate to the present crisis,—the only resolution which can strike terror into our enemies at home and abroad—the only means of founding a new military system which, by making all the citizens into soldiers, shall at last deal a death blow to the spirit of distinction, by annihilating that last and terrible guild which is called the Regular Army. . . . It is necessary that, as J. J. Rousseau said, every citizen should be a soldier from duty, and not by trade.* When we have made peace (or sooner it may be) all the line battalions must become battalions of the National Guard." And Carnot, expressly founding his arguments on the facts of the Swiss militia, goes on to describe how he would keep the whole nation trained in time of peace, and how

* Carnot is probably alluding to the opening words of Rousseau's *Contrat Social*, Bk III, ch. 15: "As soon as public service ceases to be the principal business of the citizens—as soon as they prefer purse-service to personal service—the State is already tottering to its fall. When fighting is needed, they pay troops and stay at home; when counsel is needed, they name deputies and stay at home. By dint of laziness and money, they at last possess soldiers to enslave the country, and representatives to sell it."—Ed.
such a manly organization would help to "stifle all the mean and degraded passions which lead a nation to slavery." Upon which Jaurès comments: "these accents of manly simplicity and of proud courage will never find a fresh echo in men's hearts until the army, freed from all the baseness and violence produced by the class and caste spirit, and purified from all spirit of aggression, has become nothing more than the supreme protection, and the last resource, of a peace-loving and justice-seeking society. The sturdy antimilitarist proletariat of to-day will be the first to understand these words of Carnot's, and to thrill at the sound of them. I want only to emphasize this great point, that the idea of national militias is a legacy from the Revolution to us; it rose in the minds of Frenchmen at the very moment when our nation was concentrating all its strength to abolish royalty, to drive back the anti-revolutionary invasion from within and from without, and to create a new order of unalloyed democracy. . . . There are men who condemn the militia idea, and will not listen to the Swiss example, asserting that the army system of democratic Switzerland cannot suit democratic France. To them I would answer that, at the moment when France was agonizing under the double menace to her liberty and to her nationality, and was seeking the best form of army to protect both liberty and nationality, her thought went out to this Swiss militia. Moreover, the man who proposed that truly national and popular organization was no mere dreamer. Carnot knew the old army of the monarchy, in which he had done brilliant service. He knew also what the new age needed; for it was he who was destined soon to endow revolutionary France with incomparable force of method and of initiative."

This was in April, 1792. In August, advanced democrats were suggesting that "suspects" should be forcibly enrolled and sent to the front; and Barère, a few days later, demanded the enrolment of all citizens on the suc-
cessive group-system. But, a month earlier, the first practical step in compulsion had been taken; powers had been given to "requisition" men for supplementing what was still lacking in voluntary enlistment. In February, 1793, the Government issued a decree which "contained, in germ, universal conscription."* An immediate levy of 300,000 men was decreed; each Department was assessed in proportion to its population, and was bound to produce the number fixed, whether willing or unwilling. The framers of this decree committed the grave error of permitting substitution. The measure was soon found insufficient, and in August the Republic decreed a "levée en masse," by classes. All young men from 18 to 25 were called out at once; and, in the frontier districts, the whole able-bodied population. At the same time, the Government "associated the growing hopes of the proletariat with this lofty national effort; the livelihood of the poor was secured by progressive taxes upon the rich. While requisitioning workmen for the armament factories, the Republic demanded from them continuous labour, because no pause could be permitted in the production of muskets and cannon; but the prices of work were fixed by discussion between umpires chosen by the workmen on one side, and the nation on the other. Government hastened the distribution of communal lands to the poorer peasants, proclaiming that, when they possess the land, they will be more ready to defend it. . . . For the first time, a whole great nation entered into the fray, with its inexhaustible wealth of men and of possessions, fighting not only for its own rights, but for those of mankind."

* Jaurès might have put this even more strongly; Dubois-Crancé, in his speech in favour of the requisition, had plainly told the Chamber: "it can only be effected by the proportionate Conscription of all able-bodied citizens, in every department, except so far as they can raise substitutes" (C. Rousset, Les Volontaires, 1870, p. 165). An admirable description by a gardener who went as a volunteer under this levy may be found in L'Armée à travers les Âges, vol. I, p 187.—Ed.
Let us trace the part played by the election of officers in these revolutionary armies.*

It is undeniable that a good many incapables were thus promoted; but it must be remembered that the professional army itself was not in a good state, and that it also contained a large proportion of incapable officers. France, it is true, was fortunate in the mistakes of her enemies, whose delays and hesitations enabled her to set her house in order. The invaders gave her time; and in time the elective system produced good results. There is much good to set against the undoubted weaknesses of the system. It resulted in many political jobs; but the common interest of all soldiers in the success of French arms did, on the whole, outweigh political prejudices on either side. The correspondence of Carrier, one of the most violent soldier-politicians, contains numerous testimonials to the ability of certain Conservative officers and to the military weakness of other devoted Republicans; even to Carrier, the one decisive criterion was that of efficiency. The Committee of Public Safety, again, adopted the same criterion; unsuccessful soldiers, however "sound" in their politics, were remorsefully superseded or cashiered as soon as their incompetence was recognized. This firmness on the part of the higher authorities did much to counterbalance the defects of election. Some of the newly-elected officers, it is true, were replaced for political motives; but many others were superseded on purely military grounds; and, now that the army repre-

* A description of these same events from the anti-socialist point of view may be found in Roussel’s Les Volontaires. Both sides are very ably presented by L. Dussieux, L’Armée en France, vol. II, pp. 376-8, 383, 395-6. He concludes that the elective system was inevitable in the earlier Republican armies; that at the worst it gave as good results as the old system of purchasing commissions; and that it was answerable for a great deal of the French success. As the armies grew more definitely professional, the elective system died out. In 1795 it was restricted to two-thirds of the promotions; and in 1796 it was abolished altogether.—Ed.
Democracy and Military Service.

sent all classes in the nation, the education and intelligence of the privates did much to raise the professional level of their officers. The standard of military education rose as time went on. But, even so, these masses of new soldiers, with new officers, were often terribly deficient in tactics and in discipline; and "even those who most definitely favoured the elective principle, like Carnot, admitted that it too often resulted in the promotion of incapables." Other Republican commissioners with the army were more pessimistic; one official report attributes the indiscipline of the soldiers to the officer's dependence on his electors and to "the tedious forms which must be gone through before culprits can be punished." It adds "what is going on under our eyes is so fatal that, unless some means be found of rendering officers quite independent of their soldiers, you must give up the idea of getting real armies."

A remedy was found in the "Amalgamation System" of Dubois-Crancé. This was voted in February, 1793, but not completed until August, 1794. The army was now organized in half-brigades, each of which consisted of one battalion of Regulars and two of Volunteers (as the new levies were called; in spite of the fact that most were pressed men). Under stricter discipline and more experienced officers, these formations rapidly improved, and finally became the victorious armies of the Revolution. But we must remember that, by this time, even the Regular officers had to a large extent been chosen by election; the Amalgamation, therefore, cannot truly be called an abandonment of the elective system. The greatest victories of the French Republic had already been won before the elective system was abandoned; and, though it was judged unsuitable for the more regular armies of 1796 onwards, it is not fair to emphasize only its weaker side. It helped to keep the army in touch with the nation; it frustrated Royalist plots; we must remember, also, that the Revolution began to need large
bodies of professional soldiers only when it began to violate its own traditions of liberty. Therefore, concludes Jaurès, "I believe that the Revolution, if its normal democratic course had not been interrupted or disturbed, would have ended in an army-system which would have laid far less stress on barrack-life and on professional militarism than the present French system. On the other hand, I believe it would have centralized military education and military life more strongly than is done at present even by the Swiss militia, though this militia is more concentrated and more fully-organized than it was in Carnot's day."
CHAPTER VII.

SCHEME FOR A NEW SYSTEM. COVERING TROOPS.
THE PROBLEM OF CADRES IN FRANCE
AND SWITZERLAND.

[p. 215).

Of all military systems the Swiss system is undoubtedly the one which comes nearest to the ideal of a democratic and popular army. By reducing the time spent in barracks to a minimum, by arranging as far as possible that men shall go through their training in the immediate neighbourhood of their homes, by organizing the entire nation in territorial units, the Swiss have managed, more successfully than any other people, to enable the individual to fulfil his military obligations with the least possible disturbance of his civil life. We do not however maintain that the Swiss military system could be adopted in France without modification. There are features in that system which are the result of the past history of the nation, depending for their successful working on a state of public opinion which does not exist in countries whose citizens have not been taught, as the Swiss have, to see the necessity and the advantage of universal military service designed, not for the benefit of a class or for the creation of a spirit of aggression, but for the preservation of national security and the free development of social justice.

It would not, for example, be advisable to transplant to French soil the Swiss method of dealing with boys who have left school. For schoolboys between the ages of 10
and 14, (at which latter age compulsory schooling ceases), the Swiss law prescribes physical exercises as a preparation for military training: the school teachers who have qualified in this branch at the normal schools and during their period of military service act as instructors. This is an admirable arrangement, and we propose the adoption, in France, of a similar system. On the other hand, the cadet training of boys who are no longer at school—i.e. of boys of from 14 to 20 years of age—is, in Switzerland left to the initiative of private agencies, and no compulsion is applied. Now the fact that such a system gives good results in Switzerland does not at all imply that it would give equally good results elsewhere. Swiss military institutions are the outcome of the past history, and the expression of the present public opinion, of the country.

For centuries past, the Swiss have cherished traditions of democracy, of decentralization, of national and local independence. Their social and political conditions have created and kept alive in them a keen sense of the value and importance of military efficiency, in the individual and in the community. Rifle shooting is practised as a recreation to an extent unknown in other countries. In such an atmosphere voluntary cadet training may well produce good results.

In France, on the other hand, where none of these conditions exist, and where private associations are so likely to be unduly influenced by political party feeling, the cadet training of boys who have left school should, like the preliminary training of schoolboys, be organized by the State on a compulsory basis. We propose, therefore, that boys from the age of 13 onwards, whatever class they may belong to, whether they are still at school or not, shall belong to cadet corps, organized by the State through the agency of the territorial units in the different localities: and that they shall receive, at the hands of official instructors, such training in drill, gymnastics, and rifle shooting as shall be suitable to their age and degree of
proficiency. We propose that there shall be one day of drill per month. Neglect, on the part of parents, to send their boys to the training centre at the appointed time should be punished by fines. Boys guilty of breach of discipline, of repeated failure to attend, of refusal to profit by instruction, should be liable to an increased amount of barrack training on reaching the military age and should be shut out from employment by the State in any capacity.

The military training which, under the system here advocated, would be given to boys in the primary schools and in cadet corps would lead up to the more systematic training which each man would undergo on reaching the age of 20. We propose that every man on reaching that age should go through six months' continuous training, such training to be given at suitable centres, at the most suitable time of the year, either in barracks or, preferably, in training camps. The men thus assembled for their recruit training would naturally not form a permanent unit. At the conclusion of each course of training the men would take their places in the territorial units, as members of which they had, during their boyhood, received their preliminary training.

The active army would consist of all men between the ages of 21 and 34. During their boyhood they would have received preliminary training at school and in the cadet corps attached to their territorial units: at the age of 20 they would have gone through a continuous period of recruit training lasting for six months: and during the thirteen years of their active service as members of the army they would be called out eight times for repetition courses, lasting alternately eleven or twenty-one days; the shorter periods being devoted to company and regimental training, the longer periods to combined manoeuvres.

The chief argument put forward against the system here proposed is to the effect that it does not provide a body
of troops, sufficiently large and sufficiently well trained, to guard the Eastern frontier against invasion. The difficulty is largely an imaginary one. (i) As regards military efficiency, the result of the preliminary training here proposed would be that the recruits assembled in the frontier districts for their six months' training would have more military experience than the majority of our soldiers have under the existing system. (ii) As regards numbers, the existing system provides for the maintenance in the frontier districts of about 100,000 troops. It is impossible seriously to argue that, for the provision of such a force, it is necessary to keep 400,000 men in barracks, or that no other method of providing such a force can be arrived at. It would be possible, by offering proper inducements in the way of pay and conditions of service, to induce a sufficient number of men voluntarily to prolong their term of service, and so to provide whatever force may be necessary for the defence of the frontier. It would also be possible, by arranging that all the recruits from all parts of the country should go through their six months' training in the frontier districts, to develop and extend the existing system by which the men who are stationed on the Eastern frontier are drawn from other parts of the country. The periods of recruit training could be arranged in such a way that there would at all times be a defensive force of 100,000 men stationed on or near the frontier: and the necessity—and the duty—of defending the frontier against attack would thus be brought vividly before the mind of the entire population.

The mobilization and concentration on the frontier of the troops destined to guard against invasion will be appreciably more rapid if the Swiss system of allowing men to keep their arms and equipment at their own homes is adopted in France. We do not propose the immediate adoption of this system in France for the country as a whole. It would be a mistake to give any ground for the suspicion that, under the pretence of providing for rapid
mobilization and national defence, we are aiming at facilitating revolutionary action on the part of the masses. The military system here advocated ought to be examined on its merits, from the single standpoint of its ability to provide for national defence against attack. It is, as a matter of fact, highly improbable that the system of allowing men to keep their weapons in their own homes would have any such social effects as are frequently apprehended. When strikes or riots take place, talk about using weapons is harmless enough, especially when the weapons are not available. If the weapons were available, to talk about using them would be quite another matter: the talkers would run a serious risk of being taken at their word. Men who fire on their fellow citizens must either be in a state of uncontrollable excitement, or they must be acting in obedience to orders which cannot be disregarded. When soldiers fire into a crowd, it is, so to speak, their function to act as murderers: yet they shrink from doing it, and the repugnance they feel grows more intense as time goes on. Moreover their action arouses not merely fear and anger, but a feeling of horror. If working men were to misuse the weapons entrusted to them for the defence of the country, they would arouse a moral reaction on the part of their fellow citizens which would wreck their cause. Their own leaders, realizing their material and moral responsibility, would undoubtedly strain every nerve to prevent any such action: and, if such action took place, it would expose the perpetrators of it to the bitter hostility, not only of other classes of the people, but of numbers of their own fellow workers. Those of the workers who were animated by revolutionary ideas would not be the only people possessed of weapons. The middle classes of all grades, and the more conservative working men, would form a compact body, exasperated by anger and fear, unanimous in their determination to crush those who had first resorted to such murderous action. The knowledge that such consequences would follow
would certainly suffice to prevent such action from being taken.

This view is fully borne out by experience of the conditions existing in Switzerland. Industry in Switzerland, as compared with agriculture, is more highly developed than in France. Industrial and working-class towns are growing day by day. The population is being continually increased by the addition of men differing in race and in temperament. Strikes of extreme bitterness, leading to open conflict with the troops, are by no means unknown. Industrial disturbances have led to the soldiers using their rifles against strikers: they have never led to the use, by the working men, of their rifles against the soldiers. I have asked Swiss socialists whether the capitalist classes were not afraid of such action on the part of working men: and the reply has been—"Nobody has ever thought of such a thing. Such a recourse to violence would be madness, and the men who resorted to it would ruin their own cause."

Those who disagree with the views here expressed may argue that Swiss soldiers, although they keep their rifles in their own homes, do not keep the cartridges which they would need on mobilization; and that the action of the Government in not allowing them to do so is dictated by fear of revolutionary action. This view is untenable in view of the fact that most Swiss citizens have in their possession cartridges which they have obtained, and not used, at the rifle ranges, and of the further fact that they are allowed to buy as many cartridges as they like from the official dealers. The action of the Government in no longer supplying them with cartridges to be kept at home with their rifles was taken in accordance with the wishes of the citizens themselves, in order to guard against the risk of accident.

Thus, though we do not put forward—as regards the whole of France—proposals which might enable our opponents to misrepresent our aims, it is clear that the adoption
—as regards the frontier districts—of the Swiss system of allowing men to keep their arms and equipment in their own homes would not involve any danger of civil disturbance: and it would materially increase the rapidity with which the citizens of those districts could be mobilized and concentrated for the defence of the frontier.

The question of the relative proportion of the recruits which is to be allocated to the different arms presents some obvious difficulties which are, however, easily capable of solution. Broadly speaking four-fifths of the military forces in a modern army consist of infantry. It is therefore easy and natural to make the basis of recruitment for four-fifths of the national army a purely territorial one. A given area will supply the recruits for a division, and these again will be subdivided into areas from which recruits will be drawn for any given unit—a regiment, battalion, or company.

The recruitment for the special arms is obviously not quite so simple, and it may be necessary to take a somewhat elastic view of the strict territorial basis which should be absolutely adhered to as regards the infantry. Clearly, some of the special arms, especially the artillery and the engineers, will have to be recruited mainly in industrial centres where there is a considerable population with experience of mechanism. It will therefore, no doubt, be necessary to take a larger area as the basis of recruitment in the case of the artillery and the engineers, and the basis may not correspond exactly to the infantry areas. But every effort will be made to adhere as closely as possible to the territorial principle, so that the military life may be modelled as closely as possible on the normal life of the nation, so that mobilization may be as rapid as possible.

Jaurès draws attention to the fact that the arrangements for the recruitment of the cavalry in Switzerland have given to that arm something of the character of middle-class superiority, based upon the fact that all
those who wish to belong to the cavalry, even as privates, must give evidence that they can purchase, or at least maintain, a horse. A slight element of class distinction is thus introduced, and it is quite impossible for the proletariat to find its way into this corps d'élite.

Jaurès takes strong exception to these conditions, as militating against that basis of complete equality in the face of the national needs which he regards as the foundation of a truly democratic military system. Instead of insisting that a cavalry recruit should furnish or maintain his own horse, therefore, he proposes that, under his scheme, the best and most active among the recruits should be posted to the cavalry, always on the strictly territorial basis, the State defraying all the cost incidental to this more expensive branch of the service.

Turning to the important question of providing training cadres for the enormous numbers forthcoming under a system of universal compulsory training in a short service army such as he has in view, Jaurès proposes a compromise between the French system, which provides permanent professional officers and N.C.O's for nearly the whole army, and the Swiss system which provides only a very exiguous proportion of professional officers, reducing their functions almost entirely to the task of supervising the training of the recruits. The whole instructional corps of the Swiss Army amounts to only 240, and they are the only professional soldiers. The same proportion would limit the French professional officers and N.C.O's to 2,400, which would obviously be totally inadequate. But the fact is that the Swiss professional soldiers do not form cadres at all; they are instructors pure and simple, and never hold any command.

The cadres are provided from quite a different source by a very complete and elaborate system, which is based upon three principles: (i) that no one has the right to refuse to be an officer, (ii) that all rise from the ranks and (iii) that each step in promotion depends upon the attain-
ment of a higher standard of military competence and technical knowledge, preceded in every case by a special course of training.

The fact that no citizen may refuse to undertake the duty of officer may give rise to the impression that the Swiss are often anxious to escape this burden. "Nothing of this kind, fortunately, can be said against the Swiss army. If men had to be compelled by law to accept commissions, they would show themselves, as officers, lacking both in zeal and in initiative: and in the case of a nation not animated by the general willingness to serve the State, the law would be a dead letter. The forces of national indifference and inertia would prevent such a law from attaining its object. Switzerland has enacted, and maintains, this legal obligation because the goodwill of the vast majority of her citizens can be confidently counted on: in other words, the law is merely a precaution against individual and temporary shortcomings. As a matter of fact, men accept promotion to officer’s rank of their own free will.

"The second characteristic of the Swiss system is, that ‘unity of origin’ is almost complete among the officers. It may be said that all officers rise from the ranks, and are promoted step by step from the humblest positions. . . . The third distinguishing trait is that, at each fresh step in promotion, a fresh educational effort is demanded from the citizen thus promoted; not as in France, where the whole educational effort is too often concentrated upon the first years of the officer’s career.”

Jaurès deals very fully and minutely with the system by which Switzerland provides for promotion from the lowest ranks, i.e. from that of private to that of colonel, the highest rank attainable in peace time. It does not seem necessary to deal with these arrangements in detail*

* They are fully described in “A Territorial Army in Being: A Practical Study of the Swiss Militia” by the British Military Attaché at Berne. (Murray. 1908).—Ed.
here. Suffice it to say that they represent a progressive course of military education, in which practical training goes hand in hand with thorough instruction in theory and in which every step is checked by examination at the hands of the professional Instructors, the whole demanding from the citizen chosen, or applying for, the successive promotions the sacrifice of a large amount of time and a very assiduous devotion to his military duties during the periodic "schools" through which he has to pass. Let us take an instance of the serious nature of the demands made upon the Swiss citizen who wishes to attain the rank of a commissioned officer. The school for promotion to corporal follows immediately after the recruit training for the infantry, and lasts 20 days, during which he goes through a course of practical and theoretical instruction in everything relating to platoon work, outpost and picket duty and musketry. To secure promotion to commissioned rank in the infantry, the candidate who has been passed as an N.C.O. has to go through a "school" or course of 84 days, followed immediately after promotion by a musketry school lasting 28 days, which is also attended, during the first ten days, by captains and other officers of higher rank, so that the latter may have the opportunity of studying the control and the effect of infantry fire in all the developments of modern arms of precision. Promotion in the special arms is based upon the same system, but with a considerable increase in the period of the various courses; for instance, the "school" for promotion from N.C.O. to lieutenant in the artillery lasts 105 days, and in every case these schools and preparatory courses are additional to the regular training prescribed for each branch of the service, so that the officer promoted has constant opportunity of practising what he has learnt during this period of instruction for promotion.

Jaurès draws attention to the important fact that, although the Swiss Army is otherwise based and organized
on the most democratic system, there is no election of officers by the people. "It may be said that promotions are managed, directly or indirectly, by the Government authorities; and the actual people, the actual democracy, have only a very indirect and remote influence on the selection or advancement of officers."

"What, then, is the professional value of these officers who give but a small portion of their time to military theory and practice, and whose life is almost wholly taken up with a trade, a profession, or some other civil occupation? It is always very difficult to pronounce a judgment upon the value of an army which has seen no fighting for a very long time. The task is especially difficult for a foreigner, who cannot form a personal and direct opinion by associating with Swiss officers. Without such daily familiarity and friendly talk, it is difficult to estimate their state of mind—their taste for work and for military problems—whether, again, they wear their uniform from a noble care for Swiss independence, or through vulgar bourgeois vanity, or such snobbery as is common enough in democracies. I have heard Swiss Socialists speak without much esteem of their officers. They say that, apart from a small number of very honourable exceptions, the general bulk of them are second-rate. But this judgment may be inspired by party-spirit, especially at a time when they were irritated by the display of coarse militarism and mean patriotism which was so noisy in Switzerland during the Referendum on the new Army Act.* All that can really be said with some real confidence, is this: that, at the grand manoeuvres and at the mobilization-tests, the Swiss army has shown remarkable qualities

* In 1907, a Referendum was held on a proposition to increase the time of training for the Swiss Army by something rather less than 20 per cent. (which, of course, entailed a corresponding increase in the budget). The question was hotly contested, but the proposal was carried by a substantial majority of the electorate.—Ed.
which have struck all impartial observers.* This has been admitted by both French and German experts, even those who were least disposed to extol the militia system; and these established qualities of the Swiss army would seem clearly to prove that the officers reach a serious standard of efficiency. Moreover, I can add from personal knowledge that it is impossible to read the Revue Militaire Suisse (which has been published in the French-speaking cantons since 1888) without being struck by its living spirit. . . . What especially strikes a Frenchman, accustomed to the pall of silence which hangs over our army and the censure which paralyses all initiative among our officers, is the liberty of thought and action which these Swiss officers enjoy. They are formed into associations, which meet freely and publicly—often in the churches, which, in Switzerland, are used for so many functions of social life. These officers' associations advertise their meetings in the papers, and arrange their own programme. They intervene, by way of approval or disapproval or amendment, in the military proposals of the Government authorities. They address public and collective petitions. They call upon the authorities to consider certain questions or reforms; and, when a bill is brought forward, they discuss it in a spirit free alike from revolt and from servility."

Jaurès finally notes a dual tendency among the body of Swiss officers, the one towards a more conservative military policy, based upon a recognition of the efficiency of the German system, the other towards a still more democratic organisation of the Swiss army which would give the cantons some voice in the appointment of the higher officers who are placed in command of the divisions

* The rapidity and ease with which Switzerland mobilized all her active forces in August, 1914, was noted by all critics; and it has more than once been suggested that this accounts for Germany's decision to attack through Belgium rather than through Switzerland.—Ed.
or brigades raised by them. He looks to the Socialist party to strengthen the latter tendency. In time, he sees in the active spirit of the Swiss people and their keen interest in improving the training and efficiency of their officers a proof that the principle of a militia force, raised upon the popular basis of compulsory universal training, is by no means incompatible with a constant improvement in military organisation and efficiency. On the other hand he does not by any means propose to accept the Swiss system bodily for France.
CHAPTER VIII.

OFFICERS AND THEIR EDUCATION. THE CLAIM OF "UNITY OF ORIGIN" FOR ALL OFFICERS.

(p. 263).

Jaurès aims at providing a total of 50,000 officers for his Nation in Arms, as compared with the 31,000 provided under the existing French system. These 50,000 would consist, as to a third, of professional officers; another third would be civilians who had attained a fairly high standard of military education, based upon a broad general culture; while the balance would consist of non-commissioned officers, raised from the ranks as the reward of merit, and becoming, henceforward, "civil" officers, like the second category. He would thus turn to account, for the purpose of the command, the whole of the intellectual, scientific and moral resources of France at the present stage of her development.

This question of the provision of officers leads Jaurès to a very full discussion of the much debated principle of the unity of origin for all officers.

The chapter need not, however, detain us long, since the more important details upon which he insists are clearly stated in the Army Reorganization Bill which he brought into the French Parliament in November, 1910 (see Chapter XIV). The rest of this Chapter VIII deals mainly with matters which primarily concern France. Jaurès combats the extreme position that, in a truly Republican country, it is necessary that all officers should not only
pass through the ranks, but should obtain their promotion by the same process, educational and technical. To any sympathetic observer who should happen to be also a fairly impartial and friendly student of social and democratic evolution, it is particularly interesting to note the remarkable freedom from the mere shibboleths and catchwords of Socialism which Jaurès shows in his treatment of the question how a truly democratic army, representing the strength of the Nation in Arms, eager for peace but resolved to defend national independence, should provide and train its officers.

He has little patience with those theorists of a pseudo-democracy who, with a narrow-minded intolerance of any inequality, even that of intellect and character, insist that the only way to secure the avenue to the commissioned ranks to the proletariat is to reduce to a minimum the educational qualifications and the intellectual standard required of the officer. Against such folly Jaurès protests with vigour and real eloquence. The principle of a common origin for all officers might conceivably be tenable, he thinks, in a communistic society in which private property would have disappeared entirely, so that no class, not even the "lower middle," could secure a better standard of education for its sons than that which was at the disposal of the humblest—and least gifted—child; although the great Socialist expresses a very strong doubt whether even a communistic state would not find it necessary, for its own preservation, to confide the direction of its army to men specially trained for that purpose and devoting all their time and their intellect to it; in other words, to professional soldiers.

In any case, (for a society constituted as it is to-day and such as, in spite of socialistic developments and improvements, it is likely to remain), he scouts the idea of lowering the standard of educational and professional attainment in order to place the insufficiently educated and mentally ungifted on the same footing as those who have devoted
years of close study to the higher sciences. Such an idea must seem absolutely suicidal, and destructive of all hope of obtaining for the new democratic army, the Nation in Arms, the best, most energetic and most highly cultured minds, which are essentially needed for a profession so difficult and so noble as the profession of arms should be in a nation which entrusts them with the organisation, instruction and education of the whole people for its defence.

In fact, as he points out, the French advocates of absolute unity of origin for all officers do not in the least follow out their theories to their logical consequences. Indeed, so far as the mania for abstract equality goes, it resolves itself mainly into the fact that all officers do, literally, pass through the ranks. But that does not reduce them to a common origin! And this truth is recognized in the system which, while establishing the two years' service for all (the French law of 1905)* only compels students of Saint-Cyr and of the Ecole Polytechnique to do one year in the ranks, after which they pursue their studies for another two years at these schools and then return to the army, not as privates but as second lieutenants. Nor do they serve even their one year in the ranks quite in the same way as the ordinary private does; for, in spite of every effort to treat them exactly like their comrades, or even to apply a special standard of severity to them, everybody knows that, in virtue of their educational endowment, they are officers in posse. Thus the fiction of unity of origin remains a fiction, as, in Jaurès' opinion, it ought to be. Indeed, he would do away with it completely and frankly recognize that, in the present state of society, it is no use sacrificing the army and the efficiency of the whole system of national defence by in-

* It must be remembered that Jaurès wrote in 1910, long before the Law of 1913 which re-established the Three-Years' Service. —Ed.
venting methods to prevent brains and character and education from being attracted to the career of the officer. "With us Socialists," he writes, "democracy has never stood for mediocrity and a levelling down to a common mean; and, as far as I am concerned, I will never admit that the high preliminary tests or the higher military instruction can be abolished without grave danger for national defence and for the mainspring of French culture."
CHAPTER IX.

ARMY, LABOUR ORGANIZATIONS AND UNIVERSITIES.

In democratizing the army, and ensuring that the officers shall represent all classes, we must guard against the tendency of the self-made man to lose his social balance. "Workmen who become foremen, foremen who become employers, are sometimes more tempted to abuse their authority than the heir of a great manufacturer, who is accustomed to power. . . . There is only one way of ensuring that the working-classes shall have their own men in the army, unceasingly penetrated with working-class influence and spirit. They must themselves undertake, in fact, the burden and control of these young officers' education. Let the working-class friendly societies and trades unions and co-operative societies choose, from among the boys in the primary schools, such as have the best recommendations from their class-masters and their drill-masters; such as possess most vigour and intelligence, and the greatest aptitude for a life of combined study and action. Let these boys, supported partly by the workmen's societies and partly by the nation, be sent to the higher schools and to the University for their degree in military science; then there will be a visible bond between these young men and the permanent Labour organizations of the country. These officers, while they rise, will feel that they are not leaving the great working-class from which they sprang. When they come back, in later years,
to command troops in their own district, they will then find themselves side by side with the very Labour societies which have been (so to speak) their guardians and adopted fathers; then the powerful organization of the workers, which has the whole future before it, will be represented by picked officers, even to the highest commands."

"This will of course entail expenditure of money on the part of working-class organizations, but the burden will be slight compared with the great social advantage derived from it. The idea of calling on working men's organizations to help in furnishing officers for the army will only seem strange to men who do not realize that the efficiency of an army springs from its ability to represent the living social forces of the country. Co-operation and organizations are the means by which the workers can claim their rights and fit themselves to exercise them; the army can only be truly national and truly popular by showing itself able to assimilate these new social forces. The strength of the army will depend on the closeness of the relationship between its organization, as regards both officers and men, and the organized forces of labour: and the power of the workers will depend on their ability to assume the responsibilities of a ruling class and to do their share in creating the new army.

"The aim of the workers, in taking up this attitude, should not be to guard themselves against possible action, in social conflicts, on the part of an army in whose higher ranks the Labour spirit has no representation: their aim should be to claim the position due to them, to assert their intention of taking an active part in remodelling all the social institutions of the country. In the early days of Christianity, the upholders of Paganism were told:

"We are everywhere: in your courts of law, in your armies, in your palaces. We leave you nothing but the temples of your Gods."

In the same way the chief aim of the workers should be to show, in every phase of national life, that they have the
Army, Labour and Universities.

power and the will to influence the actions of the country. No officer, trained in the way here set forth, could disregard the wishes of the workers or fail to understand them.”

But these officers must be far less specialized than our present officer-caste. Let the present Cadet Colleges be abolished; and let all higher military studies be carried on at the universities, where the future officer will work side by side with students who are learning other professions—law, medicine, etc. “Military science is an essential part of the system of human knowledge. Henceforth, its natural place is at the great Universities. . . . Why should we maintain any remnant of separation or of caste-spirit between the living nation and the army? Why deprive the future officers of that richer life which they would find at the University, in the free exchange of ideas, in the sharing of studies and researches to some extent with other students, in a wider and more varied companionship? And why deprive the University of that fresh intellectual and moral life which would be brought into it by young men whose business is to study National Defence?” The young officers themselves, beginning life with a broader intellectual outlook than now and having been compelled to compete in many of their classes with other professional men, will be far less tempted to settle down into the mere ruts of their profession, than at present. Many men are now devoted to routine because they have never known any education beyond routine. The army would gain in every way if each fresh generation of officers were inspired by the full intellectual traditions of its own generation of citizens.

This course of training would take four years, including a recruit-school of six months. The combined contributions of Labour Societies and Government would not only defray the student’s ordinary expenses, but provide higher scholarships and prizes for those who distinguished themselves even among this picked contingent. Each
great University would take about twenty military students per annum: thus, at Paris, Lyon, Lille, Toulouse and Bordeaux there would be from 70 to 80 at any given time.

For the French army has always had a real intellectual tradition, and we do but propose to recognize this and to adapt it to modern conditions. Descartes, the greatest French philosopher "began, by his service in the German wars, his studies in 'the great book of the universe.'" Vauban, our greatest military engineer, was also one of the most disinterested politicians, and one of the boldest reformers, that France has known. The best Revolutionary generals, like Hoche, were hard readers and independent thinkers. What ability many of Dreyfus's persecutors showed, even in so bad a cause! "Woe to those who have already forgotten the lesson of those dark days, and who have not resolved to bring back the spirit of the army into the broad current of democratic life and national thought, for the sake of army and of nation alike! . . . By the very fact that our officers are called to the Universities, they will be warned that the very spirit of the army has been renewed; and the whole of this new military organization which I propose will help to give a new direction to their thoughts."*

This new direction will be only one side of the vast problem of social organization—the military side of it. Our new officers, in touch with the Universities and in touch with the whole practical life of the nation, will see national defence in its true perspective; they will not neglect any important factor of human nature or of history. Nothing short of this wide outlook can enable them to grasp what is really the main problem in military as in civil life: How can these vast masses of men, with which

* Jaurès, it will be remembered, was one of the earliest and most determined public champions of Dreyfus. This lends special point to his words here (pp. 322-4).—Ed.
modern democracies deal, be so organized as to work together with the maximum of co-operation and the minimum of friction?

"It will be to the eternal shame of our military authorities if they are reduced to say, like an impotent miser, 'what can we do with all these millions of men? How can our thoughts move with conscious freedom amid this close-packed multitude?' True, the task would be impossible for any man or group of men unless the ground were prepared beforehand. No commander-in-chief, no general staff, could give unity of direction to the whole armed mass of the French nation, if there were no community of thought, or no deeper unity, between the mass and its leaders. We need complete national agreement as to our main object, our methods, our tactics; we must be inspired by the same passions and the same thoughts. The commander, in elaborating a vast plan of convergent action for these millions, must count on being seconded at every step by the intelligence and goodwill of these complicated groups of soldiers, each of whom has been accustomed, by living manoeuvres, to work on a broad and intelligible plan. The grand mass-strategy of the future will not be an inert mass, like the heavy mountains of bricks that form an Assyrian palace. It will be, on the contrary, a triumph of methodic thought, obeyed and ordered on a vast scale by millions of conscious beings. But we shall never attain to this unless we break down, from the very beginning, those barriers which divide our present military colleges from the nation. The officers must begin, as University students, to get into contact with the whole spirit of their age and their country; they must thus assimilate the vast and bold conceptions of science and democracy which will give breadth to military methods and plans. Thus France will be able to endow thousands of officers with the highest culture—and, in a sense, the most special culture—without allowing these picked men to become an oligarchy. We shall then need
no artificial means of spreading the spirit of democracy and of progress through the Army. There will then be no excuse, under the pretext of 'community of origin,' for lowering the intellectual level of our officers, who in fact will need all the more intelligence and learning in proportion as they will have to wield vaster and more complicated masses of men."
CHAPTER X.

MILITARISM AND DEMOCRACY.

(p. 341).

But we have still to answer the vital question: "Will the artisans and peasants of France care to make the army a success?"

"If the proletariat is hostile, or even merely sulky and aloof, we shall get no improvement. Under those circumstances, any change will then end in one of two things; either national defence will break down altogether, and we shall be at the mercy of any sudden attack from without, or else we shall get an armed oligarchy, all the more dangerous because, under a veneer of democracy, the propertied classes will in fact still keep their privileged position in the army; the foolish indifference of the people will leave them sole masters of the machinery of war and of repression.

"Why then should not the proletariat, from its own point of view, in its own spirit, and in proportion to its growing power, undertake the great task of military organization and national defence? I know very well that a confused anti-militarism (or even anti-patriotism) is often preached in such a way as to fill this problem with muddles and misunderstandings. But that affords only a stronger reason for stating the question plainly; and I am convinced that any accurate analysis of the problem will show the necessity of constituting a New Army through the intervention of the proletariat. And when I say
necessity, I speak of what is necessary not only for the nation, but for society and for the proletariat also; not merely a French necessity, but a revolutionary necessity. The question is not, how far the proletariat has hitherto revolted against the army in its present form, and as at present employed; nor even, how far it has revolted against the idea of patriotism as conceived by reactionary politicians. We need not ask whether some of the proletariat, carried away by anger or misled by formulas which are only half-truths, have gone so far as to repudiate every form of army, even popular and defensive, and every form of Fatherland, even when pacific and just. What we are really concerned with, in the present state of the world and at the political and social level which the French nation has now reached, is a very different question. Does the proletariat now judge that its duty and its interest require it to undertake the necessary reorganization of the army in a democratic and popular sense? Will it thus become, under far-reaching and clearly-expressed rules of justice and peace, the most vigilant guardian of this gradually-transformed Fatherland? It must intervene, and as soon as possible, for the security of France, without which security there can be no freedom of social evolution in the country.’’

It is no good meeting this with a vague cry of ‘‘militarism!’’ ‘‘The workmen and socialists reproach the army with being a tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie; an instrument of repression at home and of adventure abroad. And, in actual fact, it is only an instrument. The army has no force of its own, no will of its own, no policy of its own. It is, at least in France, the servant of the civil authority. Even when it commits odious excesses, even when it violates the Constitution, threatens or crushes liberty, shoots upon the people,—even then, it acts not on the initiative of its own officers, nor for its own direct interest. In Spain or Turkey or Greece, the army makes revolutions of its own accord, for good or for evil. In
France, the army is only a tool in the conflict of social forces. The great French Revolution was a civilian revolution, and it has given its own impress to all succeeding history. The grenadiers who put Napoléon on the throne were not working for the profit of a caste. Bonaparte’s elevation had been rendered possible by a long-drawn faction-fight in which the political parties had exhausted themselves, and in which the army had taken no part whatever. Bonaparte himself affected to stand above and outside the army; and his success was at least as disquieting to his fellow-soldiers as it was to the revolutionaries who remained faithful to the Republic.”

Jaurès proceeds to show in detail that neither the reaction of 1830, nor the coup d’etat by which Napoleon III came to the throne, nor the bloody scenes which accompanied the repression of the Commune in 1871, nor Boulanger’s dangerous attempt to make himself Dictator, were really due to the initiative of the army or worked in the interests of the army. Only the Dreyfus case, he argues was “really a crisis of militarism.” “Here we have really the army working for its own interests, to shield its own culprits and to maintain its own authority; an army striving proudly for domination and attempting to impose its own law on the country. And this phenomenon was all the more startling because, in fact, it was new in France; and because, coming after 30 years of Republicanism, it seemed to belie and to mock the whole educative virtue of republican rule. . . . But the really striking thing is that the republican democracy, taken aback for a moment by this apparently formidable assault, pulled itself together and found immense resources at its disposal. It was the democracy which, to a great extent, bore the responsibility of the peril in which it found itself; for it began by showing signs of weakness. If certain statesmen, who had at least a glimpse of the truth, had been brave enough to tell it while yet
there was time; if the Radical party had not shown at first a lack of general firmness and insight, this militarist crisis would have been a fiasco from the first. Another striking fact, which bears witness to the force of the civil tradition in our Republican democracy, is this: even in the turbid atmosphere, thick with lies and blind fury, which the army and its nationalist champions had then created, this army did not risk a single decisive action or definite enterprise. Its chiefs confined themselves to quibbles, tricks, forgeries and threats. . . . Here again, therefore, truth and justice and Republican liberty won after all."

And the victory would have been even more complete, but for the timidity of middle-class Radicalism. "It was these Republican and Radical middle-classes who sanctioned the abolition of territorial recruiting, for fear of an intermingling of Army and Nation which would force more rapid social changes upon the country."

"At this present moment it is not the actual force of the military machine which is stopping the progress of democracy. It is rather the democracy, (still more than half-paralysed by the selfish influences of a timid middle class), which is stopping or slackening the necessary evolution of military institutions. And all French history—especially since the Revolution—may be summed up, so far as it concerns the relations of army and democracy, in the following two facts: the army in France is a subordinate force; at no moment does it constitute a controlling force. But, in consequence of its actual machinery, the working of which is far too free from the action of popular will, the army is a tool that comes too easily to the hands of the repressing power; and, in the long run, it constitutes a sort of close administration, whose corporate spirit develops in militarism.

"Therefore, military institutions are a tool which a democracy can wield; and if the proletariat, developing its action upon democracy, interferes to transform the
army—if in the army thus transformed it takes an active part,—then it runs no risk of being caught in a machine stronger than itself, which would distort its will. Therefore, let not Labour fear to strive for a really national and popular army, instead of our present army with its half-national and democratic, half-professional and oligarchic character. Let it strive for an army which cannot be turned against the rights of the working-classes and against their wish for peace.

"Let not Labour fear to seek and exercise the greatest possible share of command in the army, in order to ensure its popular working in accordance with the popular spirit which will have created it. Let not the proletariat say that it would thus shoulder the responsibilities of those bloody repressions which wound the working-classes in social conflicts. If this objection were valid, then working-men, socialists, democrats, would refuse to serve, not only as officers, but also as privates, for privates also are exposed to become the tools of capitalist repression against the proletariat on strike or in revolt: or rather, it is as privates that the working-men are most helpless. As lieutenants or sergeants they can soften the rigour of the orders they receive, mitigate the brutal bluntness of commands, and keep order by prudent and conciliatory methods rather than by provocation. Privates, on the contrary, when a clear order casts them into a brutal conflict, are often obliged either to risk flat disobedience, or passively to execute the order of violence or murder. If therefore, for fear of being employed as tools of capitalist policy, the proletariat and the socialists refuse to become officers in this new army, logic would compel them to oppose every form of universal military service, and to leave the formidable monopoly of armed force either to paid troops or to African contingents, or to a middle-class civil guard, with every responsibility for repressive interference in social conflicts. But the whole instinct, the whole thought of the working-classes, in every country,
Democracy and Military Service.

goes in the contrary direction.* Everywhere it is the workmen and socialists who demand military service for all. Just as they cannot admit that the middle-classes should buy themselves off from this burden, so they would not permit the working-classes to be cast forth from the army like the helots in Sparta and the slaves in Rome, leaving the middle-classes, like a fortress bristling with rifles and guns, to look down upon a vast proletariat dispensed from military service and enslaved. Even in the army as it is to-day, where they risk subjection to terrible orders, the working-classes wish to bear their part. They know well that they do not enter the army as a solid class; they know well that they are not yet strong enough, politically or socially, to grasp the enormous military machine; they know that, under uniform, they are exposed to do the work of a privileged State still too much enslaved to middle-class capitalism. But the workmen know also that, if they wish to act upon the army, it must be from within; they know that it is a source of strength to the proletariat to bear arms even under the command of the bourgeois State. They know that the proletarian and socialist spirit, with which the mass of artisans and peasants is inoculating the army, does sometimes act in spite of all. They know that the authorities themselves, in spite of their bullyings and their law-codes, have to reckon with this mass of armed workmen, and that the armed democracy would not be a tool fit for every design. Even if the proletariat, for a long time still, could find no force but its force of inertia, yet this sullen resistance is sometimes almost invincible. And this is not all. In great and tragic upheavals, would not the proletariat thus be better prepared to use every chance, being already lodged in such masses at the very heart of the capitalist citadel? This being so, it would be a madness to neglect

* Jaurès of course recognizes the exception of Great Britain, though he doubts whether we shall long maintain this exceptional position. See Chapter XV below.—Ed.
accepting—nay rather, seeking out—every possible command in the army popularized according to my proposals. Even at the cost of tragic difficulties and terrible responsibilities, organized Labour must furnish as many officers as possible for the new army.

"The capitalist policy of repression and force will be all the more difficult, in proportion as its words of command find it impossible to reach this democratic army otherwise than through a whole series of officers of whom many will sympathize with the workmen. Or rather, this policy of systematic violence on the part of Government will become almost impossible; and workmen-officers, or socialist officers, will have nothing worse to fear than those chance incidents which crop up during strikes and which may suddenly pledge their responsibilities. They may be caught as officers in this dilemma, which in itself is bad enough, either to allow the crowd, over-excited by suffering, to commit acts of violence against property or persons, which the crowd itself would regret to-morrow, or else to forestall such disorderly assaults by an interference which might suddenly produce effects unforeseen and undesired, under the chance working of strife and wrath. This risk is serious, no doubt, but what would even this risk be, (even if it were then as great as it is to-day), compared with the immense interest which the proletariat has in gradually assimilating the army to itself? And, in fact, this risk will decrease from day to day. The chances of brutal and bloody conflict between the army and the workmen must diminish daily and at last disappear. They must disappear, and they will.

"To begin with, it is clear enough that this broadly popular organization of the army will not be an isolated fact in French politics. It will be a necessary part of the great social policy. It will be part of a very vast programme in which every class hangs together. Many measures will be adopted at the same time (or even before), which, by mitigating the sufferings of the people, will
forestall those explosions of despair and instinctive revolt which still mingle sometimes with popular claims for justice. Give the workmen real insurance against the risks of life. Insure them against the consequences of sickness, unemployment, breakdown, and old age. Let them not join the strike with a heart already embittered by excessive suffering, by repeated crises of distress and misery, and by daily insecurity. Give the workman’s child a chance of getting some real schooling. Let him stay at school long enough to carry away a modicum of knowledge which will really stay with him through life, and beyond this, a craving for more knowledge, which would prompt him to more methodical and reflective action. Limit the working-hours by law, and so give the workman enough leisure to get both family life and open-air life, which are two forces of serenity and moral balance. Make an immense effort, by the combined action of the State and the parishes, to give the working multitude (who are too often crowded in hovels or preyed upon by usurious rents), healthy lodgings at possible prices. In all so-called home industries, in which the working-folk cannot defend themselves by organization, and under whose deep shadow undreamt-of miseries are accumulated, with their own heritage of silent despair and im- placable rancour, follow the example of England with her vigorous development, and give a legal minimum of wages.

"Let there not be one existence ignored, lost, left alone with its mortal resignation or furious revolt, and ready at any crisis to pour its overflowing wrath and hatred into street riots. Let there not be, in our complicated society, a single miserable corner unvisited by some ray of social justice, some particle of the great mutual guarantee, and some light of new hope. Be brave enough to forbid the poisonous liquors which madden the people. Control and reduce, by a State monopoly, the consumption of alcohol. Furnish your schools with medical inspection on the watch for the first symptoms of hereditary defects, and ready to
forestall their consequences. Fortify thus the nervous equilibrium of the working-classes. Give them confidence in the force of legal progress; and in attractive combinations by which working-men can gain access as a class, as one collective organism, to the great mass of modern property. Trace broad and clear avenues before the people: no quibbles, no tricks. Do not seize upon the pretext of some single gesture, immediately disavowed by the wiser comrades, or of some coarse and brutal speech, which has even more thoughtless clumsiness in it than hatred, to suppress in time of strike that collective action which is the absolute condition of success for the working-classes.

"And, in return for this effort of justice on the part of the Republic, it must be the duty of the proletariat freely to organize and discipline itself. It will also be its interest. It has nothing really to gain by putting its claims into brutal forms. It is under no figure of savagery that proletarian civilization ought to appear before the world. Acts of destruction do not only deceive humanity, still so mistrustful as to the real sense and value of socialist thought, which is destined to show itself a creation, an organism, a living order. They do more than this. They give the proletariat a momentary illusion of strength, and thus turn it aside from its search after true strength, which consists in vaster and vaster groupings, more and more methodical action. This, without blind optimism, we may assert that the proletariat is understanding better and better. The more widely a Trades Union is recruited, the more easily it can prevent, by the mere effect of its masses, and by the enveloping action of its moral force, those fatal quarrels which damage the only real property which the proletariat has yet been able to gain—the power of common action. This is no vain dream. Already in Germany and England and Belgium the conflicts between people and soldiers have become very rare. For more than fifteen years, I think, England has not had a single bloody collision to deplore. Yet the Labour struggle has never
slackened, and Labour energy has never failed. In France, the institution of a really popular army will be the sign and the consequence of a vast political and social movement, whose effect will be to give the people more guarantees and more self-control. Between the people and these soldiers who have mingled with popular life, between the proletariat and these officers of whom many will be closely bound to the proletariat, every conflict will appear as a scandal. On both sides a loyal effort will be made to prevent them, the officers seeking without provocation to secure respect for property and persons, while the proletariat will not only refrain from those violences which call for the interference of armed force, but will also be dispensed from every brutal action by the vigorous exercise of a very extensive and scrupulously-respected right at law. In these conditions the proletariat will have to ask whether it is willing to secure by its own action, to a great extent, the working of this New Army and the supply of officers for it. The people cannot hesitate to develop its strength in this transformed army, and it will not fear to fall into a trap by securing the independence of the nation, and by giving it the most efficient means of defence that are possible.

"I, for my part, have never taken antipatriotic paradoxes too seriously. The Fatherland is not an outworn idea; it is one which is changing and growing greater. I have always been sure that the proletariat would not, in its heart of hearts, accept any doctrine of national abdication and servitude. To have revolted against despotic kings and against the tyranny of capitalism, and then to suffer quietly the yoke of conquest and the lordship of foreign militarism, would be a contradiction so childish and miserable that, at the first pinch, all instinct and reason would rise up and sweep it away. It would be monstrous if the proletariat consented to become the tributaries of a conqueror who would do nothing to deliver them from the yoke of capitalism. Never would a pro-
letariat which had abandoned the defence of national independence—and therefore, of its own free development—never would such a proletariat find vigour enough to conquer capitalism; having unresistingly suffered the invader's yoke to be added to that of the capitalist, it would never raise its head again. Those Frenchmen (if any still exist) who say they don't care whether they live under the German or the French militarist—under the helmeted soldier or the capitalist President—are guilty of a sophism too absurd for refutation. And when they are answered (as they often are) by an appeal to the special claims of France, to the generosity of her history and the services she has rendered to mankind, then this answer also is a sophism, for it justifies only the patriotism of the French, and implies that other European countries have not just as good a right to the independence and devotion of their citizens.

"The fact is that, wherever there are countries—that is to say, historic groupings conscious of continuity and of unity—every attack upon their liberty and integrity is an attack upon civilization and a relapse into barbarism. To say that workmen, being already mere serfs of capitalism, could suffer no worse servitude through invasion or conquest, is simply childish. The capitalist and middle-class domination which reigns everywhere is a natural and necessary effect of economic development. Capitalism is not immortal; and, by raising up a proletariat which becomes daily vaster and better organized, capitalism is itself fashioning the force which is destined to take its place. . . . The workmen recognize (if not clearly, at least dimly) behind the will and the commands of capitalist chiefs, the existence of vast impersonal laws which dominate a whole period of history, and are often far stronger than the men who direct them. . . . This is proved by the following fact. In democratic countries like the U.S.A., Britain, or France, the mass of wage-earners could, if they would, drive out the capitalist minority from their property.
They would only need to exercise their legal powers; and capital has no guard which could stop them. But they dare not: or, rather, they never dream of making the attempt. Yet, on the other hand, suppose that a country had only to go to the poll and record its votes, in order to get rid of an invading army which weighed upon its territory. In that case, the invaders would vanish as rapidly as darkness vanishes before the searchlight."
CHAPTER XI.

CAPITALISM AND PROLETARIAT.

(p. 397).

This brings us to the second section of Jaurès’s tenth chapter.* In this, he sets himself to do justice to all that is really good in capitalism, and to correct the exaggerations of “those socialists who, inspired by a narrow interpretation of Marx’s writings, have seen nothing but a refined Machiavelism in the whole political and social action of the middle-classes.” He emphasizes the immense extent to which these classes, by their own labour and their more scientific industrial combinations, have stimulated the proletariat and raised it to higher planes of civilization. They and the workers were allied against Feudalism; again, it was the middle classes which, during the Reformation period, did most for popular schools; it was the middle classes, finally, who led that French Revolution which has created modern democracies.

In that Revolution, bourgeoisie and proletariat (to use the more convenient and briefer French terms for what we call middle-classes and working-classes) were both allies and rivals. “The bourgeoisie was at first a great and stern educator for the proletariat. . . . It was the example of the bourgeoisie, its boldness, its habit of taking broad views and decisive actions, which raised the proletariat to the revolutionary level.” Then, however, by

* His chapters here become so long that we have thought it best, for the sake of clearness, to sub-divide them. The page-references will enable the reader easily to compare our text with that of Jaurès.—Ed.
its selfishness and its denial of the suffrage to a large fraction of the poorest classes, the bourgeoisie compelled these latter to fight for universal suffrage, and to treasure it all the more because they had conquered it by their own efforts. Next, the distress of the proletariat compelled the bourgeoisie to face the problem of private property in a democracy. The sufferings of the poor during the long wars, and the frequent bread-riots, led to experiments in state socialism. "The bourgeoisie learned that it could never survive, in this world of new forces which itself had liberated, unless it obtained the social assent of the proletariat." And this mutual education would have been far richer in results, if the Revolution had not sunk into Caesarism and oligarchy.

Just as bourgeoisie and proletariat have advanced in politics both by mutual help and by rivalry, so also has it been in economics. The bourgeoisie, in their haste to get rich, have invented fresh machines and processes, and shifted the centres of industrial activity. Thus, though they have too often exposed the artisans to terrible and useless sufferings, which a better-regulated development might have avoided, yet they have at least freed the proletariat from lingering relics of conservatism and professional timidity. For it must be confessed that even those workmen who are most emancipated in their general ideas are often necessarily conservative in their manual methods; they themselves are perfectly conscious of this natural temptation; and the restlessness of the employer, however little due to benevolent intention, is in the long run an educative force for the workman. On the other hand, the proletariat often teach a similar lesson to the bourgeoisie. "Eighty years ago, the Journal des Débats greeted the advent of machinery with a cry of bourgeois ferocity which scandalized Armand Carrel: 'Here, at last, we have got iron workmen who will not revolt, and who will help us to keep down the workmen of flesh and blood!' But the Journal des Débats here
made the same mistake as the men themselves have often made. The development of machinery has not, on the whole, reduced the part played by the mechanic; moreover, by concentrating the workmen, it has added to their power of protest.” The strike, or the necessity of granting higher wages, has often compelled the sleepy capitalist to improve his machinery and his methods: it is the activity and combativity of the workmen which has often saved the industrial system from a Chinese torpor. Moreover, Socialism itself has contributed something to the development of Capitalism; Fourier and St. Simon, by their speculations in political economy, did much to suggest the vast organizations and banking-combines of to-day.

Nor are bourgeoisie and proletariat, in this necessary struggle, breaking the ground from under their own feet and digging a pit in which both will perish. Both classes, as time goes on, are learning more discipline and self-control, and more mutual respect. Vast organizations of workmen are met by vast capitalist organizations; the one fights by strikes, the other by lock-outs. But it is a mistake to suppose that all this is necessarily tending towards a general war of Labour against Capital, in which class-distinctions alone will count, and national distinctions will be obliterated. “These are very superficial views; in the effort thus to simplify the facts, we arrive at a caricature of the facts. As the struggle grows wider and more systematic, the relations between class and class are not broken off. The exchange of vital activities between class and class still continues, and binds them together in a deep organic unity. It is still possible that great transformations may be effected without any breach of continuity; we may yet have internal revolutions which will crush nothing and dislocate nothing. A new economic balance of power is preparing, through a long series of passionate conflicts, which will get rid of capitalist and bourgeois privileges, but which will not shatter either the living forces of what we now call ‘bourgeoisie,’ or the in-
dependence and individuality of different nations. As a matter of fact, in proportion as the two classes face each other over a wider front and with vaster organization, they begin (in spite of occasional violence and insults) to esteem each other more and more. The most foolish employers can no longer despise the working-classes, who are asserting themselves in economics and in politics as a force which imposes secret respect even on those who most hate the proletariat, and affect most to despise it. Their only refuge is to go on complaining that the workmen allow themselves to be led by a minority. But that in itself (as they well know) is an admirable thing—to have raised from the too often inert and overburdened masses a picked body who are capable, at certain moments, of rallying and leading the rest! A growing proportion of wage-earners are entering these organizations; and we may anticipate the day when the workmen have accomplished their masterpiece—the organic and active union of the working classes. . . .

"On the other hand, it is equally impossible for the organized workmen to overlook what value there is in the middle classes. The labour leaders, amid the hard and complicated struggles of the modern world, realize how difficult is this rôle of leaders of men which the bourgeoisie have played, and are still playing. They cannot help recognizing the energy, the vigour, the bold foresight of these industrial magnates who have renewed their methods of social conflict; who have learned discipline for their own part also; who have tempered, by all sorts of compromises, the effects of competition; who have learned co-operation for conflict as for production; and who, in short, are resolved to take the initiative in attack, instead of relying on the sheer force of capital alone."

Moreover, between these two extremes of the Capitalist employer and the Proletariat, there are all kinds of intermediate degrees—small shopkeepers, better-class artisans, peasant proprietors, village carpenters or masons whose
lives and ideas differ widely from those of the town workman. Thus the displacement of forces is necessarily slow. The bourgeoisie will disappear sooner or later; but meanwhile its members will have time enough, and adaptability enough, to accustom themselves to the gradual change in their condition. The final victory of socialism will not be sudden and catastrophic.

"This class-conflict, then, in spite of its enormous extent, is not working for social dislocation; democratic evolution is assured, but so also is national unity. This is proved by the fact that all the compromises, combinations, or reforms to which the conflict gives birth, are on a scale proportionate to that of the general struggle, and offer solutions proportionate to the extent of the problem. . . . Strikes are on a greater scale; but this in itself warns both classes to limit the damage done, to minimise their occurrence and to arrange periods of truce. . . . And, the more vast become these collective bargains by which strikes are settled, the more surely they forebode combinations on a great scale between the two conflicting classes, which will bring about a transition to a new system."

"How, then, can it be said—in these democracies in which social revolution necessarily takes the form of evolution, and in which all evolution has necessarily a revolutionary tinge—that all intercourse is suspended between the conflicting classes? How, especially, can it be said that the modern proletariat is a stranger within the nation? It is the proletariat which daily fashions the nation, and which is appointed to shape its future destiny. When socialists, either in controversy or in official language at their congresses, speak of 'the Capitalist State' as if the working classes had no part in this State, they are employing a too concise formula which is partly true, but which does not cover the whole truth. There never has been a purely class-State, the complete tool of any one class whose whims it completely serves. . . . The State
does not in fact express a single class, it expresses the correlation of its different classes, the correlation of different class-forces. As Lassalle said, the true constitution of a nation is determined, not by formulas on paper, but by the actual correlation of the forces which determine the real nature of that State. It is therefore the State's function to maintain such guarantees of existence, order, and civilization as are common to both classes; both to give effect to the primacy of the class which sways by means of property, enlightenment, and organization; and also to help the rising class by clearing a way proportionate to its real power, to the force and extent of its upward movement. It is true that the form of property is now a primary value in social relations. Therefore, in a society founded on capitalist property, and so deeply influenced by capitalist property, we may speak of 'the Capitalist State' for brevity's sake, by way of summing up its chief characteristic in a single word. But it would be an intellectual disaster if this misleading abbreviation were taken strictly and literally."
CHAPTER XII.

INTERNATIONALISM AND PATRIOTISM.

(p. 435).

"If we try to characterize the State of to-day, we can only do so by introducing the idea of movement; we might define the State as 'a middle-class democracy in which the power of the proletariat is growing.' It is incorrect to deny all share in the State to a class which has won universal suffrage and driven the bourgeoisie out of its political monopoly; to a class which has secured for all its children a minimum of instruction in those schools whose progress all civilized nations tend with honourable care; to a class which has succeeded in freeing public teaching from the dogmatic constraints which once taught resignation to the poor; to a class which is now free to organize itself, not entirely without risk, but under a risk which decreases in proportion as the workers use this right more and more freely. The proletariat can now organize strikes on a scale of ever-increasing magnitude—strikes in which they do suffer, but not alone, and which have certainly tended, on the whole, to better their lot and to increase their authority. Even now, in drawing up a programme of claims which will be forced successively upon the democracy, they are spreading far and wide the idea of a revolutionary change in society. Moreover, by the very constitution of modern armies, and by their inevitable evolution in the direction of popular militias,*

* Jaurès, as an historian of the Revolution, knew very well that, since conscription was first introduced in 1793, the general tendency in all countries has been to shorten the time of service; and that even the German Army of to-day bears far more resemblance to a citizen-militia than the armies of 120 years ago did.—Ed.
the proletariat is, so to speak, at the very centre of social force and entrenched in the very citadel of the State. To say, then, that the proletariat counts for nothing in the balance of social forces—that it is no part of the State and does not even come within the definition of the State—that it is condemned to be nothing, until the moment when it will become everything—to talk like this is to contradict the evidence of facts, to repudiate the vast march of events and to ignore the real conquests of the proletariat. . . . To talk thus, is to discourage that daily struggle which is the only condition of our final liberation."

"The proletariat, therefore, is not outside the Fatherland. In 1847, the Communist Manifesto of Marx and Engels pronounced the famous sentence which has so often been repeated and exploited by all parties, 'the workmen have no country?' But this was only a passionate explosion of feeling, a paradoxical and not very well-considered reply to the attacks of middle-class patriots, who denounced communism as the destroyer of the Fatherland. Moreover, Marx himself hastened to correct and to limit the sense of his own formula."

"In order that the peoples should be able to govern themselves democratically, they must be organized; they must not be either dispersed and enslaved by remnants of feudal conditions, or crushed by the brutal domination of a foreigner. What avails it to drive out tyrants, nobles, and priests, if the despots from outside can bring these oppressors back, and stifle all free breath again? On the other hand, what avails it to drive the foreigner out, if it is only to submit, at home, to the masters whom these foreigners would have imposed on us? Thus, ever since the Revolution, democracy and nationality have made common cause in France and Spain and Italy. It is this fact alone which gives any sense to their history during the last century. Nationality and democracy, though focussed together, are not always equally developed; but they have always been inseparably bound together.
There has never existed any democracy, however pacific it might be, which could take root and endure without guaranteeing its national independence. On the other hand, no nation, however militarist it might be, has ever been able to organize or save itself but by appealing in some degree to the revolutionary forces of liberty. True, the peoples have sometimes been duped, and have been baulked of the democratic reward which by their national effort they had earned. This was the case in Germany after 1815, and even after 1866 and 1870. But here, even they have not been altogether baulked. The national victory has always brought with it some share of democratic victory. There is a great gulf between what Bismarck proposed at the beginning of his career in the Prussian Landtag, and the system of universal suffrage which he had to grant to Germany in order to concentrate all its forces. That universal suffrage, it is true, was neither so dominant nor so free as it should have been; yet, even thus, it is essentially a democratic and revolutionary force whose effects are slowly but invincibly developing."* Therefore, in

* The fact to which Jaurès here alludes is too little known in England. When the North German Confederation was reconstituted after the victories of 1866, and the German Empire after those of 1870, universal suffrage was granted to the people. The Conservatives, of course, opposed this; but the existing facts of universal education and universal military liability rendered their opposition fruitless, as Bismarck frankly confessed. "In a modern European state where all men can read and write, and all men must serve in the army, there is no means of limiting the franchise in a way which will command universal assent" (J. W. Headlam, Bismarck, p. 298). This universal suffrage has been too little used as yet, because Germany has been the spell of a soldier-class which had guided it through two brief and startlingly successful wars. The nation, in Bebel's well-known words, has been "drunk with victory." After this present war, universal suffrage is likely to prove a very different tool in the hands of the German democracy. It is an extremely superficial view of history which attributes German militarism and despotism to universal military service. Voltaire's Mémoires (to quote only an easily-accessible book) show how far worse was the state of things before Prussia instituted universal service. Some very illuminating remarks of Jaurès on German suffrage may be found in Appendix III.—Ed.
Marx's day, "if the proletariat had taken the sarcasms of the Manifesto seriously, and had behaved as strangers within their own countries, Socialism would have become a mere sect of impotent and mischievous visionaries." Indeed, Marx himself, in practice, appealed more than once to the spirit of Nationality.

"The world presents new problems from day to day. We must complete the political democracy by developing a social democracy. We must penetrate independent nations with the international spirit, and secure the evolution of social justice in universal peace, by the concerted effort of workmen in every country. But Democracy and Nation are, after all, the essential and fundamental conditions of any further and higher creation we may aim at. The word Fatherland, already so mighty and so pregnant with meaning, is gaining fresh significance, loftier still and vaster than the old. The present apparent crisis in this idea of Fatherland is simply a growing-pain. Anatole France is mistaken when, in the introduction to his Joan of Arc, he builds the Fatherland on landed property, and holds that the word has no sense or value but for those who possesses the soil. The history of other nations shows how far short this narrow definition comes of the real facts. The splendid patriotism of the Athenian democracy in the time of Pericles did not rest upon landed property, the importance of which had been broken down by the new trading classes. . . . Rome perished because she was able to found her dominion only upon the soil. . . . So far from its being true that landed property is the only foundation of a country, we may almost say the exact contrary. Wherever landed property is the dominant and almost exclusive force, in that country the idea of Fatherland is at its lowest. . . . The great landowners have far less need of the Fatherland, in the wide and full sense of the word, than industrial producers and traders have." Jaurès traces this idea through French history, down to the great Revolution. That Revolution, he
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shows, was due in its beginnings to the bourgeoisie; and, among the working men who fought for it, the possession of the soil was not an essential idea. "It would be childish to imagine that the proletariat—those workmen of the suburbs or the dark streets of Paris—when they fell in love with the Revolution and shed their blood for her, were led by the bait of a few yards of land which perchance, some day, would be distributed to the veterans; or, again, by the definite expectation of a precise share in any form of property. They marched towards the Future without requiring of it (if I may so say) any formal promises. They well knew that their action would one day have social effects; and for the moment they found a noble joy in this action itself. The Revolution gave them, straight off, something better than title-deeds or promissory notes. It gave them the consciousness of their dignity and strength, and of the vast possibilities which sturdy and self-respecting work would inherit under a full democracy. . . . Thus, separate countries and organizations have been the condition of those wider organizations which evolution has still in store for us. And in each of these organizations a common life has developed, which has guarded and widened the life of each and all; a collective conscience has formed, in which the individual consciences were united and exalted. Even for those who were being exploited and enslaved, this was to some extent true. The human organization in which they had at least some definite place, and a few hours of quiet sleep on the steps of a palace, was better, after all, than the world outside, full of absolute hostility and insecurity."

The State is a necessary apprenticeship to the higher internationalism. This is none the less true, because the idea of patriotism has so often been abused. A monarchy, an oligarchy, will often imagine that the well-being of the country is bound up with its own interests; all sorts of political and social monopolies try to maintain themselves under this plea of patriotism. Even when the
king and the nobles appealed to the foreign invader to crush the Revolution, they did this under the plea of serving the true interests of the country. Again, the patriot of one country is often merciless to the patriot of another; barbarities which have disappeared from ordinary life are still permitted between nation and nation. Too often the individual egoisms of the million collect into one huge complex egoism under the excuse of Fatherland, and we find even thinking men accepting the detestable maxim "My country, right or wrong!" The necessity of outgrowing these narrow conceptions becomes more and more evident: "but this national and international transformation of parties is possible only under one condition; each man who has grasped this new idea must act in his own country and through his own country. All the proletariats, all adherents of social justice and international peace belong already to the same higher Fatherland. Their hopes, their efforts concentrated on a common purpose, make them citizens of that universal Fatherland which is founded upon freedom of work and upon national reconciliation. But this lofty ideal cannot be built upon air. It can be realized only in a nation whose national independence is secured. It can be realized only in accordance with those methods and those tactics which the history of each particular country dictates to its citizens; only, again, with the materials furnished by the nation itself. . . . The day of Utopias is past. Henceforth, Socialism will never cut itself off from real life; therefore, it will never cut itself off from the Nation. It does not desert the Fatherland; it utilizes the Fatherland itself in order to change it into something greater. Mere abstract internationalism, leaning towards anarchism, has had its day. Any internationalism which takes no account of the actual conditions under which the various States of to-day are acting, struggling, and evolving, is simply a Utopia, more unreal and more superannuated than those of the past."
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It is no argument to the contrary, to say that States have been created by brute force. Even if this were a whole truth, (instead of a misleading half-truth,) our real duty would be not to repudiate the past, but to accept it and make it a stepping-stone to higher things. Man himself is the product of a simple natural evolution; he inherits many brute forces and animal instincts; yet even the religious ascetic cannot consistently live up to his ideal of treating the body as non-existent. [The real victory is not to turn our backs on nature, but to raise nature to the level of our ideas.] Similarly, nations will rise to a higher humanity without ceasing to be separate nations. "And the proletariat is more truly in the Fatherland than any other class; for it is in the true upward movement of the country. When the working-classes curse (or think they curse,) the nation, they are cursing only the miseries which dishonour it, the injustices which divide it, the hatreds which madden it, and the lies which make their profit from it; this apparent curse is, in reality, an appeal to the new Fatherland, which can develop only through independence of the nations, through the exal- tation of the democracies, and through full application of different national characters to new problems—in other words, by extending the idea of Fatherland to all Humanity. That is why, at every Congress, the Internationale follows the same line. This organ of the workmen and the socialists reminds the proletariat in every country of two duties which cannot be separated; (1) to keep peace by every available means, and (2) to safeguard the independence of all nations. Yes, to maintain peace by every means open to the workman—even by a general international strike or by revolution. How many misunderstandings wilful or unintentional, have our adversaries brought in here! How many mistakes and calumnies! They forget (or profess to forget) that war may be declared, even in democratic countries, without the people's consent, un- known to the people, or against its will. They forget
that, in the mystery in which diplomacies are still wrapt, foreign politics escape too often from national control; that a single imprudence or act of folly or silly provocation, or the rascally greed of a few financial groups, may cause sudden conflicts; that it is still possible for a minority, a tiny clique, or a single pertinacious and infatuated statesman, to pledge the whole nation, and to cause irreparable ruin. War and peace still move outside the law of Democracy."

"The people knows well that war must only be the last resource. It well knows that it will have no right to adopt these terrible methods of force, and will have no chance of succeeding with them, unless it has first exhausted all those means of preventing war which democracy puts into its hands—even the too incomplete democracy of to-day. Let the people be ever on the watch to stamp out the first sparks of war. Let them send representatives to every political assembly, who will denounce intrigues and remove misunderstandings. Such a minority will grow steadily in numbers; it will steadily discourage greedy or adventurous diplomacy, and recall us to the spirit of equity, moderation, and peace. Let the people, through its delegates and lawyers, prepare a code of international law against the fatal competitions and violent enterprises of capitalist imperialism; let it protect all races against those who wish to carve out privileges, monopolies, or exclusive concessions for themselves. Let it widen every attempt at arbitration. Let it not yield to the poor and vulgar temptation of laughing at the Hague Tribunal, but rather strive to strengthen it, claiming for it more and more activity, and a control over every quarrel. . . . When, in my turn, I repeated these things in the course of my comments at the International Socialist Congress of Stuttgart, I was insulted and denounced at home as a traitor to my country. I scarcely think that anyone will dare, nowadays, to repeat these silly calumnies against the Socialist party or the Inter-
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nationale. The Copenhagen Congress, though it marked a new step forward in the international and revolutionary struggle against war—though it made it part of the programme of every country to study the precise means of preventing war by the concerted action of the whole proletariat—did not call forth the same insults as the Stuttgart Congress. The European democracy is gradually accustoming itself to the grandeur of international thought. Men no longer dare to say to us French socialists (or at most they only whisper it now) that we want to disorganize the defence of our own country."

"One thing is certain. The Internationale is inflexibly resolved that the independence of no country should suffer. In tearing the different countries from the grasp of the patriotism-mongers, or the military caste, or the financier-hordes, in leaving all nations free to develop democracy and peace without limits, we are not only serving the Internationale and that universal proletariat through which the world will realize its still incomplete ideal of humanity. We are doing more than this; we are serving the Fatherland itself. Henceforth, Internationale and Fatherland are bound together. In the Internationale the independence of nations finds its highest guarantee; on the other hand, it is among independent nations that the Internationale has its strongest and noblest organs. It may almost be said that, while a little dose of internationalism separates a man from his country, a large dose brings him back. A little patriotism separates us from the Internationale; the higher patriotism brings us back to it. Therefore, there is no inconsistency in the fact that the different proletariats, socialist and international though they be, should take an active part in the popular organization of National Defence. On the contrary, the harder and more complicated is the problem (of Peace and War) which they have to solve, the more important it is for them to increase their authority and influence by exerting every force at their disposal. The
more important, again, that they should have real power over the army, in order that, when the crisis comes, it may better serve the lofty aims of the proletariat; viz. the protection of international peace and national independence. It is, therefore, a law of working-class progress and of socialist action that the proletariat should take an active part in the working of the reformed army. Moreover, it is impossible for socialists to avoid recognizing this law. We sometimes see the working-classes so disgusted by the acts of the bourgeois Republic as to seem detached from this Republic. Yet, when the Republic is really threatened, they rise in their wrath; and similarly they are transported with joy when a new Republic, even a bourgeois one, is set up in Europe. So also, in spite of paradoxical formulas, the working-classes do not seriously curse the Fatherland itself when they protest against the bourgeois and capitalist forms of country; on the contrary, they would rise up like one man on that day on which national independence might be really imperilled. Moreover, they would free the country from corrupt and gambling governments, for the better preservation of world-peace and national independence. The vain exaggerations of these anarchical paradoxes would be swept away in a moment, at such a crisis, by the force of Labour-thought in its completest form, which takes account of Internationale and Nation alike. It is to this full Labour-thought that our Republic should appeal without further delay, if she wishes to organize a really popular, defensive, and efficient army."
CHAPTER XIII.

JAURES'S BILL.*

(p. 549).

1. All able bodied citizens from 20 to 45 are bound to help in national defence. From 20 to 34 they are in the first line, thence until 40, in the reserve; thence until 45, in the Territorial Army.

2. The citizens of the active army will be organized in divisions corresponding to the regions of recruitment. Each division will include infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers.

3. The recruiting is done by districts; the citizens are drafted into units corresponding with their district of domicile: these limits may only be slightly extended for cavalry, artillery, and engineers.

4. The education of the army will be in three steps: (a) preparatory (boys and youths); (b) recruit school, and (c) periodical after-trainings.

5. Preparatory, for boys from 10 to 20. This education will be more than a mere anticipation of military drill and manoeuvres. It will be, above all, an education in health and activity, by gymnastics, marchings, rhythmical drill, games of skill and swiftness, and musketry-drill.

* This Army Reorganization Bill, brought into the French Parliament by Jaurès on November 14th, 1910, is printed in his book as an Appendix. We have thought it best to give it here, almost in full, since it seems necessary for the full comprehension of his arguments in his Chapter XI (i.e. in Chapter XIV of this translation).—Ed.
This physical education will be directed and controlled (1) by the officers (commissioned and non-commissioned) of the units to which the boys will be drafted, (2) by masters of public and private schools, (3) by local doctors, and (4) by a Council of Promotion. This Council, of 30 members, shall be elected in the regimental district by universal suffrage, and shall comprise representatives of all four arms.

Horses shall be supplied by the Remount Department for the use of pupils chosen by these instructors.

The instructors themselves shall have gone through a course of training for their work, in some normal school.

The families of the boys and youths under exercises shall be warned that notes will be taken of the pupils' punctuality and zeal. Habitual negligence will be punished by different penalties on a cumulative scale; notably, by being debarred (at least for a time) from all public functions, and by being kept longer than the rest in the Recruit School. Prizes, on the other hand, will be offered for the best pupils.

6. Recruit School. Youths of 20 will be called for six months to the nearest garrison-town, to learn company, squadron, or battery manœuvres. This work may be done in two instalments, but always within the limits of one year. The times shall be so chosen as to permit open-air drill and manœuvres on all sorts of ground.

7. After-training. In the 13 years of active service which they have yet to render, these soldiers shall be called out eight times for exercises and manœuvres. These will be alternately (a) minor manœuvres, lasting 10 days and covering a fairly narrow radius; (b) grand manœuvres, lasting 21 days, covering a wider radius and including instruction-camps.

Besides these compulsory manœuvres, the Officers and Councils will try to arrange as much voluntary marching and rifle-practice as possible.
Each soldier keeps his uniform and kit at home, and is personally responsible for them. Armouries will be kept up, under guard of the civil and military authorities, in the towns or chief villages of the district.

In the Departments near the Eastern frontier, every soldier shall have his arms at home. Depots of artillery and cavalry shall be distributed about these districts, and a close network of communications of every kind—railways, steam-trams, motor-cars—shall be instituted, in order that all the citizens of that region, by an immediate mobilization, may serve as a covering force for the general concentration. Aviation centres will also be created; and recruits from the whole of France, after a preliminary instruction of three months, may be called to do their remaining three months in the instruction-camps of these Eastern districts.

8. Promotion. The officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, will be divided into two classes—professional and civil. There will be no professional non-commissioned officers, except the recruit-school instructors.

After three months of recruit-school, the smartest and best-educated recruits will be prepared to become non-coms. This choice will be made by the instructors, assisted by delegates of a Regimental Council. This Council will be composed of (a) the corps-commander, (b) representative officers of different ranks, and (c) members of the Council of Promotion (which is elected by universal suffrage). These candidates if they are still approved after the first three months' preparation at the recruit-school, will be sent for another three months to a non-commissioned officers' school, and employed as corporals or sergeants either in their own or in a neighbouring unit.

No recruit may decline such an appointment; if there are not enough voluntary candidates, the authorities may select recruits to fill the gaps.

Those who are in training at this non-com. school will receive daily pay equivalent to their loss of time.
promoted to non-com. rank, they shall be sufficiently indemnified for the time that they spend at their duties. In every public employment their rank shall give them a certain seniority. Private employers (who will be formed into Divisionary Associations) will be bound to give them employment suitable to their aptitudes. At the age of fifty, they will be entitled to a pension. Moreover, promotion will be so arranged that non-coms. may obtain seniority, and that a considerable proportion may rise to sub-lieutenant or lieutenant.

9. One-third of the commissioned officers shall be professional soldiers.

Labour organizations of all kinds—trades unions, benefit and co-operative societies—are authorized to contribute towards the expenses of such sons of their own members as have passed the necessary examinations and can study for promotion to the rank of officer.

Students who have passed the Bachelor examination* shall be admitted by competition to sections of military studies created in the six most important universities, so that each main region of France shall have a section of its own. Such candidates must first have gone through their six months' recruit-school.

These studies shall last four years, and shall be specialized for different branches of the army. These military students shall be taught as far as possible in conjunction with the other university students, in history, philosophy, political economy and science. They will use the neighbouring recruit-schools to learn the habit of command. They shall receive a daily allowance from the State, until the end of their course.

If their families are poor, these also shall receive an allowance. After these four years, they shall be gazetted sub-lieutenants. Their university years shall be counted

* Roughly equivalent to the London University Matriculation Examination.—Ed.
for seniority, in order to hasten their promotion to captain. Before each fresh promotion, they must again follow a special preparatory course, of at least twenty days, at the university, which shall prescribe the subjects of study.

The duty of these professional officers shall be to assist the teachers and the delegates of the Council of Promotion in the aforesaid preparatory training of boys and youths; also, to help in the training of civilian officers.

The officers shall be admitted by competition to a higher military school in which they will secure advantages for further promotion, and which will prepare them for the General Staff. This higher military school, one of whose duties will be to co-ordinate the teaching in the universities, will give successive courses of instruction in each of the universities which has a military department.

10. Two-thirds of the officers will be civilians, chosen from among the civilian sergeants and attached to their Territorial unit, or to a neighbouring unit.

A certificate of military studies, securing seniority for promotion to higher rank, will be given to any citizen who has followed special courses of study either at the university or at the capital of his department. No man may receive a diploma as doctor, lawyer, engineer or teacher, if he has not obtained this certificate of military study.

The civilian officers will receive pay. They will also enjoy a right of seniority in the different public departments in which they work. At fifty they may claim a pension. No non-commissioned officer may refuse a commission. If the number or the quality of voluntary candidates is insufficient, the authorities will have power to fill the vacancies.

11. Promotion will be partly by seniority, partly by choice. Half the commissions given to civilian officers must go to those who have earned their certificate of military study. The other half of the sub-lieutenancies and lieutenancies shall be left open for promotion of
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sergeants by merit alone. The higher ranks also shall be accessible to such sergeants, but in a diminishing proportion.

12. Commissions shall be given in accordance with lists drawn up by regimental committees and divisional committees, composed, as already described, of colonels, of representatives for the regimental officers, and of delegates from the Council of Promotion, chosen by universal suffrage. If it is necessary to proceed to voting, each of these three elements shall have a single voice.

13. Officers beyond the age of 34 may be kept at their own request in the active army. Nevertheless, they may, if necessary, be assigned by the authorities to command Reserve or Territorial units.

14. The Reserve units will be formed by men from 34 to 40, who have served in the neighbouring Active units. The Territorial units will be similarly formed. These Reserve and Territorial units will be officered partly by retired officers from the Active army, partly by sergeants from the Active army, promoted to higher rank in the Reserves and Territorials.

15. The Minister of War will aim at utilizing the whole Active army as a first-line army, and will keep this object in view in all arrangements for districts of mobilization, for means of transport, and for commissariat.

16. The Army thus constituted, has one single object,—to protect the independence and the soil of France against all aggression. All war is criminal if it is not manifestly defensive; and it can be manifestly and certainly defensive only if our Government proposes to the foreign Government with which we are in dispute to settle that dispute by arbitration.

17. Any Government which plunges into war without having publicly and loyally proposed arrangement by arbitration, shall be held to have committed treason against France and humanity, and to be a public enemy of our country and of the human race. Any Parliament which
has consented to this act shall be guilty of felony, and legally dissolved. The constitutional and national duty of all citizens will then be to overthrow this Government and replace it by a Government acting in good faith, which, while perfectly safeguarding national independence, shall offer the foreign power either to forestall or to stop hostilities by a sentence of arbitration.

18. The French Government is herewith invited to complete treaties of arbitration with all countries represented at the Court of the Hague, and to regulate procedure for arbitration in agreement with those countries.
CHAPTER XIV.

OFFICERS AND THEIR PROMOTION.

(p. 465).

The Council of Promotion mentioned in the Bill will be thus composed. "In each regimental district, thirty citizens shall be chosen by universal suffrage. Half of this body shall be re-elected every four years; each member will therefore sit for eight years and will be re-eligible. To guard against party spirit as much as possible, the elections will go by proportional representation. . . . Each of these Regimental Councils will send three representatives to the greater Divisional Council, in which each branch of the army will be represented by a similar choice of representatives."

This Regimental Council of Promotion will supervise the training of the youth in its district, and will choose the candidates for promotion to the rank of non-commissioned officers. When these have done their three months of special training as candidates (i.e. their last three months of training as recruits,) then "a jury will decide whether each has earned his certificate. This jury will be composed, in equal proportions, of (a) instructors, (b) representatives of the Council of Promotion, and (c) representatives of the regimental officers. The certificate does not, in itself, confer promotion; it only confers the right of attending for three months the Non-Com. School." This school presents four advantages:

(1). The candidate will not lose his civil employment; and he will receive pay which, in most cases, will more than compensate his loss of time.
(2). Many public employments will be reserved for those who have thus served their country: and the three months thus spent will be counted as two years' seniority for promotion in government offices.

(3). It will be so arranged that a considerable proportion may receive higher commissions in the army.

(4). All will receive a small pension at the age of 50, or even at 45.

Those who have done their three months in the Non-Com. School and gained their certificate, will be allotted to their local regiments as fast as vacancies occur. Every three years they will return to this school for a course of 21 days, to keep them up to their work. Their promotion to sergeant-major will depend upon the votes of (1) the Colonel of the regiment, (2) representatives of the officers of the regiment, and (3) representatives of the Council of Promotion. "Promotion will thus depend upon the consent of all, (or the majority of), these three different elements—the Colonel, the regimental officers, and a Council of citizens who are not only inhabitants of the district but naturally ex-soldiers also.* Under these circumstances, the public interest must prevail. Purely selfish interests would so cancel each other that the simplest course for each voter would be to emphasize the consideration underlying all selfish interests—the real worth of the different candidates."

In this way, then, almost all the non-coms. will be chosen. The only exceptions will be the few who choose the army as a profession, and wish to earn their living as sergeant-instructors. These latter will have to do a year of special training, and will be chosen by a purely military council.

We thus ensure for our lower officers the maximum of physical fitness from an early age, and the maximum of

* Jaurès evidently assumes that, as the majority of French citizens serve in the army, the men elected to this Council by their fellow-citizens would seldom be men who had themselves been unable to serve.—Ed.
military efficiency; they will be chosen from among the most self-respecting citizens, and their very work will increase their self-respect. It will command a certain degree of consideration from their neighbours; and this, of itself, will stimulate the officer to maintain and increase his personal consideration by the conscientious fulfilment of his duties.

The Commissioned Officers will be recruited from three sources. One-third or a quarter will be professionals, trained at the University, as already described. The rest will be civilians, earning their livelihood outside the army, and commanding only at the periodical manoeuvres. These, again, will be divided into two classes, certificated and non-certificated. The certificated will follow officer-schools in connexion with the Universities, in which they will not only share to some extent the studies of the professional officers, but also mix with them socially. These courses of study shall last from six months to a year, and the students shall receive pay. Having thus obtained their certificate, they shall pass at least two years as non-coms., and shall then be eligible for promotion by the same method of choice as we have prescribed for professional officers. "We may take it for granted that many young men will follow these officer-schools. Those who can afford to attend them, and yet neglect them, will lose moral and social caste to a certain extent. Moreover, the nation will grant none of the diplomas which permit the middle classes to exercise their different professions, except on condition that these future engineers, teachers, doctors, or lawyers, undertake that share in national defence which their culture permits them to take. Those great employers of industry who are never tired of extolling the virtues of patriotism, will find themselves disqualified if they do not devote to their country's service those qualities of decision and organization which their social functions have developed in them. Moreover, all
employers who have sufficient education would commit a serious error if they did not turn some of their activities in this direction. Therefore this second source of recruitment for officers will be abundant.”

Uncertificated. Quite a large proportion of these civilian officers, in the lower grades at least, should be chosen from among the sergeants whose long service and proved capacity entitles them to promotion. On their promotion to sub-lieutenant, they must follow a three months' course in an officer-school.

But promotions often concern more than a regiment; they concern a whole division. There will therefore be a Divisional Council of Promotion on a great scale, answering to the Regimental Council of Promotion on the smaller scale. It will consist, like the smaller council, of three elements, each of which has a single vote—the elective citizen-element, the officer-element of the division concerned, and the War-Office element. This will arrange transfers from regiment to regiment, and all the wider problems of promotion. In proportion as officers advance in rank, their promotion may safely be left more to the judgment of the War-Office element.

The civilian-officers will, of course, be attached to the units nearest to their place of residence. There will be the closest territorial union between officers and men. Many will be known to each other from boyhood; all will have done their recruit school and their periodic trainings in the same unit; the men will be led to war by the same officers who have commanded them in time of peace. This fusion of army and nation will not weaken, but strengthen, the powers of national defence. It fosters the right spirit—the spirit of collective action on an enormous scale for the sake of a country in which all have a stake; and discipline will be aided by the hearty interest which men take in questions of local defence. Professional officers, as well as privates, will have strong local bonds, they will have to train the youth of the district, to colla-
borate with the district Council in the allotment of commissions, and to encourage volunteer drill-clubs or shooting-clubs. They will naturally talk over military questions with their civilian brother-officers; their periodical examinations for fresh promotion will take them back for a few weeks to University life; everything will thus be done to break down the merely negative caste-spirit.

This proposition is not the idea of a demagogue; it opens no door to ignorance, laziness or mediocrity. From the very schooldays, promotion will depend upon smartness, strength and intelligence; and for the higher ranks an adequate system of study and examination is secured.

"Some may argue that to introduce universal suffrage, even to a small extent, is to give up army and officers to the caprice of the multitude. But how can an army be really strong if there is no harmony between its root-principle and the root-principle of the nation? And how can the people take the necessary interest in the army, if they take no direct and important part in the choice of officers? There is no menace to discipline here. The officer will not fear to be punished by a bad mark for his zeal, his punctuality and his firmness. His future depends in no way on the immediate vote of his own soldiers, but on the judgment of a vaster multitude which acts only through an elective Council of Promotion. It is inconceivable that this Council should not take its task seriously. The real guarantee for the officers will be this; they will have to interest the people in the army, to show them how much physical and moral strength they may draw from the army, and how much they may learn from it in power of collective action. The officer's task will be to make his men enter as much as possible into the real sense of the manoeuvres. The more the officers, by their friendly help given and asked for, succeed in developing the military education of the men whom the people elects to this Council, the more certain it is that the Council will repudiate base
and selfish motives, and will give its votes for promotion with an eye to the true interests of Army and Nation.

"It will be an open, public, and straightforward system, which will give the officers far better guarantees than they get from present rules or present practice. They are now at the mercy of a commander's caprice, and of the often irresponsible notes made by inspectors passing at rare intervals, and judging from afar. At present, rival cliques dominate the army in turn, or even simultaneously; the Jesuit clique or the Freemason clique.* We shall get rid of this state of things for ever." So far as we have succeeded in purging the army of Jesuit influence during these last years, it has only been by methods as secret, and therefore almost as dangerous, as those of our enemies. Where, then, is the real remedy? "There is but one way of salvation; that is, to create a really popular army of the kind that I have tried to sketch."

In certain purely military directions the gain will be almost equally great. "At present, the grand manœuvres lose half their real value. This is because the military education of the people is incomplete, superficial, and lifeless; because the citizens, first shut up in barracks and then called out for infrequent manœuvres as for a sort of pompous fatigue-duty, have never formed the habit of asking themselves what it all means. They ought to have learned all this gradually; first in connexion with their own village, then as a matter for the whole district, and finally on the great scale of divisional manœuvres. As it is, the grand manœuvres are a sort of parade in which the commanders compete less in serious study and energetic preparations, than in favour with the daily papers or political cliques. The great success is not to combine all means of action in view of some clear military object, but

* In France, as in Italy and Spain, Freemasonry is a political sect based upon definite anti-clericalism. Foreign freemasons find it difficult to understand the different conditions which obtain in Britain.—Ed.
to get hold of the most influential newspaper-manager in one's own automobile. . . . Meanwhile battalions, regiments and brigades are wandering aimlessly without leadership; and the endurance of the men contrasts with the incapacity and vanity of the commanders. . . . It is this whole system which needs remodelling."

We must aim at a real and intelligent military education, from boyhood upwards. The citizen must think of defence—problems first in terms of his own parish, then in wider terms; finally, on a vast national scale. The commanders, having to lead men who possess an intelligent sense of combination, will be thus both helped and compelled to think out wider combinations on an ever-increasing scale. "Thus, little by little, the real spirit of military education grows: the spirit of vigorous and co-ordinated action.* It too often happens that the artificial barrack-maneuvres of to-day, by isolating cavalry from infantry and both from artillery, turn the art of war into an abstraction which has no touch with reality, and seems good only for closet-tacticians. Living, real manoeuvres will awaken a sense of reality among the masses themselves, among the Nation in Arms. Operations will be explained and commented to the soldiers on the ground itself, the familiar ground of their parish. This will open their eyes, and a real public-spirit will be formed in military matters, a real habit of intelligent judgment upon the manoeuvres.

* Compare the words of another pacifist of European reputation, Prof. Jacques Novikow, who writes: "The organization of intellectual propaganda is almost always closely copied from the organization of our standing armies, because these latter have the most perfect organization which men have yet invented on this earth." (Les Luttes entre les Sociétés Humaines, 1893, p. 440.) No less emphatic is John Stuart Mill, whom nobody ever accused of militarism. "'Until labourers and employers perform the work of industry in the spirit in which soldiers perform that of an army, industry will never be moralized; and military life will remain what, in spite of the anti-social nature of its direct object, it has hitherto been, the chief school of moral co-operation" (Essay on Comte, 1865, p. 149).—Ed.
Then, any commander who shows clear conceptions and rapid decision will be able to compete in public opinion with the intriguers who now throng government ante-chambers, or aristocratic drawing-rooms, or political clubs, or the offices of the men who manage our noisy press. High officers themselves will see that promotion will best be sought—even to the most important commands—by leaning on the nation, on the testimonials of their most competent fellow-officers and of the popular representatives—representatives of a people whose sure instinct of action will have been educated by manoeuvres which have always been real, living, interesting and instructive. We shall thus get one single spirit all through the army; the sap of a generous and noble soil will run through all its branches. We shall thus get real harmony between the mass of citizens and their officers: here indeed is a Nation in Arms which will guarantee its own independence, and its own freedom of political and social advance, by means of a homogeneous and indivisible force."
CHAPTER XV.

THE TREND OF FACTS AND IDEAS.

(p. 491).

This chapter is of such special interest for British readers, that we give it almost in full. Jaurès begins by sketching the military systems of different European countries. He points out that the tendency on the part of the Great Powers to form rival groups increases both the anxiety and the importance of the smaller countries. On the one hand they are in danger of being drawn into war by their larger neighbours: on the other hand, the more evenly balanced the vast rival groups are, the greater is the advantage which may result to one group or the other from the adhesion of the smaller countries. The tendency in these countries, therefore, is towards giving to the largest possible number of men as much military training as is compatible with their continuous activity in civil life. This necessarily implies Universal Service with a very short term of training followed by repetition courses at regular intervals.

After examining the state of affairs existing in Denmark, Holland, Norway and Sweden, the author proceeds.

"The meaning of what has happened in Belgium is clear. The first step towards equality of sacrifice as regards military service has necessarily been a shortening of the term of service. From 1911 onwards the duration of active service for the infantry, the garrison artillery, the engineers will be reduced to 15 months: for the cavalry and horse artillery to 24 months: for the field artillery and the army service corps to 21 months: for the administra-
tive branch of the service to twelve and a half months. In the second, third, and sixth years after the expiration of these periods of active service men will be recalled to the colours for repetition courses, each course lasting four weeks for men of the 15 months or 21 months’ classes, six weeks for men of the 24 months’ class. Here we have a compromise between the ideas of the Conservative majority, itself not agreed on the question of military service, and the ideas of the Liberals whose chief desire was to get a scheme of some sort—however incomplete—embodied as a law. One can hardly doubt that the Belgian system will very soon be amended in the direction of service for a period of one year. The further development of democratic ideas in Belgium, a clearer sense on her part of the necessity of training not one son from each family but all her citizens for the preservation of her independence, the desire to save her economic life from being stifled, will undoubtedly lead her to adopt a system closely resembling the system of the Swiss democracy. In any case it is evident that her military system is now being developed in that direction.* All the small nations which wish to remain independent, and at the same time free from the burden of militarism, will be led to abandon the old systems of military service. They will not venture to remain unprepared to defend themselves: they will be unwilling to submit to the burden of German or French militarism: they will adopt a system of universal service which allows the civil life of the nation to flourish. And their example will have all the more effect on the great military Powers, because these small countries are called upon to play their part in a Europe where the huge military resources of rival powers are so evenly balanced that the

* The most important part, at any rate, of Jaurès’s prophecy was realized a few months later. Belgium then adopted compulsory service, no longer for only one son per family, but for the whole able-bodied population, with certain exceptions dictated by political exigencies. The most important exceptions are for clergy and clerical students, whom the Liberals and Socialists had wished to bring under the same law as the rest.—Ed,
support given to either side by the small nations will have a military value out of all proportion to their size and population.

"Another factor which will do even more to bring about a general transformation of military systems is the rivalry between England and Germany. The ruling classes in England have to bear in mind two things: the provision of an army for foreign service, and the maintenance of a Home Defence Force to safeguard the country against attack. The foreign service army must be able to garrison India and Egypt: it must also be in a condition to take part—in Europe—in a war between France and Germany. The South African war brought to light the shortcomings of the military system existing at that time, and the new Minister for War, Mr. Haldane, has set to work to improve matters. In addition to raising the standard of enlistment in the Regular Army, he organized a Reserve for the purpose of reinforcing the Expeditionary Forces and of keeping them up to strength. In order to accomplish this, he prescribed, for the newly formed Special Reserve, an obligation to which the old Militia was not subject. The Special Reserve, like the old Militia, is recruited on the voluntary system: the men, on joining, go through a period of training not exceeding six months and are recalled for repetition courses of from 21 to 28 days in the succeeding years of service. The Special Reserve is thus a true Militia composed of men who, outside of the short periods of training, lead the life of ordinary civilians. The Special Reserve differs, however, from the old Militia in that the men who join it put themselves under the obligation to serve abroad if they are called upon. They thus form, as a part of the Regular Army, an extra Reserve in addition to the Reserve formed of time-expired Regular soldiers. This Special Reserve is intended to fulfil two functions. It will furnish non-combatant units such as the Transport and Supply columns: it will also provide drafts for the combatant units. It might seem at first
sight that it would not be necessary for such a body of men to have reached—at the outbreak of war—the same standard of efficiency as the Regular Army. Such a view would be a very mistaken one. A division of the British Expeditionary Force consists of 16,000 combatants and 4000 non-combatants. If the men who, though they are called non-combatants, may at any moment find themselves in the fighting line, whose business it is to supply the fighting line with provisions and ammunition, were—to any degree—deficient in coolness, endurance, or discipline, the whole division would be involved in disaster. This Special Reserve is an integral part of the English military system, an essential element of the Expeditionary Force which will be called upon to face all possible tests in all parts of the world. As regards the supplying of drafts to the fighting troops, it is impossible to maintain that the Special Reserve will be able to discharge this duty slowly, step by step; or that the Special Reservists will have time, before the need of drafts arises, to get ready, to train, to make up for the incompleteness of a militia training. If England is ever called upon to deal with any of the emergencies for which her military institutions are being reconstructed, if she has to repress native risings on a large scale in Egypt or in India, if she has to take part in a war between France and Germany, she will have to strike hard and without delay, she will be obliged to put all her available forces into the field at once.

"General Langlois, in his recent essay on 'The British Army in a European War,' leads us to believe that it is the intention of the British military authorities to put into the field five out of the six divisions of which the British Army consists. Colonel Repington, the military correspondent of The Times, says:

The idea that we ought to keep two divisions of the Regular Army at home is absolutely inadmissible. Such a plan would leave our field army too weak to intervene decisively on the Continent, and would thus reduce the value of our friendship and the weight of our hostility.*

* We have retranslated these words from Jaurès's text.—Ed.
If France and Germany were at war, England's policy would evidently be to intervene with the least possible delay. General Langlois points out quite clearly that England's help would only be of value if it were immediately available:

Let us assume that England will put into the field five complete divisions; i.e., two army corps, equipped, armed, and organized, abundantly provided with artillery. The prompt arrival of such a force on our left flank would place the German right in a position of the greatest danger. If Germany had crossed Belgian territory to the south of Namur and Liege, such intervention on the part of England would probably bring into the field the Belgian army, which would otherwise remain immobilized inside the fortified lines of Antwerp. But our Entente with England can only be of real value to us if the British Expeditionary Force disembarks in France promptly, soon enough to take part in the great battle which, according to most military writers, will decide the fate of the campaign. This battle may begin as soon as the mobilization of the German forces is accomplished, on about the fifteenth day after the declaration of war, or perhaps sooner. If the British troops are to take part in this decisive struggle they will have to be on French soil on the fifteenth day at the latest. Their mobilization must therefore be extremely rapid—their present organization makes this possible—and their embarkation must take place immediately after mobilization.

In other words, General Langlois contends that England in order to carry out the policy which dictates her military organization will be obliged to throw the whole weight of her resources into the scale at once. The Special Reserve will therefore come into action as soon as the campaign begins. The 67,000 men composing the Special Reserve will not remain in reserve waiting to come on to the stage when the performance is over. If, as General Langlois seems to maintain, the English and French authorities are agreed that the issue of the struggle on which the whole economic future of England depends will be decided by the intervention of British troops, then it is evidently of the greatest importance to increase the efficacy of such intervention to the utmost limit, and consequently to make the greatest possible use of the Special Reserve. So we have this Special Reserve looked upon
as a prime factor in the struggle which will decide the fate of Europe and of the world.

"England, however, in her nervous unrest, is not only concerned with oversea action. There is also the question of Home Defence against invasion. To what extent is this nervous unrest justified? To what extent is it genuine? The cry of alarm is raised in the English press, whenever it is necessary—in the electioneering interest of the Conservative party—to create a panic, or when it is necessary to persuade the nation of the need either for further outlay on the army or for the adoption of that compulsory service which English people still dislike so much. The cry of alarm dies down, and the attempt to create a panic is given up when the ruling classes see that it will not be possible to increase the outlay on the army without checking the growth of the fleet or without laying a crushing burden of taxation on the country." The opponents of Universal Service argue on the one hand that its adoption would necessitate a large increase of taxation, on the other hand that the danger of invasion is an imaginary one as long as England maintains her naval superiority.

"Lord Roberts and his group, however, continue to dwell on the responsibilities which England has undertaken and the difficulties which she may at any moment have to face. If there should be simultaneous uprisings in India and in Egypt, the English garrisons and the Indian Army will not be strong enough to deal with the situation: it will be necessary to send large numbers of troops abroad: rebellion will no doubt happen at the same time as a European war, either because Germany will take advantage of a rebellion in India or Egypt in order to deal England a decisive blow, or because Egypt and India will choose for rebellion a time when England and Germany are at war. The British fleet will be obliged to spread itself all over the world: the Navy will be called upon to convoy troops, to protect merchant ships bringing to
Great Britain the supplies without which her inhabitants would starve, to safeguard the Dominions against attack. Germany will then be able to throw 100,000 or even 200,000 men into England and to strike at the heart of the country. Who can assume—now that aircraft are so rapidly developing—that a flight of aeroplanes will not alight some day on her ineffective cliffs.

"Thus we have, on the one hand the general uneasiness which pervades England, and on the other hand the great influence of Lord Roberts, working together to keep alive—in spite of the doctrines of the advocates of reliance on the Navy—the question of the defence of Great Britain against attack. As a solution of this problem Mr. Haldane has organized the Territorial Force, which would otherwise have no justification for its existence. Why such persevering efforts to bring this Force up to the establishment of 315,000 men? Why call up and train more than 250,000 men if England’s only enemy is a phantom born of the delirium of fear?

"In practice all Englishmen act on the assumption that invasion is a possibility, something to be guarded against. The only question in their eyes is whether the danger can be guarded against by the Territorial Force, or whether a National Army will have to be organized on a universal and compulsory basis. In either case—and this is for the time being, and for the purposes of my argument, the only relevant consideration—England does not demand, for the defence of her territory, a professional, barrack-trained, long service army. If universal compulsory service is introduced into England, it will certainly not be organized as it is in Germany and in France. Among Englishmen, with their traditional desire to leave young men free to devote themselves to economic activity, it will only be possible to introduce universal service if the term of service is so short as to leave the economic activity of the community unhampered. Lord Roberts and his League have no idea of putting the English people into
barracks. What they want to institute is a vast English militia."

Mr. Haldane's Territorial Army is, like many English institutions, a curious compromise. It resembles neither the partly professional armies of France or Germany nor the democratic militia of Switzerland. Men and officers are at no time segregated from the nation: they are not removed from civil life. By the law of 1907 enlistment is for a term of four years at any age between 17 and 35. The obligation into which a man enters on enlistment can be cancelled by giving three months' notice to the corps commander and by restoring the equipment in good condition. Recruits undertake to attend a certain number of drills each year, and to go into camp for a period of from eight to fifteen days. That is to say, the Territorials are in no sense professional soldiers, and their service is so arranged as not to interfere with their ordinary occupations.

"The officers are no more professional soldiers than the men. They are not even obliged to qualify by attendance at a military school. They are appointed by the Crown, on nomination by the County Association, without even being obliged to pass any preliminary examinations. They go through an examination after having taken part in two periods of camp training, and the military authorities then decide whether they are fit to retain their rank. To qualify for promotion they have to pass special tests at each step. It is thus evident that the officers, as well as the men, are essentially civilians. Thus England, in spite of her fear of a German invasion, entrusts the defence of her territory to an army which has had little or no experience of barrack life, and which remains an integral part of the nation. And General Langlois gives it as his verdict that these non-professional soldiers do extremely well at manoeuvres. The infantry especially is excellent. The cavalry is not so good, horses and men not having had enough training. As regards the artillery General Langlois
says that great improvement is necessary, but that it could easily be made more efficient by simplifying the traditional English artillery procedure." On the whole, General Langlois recognizes that the English Territorials form a force of very considerable value: and it is a noteworthy fact that this Territorial Army, backed by, at the most, one division of Regulars, is to be entrusted, should the great conflict ever come about, with the defence of England.

"General Langlois gives it as his opinion that the efficiency of the Territorials is due to certain moral and social forces, which are specially active in England. Service in the Force is voluntary: the men join of their own free will because they wish to take part in the defence of their country: and the officers are drawn from a class which has had long experience in directing and controlling men. According to this view the Territorial Force combines the strength of a popular and national movement with the strength of a tradition of authority and social discipline. The belief that such a militia system is inapplicable in other countries is open to a good deal of doubt. A people which cheerfully accepts—as the French people on the whole accepts—the burdens involved in a system of compulsory, universal, and prolonged military service would (if called upon to form a really popular army, an army whose employment for any other purpose than national defence were forbidden both by its constitution and by public opinion), show at least as much devotion and enthusiasm as Mr. Haldane's volunteers. As for the supply of officers, it will for us be a source of strength, not of weakness, to be able to draw not only on one class, but on all classes.

"It seems highly probable, on the contrary, that the English Territorial scheme will prove only a short-lived compromise. There are two courses open to England as regards her foreign and colonial policy. By following the lines so ably laid down by the advocates of peace—the
Socialists, the Labour Party, the best and most courageous members of the Radical party—England can play a decisive part in inducing Europe and the world at large to adopt a policy of peace. In that case she will grant far-reaching concessions—both political and social—to Egypt and to India, and will thus avert the revolts with which she is threatened. She will accept, she will herself propose, the abolition of the right to seize private property at sea; and by thus weakening the power of naval war she will do away with all danger of war being brought about by the economic rivalry between herself and Germany. By adopting the principle of arbitration as applicable to all international disputes, she will open up the way to progressive reduction of armaments. By such measures the economic forces both of England and of other countries will be enabled to follow their natural course: and the law of nations will easily be able so to extend its jurisdiction as to prevent industrial and mercantile rivalry from leading to fraud or violence.

"England may, on the other hand, refuse to follow this wise and beneficent policy: and in that case the half-hearted measures elaborated by Mr. Haldane for the purpose of national defence will certainly not enable her to face the dangers which she foresees in the future, national and religious uprisings in Egypt and in India, and the dreaded conflict with Germany, whose naval force, growing day by day, threatens the coasts and at any rate the imagination of England.

"Mr. Haldane's Territorial organization is one of those ingenious compromises which English statesmanship excels in creating. But it will probably not be able in the long run to withstand the varied attacks to which its complexity exposes it. If ever the danger of a world-wide war comes home to the masses of the English nation, the Territorial system as it exists will probably be swamped.

"Its critics are already pointing to the defective
military training of the officers and to the absurdly small amount of time available for the training of the men. Lord Curzon declares that most of these volunteers have not even done the fifteen drills prescribed by the law. He asserts that he knows a Northern district in which the men had averaged only ten hours outside camp, and five days inside. Most of the volunteers are quite young—from 17 to 20—and Lord Curzon, while rendering homage to their patriotism and devotion, seems to imply that their enthusiasm is tinged to some extent by the levity of youth—a passing fancy encouraged by present fashion. [Speech at Hanley, in favour of universal military service, Oct. 21st, 1910.]

Be this as it may, the number of actual recruits falls short of Mr. Haldane’s requirements. He hoped to get 315,000: less than 260,000 have joined: and there is no ground for maintaining that the numbers will increase. Measures are already being advocated for the purpose of attracting volunteers, which are quite at variance with the idea of a spontaneous, popular and national movement. It has been suggested that men who join the Territorial Force should receive an increased Old Age Pension on reaching the age of seventy. But, even if this far-off premium is effective, its very success will deprive the institution of part of its moral prestige. Again, the free national impulse (which runs rather short at present) is to be helped by pressure, direct or indirect. It is no longer sufficient to excite rivalry between different regions by publishing their recruit-lists for comparison. Nor does it now suffice (for instance) to congratulate the principality of Wales, which, after hesitations which have earned her certain criticisms, has at last decided to support the movement. It is now proposed to publish a blacklist of employers whose men do not enlist among the Territorials. Already, speaking of the 1910 manoeuvres, The Times held up certain great employers, in very clear terms, to the scorn of patriots, for having chosen to keep all their work going rather than to manifest any incon-
The Trend of Facts and Ideas.

In every district a movement should be initiated for securing the co-operation of employers. The aim would be to impress employers with a sense of pride in the service rendered to the State by those whom they employ. Those employers who failed to rise under the inspiration of the Association might fittingly figure in a black list.

This would mean moral and national terrorism put in the place of free and enthusiastic goodwill on the part of the people of the country. In order to keep their names off the black lists, employers would bring pressure to bear on their men and would play the same part as the press-gang of old. The employers, driven by fear of social and industrial ostracism, would adopt measures which would be resented by their men as being a new form of oppression. This resentment on the part of the working men would be strengthened by the system of drawing the officers exclusively from the well-to-do classes.”

“General Langlois is wrong in thinking that the aristocratic element in the English Territorial system is a lasting source of strength. If the system develops in that direction it will arouse increased distrust on the part of the working men, and will end by being merely a hybrid growth springing neither from a genuine popular feeling nor from a sound tradition of aristocracy. Many of those who still support Mr. Haldane’s scheme as being the only possible compromise in the present state of English opinion and of English finance, seem to feel that some more far-reaching system will be needed. The English military magazine, National Defence, seems afraid of the idea of

*I have here omitted half a page of Jaurès which rests upon an obvious blunder. Misreading either his own writing or a note supplied to him by his collaborators, he makes the writer (Mr. Archibald Hurd) speak of abus (abuses) where the Fortnightly actually prints clubs; and he thus credits Mr. Hurd, quite unjustly, with an attack upon workmen’s clubs in England.—Ed.
Universal Service. The writer admits that Australia and South Africa have adopted it or are likely to adopt it. He maintains, however, that they have been obliged to adopt it by the size of their territory and the sparseness of their population: universal service being the only means open to them of forming a respectably sized army and of training the men without taking them too far away from their homes. The writer, however, while opposing—at any rate for the present—the adoption of universal service in England, seems to entertain dreams of a Nation in Arms, of a possible organization of the national resources for the defence of British territory. He holds up to admiration the magnificent example of national defence shown by France at the time of the Revolution. He speaks in terms of the highest praise of the effort made by France in 1870, after the destruction of her regular army. He approves of Gambetta's action in creating provincial Committees of Defence endowed with responsibility and powers of initiative; and he would like to see something similar created in England, something more popular in character than the aristocratic County Associations instituted by Mr. Haldane.

"The effect, however, of strengthening the democratic element in the constitution of the Territorial system will be to transform it into a vast national militia. The advocates of Unionism, Imperialism and the policy of preparation for war, have no difficulty in showing that the Territorial system rests—as regards both its military and its social effects—on too rickety a foundation. They can maintain that a militia system based on universal compulsory service would be more efficient and more democratic. They can even argue with some apparent justification that such a system would do more to ensure peace, since the people of the country, being no longer able to delegate their military duty to a minority, would pay more attention to international politics. Some of the advocates of Universal Service—to judge by the language
they use—seem to look forward to this huge citizen army being used, not merely as a Home Defence Force, but also as a reserve from which reinforcements can be drawn for the Regular Army in times of need. There is no doubt a certain confusion of thought underlying this movement in favour of Universal Service. To speak frankly, I doubt whether peace is the chief consideration in the minds of Lord Curzon and his friends. They would probably not be sorry if some tremendous strain imposed on the energies of the English people were to result in one of the terrible nervous reactions which suddenly involve nations in war.

"There is something paradoxical and disquieting in this. Here is a thorough-going upholder of aristocratic privilege, one of the most aggressive of Imperialists, appealing to the English proletariat in favour of the militia system which is advocated in France, in Germany, in most European countries, by Socialists! It is noteworthy that Lord Curzon puts forward, among his arguments in favour of Universal Service, not only the necessity for National Defence, not only the need of strengthening the fibre of English policy, but also considerations involving the interests of democracy and of international peace. The ambiguous nature of such a line of argument will give England's citizen army, if it comes into existence, a curiously complex character: it also increases the prospect of a successful evolution of a military system produced by influences of very diverse nature. Our opponents—those of them especially who do not know what is going on in other countries, may fairly be asked to examine this speech of Lord Curzon's. It is part of the history of the movement which will end in the transformation of European military systems: it is a document of great importance by its very complexity and ambiguousness. It is an attempt to capture the democratic spirit for the benefit of Imperialism: but, by a just reaction, the leaders of European democracy in their struggle for military reform can draw fresh strength from the unexpected and powerful
support which English Toryism—whatever its motive may be—gives to their cause—the cause of national militias.”

It would be well if our French militarists would come out of the grooves in which they live, and open their eyes to what is going on in the world. “It would be particularly advantageous if they were to realize how strongly the evolution of military institutions in Europe will be influenced by the existence of militia systems throughout the Anglo-Saxon world, in all those free British Dominions whose experiments in political and social organization are beginning to claim the attention of other nations. When Lord Curzon, Lord Roberts and their fellow-workers of the National Service League want to show the English people what has been done elsewhere in the way of Universal Service, they do not only point to democratic countries like Norway and Switzerland: they point to the action already taken by the Australian government, to the action which is likely to be taken by the Union of South Africa. Moreover, what is now contemplated is not merely the adoption by individual Governments of military systems designed to satisfy their own needs. Attention is already being paid to the possibility of co-ordinating the military institutions of the Dominions with those of Great Britain, not so as to make them all conform to the same type, but so as to ensure the possibility of effective co-operation among them. The logical conclusion to be drawn from that evidently is, that the militia systems which Australia has already adopted, and which South Africa and Canada are likely to adopt in the near future, are looked upon as being factors of considerable value in case of war, available for service not only within their own borders but in any part of the world. It is also evident that, if the military institutions of Australia are sufficiently in harmony with English ideas to be looked upon as being an integral part of the British Imperial system of national defence, their influence on the development of military institutions in England is likely to become stronger and stronger as time goes on.
It is true that the English people has always been opposed to conscription, and that the working-classes are afraid of the army being used in labour disputes. The knowledge of what has happened in France, of the scandalous coercion of the French railwaymen, has made a deep impression on English working men.* Keir Hardie, speaking in their name at Hanley two days before Lord Curzon, declared that the danger of such a use of the army was in their eyes an insuperable obstacle to the adoption of Universal Service. Lord Curzon attempted to overcome this objection by stating that the law providing for compulsory universal service in a Territorial Army would forbid the intervention of such an army in conflicts between capital and labour.

"In any case, I repeat that England will either be obliged to lend her support to a new international policy which will do away with the nightmares of war and invasion by means of a general reduction of armaments, or she will be forced by the nature of things, by the pressure of the existing armed peace, by the fear of war with Germany, to resort to universal service. The fact that The Times supports Lord Roberts and Lord Curzon is not the only proof that their movement is a serious movement of political importance, not merely one of the fantastic sectarian agitations which are so frequent in England, and which are often only the safety-valve of faddism. Even the military reviews which still support the voluntary system, and which still believe in the possibility of developing Mr. Haldane's scheme so as to meet all requirements, are beginning to appeal to the great popular uprisings recorded in history and caused by the necessities of national defence. Everywhere, then, the tendency of military evolution is towards the adoption of militia systems."

* This strike lasted, in its different phases, from May to October, 1910. Jaurès published his book a few weeks after the strike, in December, 1910.—Ed,
In the closing paragraphs of this chapter Jaurès examines some views put forward by German writers, and concludes that even in Germany there is visible a tendency to weaken the distinction between first-line and second-line troops. There is a constant demand, on the part of the military authorities, for greater numbers of men: to give to this increased number of men continuous barrack training so as to bring them up to the standard of first-line troops would involve too great an increase in taxation: the only solution of the problem is to make a freer use of second-line troops than has hitherto been contemplated. The more this tendency develops, the more apparent it will be that too sharp a line has been drawn between first-line and second-line troops: that it is possible, by suitable methods of training, to keep reserve troops in a condition of military efficiency which will enable them to take their place side by side with first-line troops. Victory in war will rest with the nation which abandons the illusory and antiquated distinction between first-line and second-line troops; which resolves to train, and to make full use of, all its reserves; which is prepared to put into the first line of battle the entire manhood of the country.
CHAPTER XVI.

CONCLUSION.

(p. 521).

"The end brings me back to my starting-point: the great misfortune of the French democracy is its unwillingness to make up its mind. It does not venture to reorganize its army on the bold lines which are not only suggested, but demanded, by the logic of democratic principles." French military writers themselves often halt between two opinions in this matter.

Extremists (e.g. General Bonnal) wish to increase the barrack-training to three years and to stake everything on the first-line army. All, will be decided (they say) in the first great battle of the war, or at least in the one or two great battles which may follow close upon this first.

Let us repudiate this pessimistic doctrine with all our might. Let us, as democrats, refuse to believe that the final fate of three million fighting-men can be decided by the first great battle, unless there has been, in peace time, a culpable lack of preparation for the greatest eventualities. National defence, if backed up by true national feeling both before the war and during the war, cannot collapse so hopelessly as this.

But (argues a more moderate opponent like General Foch) wars are now becoming national only in the sense that they are fought for national self-interest, for trade advantages: wars are now becoming "more interested and less interesting." This, however, is an exaggeration,
to say the least. The great Franco-British war of 1792–1815 was to a great extent a war of rival interests; but it was still more a war of ideals. The British had reason to believe that they were face to face with a would-be universal empire which threatened not only their commerce, but their pride and their liberty as well; and, even so, there was a strong anti-war party in the country. The Russo-Japanese war, again, was economic; but it was far more than this.

In the heroic valour of the Japanese there was more mysticism than greed: their patriotism showed a sort of religious self-sacrifice. "No doubt, Britons and Germans are jealous, watch each other, and try to hinder each other. But it would be difficult for these passions of economic rivalry to spread so far or so deep as to create a really national war. The disproportion between the advantages procured by any particular treaty of commerce imposed by force, and the immense sacrifices which modern war involves even for the victors, would prevent a purely commercial war from becoming wholly national. Consider also the growing repugnance of many minds in all nations to violent solutions of this kind. Consider the daily-increasing will of the proletariat in every country to avoid international conflicts, and the growing certainty among them that each nation would gain more, economically, by equitable and peaceable arrangements. All these factors can have but one result; war might break out between the commercial interests of London and Hamburg, but it could not be a truly national war."

"If General Foch, and the officers whose teacher he is, will think the matter over, they will see that we have come to a critical moment for their conscience and their intellect. It is absurd and retrograde to attribute a thoroughly and essentially national character to wars kindled by the greed of rival capitalist groups. Our officers themselves must take a definite side in this great social and moral drama which the age is unrolling. They
must not only realise in their minds, but also proclaim in public, that a policy which sets two nations by the ears for the sake of Colonial competition or stock-exchange speculations, is an infamous and fatal policy. They must proclaim publicly, as officers, that troops cannot be expected to fight with the necessary dash, when they are dragged to butchery for such an ignoble traffic as this. There are only two possibilities of truly national war nowadays. If a nation which wants peace, and which proves its wish for peace—a nation which has no thought of aggression or robbery—is assailed by predatory and adventurous governments in quest of some colossal plunder or some startling diversion from their domestic difficulties, then we get a truly national war. Or, again, if a people were to carry out at home, without armed proselytism, some great social reform which should provoke the fears of neighbouring oligarchies, and should impel them to attempt to quench this revolution in blood. Then, but in no other cases, can we call a war really national."

The first point, therefore, of army reform is the diplomatic point; no war must be declared unless arbitration has first been offered; thus alone can you get that national conviction of self-defence which will make the family-man as eager a fighter as the first-line youngster.

Under these circumstances, our strategy must be as predominantly defensive as our diplomacy.

With this conviction of an entirely just cause, and with men trained from boyhood upwards in all the most scientific possibilities of defensive warfare on a great scale, we can better utilize the million reservists who, by our present system, are separated by so unnecessary a gulf from the younger men.* We must organize recruiting and mobilization on as close a territorial system as possible, so as to

* We hear from officers back from the front that, on the defensive side of present trench-warfare, the older men are doing better, if anything, than the younger.—Ed.
call out our reservists at the shortest possible notice. With these vast masses of men we can confront the invader, falling back where necessary upon carefully prepared positions in the rear, and again fresh positions behind those. Thus the enemy, always and everywhere, will have to lose heavily in attacking prepared positions, while his own communications are extending, and our main forces are massing behind to seize the first opportunity of striking heavily back. In face of a nation with self-control enough to adopt this resolute and calculated defensive, any predatory policy of adventure would run enormous risks.

If the people really apply themselves to this problem, the people will victoriously solve it. Here, if anywhere, is a truly national ideal. “The best way of protecting every region of France is to protect France herself. Our army, in order to secure full liberty for decisive manœuvres and for the victory which shall at last free us, may be obliged to abandon some part of our territory for a time. Yet this would be better, in the long run, even for the districts thus abandoned, than to cling so closely to the frontier as to lose all chance of a great victory. In a truly democratic and popular France, in which army affairs were understood by the general public, it would be possible to appeal to the highest intelligence of the nation. How are we to break the shock of the enemy's onset? We must have two millions of French citizens in the very first line; and this enormous mass must have free play to combine for attack when the time comes. As soon as our General Staff, animated by a thoroughly republican, popular, and national spirit, has understood this, then they will persuade all their fellow-citizens to let France have full liberty of manœuvre.* The enemy would then

* i.e. to abandon territory, if necessary, for a time in order to fight at better advantage in the long run. It must be remembered that the vast majority of Frenchmen, before this war, were unwilling to think of any but offensive operations.—Ed.
Conclusion.

have to move slowly and cautiously; for the country would have made full preparations against invasion; and he would therefore meet the resistance which would most embarrass him. He would then have to reckon neither with a limited resistance nor, on the other hand, with a compact and motionless resistance of our whole forces. He would find us resisting, not only in full force, but also with a suppleness of movement which would add to his difficulties as much as our vast numbers would add to them."

"We must have a new system with more elasticity and freedom and life than the present: only thus can we command the real interest of the people. We must have a system which develops all citizens better, both physically and morally; it must give us a fuller and more vigorous guarantee of national independence; it must give us firmer certainty, and a fresh pledge, of the people's will for peace. Remember that governments will be far less ready to dream of adventurous foreign policies, if the mobilization of the army is the mobilization of the nation itself. France must adopt this policy, and thus take a step forward beyond all other nations, seeing that she can do so without risk; for such a system would rather strengthen than weaken her defensive force. Then the other nations will have to follow suit. Germany in especial—whatever may be her political and social reasons for putting nearly all her force and hope into her first-line army—will be compelled, in her turn, to organize and to wield masses of soldiers no less vast than the masses manoeuvred by democratic France. She may begin by laughing at us; but, sooner or later, she will have to take us seriously; and then (as her own general Falkenhaus puts it) she will be obliged to deepen the sources of her army and to depend more seriously upon the older men. Then, Germany in turn will gain greater defensive power against invasion, and less power of aggressive militarism. This will bring to Europe a new era; it will bring hopes of justice and
peace which will help the French proletariat to understand the sense, the interest, and the necessity of our proposals. Meanwhile we labour with passion, but with perseverance, to realize this scheme; since it forms part of the vast plan of social reform which, in these days, must be in the thoughts of all good citizens, of all good Frenchmen.”

The End.
APPENDIX I.

CAPTAIN GILBERT.

In order not to delay the march of Jaurès's argument, we have thought it best to relegate to this Appendix a fuller summary of this writer's views. They will be found still more fully in the beginning of Jaurès's Chapter IV.

Gilbert protests against the assertions of the German military school that Clausewitz has seized the principles of Napoleon's strategy and made them the basis of their whole scheme of thought and action, and that their victory in 1870-71 was due to the fact that they had become the true disciples of Napoleon and had improved on his teaching. He utterly repudiates such a claim, although he expresses the most profound admiration for Clausewitz himself and lays the utmost stress on the value of his teaching, especially in its appeal to the intellect, in its exhortation to the soldier to become a thinker and a philosopher.

But he calls upon the military thinkers of France to throw off the obsession the German school of thought created by Clausewitz and to realize that, after all, the great German thinker learnt all his lessons from Napoleon; and that it is to Napoleon's teaching and example that they must look if they are to find the secret of a military system, administrative and strategic, which corresponds to the genius and capacity of the French people.

Napoleon was the inimitable Master whose lessons never grow old. He freed the army from the fetters of the old régime, the obsession of clinging to ground for its own sake, of being tied to "fortified posts." He taught rapid
concentration for a vigorous offensive, with the object of securing superiority of forces at the decisive point; and, as the necessary corollary, a highly efficient administrative machinery to provide the material which will enable the army to move easily and rapidly, with absolute security as regards its equipment, munitions and commissariat.

France was the first, says Gilbert, to discover these principles and to put them into practice through the genius of Napoleon, and it was only because she had forgotten his teaching that she failed in 1870. The one thing the French can learn from the Germans is that, even without such genius, military leaders can make up for its absence by the close study of its methods and by the complete co-ordination of their efforts for the commonweal.

Another point upon which Gilbert laid great stress and which has made a correspondingly deep impression on the military thought of France is that, (according to him), the Napoleonic system embodied and crystallized military science, once and for all, precisely in the form which is the outcome of the Revolution. It is the expression of a new world of thought, and is as incompatible with the old régime, social and political, as it is inseparable from modern conditions, which it will always dominate, however they may vary superficially. "The genius of Napoleon introduced the order and method of a strong and thoughtful mind into the volcanic and effervescent life which the Revolution had created by instinct in a form less clean-cut, less precise and consequently less vigorous. The military science created by Napoleon is therefore the very expression of the new social order, and will last as long as it lasts."

Thus, in the minds of those who accepted Gilbert’s interpretation of the Napoleonic system, the army was a product of modern times: the old divine-right monarchy and the whole social system summed up in it had lost the secret of victory and of life: antiquated forms of thought
and belief were cast aside: the conditions of the modern world were fully accepted, and the army took its proper place as a part of the modern world: moreover the army was no longer exposed to the fluctuations of opinion which keep modern society in a state of unrest: the army was based on the bedrock of the Revolution.

By the Napoleonic system men of all shades of opinion were enabled to co-operate in the new method of war based upon the principles of a purposeful offensive, and the danger of this unanimity being impaired by the recollection of party struggles was done away with. The army could not be looked upon with suspicion by democracy or by the nation at large, since it was the offspring of a system coeval with democracy, from which the greatness of the nation had arisen. And, on the other hand, the army was a powerful factor in national life because it represented the highest form of the national spirit to which the Revolution gave birth.

The duty of France is, then to summon up her energies and to organize her resources: to see in the grandeur of her recent achievements a proof that her intellectual power still exists: to make ready, diligently and confidently, for conflicts foreseen and secretly planned: to be prepared to bring to bear the masterly methods which will lead to victory in the future as they have done in the past.
APPENDIX II.

Extracts from three articles by General Percin, published in "l'Humanité" for Oct. 10, 12, and 19, 1915.

"Jaurès asked why the Government was taking no measures, in time of peace, to concentrate the 1,600,000 men of the Reserve, thus making sure of a mass of 2,000,000 men to meet any invader with irresistible force. The events of 1914 have shown that, of the 1,600,000 Reservists in question—

(1). A few more than 200,000 were used to bring the first-line regiments up to their full establishment.

(2). A few less than 400,000 were formed into Reserve Regiments.

(3). About a million remained in the dépôts, waiting their turn to replace the casualties at the front. These men at the dépôts had meanwhile no organization; there was a great lack of officers; some of the men had neither uniforms nor arms. Yet Jaurès had written, [four years before this], 'It is the duty of France to put into the first line these drilled and strong men who are furnished by the eleven classes of the Reserve. Why does our Government subtract nearly half of our active forces from the army, before the real tug of war comes—before those first battles, which (as they themselves tell us) will be decisive?'. . . . The clearness of this forecast is amazing. Certainly, it was useful to keep the first-line units up to their establishment by this stream of substitutes. But it would have been better still to have these Reservists at the front from the very beginning, grouped in organized units, which would have enabled us to confront the two
million Germans with two million Frenchmen. Then, perhaps, we should not have lost the first battle. We should, perhaps, have been able to push the success of our second battle farther than we did. . . . Once again, why did we accumulate this million in the depots, where there were no instructors to drill them, and such a lack of uniforms and rifles that a number had to be sent home again for a time? . . . Why had we not taken our precautions to meet the enemy with numbers at least equal to his own—with two million men instead of 1,300,000?"

And General Percin bears testimony to Jaurès's general clearness of vision in these matters. "The fact is that few of our contemporaries knew more of military questions than Jaurès; I do not mean, of course, details of drill and tactics, but the general principles of army organization and of warfare. None had read the classics of military science more carefully, from Langlois to Bernhardi; none could quote them more appositely; none foretold more exactly the actual events which marked the beginning of this present war."
Jean Jaurès was born at Castres, in the south of France, in 1859. He was related to Admiral Constant Jaurès, who was distinguished both as Ambassador and as Minister of Marine; but his own parents were of straitened means, and he owed much of his education to a Government Inspector who discovered his extraordinary talent and sent him to Paris. Jaurès carried all before him not only at school, but also at the Ecole Normale, where the pick of the French youth compete for future professorships. The philosopher Bergson was one of his competitors in those days. In 1883 Jaurès was appointed Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toulouse, and left this post two years later in order to enter Parliament.

He began as a Radical; but from the first he had felt a philosophical interest in Socialism, and had written a thesis for his Doctorate on this subject. In Parliament, he leaned more and more towards the Socialist party, and finally joined it in 1893. In 1898, he took a prominent part in the agitation which led to Dreyfus’s acquittal, and was among the journalists whom the Minister of War proposed to get rid of by a sudden arrest. He worked hard for the unification of the different sections of the Socialist party, which had grown up independently and suffered much from want of a common parliamentary policy. He succeeded in forming a coalition in 1899; but the centrifugal forces were still too strong, and the Socialists divided into two sections, the Parti Socialiste de France, led by Edouard Vaillant, and the Parti Socialiste
The Life of Jaurès.

Français under Jaurès and his friends. In 1904, the questions at issue between the two parties were submitted to the Internationale at the Amsterdam Congress, and unity was again attained at the price of mutual concessions. Within a short time, Jaurès became the recognized leader of the united Socialist party. His efforts prevented further scissions, and nearly all the resolutions of the Socialist Congresses, from 1905 to 1914, were from his hand. He fought for Socialist unity as hard as for International unity, yet in neither case at the cost of sacrifice of principle. In 1907, he incurred great obloquy in France by voting at the Stuttgart International Congress for the principle of national strike against unjust wars; but he very clearly guarded himself against misapprehension. If the country went to war without having offered arbitration, he would have the workmen refuse to march. But if, after offering arbitration, France were still attacked, then Jaurès left no doubt as to the Socialist's duty. On his return from the Stuttgart Congress he rendered account of his mission to a vast assembly of the party at Paris; and here he definitely approved what Bebel and Vandervelde had expressed elsewhere. "I agree with Bebel," said Jaurès, "that if a nation, under any circumstances whatever, cut itself off from the possibilities of self-defence, it would thus simply play into the hands of the governments of violence, barbarism and reaction. When Bebel and Vandervelde said this, they were simply repeating before the Internationale what we Frenchmen had said at the Congresses of Limoges and Nancy, and what I myself, in free controversy within our own party, have often urged against Hervé. . . . All this time, French and International Socialism has been studying how to defend national liberties by methods suitable to free people; let us have no more professional armies, caste-armies, officers chosen from the 'classes' and educated apart from their fellow-citizens; let us have the people themselves, the Nation in Arms, organized into their own militias and
choosing their officers; let these officers themselves be scientifically educated, democratic, and not separated from modern life. There—until the time is ripe for general disarmament—there is the form of military system which the Internationale prescribes; a form that will safeguard national independence against all external aggression, while, at home, it prevents class-aggression, or class-domination over an enslaved people. Here you have, in clear and plain form, the Socialist doctrine on the national question.” As his friend Albert Thomas said over his grave on the anniversary of his death: “Jaurès represented the purest traditions of national defence. . . . It was he who wrote: ‘a little dose of internationalism may estrange a man from patriotism, but a strong dose brings him back; a little patriotism may estrange us from internationalism, but a strong dose puts things right again.’”

Vaillant, who had differed from Jaurès on a good many points, was at one with him here. Vaillant had already brought before the French Parliament a bill for the democratic organization of the Nation in Arms, before Jaurès took the matter up. Though Jaurès had planned his bill and his book in 1907, it was not till 1910 that the former was brought in, and the latter published. In the following years, he fought uncompromisingly against the extension of service from two to three years in the French army. He was strongly opposed to French colonial expansion, and emphasized the dangers of political combinations which divided Europe into two armed camps. “He was in favour of the Anglo-French Entente, in which he welcomed a guarantee of democracy and peace; but he protested violently whenever anyone seemed to use this necessary agreement as a sword-point directed against Germany.” He took, it must be confessed, a too optimistic view of Germany; he naturally incurred the imputation of pro-Germanism; yet he has spoken on this subject more plainly than many other statesmen who had not one-tenth of his excuse for believing in German pro-
testations. As early as 1904, at the International Congress of Amsterdam, he plainly accused the German Socialists of practical impotence. "The German proletariat has shown admirable devotion at times; but there is no revolutionary tradition in its history. It did not win its Universal Suffrage on the barricades, but received it as a gift from above. . . . And, because you have no such revolutionary tradition, therefore you look askance at it in the nations which have recourse to it; so that you and your theorists have nothing but abuse and disdain for our Belgian comrades who had come into the open, at the risk of their lives, to conquer universal suffrage (hearty applause). And, just as you lack revolutionary means of action—just as you lack that force which a revolutionary tradition among your proletariat would give you—so also, as you well know, you have no parliamentary force. Even if you got a majority in the Reichstag, you are the only country in which a Socialist majority in parliament would not mean a Socialist mastery over the country; for your Parliament is but a half-Parliament, without executive power, without governmental power; its decisions are merely advisory, and the imperial authorities may reverse them at their will. . . . We expected from you, as all mankind did, that at your Dresden Congress, following upon your victory of three million votes, you would define your policy. You cried in your newspapers 'The empire is ours, the world is ours!—Unser das Reich, unser die Welt!' No, the Empire is not yet yours, since you are not even secure enough to offer hospitality to International Socialism in your own capital (applause). . . . You mask your practical impotence by taking refuge in extremist theories—in formulas of the sort that your eminent comrade Kautsky will go on spinning as long as he has breath left in his body" (applause and laughter).

Strongly as Jaurès opposed M. Delcassé's policy, he spoke plainly about German sabre-rattling; and in the last speech he ever made on French soil, as again in his
Appendix III.

final speech at Brussels, he pointed out plainly that Germany, with Austria, was steering for war. Of those who knew him best, none has ever questioned the assurance of Albert Thomas that Jaurès would have thrown himself heart and soul into the national cause during this war. He was murdered, on the night of July 31st, 1914, by a half-witted degenerate who had apparently no other reason than that he had always heard Jaurès spoken of as a pro-German and a traitor. With all his brilliant gifts, and after so many years of exceptional labour, Jaurès died a poor man. Yet he was perhaps the most hard-reading statesman since Gladstone; and his whole power of work was colossal. Those who feel most strongly the prolixity of his style must remember that he dictated his Armée Nouvelle at hours when other men, even hard-working men, would have been playing bridge or sleeping. Even in the midst of this war, an honest German Socialist like Eduard Bernstein has dared to bear public testimony to the statesman who "welded Realism and Idealism in harmonious unity," and, in particular, to this last book of his, L'Armée Nouvelle.* But perhaps the dead man himself would have desired no better epitaph than the tribute which his murder extorted from one of his most determined adversaries (Le Temps, August 2nd, 1914) "We ourselves have never ceased to combat the Editor of L'Humanité, to denounce the dangerous part he played, and to condemn his anti-militarist attitude and his blunders in foreign policy, in spite of his extreme ability and his perfect honesty. And, since his paper never spared us, we have now the right to proclaim our indignation at his murder, and to do homage to the dead man."

* Translated in the Labour Leader for August 5th, 1915.